

**LITERARY CRITICISM
IN ANCIENT INDIA**

DR. RAMARANJAN MUKHERJI

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Dr. Ramaranjan Mukherji



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To
my father
Sri Amitaranjan Mukherji
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Preface to the Second Edition

The first edition of 'Literary Criticism in Ancient India' had been out of print long back. My wife, Dr. (Mrs.) Arati Mukherji, had been insisting on publication of the second edition for a pretty long time. Sri Shyamapada Bhattacharyya, the Proprietor of the publishing concern also was pressing hard for revision of the work and making it up-to-date, so that the second edition could see light of the day in no time. Unfortunately, because of my administrative assignments, the work of making the book up-to-date could not be taken earlier, and the book had to remain out of market for several years. The inconvenience caused to the lovers of Sanskrit and students of Indian Aesthetics due to this is regretted.

In 'Literary Criticism in Ancient India', the plan followed by Mammaṭa in his 'Kāvya Prakāśa' had generally been followed, and the approach of Sanskrit Poetics to the problems of Poetic Expression, the relation between Language and Meaning, the problem of Suggestions, the Theory of Aesthetic Experience and the controversy between Intellect and Emotion had been expounded in details. While giving a second thought to the contents, it was noted that the relevance of Sanskrit Literary Theories to Modern Literature should be discussed in order to show to the modern mind that these literary theories had not become things of past, and it was possible to evaluate specimens of Modern Poetry even by applying the yard-stick of adjudication, projected by Sanskrit Theoreticians. This explains the incorporation of the last chapter entitled 'Relevance of Sanskrit Literary Theories 'to Modern Poetry' in the second edition.

Now that my interest has shifted from Indian Aesthetics to Comparative Aesthetics, I have started analysing the works of Indian Literary Critics in the light of the principles formulated by Western Aesthetics and writings of Western Aesthetes in the light of the doctrines propounded by Indian

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Aesthetics. The result of this analysis has been fantastic, because the similarity between the thought-currents, projected by Indian Aesthetics and Western Aesthetics has appeared to be amazing. The last chapter incorporated in the second edition is likely to give an idea of this amazing similarity between two thought-currents.

I am extremely grateful to the lovers of Sanskrit and general readers, who did receive the first edition of the book with affection and appreciation. I am sure the second edition, which contains analysis of some of the Western Theories also will receive the same treatment from connoisseurs and general readers.

At this moment when the second edition of the book is going to see the light of the day I offer my respectful homage to the Divine Mother, whose unfailing blessings have enabled the second edition to see light, and put on record my appreciation of the encouragement received from my wife, Mrs. Arati Mukherji, my nephew, Sri Parthasarathi Mukherji and my grandson Sri Suryadip Sarkar. After all, the atmosphere which one has in home is responsible to a great extent for successful literary pursuits. This was maintained throughout by my wife, my nephew and our domestic assistants, Sri Rajendra Giri, Sri Tapan Naskar and Smt. Sailabala Halder. Thanks are due to all of them, as also to Sri Sourendranath Banerjee, who provided secretarial assistance in preparing type-script of the new chapter. The inspiration which I drew from my students, Dr. Sudhisankar Bhattacharya, Dr. Amarnath Bhattacharya and Dr. Samir Kumar Datta, is measureless. My profound gratitude is due to them.

The book is now being released for adjudication by lovers of Sanskrit.

Ramarnan Mukherji

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ABBREVIATIONS

AP	Agnipurāṇa
ALS	Alaṃkārasarvasva
AK	Alaṃkāraustubha
AB	Abhinavabhāratī
AS	Arthaśāstra
AV	Avaloka
AVC	Aucityavicāracarcā
BP	Bhāṣāpariccheda
BHS	Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu
BS	Bhaktirasāyana
CL	Candrāloka
DR	Dasarūpaka
DL	Dhvanyāloka
EV	Ekāvali
KM	Kāvyamīmāṃsā
KL	Kāvyālaṃkāra
KD	Kāvyādarśa
KLS	Kāvyālaṃkārasūtra
KS	Kāvyānuśāsana
KK	Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa
SA	Kāvyaprakāśasaṃketa
KKK	Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā
KP	Kāvyaprakāśa
LC	Locana
MB	Mahābhāṣya
MD	Mānameyodaya
MP	Muktāphala
NS	Nāṭyaśāstra
NM	Nyāyamañjari

NK	Nyāyakusumāñjali
PR	Pradipa
PLM	Paramalaghumañjūṣā
PS	Prakāśa
PTS	Prītisandarbhā
RKL	Rudraṭakāvyaḷamkāra
RG	Rasagaṅgādhara
SD	Sāhityadarpaṇa
SK	Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa
SV	Ślokavārttika
SSP	Śabadaśaktiprakāśikā
SM	Siddhāntamuktāvalī
SP	Śṛṅgāraprakāśa
TC	Tattvacintāmaṇi
TV	Tantravārttika
TP	Tattvapradīpikā
VP	Vākyapadīya
VJ	Vakroktijīva
VL	Vāghbhaṭṭālamkāra
VB	Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa
VSM	Vaiyākaraṇasiddhānta-mañjūṣā
VV	Vṛttivārttika
VS	Vimarśinī
VVV	Vyaktivivekavyākhyānam

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LITERARY CRITICISM IN ANCIENT INDIA

CHAPTER I

THE IDEA OF POETRY

I

Introduction

In his famous work *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, the reputed critic Rājaśekhara incorporates an interesting story relating to the birth of Poetry and its marriage with Criticism. The story runs as follows :

The Goddess of learning was practising penance on the Himalayas with the desire of having a son. Pleased with her penance, Brahmā gave her a son, who was afterwards called *Kāvyapuruṣa*. Immediately after his birth, this child addressed his mother in metrical speech and introduced his own self as the supreme speech—the Eternal Verbum, which is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe, that has appearance only.¹ At this Sarasvatī became greatly pleased and granted him this boon : may thou be the progenitor of metrical compositions : may sound and sense be your body, Sanskrit your face, Prākṛta your hands, Apabhraṃśa your thighs, Paisāca your feet and a mixture of different Prākṛtas your breast : may chiselled expressions be thy speech, Rasa thy soul, metres thy hair, riddles thy sport and figures thy instruments of decoration. Then as Sarasvatī placing the child on a slab of stone, situated² close to a tree went to the heavenly Ganges to have a dip therein, the great sage Uśanā approached the baby and thinking him to be helpless took him to his own hermitage. The baby addressed the sage in metrical expressions, whereupon he was greatly astonished and praised the Goddess of learning by poetical composition in his turn also. He referred to Sarasvatī as the milch cow of fine expression : though constantly milked by poets, her store of milk shows no sign of decline, whatsoever.³ As Uśanā was the first to compose a verse, he was regarded as

Kavi. Another Kavi was Vālmīki, who conducted Sarasvatī to the hermitage of Uśanā and effected her reunion with the missing child; he, also, cursed in a verse⁴ the fowler, who pierced the she-bird into death of the pair of playing Krauñcas, and thus attained fame as *Ādikavi*. Once upon a time, while Sarasvatī was going to the celestial assembly as a judge, this child named *Kāvyapuruṣa*, persisted in following her; as he was desisted by mother, because as she pointed out, the gates of *Brahmaloka* are open only to one, who holds a permit to that effect from the supreme creator, he became angry and left the place in a hurry. This conduct of *Kāvyapuruṣa* agitated his friend Kumāra, who reported the whole thing to his mother Gaurī, and she, also, in order to prevent him created *Sāhityavidyāvadhū* as his bride and asked her to follow him. The bride had to adopt various sorts of dress and dramatic devices to captivate the mind of her lover, who was completely won over by her at the end of the journey. The pair was then married in Vatsagulma by Gāndharva from of marriage.

The *Kāvyapuruṣa* described in this episode is Poetry and his bride *Sāhityavidyā* is the principle of literary criticism, which has for its another name *Alaṃkāraśāstra*. While Kautīlya recognises four branches of learning, namely the different philosophical systems, the Vedas, the science of agriculture and Politics, Rājaśekhara mentions this additional branch, namely *Sāhityavidyā*, which is claimed to be the foremost of all the branches.⁵ The word *Sāhitya* seems to be derived from *Sahita*: when Poetry is defined as a combination of sound and sense, it is quite in the fitness of things that the science of criticism that propounds this definition is called *Sāhitya*. Rājaśekhara himself says that, this branch deals with the different types of relation existing between *śabda* and *ārtha*.⁶ Bhoja in his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* clearly mentions these different types of relation, which are denotation, intention to convey a sense, purport, restriction of meaning, mutual connection effected by expectancy, compatability and proximity, ability, combination to convey a unified sense, association, rejection of defects, acceptance of Guṇas, insertion of figures and presentation of emotional moods.⁷ This

observation of Bhoja gives us a glimpse of the different topics, dealt with in *Alaṃkāraśāstra*. The description of wedding as solemnized between Poetry and Criticism brings out their mutual interdependence and shows that neither the Art of Poetry goes without the Science of Poetry, nor does the latter thrive without the former. Criticism serves as a check to Poetry, which is unable to throw completely into winds the existing standards of criticism, and thereby helps Poetry to flourish. In fact, the value of a poetical composition is determined by its appeal to refined critics. The statement of Rājaśekhara that *Kāvyapuruṣa*, being completely captivated by *Sāhityavidyāvadhū* blindly follows her gives a succinct hint to the idea that the productive activity of an artist is subordinated to the receptive activity of the person for whom he produces. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta maintain that, the pleasures of Poetry are not for the poet, but for those who enjoy it: they assume for this purpose a man of sound aesthetic instincts, who by dint of his trained intellectual power is able to identify himself easily with the events and characters described in Poetry or presented on stage—a man, to whom the final appeal of Poetry is supposed to be made. In a similar manner the science of criticism depends for its sustenance on the Art of Poetry, as there can be no principle of literary criticism without literature itself. For this reason, Daṇḍin and Viśvanātha begin their works with salutations to the Goddess of learning, who showers favours on Poets, and Mammaṭa proceeds to sing hallelujahs to the Poet's speech straightway: this poet's speech, he says, unfolds a creation, which is unfettered by the rules of Providence,—is comprised of joy alone,—is not dependent on anything else,—and is charming on account of presentation of nine sentiments.⁸ These characteristic features of the creation of a poet's speech, Mammaṭa points out, goes to establish its superiority over that of the supreme creator. First of all, *Kavirīṭi* is not governed by the laws of nature, that go to impose restrictions on *Brahmaṣṛī*; secondly, *Kavirīṭi* is made up of unmixed bliss, inasmuch as, the appreciator of Poetry experiences nothing but joy irrespective of the nature of emotion, depicted by the Poet: *Brahmaṣṛī*, on the

other hand, is fashioned of three Gunas—*Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas*, that lead respectively to pleasure, pain and infatuation, and consequently pure joy is not experienced in it. Thirdly, *Kaviṛṣṭi* is not dependent on any extraneous factor for its manifestation; it is said that, the poet is the supreme creator, according to whose sweet will the entire creation changes and takes up fresh shapes. Thus this creation does not stand in need of material, non-intimate or instrumental causes. It is not possible for *Brahmaṛṣṭi*, however, to do away with these three types of causes: a jar is not produced without clay and potter, a piece of cloth without yarns and weaver, and so on. Fourthly, *Kaviṛṣṭi* is charming with nine *Rasas* or sentiments, namely the Erotic, the Comic, the Pathetic, the Furious, the Heroic, the Frightful, the Disgustful, the Quietistic and the Marvellous; in it the *Rasas* give nothing but delight; *Brahmaṛṣṭi*, on the other hand, is comprised of six *Rasas*—*madhura*, *amla*, *lavana*, *kaṭu*, *kaṣāya* and *tikta*, that are not uniformly pleasing. Thus it is clear that the productive activity of an artist and the receptive activity of an appreciator,—these two are mutually dependent on each other. This is corroborated by the observation of Abhinavagupta made in the introductory stanza of his *Locana* that, the essence of speech, which creates a novel world without taking the help of causal factors and makes dry and insipid universe soft and tasteful through delineation of sentiments, made by poetic faculty of the artist is identical with the combination of a poet and a critic.⁹

The concept of *Kāvya-puruṣa*, who is supposed to be an embodiment of whole literature is developed possibly on the analogy of the idea of *Veda-puruṣa*, who is described as being possessed of four horns in the shape of four forms of speech, namely *Parā*, *Paśyantī*, *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, three feet in the shape of past, present and future tenses, two heads in the form of transient and permanent sound-units, seven hands in the form of seven case-terminations; this supreme lord, it is said, fettered in breast, throat and head and fulfilling all objects of desire declares that his own self is the underlying principle of the entire universe. This proposition is rendered all the

more plausible by the statement of *Kāvya-puruṣa* that, he is nothing other than speech, of which the great creation is a *Vivarta*. The grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari opens his *Vākya-padīya* with a reference to this subtlest form of speech, that is named *Śabdabrahman*; this supreme word, which is a highly subtle and metempirical principle, he says, is the supreme reality: it is without beginning and end and lies beyond time and space, and consequently, eludes all descriptions by means of positive and negative predicates. It is further pointed out that the supreme word is the efficient, as well as the material cause of phenomenal world,—efficient, when it manifests itself in the form of *Kālaśakti*, at whose dictates all other *Kalās* act and material, because it constitutes the changeless background to the stupendous panorama of the phenomenal world.¹⁰ The very fact that critics postulate the existence of *Kāvya-puruṣa*, who bears close similarity to *Śabdabrahman* or *Veda-puruṣa* of the grammarian-philosophers goes to show the stupendous influence exercised by grammarians on critics, who develop their *Alaṃkāraśāstra* solely on the authority of *Vyākaraṇa*.

The question whether Poetry has got any real utility or not is an interesting study. Mallinātha in his commentaries quotes an observation of ancients, in which an advice to eschew Poetry is tendered.¹¹ It is pointed out that the stock-in-trade of a Poet is anything other than reality: he conducts men to dream-land of fancy, and thereby renders them incompetent to face the grim realities of ordinary world. As against this objection, the adherents of Poetry argue that, a poet seeks as much after truth as a Scientist or a Philosopher does: but whereas the scientist and the philosopher depend on such valid sources of knowledge as perception and inference, a poet relies only on his poetic intuition. The purpose of the poet, they say, is not to present truth of facts,—truth, that is found in the world of ordinary experience, but to delineate truth of probability,—truth, that is capable of leading one to the gateway of bliss. This highest truth is revealed to a poet, when his mind gets fully concentrated on depiction of a sentiment, or in other words, his poetic faculty starts functioning; and the highest Truth is nothing different

from the absolute reality, because Reality, Consciousness and Bliss are but the three aspects of the same Truth. In his *Kāvyaśūtras*, Hemacandra maintains that, a poet is as much a seer as a painter, and the faculties of realisation of truth and description are blended harmoniously in him.¹² In support of his proposition, he quotes an observation of Bhaṭṭatota, according to which, though in *Śāstra*, a simple seer is regarded as a *Kavi*, in ordinary world this term is used to signify one, who is able to describe in suitable language things revealed to his inward eye. Vision, he says, consists in an intuition, that is competent to find out hidden truth in things and moods : though from time immemorial, the *Ādikavi* is endowed with this vision, yet poetry is said to originate from him only when he starts giving a graphic description of truths, realised by him, as a result of which *Ādikāvya Rāmāyaṇa* is found.¹³ Thus, as the composition of a poet, in whom the faculty of discovering truth combines with the power of describing moods, presents the highest truth in a charming manner, the charge that, a poet takes his stand on falsehood is untenable.

II

Benefits accruing from Poetry

The animadversion of the opponents that Poetry is to be put under taboo justifies fully the attempts of most of the *Ālaṃkārikas* to enumerate the benefits that accrue from composition, as well as perusal of poetical works. The earliest writer to discuss on this topic is Bharata, according to whom the dramatic art brings relief and solace to minds, afflicted by sorrows and worries of this world, and as such is a pleasure-giving device. Bhāmaha thinks that, application to good poetry leads to proficiency in religion, riches, objects of enjoyment and salvation, as also in fine arts, and further to pleasure and fame.¹⁴ Following the footsteps of Bhāmaha, Viśvanātha maintains that, through Poetry even men of slow understanding attain easily the group of four—*Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kāma* and

Mokṣa.¹⁵ Composition and recitation of verses, sung in praise of Lord Nārāyaṇa and such other deities produce religious merits, and so Poetry in general is capable of being regarded as one leading to religious merit. Moreover, according to the Vedas, the objects of desire in their entirety are obtained in this world and the next through knowledge of one word only, and this happens, they say, because the subtlest form of word itself is the highest reality. Attainment of riches from composition as well as appreciation of Poetry is experienced in ordinary world, and wealth automatically leads to objects of enjoyment. Poetry is said to help attainment of salvation, as it renders men competent to grasp the real significance of the philosophical speculations of the *Upaniṣads*. Viśvanātha says that, the group of four is obtained with great difficulty by persons of mature intellect only through dull and insipid *Śāstras* : but the same group is obtained with ease by dullards even through pleasing *Kāvya*, and this goes to establish the superiority of the latter over the former.¹⁶ Vāmana is of opinion that, the purpose of Poetry is both seen and unseen, inasmuch as, it produces both pleasure and fame.¹⁷ In his *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* Bhoja makes an echo of the same observation.¹⁸ Dhanañjaya thinks that Poetry does not lead to *Dharma-Artha-Kāma-Mokṣa* nor to proficiency in fine arts as also to fame : what actually and mainly it produces is supreme bliss, consequential upon¹⁹ aesthetic enjoyment. Abhinavagupta subscribes to the same view ; the main purpose of Poetry, he says, is attainment of supreme bliss and this capacity differentiates it from scriptures and historical works : though Poetry leads to the group of four as also to proficiency, its chief purpose is delight. Establishing his opinion on this proposition of Abhinavagupta, Mammata proceeds to enumerate the benefits, that accrue from Poetry. These benefits, according to him are (a) fame, (b) acquisition of wealth, (c) knowledge of worldly ways, (d) destruction of inauspicious, (e) instantaneous and highest delight, and (f) attainment of advice in the charming manner of the beloved. Acquisition of fame is found in case of Kālīdāsa, who collected massive reputation by composing monumental works, and that

of riches in case of Dhāvaka, who is supposed to have amassed a great fortune by dedicating the three dramas, that are ascribed to king Haiṣa to his royal patron. In a similar manner, an illustration of destruction of evil through Poetry is afforded by the case of poet Mayūra, who is said to have been cured of leprosy by composing a collection of hundred stanzas in eulogy of the Sun-God. Poetry leads further, to knowledge of appropriate etiquettes of royal courts, that play an important part in maintaining the stream of culture. It is said that, one of the purposes of poetry is this that, it conveys advice in the manner of a beloved in the following form: 'One should act like Rāma and never like Rāvaṇa'. Word, the critics say is of three kinds: (a) that resembling a master's command (*Prabhasammita-vākya*) (b) that resembling a friend's request (*Sulṣammita-vākya*), and (c) that resembling a lady-love's speech (*Kāntāsammita-vākya*). The words of the Vedas are like those of a master: they tender advice, no doubt, but their way is the way of a master, who issues summary commands; the words of the Purāṇas are like those of a friend: they tender counsel indirectly in the way of an well-wisher, who only points out to the good and bad effects of different actions; the Vedas give prominence to enjoining words, which are incapable of being replaced by synonymns or of being arranged in a different order, while the historical and legendary works lay stress on meanings. The words of Poetry, however, are like those of the beloved; just as a lady attracts her husband first towards her by means of side-glance and deep embrace and then conveys the desired counsel in an ineffably sweet and indescribable manner and makes the husband accept it without his feeling that he is made to swallow something, similarly a Poetry draws, first of all, the minds of princes, averse to ethics towards it by depicting emotional moods, and then administers the medicine of instruction in such a way that the bitterness of the medicine is not experienced. Poetry does not directly command, but it makes the readers and spectators experience the goodness of virtuous path through identification with the focus of the poetic or dramatic situation. In it neither the sound-element is prominent

as in the Vedas, nor is the expressed sense-element so, as in the Purāṇas: here both these factors are subordinated to an unexpressed emotional mood of paramount importance, for the suggestion of which these two expend their energies. Mammata, following Abhinavagupta maintains that, these purposes are only of secondary importance, and the prime purpose of Poetry consists in attainment of instantaneous and supreme bliss, that springs from *Rasāsvāla*. *Rasa*, the critics say, is a blissful state of ego in which knowledge of all other knowables vanishes,—a transcendental state, produced from perception of Poetry. At the time of appreciation of Poetry, a connoisseur of poetic art experiences nothing but pleasure, and this, according to Mammata, constitutes the crestmark of all benefits, accruing from it. Mammata describes *Kāvya* as the creation of a poet, expert in drawing extra-ordinary and striking descriptions: the descriptions, contained in it, he says, are not of ordinary world; they are charming and attractive. In reply to the question as to how this metamorphosis of ordinary description into an extraordinary one takes place, Mammata refers to the magic power of suggestion, that is said to work behind this transformation. In a Poetry, he maintains, the process of suggestion of sentiment is of supreme importance, and sound and sense play only a subsidiary role to that suggested sentiment²⁰. These observations establish beyond doubt the contention that, Mammata regards the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*. Hemacandra considers that, the benefits that accrue from Poetry are only three in number: they are supreme bliss, springing from *Rasāsvāla*, acquisition of fame, and attainment of a counsel in the ineffably charming manner of a beloved. Of these three, instantaneous and supreme delight is of paramount importance, and it is obtained equally by a poet and a connoisseur of poetic art, while the second and the third are achieved respectively by a poet and a refined appreciator. Hemacandra says that, as acquisition of riches, knowledge of worldly ways and destruction of evil are capable of being obtained from *Śāstras* and other factors, they are not benefits, accruing from *Kāvya* alone, and so he does not include them in the list of *Kāvya*prajojanas²¹. In

support to the contention of Mammaṭa, that is shared by Hemacandra, that in a *Kāvya* sound and sense are subordinated to the function of suggestion, the latter quotes a statement of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, who in drawing the line of demarcation between the scopes of the Śāstras, the Purāṇas and the Kāvya, clearly mentions that, while in the first prominence belongs to word, and in the second that to expressed meaning, in the third prominence belongs only to that function, that is competent to effect enjoyment of *Rasa*²².

The observations of Mammaṭa and Hemacandra that, Poetry produces supreme bliss and at the same time tenders counsel in the charming manner of the beloved bring out the supreme power of Poetry to establish harmony between the good (*Śreyas*) and the pleasant (*Preyas*), that are described as irreconcilable in the *Upaniṣads*. The conflict between the Good and the Pleasant, so emphasised by the seers of the *Upaniṣads* arise only in the empirical plane : in the transcendental plane however they are identical in essence, because the Good and the Pleasant are but two aspects of the same Absolute Reality. As Poetry removes the veil of ignorance of an appreciator and conducting him to a higher plane of consciousness induces him to realise the bliss-portion of his own self, that is nothing different from Good, the so-called conflict between *Śreyas* and *Preyas* is not experienced by him : on the other hand, what he experiences is identity between the two. The power by which Poetry lifts a connoisseur of poetic art to the transcendental plane, the *Dhvani*vālin says, is nothing other than the function of *Vyañjanā* : it eliminates the idea of unpleasant from the Good, and at the same time, introduces the idea of Good into the Pleasant.

III

Poetry—what it is ?

The question of utility of Poetry leads us to a more important question of formulating a correct definition of *Kāvya*. From the very beginning of *Alaṅkāraśāstra*, attempts have been made

to propound this definition in clear-cut terms, but storm of controversy on this issue has never ceased to exist. The earliest critic to define Poetry from the standpoint of a spectator of dramatic performance is Bharata, according to whom, for a spectator of a dramatic performance, good poetry is that, which is composed of delicate and beautiful words and is easy to understand,—which is not bereft of logic and is capable of being combined with dance, and in which various emotional moods are depicted and different dramatic unities observed.²³ This definition is not definition of Poetry in gener. l, but of a particular branch, namely *Dṛśyakāvya*, and as such, does not merit consideration. The next critic Bhāmaha makes the grammatical connection of sound and sense his starting point, and defines Poetry as word and meaning taken together.²⁴ Later rhetoricians point out that this definition is competent enough to differentiate a piece of poetic creation from the Vedic texts and the historical works, because while in a work of poetic art sound and sense are of equal importance, in the Vedas and the *Itihāsas* the sound and sense-elements are of greater importance respectively. Bhāmaha himself introduces the view-point of those, who regard the sound-element as of more importance, and as such the figures belonging to sound as essential to the very existence of *Kāvya*, as also of those, according to whom, the sense-element is of prime importance, and consequentially, the figures belonging to sense confer the status of Poetry upon a combination of sound and sense, and finally gives his own judgement that, as in a work of poetic art both the sound and sense-elements are of equal importance, figures belonging to both are covetable in it.²⁵ The decision of Bhāmaha not only shows equal prominence given to language and meaning in his system, but at the same time betrays his greatest regard for the principle of embellishment, to signify which he uses the term *Vakrokti*. Bhāmaha's *Alaṅkāra* denotes the assemblage of poetic figures, like *anuprāsa*, *upamā* and the like, and *Vakrokti* refers to a strikingness of expression, that underlies all figures of speech : he thinks that, in order to constitute a poetic expression, an ordinary expression has got to deviate from its normalcy, so that it may

acquire charm, and it is this deviating strikingness of expression that is connoted by the term *Vakrokti*. Thus, *Vakrokti* is an essential principle of an *Alamkāra*, and necessarily of *Kāvya* itself.

Daṇḍin realises the difficulty of adumbrating an accurate definition of Poetry, because it depends as much on the psychological conditions of an appreciator as on the use of refined expressions and presentation of charming meanings. The same work of Poetic Art is relished in different ways by men of different dispositions, and consequently, the only answer to the question, what is Poetry is this that, one, which is relished or taken interest in as Poetry is Poetry. Considering from this point of view, the whole of a history or a biography is capable of being regarded as Poetry by a person, who relishes it as such. In his 'Defence of Poetry' P.B. Shelley correctly remarks : 'The parts of a composition may be poetical, without the composition as a whole being a poem. A single sentence may be considered as a whole, though it may be found in the midst of a series of unassimilated portions ; a single word even may be a spark of inextinguishable thought'. The definitions of Poetry, as found in treatises on *Alamkāra* impart to us only the views of their propounders as accurately as the medium of language permits, and this explains the plethora of criticisms, levelled against the definition of one by others holding different views on the subject. To obviate this difficulty, Daṇḍin, instead of formulating a definition gives us only a description of *Kāvyaśarīra*, which, according to him, is comprised of well-arranged words, expressive of an intended idea.²⁶ He uses the term *iṣṭa* to signify this desired sense, and in explaining this, his commentators say that, this is a charming idea. Although Daṇḍin recognises the necessity of a beautifying principle in *Kāvya*, he does not, like Bhāmaha, regard the individual poetic figures as the sole means of beautifying a *Kāvya*. In this connection, he introduces a dissertation on the two modes or kinds of poetic diction, that are supposed to differ widely from each other. It is said that, on the essentials of a poetic creation, the up-holders of *Vaidarbha-mārga* hold a view

that is completely different from that, followed by the champions of *Gauḍīya-mārga* : while the former prefer grace and lucidity in *Kāvya*, the latter are much in favour of grandeur and verbosity. Daṇḍin shows partiality towards *Vaidarbha-mārga*, whose essence is said to consist in employment of ten *Guṇas*, enumerated by him, and it is asserted that, a contrariety to these ten excellences is often traced in *Gauḍīya-mārga*.²⁷ He defines an *Alamkāra* as a quality that imparts beauty to a poetic creation and maintains that, some of these *Alamkāras* are competent enough to differentiate these two types of poetic diction.²⁸ This observation shows that, Daṇḍin regards a *Guṇa* and an *Alamkāra* as identical in nature, both being means of the same beautifying principle ; the only difference between them lies in the fact that, while a *Guṇa* is an *Alamkāra* peculiar to *Vaidarbha-mārga*, a poetic figure is an *Alamkāra* common to both the types of diction.

Vāmana is of opinion that, a combination of sound and sense, beautified by *Guṇa* and *Alamkāra* constitutes Poetry : the term *Kāvya*, he says, is often used figuratively to signify the idea of a simple combination of language and meaning. He thinks that, each and every association of sound and sense is incapable of being regarded as *Kāvya*, and what actually bestows the dignity of a poetic expression on an ordinary linguistic expression is the *Alamkāra*. This *Alamkāra* is not to be taken in its ordinary sense of poetic figures only : it conveys, as well, the idea of poetic beauty in general, and that constitutes the real connotation of the term²⁹. A Poetry, he further maintains, is rendered beautiful by insertion of excellences and poetic figures and rejection of defects. In this Vāmana agrees with Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin that, a beautifying principle is of prime importance in a work of poetic art. But while Bhāmaha does not introduce the concept of *Guṇas*, and Daṇḍin does not make any difference between *Guṇa* and *Alamkāra*, he attempts for the first time, to draw a clear-cut line of demarcation between these two elements. While Daṇḍin keeps himself content with furnishing a description of *Kāvyaśarīra* only, and does not probe into the factor, that constitutes the soul of a poetic creation, the question as to

what constitutes this soul is, for the first time, posed by Vāmana, who in answer to it declares *Rīti*, or diction as forming the essence of Poetry. *Rīti*, he says, is a particular arrangement of words, and the factors, that bring out this particularity in arrangement are the elements known as *Guṇas*. Vāmana speaks of three types of diction—*Vaidarbhī*, *Gauḍīyā* and *Pāñcālī*: of these three, the first one is said to be possessed of all the ten excellences, the second of only two—*Ojas* and *Kānti* and the third one of other two—*Mādhurya* and *Saukumārya*. The importance of diction is pointed out by comparing it to the lines in a painting, and by saying that, just as a picture gets itself established on a few lines, similarly Poetry also takes its stand on *Rīti*. Vāmana is in favour of adoption of *Vaidarbhī* type of diction, as it is endowed with all *Guṇas*: his advice is to eschew the other two types, as they are possessed of very few excellences. It is curious to note that, though Vāmana regards Poetry as a combination of sound and sense, beautified by *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra*, he does not recognise the essentiality of *Alaṃkāra* in *Kāvya*. He thinks that, *Guṇa* produces beauty—the beauty that entitles a particular composition to be called *Kāvya*, and *Alaṃkāra* only heightens the beauty thus produced. Thus while *Guṇa* is an essential means of embellishment in Poetry, an *Alaṃkāra* is a non-essential means, going only to heighten the beauty thus created by the *Guṇas*. The *Guṇa*, therefore, being essential for the very existence of Poetry is described as *Nitya*, implying that the *Alaṃkāra* is *Anitya*³⁰.

Regarding his views on the definition of Poetry or on the factors, whose presence converts an ordinary expression into a poetic one, Udbhaṭa leaves us in complete darkness, because his only work that has been recovered explains merely the characteristic features of a few *Alaṃkāras*. In his treatment of poetic figures Udbhaṭa closely follows the tradition of Bhāmaha, and puts much premium on a number of decorative devices, by which poetic expression is capable of being rendered attractive. Rudraṭa defines Poetry simply as an association of sound and sense, and influenced possibly by Daṇḍin and Vāmana speaks of four types of diction: *Pāñcālī*, *Lāṭīyā*, *Gauḍīyā* and *Vaidarbhī*.

Of these *Pāñcālī* is characterised by short, *Lāṭīyā* by medium and *Gauḍīyā* by long compound-words, while *Vaidarbhī* is marked by entire absence of compounds. The acceptance of compounds as the criterion of classifying *Rītis* betrays the viewpoint of Rudraṭa that diction belongs altogether to the province of words. His advice is to use such expression as is competent to bring out as much idea as is intended,—an expression, that becomes a complete unit through rejection of defects and insertion of decorative devices. He further maintains that, such words and such arrangements are to be preferred, as go to render a creation really charming.³¹ These observations of Rudraṭa show his fondness for the principle of beauty of poetic expression, but it is a pity that instead of discussing this principle in detail, he proceeds to give an elaborate and exhaustive treatment of the poetic figures, adding a good number to the old ones, treated by Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Vāmana and Udbhaṭa. Although these writers do not realise the truth that, poetic expression being a manifestation of the personality of the poet is bound to differ in each case, and as such poetic figures or modes of expression are incapable of being grouped under a few fixed heads or categories, and proceed to add new *Alaṃkāras* to the list of already existing ones, they give a good start to Poetics by underlining the importance of beauty in a poetic expression, which, they think, is added to it by *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras*, that belong only to its outward form.

Coming to Ānandavardhana, we find the emphasis shifted from the external elements of Poetry to a much more intimate factor,—from *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras*—to *Dhvani*. This learned critic, like Daṇḍin, realises the difficulties involved in formulation of a definition of Poetry, and accordingly, avoids this question carefully. In reply to the question as to what constitutes the soul of a Poetic creation, Ānandavardhana points out to the unexpressed content and opines that, manifestation of this content, alone, is sufficient enough to extend recognition as good poetry to a combination of sound and sense, although it is bereft of figures of speech and charming expressions. In explaining his doctrine, his commentator Abhinavagupta says that,

words and expressed meanings, being comprehended by all constitute the body of Poetry, and the very fact that an ordinary expression, though consisting in an association of word and expressed meaning is not regarded as a specimen of *Kāvya* goes to show that, there is a factor, other than these two, that constitutes the true essence of Poetry, and this factor, he says, is nothing other than an implicit idea. According to Ānandavardhana, a suggested sense manifests itself in any one of these three aspects: (a) in the aspect of a fact (*Vastu*), (b) in the aspect of an imaginative mood (*Alamkāra*), and (c) in the aspect of an emotional mood (*Rasa*). Although from the point of theory, he considers each of these three aspects of suggested meaning as imparting life to Poetry, his real leaning is towards *Rasadhvani*, and it is not incorrect to draw such a conclusion from his observation that, practically he regards a suggested emotional mood as the correct secret of a Poetic Art. Reasons that enable one to draw such a conclusion are furnished, firstly, by the observation, which he makes, while giving a historical note on the creation of *Kāvya*,—the observation that, history reveals *Rasadhvani* as forming the soul of a Poetic creation, inasmuch as, the *Rāmāyaṇa* is only an outward manifestation of tragic emotion, aroused in the mind of the poet, on hearing the lamentations of Krauñca, separated from its consort, and secondly, by the explanation, furnished by him of *Guṇas* and *Alamkāras*,—the explanation that, these elements are related not to sound and sense, but to emotional mood alone. In sharp contrast to the views held by writers belonging to pre-dhvani school that, *Guṇas* are *dharma*s of *śabda* and *artha*, Ānandavardhana holds that, really, they are qualities, inhering *Rasa*—the soul of a Poetry, and when one describes them as qualities belonging to sound and sense, he only says so figuratively. In Ānandavardhana, we find an attempt to hold a psychological analysis of an appreciator; as he says, the three qualities—*Mādhurya*, *Ojas* and *Prasāda*, postulated by him lies at the root of production of three types of mental states, produced from perception of Poetry, delineating different sentiments. Similarly, the poetic figures, he holds, though belonging to *śabda* and *artha*

go really to augment the beauty of the emotional mood, that creates them in its urge to manifest itself. But although, Ānandavardhana betrays his partiality for *Rasadhvani*, he takes care to maintain his original position that, *Dhvani*, in general, constitutes the soul of Poetry, and accordingly quotes copious illustrations of *Vastudhvani* and *Alamkāradhvani*, alike. The consideration, that prompts him to take this stand is possibly to grant recognition as good specimens of Poetry to descriptions of natural objects, drawn by hosts of poets, in which the revelation of *Rasa* is not so clear.³² His commentator Abhinavagupta, however, does not like to hold this double stand: he declares *Rasadhvani*, alone, as forming the soul of Poetry and maintains that, the suggestion of *Vastu* and *Alamkāra* ultimately terminates in that of *Rasa*. This assertion gives *Vastudhvani* and *Alamkāradhvani* practically the same status with that of expressive word and expressed meaning,—elements, that constitute only the means to the ultimate end—*Rasadhvani*, but the commentator tries to justify the statement that *Vastudhvani* and *Alamkāradhvani* also form the essence of a Poetic Art by saying that, when facts and figures are comprehended through the function of suggestion, they acquire inexplicable charm, and consequential superiority to *vācārtha*, that renders them fit to secure the status of the soul of Poetry.³³ Thus, in the view of Abhinavagupta, although the terms *Vastu-dhvani* and *Alamkāra-dhvani* are capable of being explained away as figurative expressions, *Dhvanitva* in the strictest sense of the term belongs to *Rasa* alone. Following the footsteps of this great commentator, all later writers show a decided partiality for *Rasadhvani*.

It is curious to note that though Abhinavagupta declares the essentiality of *Rasa* in Poetry, without which there could be no *Kāvya*, he criticises Bhaṭṭanāyaka, when the latter attempts to explain away the Prākṛta stanza: 'Bhama Dhammia' etc. as an example of manifestation of *Rasa*. Bhaṭṭanāyaka is of opinion that in the stanza under consideration, it is the realisation of Frightful sentiment that leads to cognition of the much-talked-of negation, because the religious-minded person who is afraid of the lion naturally keeps away from the grove, infested

with the mighty lion. In reply to this Abhinavagupta points out that, the Frightful sentiment is not realised by the religious-minded person, who becomes a victim to its basic feeling fear only : this Frightful sentiment, if it is realised at all, is experienced by a man of poetic sensibility alone. He further points out that, a semblance of erotic emotion is really experienced in the stanza, and maintains that, by affording recognition to *Rasa*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka practically accepts the position of the *Dhvanivādin*, the difference between the stands of the two lying in the fact that, while a *Dhvanivādin* recognises this that, the centre of gravity in a Poetic creation may lie in its material and its imagination, as much as in its emotional element, Bhaṭṭanāyaka holds that it is an emotional element that is of prime importance in Poetry. Bhaṭṭanāyaka is of opinion that, whereas in the *Śāstra*, *Śabda* predominates and in the *Ākhyāna Artha*, in the *Kāvya* both these elements are subordinated to the *Vyāpāra*. This he says, is three-fold in nature : *Abhidhā*, *Bhāvakatva Vyāpāra*, and *Bhojakatva* : *Abhidhā* presents the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhiṭāribhāvas*,—*Bhāvakatva* accomplishes generalisation of these factors as also of others,—*Bhojakatva* brings Sattvaguna into prominence and ultimately leads to manifestation of one's pure consciousness. In explaining the observation of Ruyyaka that although Bhaṭṭanāyaka affords recognition to Dhvani, he does not realise its essentiality in *Kāvya*, Jayaratha quotes a verse, ascribed to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, according to which even though Dhvani is an established entity, it is only an element and not an essence of Poetry, and maintains that, the learned critic belongs to that class of objectors, who do not deny the existence of Dhvani, but declare it as lying beyond the province of words.³⁴ In commenting upon this verse, ascribed to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta observes that, the statement of the learned critic that, *Dhvani* constitutes only an element and not an essence of Poetry relates only to fact and imaginative mood, because he himself by postulating the existence of a function known as *Bhojakatva* affords recognition to emotional mood or *Rasa*.³⁵ These interpretations of the views of

Bhaṭṭanāyaka made by ancient scholars distinctly show that according to this great critic *Rasa* is of essential importance in Poetry.

The importance of *Rasa* is recognised equally by Dhanañjaya : he is of opinion that, everything in this world whether it is delightful or detestable,—high or low,—gross or elegant,—occult or deformed,—entity or nonentity, when touched by the imagination of a poet and a man of cultivated taste becomes helpful towards realisation of *Rasa*. This *Rasa*, he thinks, is brought into comprehension through *Tātparya* or Purport, consisting in the intention of the speaker, and consequently, the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhiṭāribhāvas* stand in the same relation to *Rasa* as do the imports of individual terms to the import of the whole proposition. For this reason, the postulation of a separate function known as *Vyañjanā* in order to account for manifestation of *Rasa* is unnecessary. Dhanika maintains that the relation existing between a *Rasa* and a *Kāvya* is not that as exists between a suggestor and a suggested : it is one of *Bhāvya-Bhava-kabhāva*, or in other words, Poetry makes the emotional moods sensed. The observations of Dhanañjaya and Dhanika are sufficient to show that both of them underline the importance of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*.³⁶

Rājasekhara, influenced possibly by Vāmana, describes Poetry as a sentence possessing literary excellences and embellished by Poetic figures, but at the same time, he does not fail to bring *Rasa* into prominence. He introduces a novel topic on maturity or *Pāka* in Poetry and discusses different views on the nature of this *Pāka*. Maṅgala is of opinion that, it is a literary finish, obtained through proper combination of nouns and verbs : other scholars fail to agree with Maṅgala on this issue ; they define *Pāka* as the competency of a Poet to select suitable words and to put them in appropriate places. Avantisundarī ridicules both these views and maintains that, maturity consists in use of *Guṇa*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Rīti*, *Śabda*, *Artha* and *Bandha* in consonance with the *Rasa*, intended to be depicted by the Poet. Rājasekhara is fully in agreement with her so far as this doctrine is concerned,—a doctrine, that

reminds one of the observations of Ānandavardhana that, in a work of poetic art, words, meanings, literary excellences, poetic figures and styles have no distinct status of their own,—all of them being dependent absolutely on *Rasa*. The contradiction existing between Rājaśekhara's description of Poetry and his definition of maturity is not to be taken too seriously, because the work is more a convenient handbook on the discipline of Poets than a treatise dealing with general principles of Poetics.³⁷

The important place assigned to *Rasa* in a poetic creation retains itself in the speculations of Bhoja, whose *Sarasvatī-kaṇṭhābharāṇa* is probably a compilation based on the model of the earlier work *Agnipurāṇa*. Although Bhoja does not give any indication of his awareness of the doctrine of Dhvani, adumbrated by Ānandavardhana, he recognises the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*, and puts a great deal of emphasis on it. This is evident from the fact that, he defines Poetry as a composition, free from blemishes, endowed with literary excellences, decorated with figures of speech and overflowing with emotion. This definition is merely an expansion of the definition, propounded by the compiler of *Agnipurāṇa*, formed by addition of the element of *Rasa* to the essential characteristics mentioned in the latter, according to which, Poetry is a sentence, shining with figures, possessed of excellences and bereft of blemishes.³⁸ Bhoja, however, does not point out clearly the relation which the *Guṇas*, *Alaṃkāras* and *Doṣas* bear to *Rasa*, and Dr. S. K. De rightly observes that, 'his conception of *Rasa* bears resemblance to that of the *utpatti-vādins*'. By recognising the truth that, possession of literary excellences and poetic figures converts an ordinary expression into a poetic one, Bhoja stages a go-back to the old systems of Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin and Vāmaṇa, but at the same time by inclusion of *Rasa* in the list of differentia of Poetry he betrays unknowingly the influence exercised on him by the critics of Kāshmīra tradition, the main protagonists of which are Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. In Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa Bhoja declares Śṛṅgāra as the sole *Rasa*, but his concept of this Śṛṅgāra is completely different from its ordinary

notion, which makes it identical with the Erotic. According to him, Śṛṅgāra is the specific inherent quality of the Ego, that forms the very basis of desire. As *Rasa* is a blissful state of the Ego, each of its types is based on this inherent quality that renders *Rasāsvāda* possible.³⁹

Kṣemendra takes the essentiality of *Rasa* for granted and posits Propriety as constituting the very life of a poetic creation, that is known to depict emotions; the literary excellences and poetic figures, he says, beautify only the external form of a poetry, being acquired attributes, and the principle that enlivens all these elements is that of appropriateness.⁴⁰ In elaborating this doctrine, he further states that, a poetic figure augments the beauty of a poetic expression only when it is inserted properly in an appropriate place: in this respect it is similar to an ordinary instrument of decoration, that renders a body charming only when worn in proper place. Thus a girdle placed on neck, a necklace worn in waist, an anklet displayed in arm, a bangle arranged in foot—all these make a frame all the more ludicrous; in a similar manner, valour shown to a refugee and compassion to an enemy subject a man to criticism, instead of acquiring praise for him. Kṣemendra remarks that, the same thing happens in case of *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras* belonging to Poetry: without *Aucitya* they fail to become instruments of embellishment.⁴¹ In reply to the question as to what constitutes Propriety, he says that, that which is suited to a certain thing is called proper and its abstract notion is called Propriety. This Propriety, he continues, has application with reference to various points, such as the word and the sentence, the import of the composition, the literary excellence and poetic figure, the sentiment, the verb, the case, the gender, the number, the adjective, the prefix, the particle, the surroundings, the family, the vow, the truth, the force, the purpose, the summarisation, the intuition, the stage, the thought, the nomenclature, the benediction and such other essentials of Poetry. Although Kṣemendra mentions sentiment or *Rasa* as one of the numerous elements pervaded by propriety, a careful analysis of his work reveals his firm conviction that the test of *Aucitya* lies in

suggestion of *Rasa*. Thus the principle of Propriety, based as it is on the contention of Ānandavardhana that, there is no other circumstance which leads to the violation of *Rasa* other than impropriety, and the supreme secret of *Rasa* consists in observing the established rules of Propriety⁴²—is nothing original in itself, but the chief credit of the critic lies in the application of *Aucitya* to various points in a Poem in such a manner that, the aspiring poet realises the importance of *Rasa* and knows what is right and proper in Poetry. As Kṣemendra is mainly a writer on *Kaviśikṣā*, he furnishes profuse illustrations of *Aucitya* concerning every point, and thereby brings home to a prospective poet his thesis that, in a Poetry, words, meanings, literary excellences, poetic figures and such other elements are to be so arranged as they go to help the manifestation of *Rasa*. In his *Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa* Kṣemendra expresses his opinion that, *Camatkāra* constitutes the very life of Poet and Poetry : a composition, bereft of this element, he says, is like gold without any priceless gem to illumine it, and is as unattractive as the youth of a lady, devoid of grace. Kṣemendra speaks of ten kinds of *Camatkāra*, which are enumerated as follows : charm, which one accrues without deliberation, that for which one has to deliberate, that which pervades a whole composition, that which resides in a part of a verse, that found in words, that traced in meanings, that noticed in sound and sense, that residing in figures of speech, that existing in sentiment and that found in the story of a famous personality.⁴³ The concept of *Camatkāra* is not a novel one, because the learned Dhvanikāra and Abhinavāgupta use this expression several times in their compositions. Dr. Raghavan thinks that originally the term *Camatkāra* was an onomatopoeic word referring to the clicking sound we make with our tongue when we taste something snappy, and in course of its semantic enlargements, it came to mean a sudden fillip relating to any feeling of a pleasurable type.⁴⁴ Thus it refers to delight, that arises in the mind of an appreciator on reading a poem, and as such, comprehends all the poetical elements—*Guṇa*, *Alaṅkāra*, *Rīti*, *Vṛtti*, *Dhvani* and *Rasa*. By recognising the essentiality of *Camatkāra* or literary delight,

Kṣemendra makes a new approach to the problem of Poetry : he thinks that in order to constitute poetic expression a composition has got to be relished or enjoyed, whether this enjoyment is due to sound-effect or to depth of meaning, or to insertion of poetic figures or to depiction of moods : he is of opinion that, it is this ability to cause artistic delight that differentiates a poetic expression from an ordinary linguistic one.

Coming to Kuntaka we find the emphasis shifted from external appendages and even from the unexpressed content to the imaginative faculty of the Poet, that gives a new turn to an expression and enables it to bloom into the flower of Poetry : in the whole range of Sanskrit *Ālaṅkārikas* he is the only critic to give the creative faculty of the Poet its due share by including it in the definition of *Kāvya*,—others only mentioning it, as one of the causal factors of poetic creation. He makes Bhāmaha's conception of Poetry his starting point and defines it as a combination of sound and sense, arranged in a composition, shining with strikingness of expression, effected by the skill of the poet,—a composition that causes delight to the connoisseurs of poetic art.⁴⁵ In explaining this definition he, first of all, sets at rest all controversies, concerning the problem whether word alone constitutes Poetry or meaning alone does it, and maintains that, as the ability to cause delight is present both in language and idea, as is oil in each seed,—both are of equal importance in it. He further asserts that, in *Kāvya* sound and sense are arranged in perfect unison,—the language going to render the meaning charming and the meaning trying to make the language attractive. A piece of poetic creation in which the beauty of sound alone flatters the ear or the depth of import alone captivates the mind is not, for this reason, regarded as a specimen of good Poetry : a lofty idea, conveyed through an expression, not befitting it, Kuntaka says, is as good as dead, and in a similar manner, a beautiful expression, significant of an idea, not suiting the occasion is as hated as a disease. From this it follows that, of a number of synonymous words, the word used by the poet alone conveys the intended idea and the meaning presented by him alone causes delight by its own nature : it is

difficult to alter a word or the position of a word, without making the poet say something worse, than he does say.⁴⁶ In reply to the question as to what lies behind the harmonious blending of language and meaning, as is found in Poetry, Kuntaka points out to *Vakrokti*, which is explained as a mode of expression, to which charm is infused by the skill of the poet. Thus in the doctrine of Kuntaka, ultimate emphasis is laid on imaginative faculty of the Poet, that gives a new turn to expression and arranges language and meaning in unison. Taking this broad connotation of *Vakrokti*, Kuntaka maintains that, this *Vakrokti* constitutes the only possible embellishment or *Alaṅkāra* of Poetry.⁴⁷ As this *Alaṅkāra* is a part and parcel of Poetry, it is incapable of being removed from that; embellished sound and sense constitute *Kāvya*, and it is not proper to say that *Alaṅkāra* belongs to *Kāvya*, for this statement is likely to suggest that, it is possible for a Poetry to exist without it.⁴⁸ Kuntaka speaks of six different types or *Vakratā*, created by *Kavi-vyāpāra*: these are *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*, *pada-pūrvārdhavadakratā*, *pada-parārdhavadakratā*, *vākya-vakratā*, *prakaraṇa-vakratā* and *prabandha-vakratā*. Of these six types, the first consists in peculiar use of letters, the second in peculiar use of synonyms, conventional words, words used in their secondary meanings, attributive words, covert expressions, compounds and suffixes, roots, gender and verb and the third in peculiar use of tense, case, number, voice, person, particle and indeclinable. The fourth type of *vakratā* namely *vākya-vakratā* consists in charming presentation of *Rasa*, attractive description of *Svabhāva*, and pleasing introduction of *Alaṅkāra*: it comprehends, according to Kuntaka, the concept of individual poetic figures. The fifth and sixth types of *Vakratā* relate respectively to 'peculiarity of topic and strikingness of composition. The emphasis laid by him on *Vakratā*, of which *Rasa* is only one aspect leads the scholars to believe that Kuntaka develops an altogether new system, opposed to the doctrine of *Dhvani*: in fact, Ruyyaka categorically mentions that Kuntaka, comprehends the concept of *Dhvani* under such varieties of *Vakratā* as *upacāravakratā* and the like, and thereby, throws

open the suggestion that, he belongs to that group of scholars opposed to the theory of *Dhvani*, who like to equate *Dhvani* with *Lakṣṇā*. A careful analysis of Kuntaka's work, however, reveals him to be an out and out *Dhvanivādin*, who not only recognises the supreme importance of *Rasa* and *Svabhāva*, but at the same time realises the truth of Ānandavardhana's doctrine that, propriety constitutes the secret of all composition. For this reason while defining *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*, he expresses his opinion that, letters appropriate to the context only are to be inserted and certain sounds, though unsuited to certain situations are capable of helping the idea and *Rasa* in other situations. This reminds one of the observations of the learned *Dhvanikāra* that, such defects as unmelodiousness and the like are *anityadoṣas*, detrimental as they are to manifestation of the Erotic, but favourable to that of the Heroic, and testifies to his conviction that, such letters are to be used as are competent to bring *Rasa* into comprehension⁴⁹. Then again his observation that such alliteration to create which a poet does not stand in need of taking recourse to a strenuous effort and in which repeated letters are often changed creates a case of *varṇa-vakratā* echoes practically the doctrine of Ānandavardhana that a figure for the improvisation of which special effort is necessary on the part of the poet is not organically related to Poetic Art and that the same sound-effect is not to be continued at great length⁵⁰. In elaborating this principle of *varṇa-vinyāsa-vakratā*, Kuntaka further states that, though the poetic figure *Yamaka* is recognised as a case of one such *Vakratā*, it lacks in beauty in other respect and as such, he refrains from discussing this element in detail: here, he continues, no life, other than a strikingness of expression is cognised. This observation, which is nothing but an expansion of Ānandavardhana's thesis that, such obscure figures as *Yamaka* and the like are incapable of being related intimately to poetic art, because for their improvisation a good deal of effort is necessary on the part of the Poet, who has to search after suitable words—brings into light his idea that, other than strikingness of expression there is an entity that gives the

very life to a poetic creation⁵¹. Then again while concluding his discussion on *Viśeṣa-vakratā*, Kuntaka maintains that application of adjectives, suited to the situation render a Poetry charming, because it brings *Rasa* to a relishable state, or in other words, helps in the manifestation of emotional mood⁵². By extending recognition to *Samvṛti-vakratā*, which consists in concealment of an idea and its expression through another mode with the help of pronouns and the like in order to create charm—as one of the main types of *Vakratā*, Kuntaka accepts the principle of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta that, charm is associated with concealment, and consequently, while a touch of suggestion makes an idea charming, that of denotation makes it unattractive⁵³. Ānandavardhana mentions suggestiveness of a suffix, and following him, Kuntaka, also, enumerates *Pratyaya-vakratā* as one of the varieties of *Vakratā*: this *vakratā*, he says, consists in use of proper suffixes, as are competent to suggest the intended idea or emotion. Kuntaka thinks that of a number of synonymous words used in different gender, the one used in feminine is to be preferred, because the gender itself is charming and is able to bring *Rasa* into comprehension, even though other forms of strikingness are not there: he introduces, in this connection, the topic of *Liṅga-vakratā*, which consists in use of a gender, that suits the occasion by means of its effectiveness in suggesting the intended emotion⁵⁴. In a similar manner Kuntaka's *Kālavakratā* and *Samāhyā-vakratā* consist respectively in propriety of tense and number or in other words, in their effectiveness in suggesting the idea or emotion. With reference to *Pada-vakratā*, he says that, it is indication of an emotional mood through prefixes and indeclinables in such a way that the mood manifested flashes forth as the sole life of the expression: this statement clearly shows that he considers *Rasa* as the main end of a poetic creation.⁵⁵ It is interesting to note that, a number of verses, quoted by Ānandavardhana as examples of different types of Dhvani are cited by Kuntaka to illustrate different varieties of *Vakratā*: thus Ānandavardhana's own verse: 'tāla jānti guṇā' etc. as well as the stanza: 'snigdhasyāmala' etc. cited by Ānandavardhana as instances

of *Arthāntarasamśramitavācya dhvani* are given as examples of *Rudhi-vakratā*; the expression—'kusumasamayayugam' etc. quoted as an illustration of *Śobhasaktimūla dhvani* as an instance of *Paryāyavakratā*; and the stanza: 'gaanam ca mattameham', given as an example of *Atyantatiroṣṭlavācya dhvani* as an example of *Upacāravakratā*. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that Kuntaka proceeds to formulate the doctrine of *Vakrokti* after taking the existence of Dhvani for granted. In explaining *vastuvakratā*, he describes it as the presentation of a charming all-important natural attribute of a thing by a suitable language: another form of this *vakratā*, he says, consists in drawing a new form of an object,—a form that surpasses all worldly limits and shines, as it receives a touch of poetic intuition or that of the poet's culture and training. In support of his thesis that, a poet is competent to give a new shape to a thing, Kuntaka quotes the well-known verse: 'Apāre Kāvyaśamsāre' etc. found in the *Agnipurāṇa* and cited by Ānandavardhana. As regards *vākya-vakratā*, he maintains that, like the skill of a painter realised as something distinct from a board, colour and other ingredients, this type of *vakratā* also is something different from use of words, meanings, literary excellences and poetic figures, and is identical with the skill of the Poet. In explaining this proposition, he states that, although the skill of the Poet gives the very life to *Rasa*, *Svabhāva* and *Alaṃkāra*, yet it is essential in case of an *Alaṃkāra*, because a figure not inserted skilfully in a proper place does not cause delight to connoisseurs of poetic art: in conclusion, he maintains, further, that, the entire assemblage of *Rasa*, *Svabhāva* and *Alaṃkāra* is rendered fresh and charming when introduced properly by a dexterous poet.⁵⁶ This classification of an element introduced in Poetry into three categories betrays unmistakably the influence exercised by the three-fold classification of Dhvani into *Vastu*, *Alaṃkāra* and *Rasa*, as drawn by Ānandavardhana. Kuntaka speaks of three different types of *Svabhāva* pertaining to various beings and things, and tenders advice to adopt different ways for their presentation: thus when a rational conscious being is described, such of his natural attributes as are competent to bring perma-

nent moods to a relishable state are to be painted ; and when an animal is described, such qualities as suit its own class are to be delineated, so that they may please the refined readers by causing a suspension of disbelief.⁵⁷ An insentient being, he says, becomes a fit object of description in Poetry only when it causes charm by its capacity to awaken *Rasa*.⁵⁸ This observation reminds one of the proposition of Ānandavardhana that, in every work of poetic art there must be some human element present, however predominantly descriptive it might be of unconscious phenomena of nature, in explaining which Abhinavagupta maintains that, every thing depicted in Poetry—whether it is conscious or unconscious—is intimately related with human feeling, inasmuch as, it either excites or ensues from that. The important place assigned to *Rasa* in the system of Kuntaka is evident from his attitude to the figure *Rasavat* : he does not regard this as an *Alaṅkāra*, because the *Rasa* is awakened not for the purpose of embellishing expressed word and sense, but for its own sake, and so he maintains that, it is an *Alaṅkārya*.⁵⁹ But *Rasa* plays the greatest part in what Kuntaka calls *Prabandha-vakratā* and *Prakarana-vakratā* ; it is said that such incidents as do not bring into light the greatness of the hero, and as such are not conducive to the sentiment, intended to be depicted are to be eschewed ; and others that are not traced in the source, but are favourable to manifestation of sentiment are to be inserted : it is also asserted that, the creation of a Poet lives not by matter or plot, but by beauty imparted to it by continuous flow of *Rasa*.⁶⁰ These observations based on similar propositions of Ānandavardhana point out definitely to the idea of Kuntaka that in Poetry *Rasa* is of paramount importance. Although this learned critic evolves a new system of *Vakrokti* and gives the skill of a Poet, that works behind a poetic creation its due share, it is always emphasised that *Rasa* is the guiding principle, that prompts a Poet to insert suitable expressions and present pleasing meanings and that the test of *Vakratā* lies in *Aucitya* of the various elements with reference to *Rasa*, the depiction of which constitutes the main end of the Poet.

The problem as to whether Kuntaka accepts the essentiality

of *Rasa* in *Kāvya* or not makes an interesting study. Although he draws a difference between Poetry, describing *svabhāvasa-kumārya*, that delineating *Rasa* and that abounding in *Alaṅkāra* and thus apparently maintains that, apart from *Rasa*, *Svabhāva* and *Alaṅkāra* are capable of being presented in Poetry⁶¹, yet elsewhere he gives his opinion in favour of depiction of such *Svabhāva* as is competent to bring *Rasa* into comprehension, and gives such illustrations of Poems, abounding in figures as are characterised by manifestation of *Rasa*. Thus the stanza : 'kim tārūṇyataroh' etc. cited as an example of *Vākya-vakratā* presents the Erotic, and so do the other two stanzas : 'Asyāḥ sargavidhau' etc. and 'Uddeśo'yam sarasakadalīśrenīśobhātīśāyī' etc. These make the conclusion probable that, from the point of view of theory Kuntaka admits three elements introduced in *Kāvya*—*Svabhāva*, *Alaṅkāra* and *Rasa*, but his leaning is definitely towards the last one. In this respect he is similar to Ānandavardhana, who, though accepting in theory the existence of three types of suggested content betrays unmistakably his partiality towards the unexpressed emotional mood.

The close relation existing between *Dhvani*, *Aucitya* and *Vakratā* is noticed by Mahimabhaṭṭa whose comments throw a new light on Kuntaka's doctrine. Mahimabhaṭṭa accepts the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya* : he says that, *Rasa* constitutes the soul of a Poetic creation and on this score he is quite in agreement with Ānandavardhana. He differs from the learned Dhvani-kāra only in point of its process of comprehension : while the latter postulates a function of suggestion in order to explain its cognition, he thinks that, *Anumāna* is competent enough to bring *Rasa* into comprehension. Mahimabhaṭṭa is of opinion that *Aucitya* of *Rasa* and *Prakṛti* is the greatest *Guna*,—most essential for a *Kāvya* : absence of this *Aucitya*, on the other hand, constitutes the greatest defect and forms the basis of all flaws, that flow from it. In criticising the theory of Kuntaka, he says that, the peculiar turn given to an expression by the skill of the Poet, to which so much publicity is given by Kuntaka is capable of being resolved either into *Aucitya* or into *Dhvani*. To state more clearly Kuntaka's doctrine might mean

that *Aucitya*, which figures so largely in his treatment of *Vakrokti* constitutes the soul of Poetry or it might mean that *Dhvani* forms the essence of Poetry. No third alternative is possible, because a specimen of Poetic Art, that conforms to the principles of literary criticism cannot do without these two elements. Of these two alternatives—*Aucitya* and *Dhvani*, the special mention of the first one is unnecessary, because no opposition to *Aucitya* is ever found in real Poetry, ensouled by *Rasa*, whose secret lies in propriety. The second alternative renders the stand of Kuntaka identical with that of the *Dhvanikāra*, and in fact, for this reason, the former quotes the same passages as are cited by the latter as illustrations of *Dhvanikāvya*. This observation of Mahimabhaṭṭa is one of his great contributions to the speculations of *Alamkārasāstra*: by asserting that *Vakratā* is capable of being resolved into *Aucitya* or *Dhvani*, he shows that these three are but different aspects of *Rasa*, or to quote Dr. Raghavan, 'the more specific names for the *Camatkāra* in a certain point'.

The definition of *Kāvya*, propounded by Mammaṭa is one of the most well-known definitions. Following his predecessors Bhāmaha, Rudraṭa and Kuntaka, Mammaṭa starts with word and meaning and defines Poetry as a combination of sound and sense, free from blemishes and possessed of excellences and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures. In this definition, word and meaning conjointly form the genus of Poetry, and freedom from blemishes and possession of *Guṇas* and *Alamkāras* constitute its distinguishing features. The statement: 'sometimes devoid also of poetic figures' arouses the presumption that, in order to constitute *Kāvya*, a combination of sound and sense has normally got to be endowed with *Alamkāras*.⁶⁴ In explaining this statement, the commentator Govinda in his *Pradīpa* says that, in those specimens of Poetry in which *Rasa* is not there, the presence of poetic figures is an imperative necessity, but in those cases, in which manifestation of *Rasa* is quite clear, the figures are capable of being dispensed with: thus, he maintains, one of the essential characteristics of Poetry is not possession of poetic figures, but presence of either

a distinct figure or a depicted emotion.⁶⁵ Mammaṭa himself though not mentioning *Rasa* as a differentia of *Kāvya*, proceeds to explain *Guṇas*, *Doṣas* and *Alamkāras* not in relation to Poetry in general, but in relation to *Rasa*. Expanding the dictum of Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa defines *Guṇa* as a property of *Rasa*, the essence of *Kāvya*: it is said that a *Guṇa* directly resides in *Rasa*, invariably co-exists with it and causes its excellence without fail: thus, he says, a *Guṇa* is definable in terms of its having *Rasadharmatva*, *Rasāvyabhicāristhititva* and *Rasopakārakatva*. In this respect, he continues, a *Kāvyaguṇa* is analogous to such qualities as bravery and the like, that belong to soul and not to the body of a human being. This view is in sharp contrast to that expressed by the writers, belonging to Pre-Dhvani school, who regard a *Guṇa* as a *varṇadharmā* or an *arthadharmā*. Mammaṭa ridicules the idea of the ancients by pointing out that, through mistake they attribute a quality actually belonging to *Rasa* to *Śabda* and *Artha*: a *Guṇa* is a property of *Rasa*, and can never reside directly in *Śabda* and *Artha*. Pradīpakara points out that those who regard a *Guṇa* as a property of a letter do not adduce any decisive reason to establish their proposition: on the other hand, they say that a *Guṇa* does not belong exclusively to a *varṇa*: it belongs also to a composition. Thus acceptance of their proposition entails a violation to the law of parsimony, strict adherence to which is displayed by the doctrine of Ānandavardhana that a *Guṇa* actually belongs to *Rasa* and it is said to reside in sound, letter, sense and composition only in a secondary way.⁶⁶ In a similar manner, Mammaṭa determines the place of *Alamkāra* in relation to *Rasa*: it is said that, like a necklace adding to excellence of the soul through adornment of a part of the body, the poetic figures indirectly embellish the *Rasa* by augmenting the beauty of sound and sense, that manifest it. An *Alamkāra*, he maintains, resides directly in word and meaning and by causing excellence to these component factors causes excellence to *Rasa*, where it exists: there are some cases, however, where an *Alamkāra* does not cause any excellence to an existing *Rasa*, and yet

others, in which *Rasa* is conspicuous by its absence, and as such the *Alaṅkāra* does not embellish *Rasa*, but ends in mere strikingness of expression.⁶⁷ In drawing the line of demarcation between a *Guṇa* and an *Alaṅkāra*, Pradīpakara says : a *Guṇa* is a property of *Rasa* and as such directly resides in it,—it invariably causes excellence to *Rasa* and invariably co-exists with it ; an *Alaṅkāra*, on the other hand, causes excellence to *Rasa*, but not being its property does not directly reside in it,—it does not cause its excellence without fail and does not co-exist with it invariably. Consistently with this view of *Guṇa* and *Alaṅkāra*, Mammaṭa explains *Doṣa* in relation to *Rasa* and defines it as an attribute that detracts the principal meaning—*Rasa* of paramount importance, by standing in the way of its proper manifestation. In a specimen of Poetic art the main end of the poet lies in depiction of sentiment, which is realised properly by a real appreciator : anything that obstructs proper manifestation of *Rasa* and causes it to remain unrealised is regarded as a *Doṣa*. Thus a *Doṣa* primarily appertains to *Rasa*, but as words and meanings suggest this emotional mood it is possible to trace it in *śābala* and *artha*, also. The division of *Doṣas* into three classes : *Rasadoṣa*, *Arthadoṣa* and *Śabdadoṣa* is based on this consideration.⁶⁸

The very fact that Mammaṭa explains *Guṇas*, *Alaṅkāras* and *Doṣas* not in relation to Poetry in general, but in relation to their capacity to awaken *Rasa* goes to show that he recognises the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*. The statement that *Alaṅkāras* may exist even in those cases, where *Rasa* is absent, and there they end in mere *uktivaicitrya* is not to be taken too seriously, because it does not represent Mammaṭa's real view. He firmly believes that *Alaṅkāras* are intimately related to *Rasa* : in some cases they cause excellence to it and in others stand neutral, neither embellishing nor tarnishing the depicted emotion. For this reason, he illustrates these two cases only, and does not quote any such stanza in which *Rasa* is not there and the poetic figures create sheer charm of expression. But still he feels the necessity of mentioning such a case, in which figures end in mere strikingness of expression, at least from the theoretic

stand-point, because poets are seen composing such specimens, abounding in figures of sound and sense only in order to make a display of their craftsmanship, and critics also recognise these means of embellishment as sources of great charm. The assumption that Mammaṭa considers *Rasa* as an essential element in Poetry is rendered all the more strong by the fact that, while enumerating the benefits that accrue from Poetry, he describes attainment of impersonal pleasure, springing from aesthetic realisation as the crest-mark of all benefits. It is curious to note that, although Mammaṭa admits the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*, he does not mention it in his definition of Poetry and accepts *Citrakāvya*, which is grudgingly recognised by Ānandavardhana as a variety of Poetry.⁶⁹ Ānandavardhana regards *Citrakāvya* as the lowest type of Poetry : it is without any distinct suggested content, and as its charm lies in strikingness of sound and sense, it is merely pictorial in word or pictorial in sense. Ānandavardhana makes it clear that, although *Citrakāvya* is not fit to be recognised as Poetry, devoid as it is of the essence of a Poetic creation, yet it is admitted to the category of Poetry, because poets actually go on creating such specimens of Poetic Art in order to make a display of literary craftsmanship. As regards the first point, namely, non-mention of such a vital element as *Rasa* in the definition of Poetry, it is pointed out that *Rasa* is known through implication, inasmuch as, *Guṇas* and *Doṣas* and in most cases *Alaṅkāras* do not exist without it : it is also said that, all reference to *Rasa* is omitted, because it is an well-established fact in the poetical and critical world. As regards the second point, namely, recognition granted to pictorial Poetry as a type of *Kāvya*, it is asserted that Mammaṭa accepts it out of deference to the view of Ānandavardhana, that he follows on many points. The inclusion of *Guṇas*, *Alaṅkāras* and *Doṣas* in the definition, as also non-mention of *Rasa* in it and recognition of *Citra* as a variety of *Kāvya*—all these go to show the attempts made by Mammaṭa to reconcile the views of the learned Dhvanikāra with those of the writers belonging to pre-dhvani schools : but for these his stand has been subjected to severe criticism by later thinkers.

This definition, however, is endorsed by Jaina writers, the foremost of whom is Hemacandra. Hemacandra defines a Poetry as a combination of word and meaning, devoid of defects, possessed of literary excellences and embellished with Poetic figures.⁷⁰ Following Mammaṭa's method, he also explains *Guṇas* and *Doṣas* in relation to *Rasa* and maintains that it is not possible for them to exist without their substratum *Rasa*, showing thereby that, this essential element, though not clearly mentioned in words, is obtained through implication. While tabooing the use of such obscure figures as Yamaka and the like, that are introduced by poets only in order to exhibit their skill in handling of expression, he remarks that, these completely defeat the very purpose of Poetry, in as much as, instead of attracting the tender minds of princes, averse to a study of Śāstras towards *Kāvya*, these distract them from it: obscure figures smother *Rasa* beneath them, and so do long-drawn descriptions of rivers, mountains and oceans, and as such these are to be eschewed. In this connection he cites a verse ascribed to Lollaṭa: this verse decries attempts made by poets to describe in details rivers, hills, oceans, steeds and cities, because, as it says, such descriptions cause admiration and wonder, but does not give aesthetic delight: it also prohibits improvisation of obscure figures through sheer desire to display skill or out of deference to old tradition, because, as it puts, these figures stand in the way of realisation of *Rasa*.⁷¹ These speculations show the important place assigned to *Rasa* in *Kāvya* by Hemacandra.

Instead of presenting *Rasa* through implication, Senior Vāgbhaṭa clearly mentions it in his definition of *Kāvya*, which according to him, consists in beautiful sound and sense, embellished with literary excellences and figures and possessed of distinct diction and emotional mood.⁷² This definition unmistakably betrays the influence exercised on senior Vāgbhaṭa by Daṇḍin, Bhāmaha, Vāmana and Ānandavardhana, on the doctrines of whom Vāgbhaṭa rests his thesis. Junior Vāgbhaṭa practically quotes the definition propounded by Hemacandra, which, in its turn, is a modification of the one advanced by

Mammaṭa and says that, Poetry is comprised of a combination of sound and sense, free from faults, possessed of excellences, and often embellished with poetic figures.⁷³ Elsewhere he maintains that, word and meaning, bereft of blemishes and endowed with properties and figures constitute only the body of Poetry, and the element that gives the very life to it is *Rasa* of paramount importance. Thus, he accepts the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*, and unlike his predecessor, who recognises without question the ten *Guṇas* of Vāmana, limits them to three following Mammaṭa, leaving the presumption that, *Guṇas* are related to *Rasa*, and not to *śabda* and *artha*. Jayadeva, the author of *Candrāloka* includes all the elements in his definition of Poetry and maintains that a *Kāvya* is comprised of a sentence, devoid of *doṣas* and embellished with *Rīti*, *Guṇa*, *Lakṣaṇa*, *Alaṃkāra*, *Rasa* and *Vṛtti*.⁷⁴ As *Lakṣaṇa* is mentioned as a characteristic feature of *Kāvya*, a separate chapter is devoted to treatment of these which are not mentioned by later writers except in connection with dramaturgy. He casts a sarcastic fling at that writer (possibly Mammaṭa) who regards that, a combination of sound and sense may constitute Poetry even without poetic figures by pointing out that, such combination is bound to be bereft of appeal, implying thereby that, a poetic figure is essential to the very existence of *Kāvya*.

The essentiality of *Rasa* is admitted in unambiguous language by Viśvanātha and what remains unstated by writers belonging to the Dhvani school becomes stated in clear terms. Before stating his own definition Viśvanātha makes a trenchant attack on the standpoint of Mammaṭa, and challenges the mention of *Doṣābhāva*, *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* as differentiae of Poetry. The mention of *doṣābhāva*, he says, to start with, renders the definition propounded by Mammaṭa vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition, because it is practically impossible to steer clear of all blemishes, and even many good specimens of Poetic Art are found to be possessed of minor defects here and there. The explanation that those stanzas represent specimens of good Poetry in those portions only that are free from defects, the other portions, stained by blemishes

being ordinary expressions does not lead us anywhere, because the very notion of a *doṣa*, marring the beauty of a portion of Poetry is a wrong one : the learned Dhvanikāra, himself, maintains that, *doṣas* stand in the way of realisation of *Rasa*, and thereby mar the charm of a whole poetic creation. Equally misleading is the statement that, the particle 'nañ' in the adjective '*adṛṣṭu*' indicates the idea of slightness, and what the clause actually means is that, in order to create a poetic expression, sound and sense have got to be endowed with slight defects, because such interpretation narrows down further the scope of Poetry, making specimens of Poetic Art, absolutely free from defects illustrations of ordinary linguistic expressions. The attempt to evade the question by pointing out that, the real intention of the critic lies in this that, an association of sound and sense, free from blemishes normally constitutes poetry, but in some cases, presence of minor defects does not take the said association out of the purview of Poetry is abortive, as Viśvanātha points out, the attributes that are grudgingly admitted are not be included in a true definition, which consists of essential characteristics only. The perforations made by insects on a gem render it one of inferior type, but do not take away its generic attribute, or in other words, do not convert it into a non-gem : in a similar manner, presence of such defects as unmelodiousness and the like impairs the relish of a poetic expression, but does not transform it into an ordinary linguistic one.⁷⁵ Secondly, Viśvanātha maintains, the adjective '*Saguṇau*' mentioned in relation to '*Śabdārthau*' is a defective one. The learned Dhvanikāra, and following him, Mammaṭa assert that, *Guṇas* are properties belonging to *Rasa* and not to *Śabda* and *Artha* : consequently, the epithet '*saguṇu*' meaning : 'possessed of literary excellences' is applicable only to *Rasa*, and not to sound and sense. The explanation, furnished to justify the use of the expression by showing that, *Guṇas*, actually belonging to *Rasa* are capable of being attributed to *Śabda* and *Artha* through *Upacāra* does not help us in the present case. The critic, who defines a Poetry as a combination of sound and sense, free from blemishes

and possessed of literary excellences and poetic figures really means that the said combination depicts emotion, as otherwise, he would not have described it as endowed with *Guṇas* : and when this is the case, clear mention of *Rasa* is proper. The point that *Rasa* is obtained through implication is without any value : no body, indeed, Viśvanātha asserts, uses the expression—'land possessed of bravery' in order to convey the idea that the country is inhabited by living beings. Equally useless is the observation that, the expression '*saguṇu śabdārthau*' really refers to such sound and sense, as are competent to suggest literary excellences, because use of such word and meaning augments the beauty of a Poetic creation, but does not constitute its differentia. The arguments, advanced above, Viśvanātha continues, are sufficient to establish that similarly defective is the insertion of the epithet '*sālakṣṇārthau*' : poetic figures enhance the charm of a poetic expression, but they do not infuse the very life into it. In support of his thesis, he cites an observation of the ancients, according to which, *Śabda* and *Artha* constitute the body of Poetry and *Rasa* forms its soul : *Guṇa*, *Doṣa*, *Rīti* and *Alaṅkāra* have their parallels respectively in bravery, blindness, arrangement of limbs and such instruments of decoration, as bangles and the like,—all belonging to a human being. Viśvanātha criticises equally bitterly the view-points of Kuntaka and Ānandavardhana. *Vakrokti* of Kuntaka, he says, is nothing but a figure of speech and as such, is unable, in the light of the above observation of the ancients to establish itself as the essence of Poetry. As regards the contention of Ānandavardhana that, suggested sense in general constitutes the essence of a poetic creation, Viśvanātha maintains that, it is wrong to consider suggested fact or suggested imaginative mood as the soul of a poetic creation, because such assumption reders the definition of Poetry vitiated by the fallacy of too wide definition, in as much as, riddles, even, are characterised by cognition of a suggested fact. The stanzas, cited by Ānandavardhana, as instances of *Vastu-dhvani*, he maintains, are really illustrations of *Rasa-dhvani*, there being a touch of

emotion or semblance of emotion in all of them : it is not that a *vaṅgya-vastu* or a *vyāṅgya-alaṃkāra* bestows on them the status of Poetry. The doctrine of Vāmana that, *Rīti* constitutes the soul of poetic art is equally inadmissible, because, as has been pointed out, *Rīti* is analogous to arrangement of limbs, which is definitely something different from soul.

Thus as the theories of earlier theorists on the nature of Poetry do not stand the test of criticism, Viśvanātha proceeds to formulate his own definition of Poetry : this Poetic creation, he says, consists of a sentence, having *Rasa* for its essence.⁷⁶ In explaining this aphorism, he maintains that, *Rasa* is regarded as the soul of Poetry, because an expression that does not present *Rasa* is regarded as a specimen of ordinary linguistic expression, and not that of poetic expression. This *Rasa*, he continues, is comprehensive enough to include all such moods and feelings as are relished in the same way as *Rasa* is done, and consequently, an expression delineating a transient feeling or a semblance of emotion, also, constitutes Poetry. In consistency with his doctrine that, *Rasa* is essential to the existence of a Poetic expression, Viśvanātha explains *Guṇas*, *Alaṃkāras* and *Doṣas* not in relation to sound and sense, but in relation to *Rasa*. Thus, according to him, the literary excellences go to heighten the beauty of the delineated mood ; and so do the poetic figures : although they reside directly in sound and sense, they go to augment the beauty of the emotional mood and do not end in mere strikingness of expression. In a similar manner, the *Doṣas* or defects go to mar the charm of *Rasa* by standing in the way of its proper manifestation, and thus are intimately related to *Rasa*.⁷⁷

Kavikarṇapūra, belonging to Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava school, however fails to endorse the theory of Viśvanātha. The definition, propounded by Viśvanātha, he says, is vitiated by both the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition. Thus, while it includes within the scope of Poetry, such ordinary expressions as : 'Lord Hari is enjoying the company of milkmaids', that are depicitors of feelings, it denies the status of

Poetry to such poetic expressions as : 'This son of a barren woman with his body covered with the hair of a tortoise and head ornamented with a sky-flower is moving, holding a bow made of rabbit's horn', that are not regarded as sentences in the strictest sense of the term, because of the absence of compatability. Equally defective are the theories, adumbrated by Vāmana and Mammaṭa on the nature of a Poetry. The thesis that a Poet is one, who is expert in drawing descriptions, capable of generating impersonal pleasure, and Poetic expression is his speech, similarly competent to paint such descriptions as produce supreme bliss is not tenable, vitiated as it is by the fallacy of mutual interdependence. In reply to the question as to what then constitutes an accurate definition of *Kāvya*, Kavikarṇapūra maintains that, this is *Kavicānūrmītiḥ*, or in other words, Poetry is comprised of a creation made by a Poet's speech. In explaining the term '*Nirmītiḥ*', he observes that, this is a creation capable of generating *asāhlhāraṇa camatkāra* or super-normal pleasure, and thus connects the idea of *Camatkāra* with that of Poetry—marking thereby, the resurrection of an old concept, already in disuse. This definition, he thinks, is comprehensive enough to include such elements as *Rasa*, *Guṇa*, *Alaṃkāra* as well as *Doṣābhava*, on which great emphasis has been put by earlier critics.⁷⁷ In his eagerness to show that his own definition is not vitiated by the fallacy of mutual interdependence, he explains the term 'Poet (*Kavi*)' as a technical one, and says that a Poet is possessed of a germ in the form of a mental impression,—is endowed with imaginative faculty and at the same time is well-versed in the different branches of learning. Like Viśvanātha he explains *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras* in relation to *Rasa*, displaying, thereby, his leaning towards this essential element. Following Kavikarṇapūra, Valadeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava school, also, defines a Poetic expression as a sentence created by a Poet and asserts that, *Rasa* constitutes the very soul of such an expression, revealing, at the same time, the great influence exercised on him by Viśvanātha.

The attempt to infuse the concept of *Camatkāra* into Poetry

and to formulate its comprehensive definition on the basis of it is noticed more clearly in Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha's Rasagaṅgādhara. Jagannātha defines Poetry as an expression that presents a charming idea, and gives a beautiful analysis of the idea of charmingness.⁷⁸ That meaning, he says, is regarded as charming which forms the content of such a knowledge that generates unworldly pleasure. The generality of unworldliness is an attribute belonging to a particular species of pleasure, capable of being realised only by connoisseurs of poetic art: this unworldly or disinterested pleasure, he continues, is caused by concentration of the mind on the events and characters described in Poetry or presented on stage. At the time of perception of Poetry, the minds of appreciators become steady and free from distractions, and as a result of undivided application of their minds on the facts, presented in Poetry, they derive literary delight. Pleasure derived from knowledge of such ordinary expressions, as 'A son is born to you' or 'I shall bestow riches unto you' is not disinterested, because when such pleasure is derived, the sense of personality of the speaker is not lulled into sleep, and consequently, such expressions do not constitute poetic expressions. In his eagerness to formulate an accurate definition of *Kāvya* in the style of a Naiyāyika, Jagannātha, first of all, defines a Poetry as a linguistic composition, which brings such an idea into expression, as produce disinterested pleasure, when contemplated. This definition, however, is not perfect, because it leaves room for application of the designation Poetry to ordinary expressions, also. This happens in those cases in which an idea, presented by an ordinary expression forms along with a sense conveyed by a poetic expression the content of a single contemplation, productive of disinterested pleasure. It is said that the focus and margin together make up the field of consciousness: when a specimen of Poetic Art is appreciated in a waiting room of a railway station, the ideas suggested by that specimen remain in the focus of consciousness and those, conveyed by sentences, uttered by persons, passing in and out and talking, as also other experiences remain in the margin, The

proposition that Poetry is a linguistic composition, bringing into expression an idea, which when thought out generates unworldly pleasure—is likely to bestow the status of Poetry on ordinary sentences, also,—the ideas, conveyed by which remain in the margin of consciousness and combine along with those, lying in the focus to form the content of a single thought, leading to unworldly pleasure. For this reason Jagannātha proceeds to give a more accurate definition of *Kāvya*: this, he says, consists in such words, the generality, lying in continued contemplation of ideas, presented by which forms the determinant of a cause, productive of disinterested pleasure. The flaw pointed out in the first definition does not go to vitiate this one, because continued contemplation of meaning conveyed by ordinary linguistic expressions does not produce unworldly pleasure, and consequently, these expressions are left out of the purview of Poetry. This second definition is more specific and pointed, and as such, is a definite improvement on the first one. But a Naiyāyika like Jagannātha is not satisfied with it, because it involves quantitative complexity,—an accurate definition of Poetry being capable of enunciation with a fewer number of terms. The general principle states that, between two alternative hypotheses,—one involving complexity and the other simplicity,—the former is liable to condemnation and the latter is entitled to preference. For this reason, in conformity to the Law of Parsimony, Jagannātha adumbrates the shortest definition of Poetry; this, he says, consists in one, that is endowed with the attribute of unworldliness or disinterestedness.⁷⁹ Jagannātha anticipates the possible objection that, disinterestedness being a generality residing in disinterested pleasure, this pleasure, alone, is endowed with this generality, and a linguistic composition has nothing to do with it; as against this, he asserts that *Samatkāraṭva* or disinterestedness is an attribute belonging to a linguistic composition, as well, because the ideas, presented by this composition forms the determinant of a continued contemplation, that generates such pleasure, or in other words, an idea, presented by a poetic expression, when contemplated produces disinterested pleasure. Thus, the opinion of Jagannātha

on this issue is this that, as a poetic expression is intimately associated with disinterested pleasure, the attribute of disinterestedness is capable of being asserted of this expression, as well. The third definition differs from the first two in this respect that, while in the latter, the relation existing between a linguistic composition and disinterested pleasure is clearly expressed in words, in the former this relation is comprehended automatically through natural power belonging to words,—a power, that remains unknown by itself. Consequently, Jagannātha thinks that, the definition that, Poetry is one, endowed with the attribute of disinterestedness is the most accurate, short and simple definition of *Kāvya*.

Dr. Raghavan quotes a verse from *Camatkāra-candrikā* of Viśveśvara, protege of Simhabhūpāla (1330 A.D.): this work claims to be the first regular Poetics-treatise to make the *Camatkāra*-approach; in this verse, the author defines *Camatkāra* as a supermundane artistic delight, produced in the mind of a real appreciator on reading a poem, and maintains that, the factors that lead to this delight are seven in number,—*Guṇa*, *Rīti*, *Rasa*, *Vṛtti*, *Pāka*, *Śayyā* and *Alaṃkāra*.⁸⁰ This observation makes it clear that, the concept of *Camatkāra* is a comprehensive one, in as much as, it includes within its orbit all the elements of Poetry from *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* to *Dhvani* and *Rasa*, and that, the writers, who make a *Camatkāra* approach formulate a comprehensive definition instead of emphasising the one or other element. This is all the more true in case of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha: his definition not only gives a beautiful analysis of supermundane pleasure, produced from perception of Poetry, but includes in its comprehensiveness, all the elements recognised by earlier speculations. Thus the definition includes the idea of *Rasa*, because it is aesthetic realisation that generates this much-emphasised impersonal pleasure. *Rasa*, that exists in an appreciator's mind is peculiar in its nature: it is no doubt, a state of one's ego, but it is essentially universal and impersonal in character, being common to all persons of poetic sensibility and possessing no significance to their personal possessions and advantages. At the time of enjoyment of *Rasa*, the sense of individuality of

the reader or the spectator, as the case may be, is put into sleep and he is taken to an elevated plane of consciousness, reaching which he realises the innate identity existing between a man and a man, and consequently, he relishes *Rasa*, not in his personal capacity, but as a member of the assemblage of connoisseurs of Poetic Art. For this reason, a line of demarcation is drawn between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment: the experience of the former produces pain or pleasure, as the case may be, because the man who experiences this remains fully conscious of his individual self, while that of the latter produces nothing but pleasure, being disinterested in nature. It is because of dormancy of the individuality of an appreciator that, normal emotions, which are far from pleasant in actual experience bring about nothing but supernormal pleasure, when presented through Poetry. Thus it is clear that supermundane delight or *Camatkāra*, so emphasised by Jagannātha is intimately related to *Rasa*, which is nothing but a mental condition,—its essence lying in pleasure, dissociated from all personal interest. The definition includes as well, the idea of *Dhvani*, because the comprehension of an unexpressed content,—irrespective of the fact whether it is a *Vastu* or an *Alaṃkāra* or a *Rasa*—contributes towards enjoyment of literary relish. The importance of an implicit idea in the doctrine of Jagannātha is evident from the classification of Poetry, drawn by him, which is made on the basis of prominence and charm of this idea. It is said that, a *Guṇa* and an *Alaṃkāra* keep the mind of an appreciator concentrated on events and characters described in Poetry, and thus while, on the one hand, help the appearance of the excitants, ensuents and accessories in their generalised characters, on the other hand, lull the individuality of a perceiver into sleep, leading him, thereby, to experience supernormal disinterested pleasure, and consequently, the definition that, Poetry is a linguistic composition, bringing into expression an idea, which when thought out causes unworldly pleasure fetches in through implication the concepts of *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra*. Jagannātha, following the older theorists, speaks of ten *śabdaguṇas* and ten *arthaguṇas* of the same name, but he seems to be in agreement with the views of the *Dhvani* theorists

on the issue of the number of *Guṇas*, and he makes it abundantly clear that, these are three in number. He, however, regards these as constituting the essence of *Rasa*, and not as attributes, belonging to them, as they are supposed to be by critics, affiliated to the Dhvani school. He also, disagrees with Mammaṭa in the latter's statement that, when *mādhurya* is asserted of sound, sense or composition, it is done only in a secondary sense, because *Guṇas* are properties belonging to *Rasa* alone. Jagannātha maintains that, when the erotic or the tragic emotion is described as *madhura*, it is meant that, this emotion is endowed with an ability to convert the mind into a liquid form, and, this is so, because there is no existence of *mādhurya* apart from that of *Druti*. Thus as the quality of *mādhurya* consists in the ability to melt the mind, and, as this capacity is present equally in emotion, sound, sense and composition, so this quality is capable of being asserted of all these poetical elements, and consequently, the question of referring to *śabda*, *artha*, and *bandha* as *madhura* by an extended use of the term does not arise. And such is the case with other two *Guṇas*: *Ojas* and *Prasāda*. Jagannātha refers to *Alaṃkāras* as the sources of charm, belonging to the unexpressed content, that forms the essence of Poetry⁶¹, showing, thereby the part played by them in rendering an idea charming, and as such, capable of producing disinterested pleasure, because, the charming in Poetry is that, which gives its appreciators impersonal pleasure. Although Jagannātha gives a comprehensive definition of *Kāvya*, he puts great emphasis on *Rasa*: this is evident from his description of *Rasadhvani* as extremely beautiful—*Paramaramaṇya*—a description, that betrays his practical stand that *Rasa* is an essential element in Poetry.

After adumbrating an accurate definition of *Kāvya*, Jagannātha proceeds to launch an attack against the definitions, propounded by Mammaṭa and Viśanātha. Poetry, according to Mammaṭa, consists of a combination of sound and sense, bereft of *Doṣas* and endowed with *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras*. In criticising this definition, Jagannātha points out that, sound and sense do not form the connotation of the term 'Poetry', as there is no

evidence that can lead us to that conclusion. On the other hand, from such uses, as 'The Poetry' is being read aloud', 'the sense of the Poetry is being comprehended', 'The Poetry has been read, but the sense has not been grasped', and the like, it is clear that, expression alone forms the connotation of the term 'Poetry'. The question of trying to justify those uses by taking recourse to *Lakṣaṇā* does not arise, because there is no direct pointer to establish conclusively the proposition that, a combination of sound and sense forms the conventional meaning of the term 'Poetry'. The observations of Bhāmaha, Rudraṭa and such other critics are incapable of being regarded as such pointers, since those observations themselves form the subject of dispute. Thus the thesis of the ancients that, due to absence of any decisive proof to show whether Poetry consists of sound or of sense alone, it is proper to regard Poetry as comprised of a combination of sound and sense—is untenable. The argument that, the essence of Poetry lies in its ability to produce aesthetic delight and as this ability is present both in word and meaning, both these elements are to be regarded as forming Poetry—lands us into fresh troubles, because this wide view is likely to bring musical tones and theatrical gestures,—all endowed with this capability of conducting a mood to a relishable state—within the purview of *Kāvya*. Moreover, the proposition that, a combination of sound and sense forms Poetry leads us to a position, leaving only a choice between two equal evils. Do sound and sense conjointly form the connotation of the term 'Poetry' or do they constitute it severally? Or in other words, is the generality *Kāvyatva*—a characteristic residing in a group of *śabda* and *artha* or is it an attribute inhering in *śabda* and *artha* separately? The universal element of 'twoness' is a group-characteristic: two things conjointly form the number 'two', and it is not possible to single out one of those two objects and call it two. Thus in the case of 'twoness', we are free to use such expression as: 'This is one, and not two'. The thesis that, the universal element of Poetryness, also, is a group-characteristic allows us similar freedom to use such expressions as: 'This is a sentence of a verse, and not Poetry proper' and the like. In reality,

however, expressions of verses are identified with Poetry, and no line of demarcation is drawn between poetic expression and Poetry itself. This shows that the generality Poetryness does not meet on a common platform with the attribute 'twoness', and consequently, is not a characteristic inhering in a group. The contention that, *śabda* and *artha* severally constitute *Kāvya* is equally untenable, because it allows us liberty to regard a single verse as a specimen of two poetic creations,—the sound-element forming one Poetry and the sense-element constituting another. These considerations impel Jagannātha to regard an expression alone as the genus of Poetry,—the sense going, only, to qualify it: and this procedure, he says, is to be followed in formulating definitions of the Vedas and the Purāṇas, also.⁸²

Like Viśvanātha, Jagannātha, too, regards the mention of *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras* in the definition of Poetry improper, because, as he says, this mention renders the definition vitated by the fallacy of two narrow definition. Such expressions as: 'The orb of the moon is visible', 'The Sun has set' and the like, when uttered by messengers of heroines, pining in separation from their consorts convey a number of implicit ideas, and consequently, are regarded as specimens of best Poetry. The proposition that, possession of *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* is an essential characteristic of Poetry, however, makes these expressions samples of ordinary linguistic composition, and not those of poetic one, because there is neither any literary excellence nor any poetic figure in them. But to declare these as specimens of ordinary expression tantamounts to sheer denial of truth, since charmingness, that constitutes the essence of Poetry is conspicuously present in them. Secondly, neither *Guṇas* nor *Alaṃkāras* are marked by respective common attributes,—there being divergence of opinion among *Ālaṃkārikas* as to their nature and the exact part played by them in poetic creation. While Daṇḍin regards *Guṇas* as attributes belonging to letters. Vāmana considers them as qualities residing in both sound and sense, and Ānandavardhana recognises them as properties of *Rasa*: in a similar manner while the earlier theorists describe *Alaṃkāras* simply as elements going to beautify a Poetic creation

the writers affiliated to the Dhvani school speak of their intimate relation with *Rasa*. The number of *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras*, again, is not fixed: according to some, literary excellences are ten in number, while in the view of others, these are three; while some speaks of four poetic figures, another defines sixty of them. The elements, whose nature and number have yet to be ascertained are incapable of being regarded, Jagannātha thinks as the differentia of Poetry. Moreover, literary excellences, having their parallels in bravery and compassion are properties of soul, and in a similar manner, the poetic figures, bearing close resemblance to necklace and bangles are instruments of decoration: and as such, it is not proper to regard them as constituent parts of *Kāvya*.

The introduction of *Doṣābhāva*, Jagannātha continues, as one of the characteristic features of Poetry is another serious defect of Mammāṭa's theory, in as much as, it renders absurd the use of the expression: defective Poetry (*Duṣṭam Kāvyaṃ*), because if the combination of sound and sense, said to constitute *Kāvya* is possessed of blemishes it is not Poetry, and if it is Poetry in the strictest sense of the term, it is certainly free from blemishes. The question of justifying the use of the expression by taking recourse to *Lakṣaṇā* does not arise, because the conditions, necessary for operation of this process, of which incompatibility of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence is one,—are not fully satisfied. The attempt to justify the expression: 'defective Poetry' by saying that, a single specimen of Poetic Art is capable of being regarded as an illustration of real Poetry with reference to that portion, in which blemishes are completely absent, as also as an example of charmless Poetry with reference to that portion, in which defects are there—is misleading, because a *doṣa* mars the beauty of an entire Poetic creation and renders the whole of it defective. In this respect, a *doṣa* offers a sharp contrast to the quality of *saṃyoga*: with reference to the latter, it is possible to have such expression as: 'The tree is united with a bird on the top, but it has no conjunction with that, so far as its branches are concerned', but with reference to the former no such assertion as: 'The

Poetry possesses defects in the first half, but is completely free from these in the second half' is capable of being made. And this is so, because, while *saṃyoga* is an *avyāpyavṛtti dharma*, *doṣa* is a *vyāpyavṛtti* one : or in other words, the quality of conjunction resides only in a part of the qualified, but the attribute *doṣa* inheres in all the parts of Poetry : the former is a non-pervasive attribute,—the latter is a pervasive one. For this reason, we never experience a single linguistic composition as an illustration of ordinary expression in one portion and that of poetic one in another.

After criticising the definition of Poetry, as propounded by Mammaṭa, Jagannātha takes up the definition, as put forward by Viśvanātha and rejects it also. Viśvanātha thinks that a *Kāvya* is comprised of a sentence, having for its essence *Rasa*. Jagannātha, however, is of opinion that this thesis is vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition, since it leaves aside those types of Poetry, in which the centre of gravity lies in facts or imaginative moods. The argument that this is what is intended is unassuring, since the proposition goes against the views of earlier theorists and the tradition, established by Poets, who describe waterfalls and the like and narrate travels and others, in which there is no *Rasa*, but which are purely descriptive and ornamental. An accurate definition of *Kāvya* is to take note of cases of *Vastu-dhvani* and *Alaṃkāra-dhvani*, as well : it should not remain confined within the limits of *Rasa* alone. As regards the explanation, furnished by Viśvanātha himself that stanzas marked by manifestation of a suggested fact or an imaginative mood are regarded as specimens of poetic creations, because there exists a touch of emotion or semblance of emotion in them and this touch reveals itself to a discerning mind, Jagannātha points out that, this is not, in the least, convincing : a touch of emotion or semblance of emotion is incapable of being considered as the differentiating factor of Poetry, since it is possible to trace such touches in the expressions : 'The cow moves' and 'The deer leaps' also. And this is so, because any and every content of Poetry can be resolved into a *Vibhāva* or an *Anubhāva* or a *Vyabhicāribhāva*

of *Rasa*. These observations betray the reluctance of Jagannātha to recognise *Rasa* as the only element of Poetry : although he admits its paramount importance, he finds it necessary to accept *Vastudhvani* and *Alaṃkāradhvani* from the point of theory, at least, showing thereby, his agreement with the learned *Dhvanikāra* in point of theoretic attitude.

The ancients who regard Poetry as a combination of sound and sense find a staunch supporter in Nāgeśa, who in his commentary on *Rasagaṅgādhara* refutes the charges levelled against the definition of Mammaṭa by Jagannātha and establishes their standpoint. He points out that, just as such expressions as : 'The Poetry has been heard', 'The Poetry is being read aloud' go to prove the contention that, Poetry consists of a linguistic composition, similarly such sentences as 'The Poetry has been grasped' go to establish another opposite proposition that, Poetry is comprised of a combination of meanings. For this reason, he says, it is proper to define Poetry as an association of language and meaning, and neither as sound nor as sense, alone. The objection of Jagannātha that, acceptance of this proposition presents a dilemma, because the generality 'Poetryness' is neither a group-characteristic, nor does it inhere in sound and sense separately has no legs to stand upon : Nāgeśa maintains that, this is a group-characteristic, and such expressions as : 'The Poetry has been heard', 'The Poetry has been grasped' are to be justified by taking the help of *Lakṣaṇā* based on usage,—this function conveying the idea of sound in the first sentence and that of sense in the second. This process, he continues, is to be followed in the case of definition of the Vedas, as well. The Vedas consist of a combination of sound and sense, which forms the actual connotation of the term : in some expressions, however, through *Lakṣaṇā* it brings out the idea of sound alone, and in others that of sheer sense. That this assumption is fortunate to receive the approval of the great grammarian Pāṇini is known from the aphorism : '*Tadadhīte tadveda*', formulated by him. Moreover, Nāgeśa points out, the capability to produce poetic relish is equally present in *śabda* and *artha*, and as such, a combination of both

is to be regarded as *Kāvya*, showing thereby, that aesthetic relish or *rasāsvāda* is of prime importance in it. This analysis of the speculations of *Ālaṃkārikas* on the nature of Poetry reveals the important place assigned to *Rasa* in their theories by all writers, belonging to post-Dhvani school. Whether emphasis is placed on *Dhvanī* or on *Aucitya* or on *Vakrokti*, it is always asserted that *Rasa* is the main guiding principle of a Poet and that, no Poetic Art, worth the name can do without this essential element.

IV

Causal factors of Poetry

The first *Ālaṃkārika* to probe into the cause of Poetry is Bhāmaha. He thinks that, the most important equipment necessary for a Poet in order to compose Poetry is *Pratibhā* or Poetic Intuition: the other factors that contribute to such composition are sound knowledge of language and meaning, guidance given by persons who know what is Poetry and how to compose it and thorough acquaintance with poetical works of great artists. The next *Ālaṃkārika* to introduce this topic is Daṇḍin, whose information, however, is as meagre as that, supplied by Bhāmaha. Daṇḍin is of opinion that, inborn genius, vast and clear learning and constant practice,—these three conjointly constitute the cause of Poetic creation. At the same breath he remarks that, in some cases, absence of inborn genius is amply compensated by intense study and polishing.⁸⁵ For this reason, his advice to an intending Poet is to cultivate speech with study and effort. Rudraṭa mentions *śakti*, *vyutpatti* and *abhyāsa* as the causes conjointly working behind the creation of a charming specimen of Poetic art. In explaining the nature of *śakti*, he says that, it is that power, whereby fresh idea and appropriate language are supplied in various ways to a concentrated mind: it is because of this faculty that, a poet does not feel any difficulty in presenting ideas through suitable expressions. This faculty, he continues, is two-fold in nature: one is natural and the other is created;

of these two, the first one is better, being congenital, and the second one is inferior, being acquired subsequently through scholarship. *Vyutpatti*, Rudraṭa thinks, is the capacity to discriminate between suitable and unsuitable, acquired through knowledge of metre, grammar, arts, ways of the world, word and meaning. As every word and every meaning are capable of being introduced in Poetry, so a Poet is to take great care in selecting such words, as are appropriate to the occasion and are most suitable to bring the intended idea into expression, and thus *Vyutpatti* is virtually but another name for all-round knowledge. In support of Rudraṭa's thesis that all words can be used and ideas presented in a *Kāvya*, *Namīsādhū*, his commentator cites a verse, which brings home the heaviness of burden, imposed on a Poet, because, at it says, there is no such expression, no thought, no logic, no art, as can not form an element of Poetry.⁸⁶ These observations unmistakably point out to the belief, prevalent at the time of these critics that no expression or thought is tabooed in Poetry: only a Poet is to use them carefully. Rudraṭa does not define *Abhyāsa*, but underlines its importance by tendering advice to poets of posterity to practice as much possible under the guidance of good poets and able critics, after acquiring all-round knowledge.⁸⁷ *Vāmana* handles the subject at greater length: he speaks of two types of Poets: the disapproving (*arocakinaḥ*) and the all-approving (*satpranābhyaṣahārīṇaḥ*); of these two, the poets belonging to the first type are endowed with the power of discrimination, and as such, are capable of being corrected, while the poets of second type are indiscriminating ones, and consequently, are incapable of being converted into real Poets. *Vāmana* mentions three elements or constituents of *Kāvya*, which according to him, are the ways of the world, different branches of learning and miscellaneous. The different branches of learning, *Vāmana* continues, include the science of language, lexicons, metrics, fine arts, erotics and politics. A knowledge of all these is a necessary equipment for a Poet; the science of language helps him to determine the chaste form of words, as also to discriminate chaste words from unchaste ones: the lexicons remove his doubts concerning the

exact meanings of terms—doubts, that constitute great hindrance to composition of Poetry, and thereby help him to derive correct knowledge of imports of terms. In a similar manner, the science of metres dispells doubts of an intending Poet concerning the nature of different metres. The science concerning such fine arts as music, dance, painting etc. leads to a knowledge of these and thereby renders a poet competent to incorporate these into his creations. The subject-matter of a Poetry abounds in descriptions of passions and emotions and a knowledge of these passions and feelings, so essential to composition of Poetry is derived from the science of Erotics.⁸⁸ Similarly the plot of a Poetic Art is made knotty and attractive through application of the principles of Politics and Economics to it, and, accordingly, knowledge of these principles is an imperative necessity on the part of an intending Poet. Vāmana's miscellaneous constitutes acquaintance with poetic creations of other artists, practice to compose Poetry, attendance upon seniors, insertion and rejection of terms, Poetic faculty and concentration. Perception of poetic creations of others leads to proficiency, constant practice leads to its excellence and attendance upon scholars, well-versed in the art and science of Poetry leads to a thorough knowledge of this art of creation. In this connection, Vāmana introduces the question of *Pāka* or literary finish, and maintains that, it consists in an unshakable placing of words : so long as the mind vacillates, words are inserted or taken out ; but when the Goddess of Learning actually showers favour, they become firmly placed. He defines Poetic faculty as an impression, inherited from previous births,—an impression, that serves as the very germ of Poetry : without this Poetry is either not produced at all or if produced per force becomes ridiculous. Concentration, he says, is complete cessation of thoughts relating to worldly objects : this mental faculty of exclusive attention is an essential equipment of a Poet, because the objects of description are revealed only to his contemplative mind. Concentration, Vāmana continues, is secured by two factors—time and place : the place is solitude and the time is the fourth quarter of the night.⁸⁹

Rājaśekhara gives a fuller treatment of the subject. Before introducing his own view on the causal factor of Poetry, he quotes the opinions of Śyāmadeva and Maṅgala, two ancient authorities on the issue. Śyāmadeva considers that the equipment necessary for creation of Poetry is concentration, while Maṅgala thinks that this is uninterrupted practice. Rājaśekhara, however, is of opinion that, *Samādhi* and *Abhyāsa*, which are outward and inward faculties respectively go to strengthen the literary power or *śakti*, which alone lies at the root of creation of Poetry. This literary power, he says, generates *Pratibhā* and *Vyutpatti*, showing thereby that *Pratibhā* is something different from *śakti*, inasmuch as, the former is effected by the latter.⁹⁰ A man, endowed with literary power becomes possessed of poetic intuition, and, at the same time learns to discriminate between proper and improper elements in Poetry. Rājaśekhara defines *Pratibhā* as a faculty, that manifests to the mind sound, sense, figure, expression and other elements, necessary for application to Poetry : through it things that are not even perceived by poets are easily conceived and expressed.⁹¹ *Pratibhā*, he continues, is of two kinds : *Kārayitṛī* or creative and *Bhāvayitṛī* or appreciative. The creative faculty benefits the poet, in as much as, it presents word, meaning, language, metre and figure, necessary for composition of Poetry to the Poet.

The creative faculty, in its turn, admits of classification into three sub-types : inborn, acquired and resulting from incantation or instruction. Accordingly, Poets, also, are of three kinds : *Sārastata*, *Abhyāsika* and *Aupadeśika*.⁹² A *Sārastata* Poet is a favourite of the Goddess of learning : he is free to compose at his sweet will ; an *Abhyāsika* is a poet by practice and is limited in his ability and output ; an *Aupadeśika* is a poet by instruction and prattles some sweet nonsense. Different types of creative faculty are traced in different kinds of Poets, and so it is said that, the Poetry of one remains within his house only,—that of another moves upto the residence of his friends,—and that of a fortunate tramples upon the faces of the uncultured and cultured alike with its foot-steps in the shape of words, as if, eager to

traverse the whole universe⁹³: While others prefer a *Sārasvata* poet to others, Yāyāvariya maintains that, eminence is always preferable and that the combination of several qualities brings forth eminence. The appreciative faculty does good to the critic: it helps him to discern the effort and intention of the Poet. Thereby the tree of a Poet's creation bears fruit: otherwise, it would be barren.⁹⁴ Kālidāsa is of opinion that, the creative and critical faculties are quite distinct, and are found rarely combined in one and the same person. In support of this thesis of Kālidāsa, Rājaśekhara quotes a verse, which states that, while one is capable of composing, another is capable of listening only: a combination of excellent qualities is very rare: one type of stone produces gold—another is competent to test it only. Maṅgala speaks of two types of critics: the disapproving and the all-approving. To these Rājaśekhara adds another two types: the jealous ones and the truth-seekers. The faculty to discriminate is natural to some: to others it is the outcome of profound knowledge. The quality of all-approvingness (*satīṇābhyaṅgāhāritā*) is common to all in the beginning, but it disappears when one begins to discriminate the best from the worst by virtue of deeper study. The jealous critics are silent over the merits of others. Scholarship without jealousy is a truism. In support of this principle, Rājaśekhara cites a verse that records an imaginary conversation between a Poet and his friend, in which the Poet expresses his deep sense of disappointment for dearth of real appreciators: there is no critic, he says, who is not competent to distinguish merit and demerit, and at the same time time, is himself a good Poet. and luckily, if there is one such critic, he is not free from jealousy.⁹⁵ But a truth-seeker is very rare: he is found perhaps one in a thousand. It is said that through great fortune, a Poet comes across an appreciator competent to enjoy juxtaposition of words and expressions and experience emotional moods, presented in his creation: a specimen of Poetic art that remains confined in the mind of its creator is useless; in order to prove its worth, it has got to be proclaimed in ten quarters by the learned critics. Where exist a good number of Poetic creations, but of them only

a few get an opportunity of receiving a firm footing in the minds of critics.⁹⁶

After describing the different types of *Pratibhā*, Rājaśekhara proceeds to explain *Vyutpatti*. His predecessors define it as all-embracing knowledge, and point out that, such knowledge is imperative on the part of a Poet, who makes an attempt at writing Poetry. Rājaśekhara, however, is of opinion that, it consists in the capacity to discriminate between the proper and the improper. In reply to the question as to which among the two factors—*Pratibhā* and *Vyutpatti* is superior, Ānandavadhana says that, *Pratibhā* is more important to a Poet than *Vyutpatti* and proves his contention by citing an instance from the *Kumārāsambhavam*, where Kālidāsa describes the dalliance of Pārvatī and Śiva. This description is improper and betrays lack of *Vyutpatti* on the part of Poet, but nevertheless, the propriety of this portion is maintained admirably by the Poet's *Pratibhā*. Maṅgala, however, records a different view on this question: he maintains that, for a Poet *Vyutpatti* is more important than *Pratibhā*, and it amply compensates the weakness of a Poetic creation, springing from the creator's lack of *Pratibhā*. Rājaśekhara attempts to effect a harmony between these two divergent doctrines and argues that, a combination of both these faculties is the best—the one without the other is as undesirable and incomplete as grace without beauty or charm without loveliness.⁹⁷

It is interesting to note that, elsewhere in his work, Rājaśekhara makes mention of eight factors, that are regarded as mothers or sources of Poetry: these are peace of mind, poetic intuition, practice, devotion, participation in learned assembly, all-embracing knowledge, strong memory and courage.⁹⁸ The practical hints given by him to an aspiring Poet, as also his description of his house and daily routine reveal his partiality towards practice: he tenders advice to a poet-aspirant to compose stanzas daily in the second quarter of the day and examine those stanzas in the fourth quarter. It is said that a Poet's paraphernalia consist in a board with a piece of chalk, a casket, pen and ink, palm leaves on birch bark, leaves of palmyra, iron nails and clean mats; Rājaśekhara, however, thinks that, these are

mere accessories,—the real requisite for the composition of Poetry being *Pratibhā* alone.

In his work Rājasekhara introduces an interesting discussion on different shades of borrowing or plagiarism. In this connection he cites a verse, which states that there is no Poet, who is not a thief,—no merchant that does not steal, but he who knows how to conceal his theft flourishes without reproach. Great care, therefore, is to be taken to earn literary borrowing skilfully to one's advantage. Rājasekhara speaks of two kinds of plagiarism: one that is to be avoided and one that is to be adopted. In his opinion, a Poet is either a creator or an adopter or a coverer up or a collector. He thinks that, the greatness of a Poet depends on his capacity to discover something new in old expressions and ideas, as also in his ability to restate what is old⁹⁹. On the exact nature of literary borrowing, that is to be encouraged, Rājasekhara records the view-points of his ancients, and thereafter explains, with illustrations his own opinions.

Kṣemendra bases his *Kavikaṇṭhābharaṇa* on the model of Rājasekhara's *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, which is more a work on instruction of the aspiring Poet in the devices of the craft rather than a treatise on the principles of literary criticism. Kṣemendra speaks of two factors, that are helpful to attainment of Poetic capacity: these are divine favour and human effort.¹⁰⁰ He advises an aspiring Poet to propitiate *Sarasvatī*, who showers nectar in the form of learning, as also to contemplate upon the unchanging and formless mystic power, which is higher than the highest. Coming to the topic of human effort, he classifies scholars, intending to be initiated into the art of Poetry into three types: Pupils who can accomplish the work with little effort,—those who can be trained with difficulty,—and those who are incapable of being trained.¹⁰¹ A pupil of the first type is advised to receive instruction from a man of literature, and not from a dry logician or an insipid grammarian, because it hampers the blossoming of good poetry: he is further advised to study the science of language, metrics and specimens of poetic art, pleasant to the ear as also to cultivate a taste for discover-

ing new ideas in delightful compositions. Thus when his mind becomes fully absorbed in the emotional moods and captivated by literary excellences, it naturally gives rise to poetic capacity like a sprout.¹⁰² A pupil of the second type is instructed to peruse the works of master artists keeping an eye on historical development: he is to wait upon a great Poet and is to fill in the gaps in a verse or in a foot or in a part thereof or is to compose in metre such sentences, as do not convey ideas or is to change the words of an already composed stanza maintaining the same meaning, and all these for the sake of practice.¹⁰³ An effort to induce poetic capacity into a pupil of the third type is fruitless; as he is like a stone by nature and at the same time, is spoiled by tedious grammar or dry logic, eloquence is unable to dawn upon him even through well-employed instructions: in this respect he is comparable to an ass, that does not sing though trained, as also to a blind, who does not see the Sun though shown.¹⁰⁴ This classification of trainees into three types reveals the attitude of Kṣemendra that, a poet is not born, but is primarily made and consequently, practice is the most important causal factor of Poetry. This emphasis placed by him on practice is further corroborated by his observations on plagiarism and a Poet's code of conduct. It is said that a Poet thrives by imitating the general colour of a Poet's idea or by borrowing a word, a metrical line or even an entire composition or through his own faculty, acquired by effort: these means render a beginner ultimately into a feeder to the whole poet-world.¹⁰⁵ To one who has acquired the gift of Poetry, Kṣemendra delivers a number of good counsels. Such a person should possess discernment, be devoted to practice, be interested in searching new expressions and ideas and should never get tired of work. He should read the auxiliary sciences of Poetry and a number of great poems and historical works and should study paintings and leaf-cuttings. He should be persistent in the composition of Poems and should try to create something new. As regards the extent of knowledge, which a Poet is expected to possess, Kṣemendra gives a long list of the arts and sciences, which include logic, grammar, dramaturgy, politics, ero-

tics, the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyaṇa, means of emancipation, spiritual science, metallurgy, science of jewels, medicine, astronomy, archery, science concerning elephants, horses and men, art of gambling and magic and other miscellaneous arts¹⁰⁶. The miscellaneous, he continues, includes painting, geography, botany, zoology, familiarity with magnanimity, the usage of attributing consciousness to insentient beings, intimacy with asceticism, discernment, restraint, and the like. Kṣemendra maintains that, proficiency of a Poet in these arts and sciences indicates his sovereignty over the kingdom of Poetry: one, who is not familiar with these branches of learning comes at his wit's end when questioned in an assembly of the wise, although he labours in the art of versification, and becomes comparable to a clown, entering a city for the first time¹⁰⁷. So what Kṣemendra wants is wide reading and constant practice on the part of an aspiring Poet.

Unlike Kṣemendra Mammaṭa puts equal emphasis on poetic genius, superior type of proficiency, arising from a close study of the world, scriptures and poetical compositions and constant practice under the guidance of the knowers of Poetry, and maintains that, these three conjointly constitute the causal factor of Poetic creation¹⁰⁸. He uses the term *Śakti* to signify the idea of imagination, thus making it equivalent to *Pratibhā* of other *Alaṃkārikas* and explains it as an inborn mental impression, that serves as the very germ of Poetic faculty: it is said that, without it *Kāvya* is not produced at all, and if attempted to be produced per force becomes ridiculous.¹⁰⁹ Most of the Sanskrit *Alaṃkārikas* describe *Pratibhā* as a power, whereby a Poet sees the subjects of his poem as steeped in beauty and gives to his readers in apt language a vivid picture of the beauty he has seen: through it he presents ever new, wonderful and charming combinations and relations of things, never before experienced or thought of by ordinary men: it is further asserted that, *Pratibhā* or imagination takes a Poet to the dreamland of fancy, full of eternal joy and peace and reveals to him the real nature of things, never known before by men of ordinary life. Mammaṭa uses the terms *Nipuṇatā* and *Vyutpatti*

to convey the concept of proficiency or culture, and observes that, this proficiency or culture, arising from a close study of the ways of the world, consisting of the immovable and the movable, of the treatises dealing with metres, grammar, lexicons, fine arts, four aims of human existence, elephants horses, swords and the like, of poetical compositions of many artists and of historical works and different sciences is as much necessary for creation of Poetry as is Imagination¹¹⁰. It is believed that, a certain modicum of culture is necessary for a Poet if he is to infuse polish into his creation, and in order to be really great, Poetry not only requires spark, but also polish. As regards constant practice or *Abhyāsa*, Mammaṭa opines that, repeated practice in composition and criticism of Poetry under the guidance of those, who know how to compose and appreciate it—is as much necessary for the creation of Poetry as are the other two elements of Poetry—genius and culture: he further states that, an aspiring Poet is to take guidance not only from those who can compose Poetry, i.e., who know the art of Poetry, but also from those who can criticise *Kāvya*, i.e., who are well-versed in the science of Poetry¹¹¹. With all emphasis at his command, Mammaṭa asserts that, these three conjointly, and not separately constitute the cause, and not the causes in the production and excellence of *Kāvya*. It is interesting to note that, although Mammaṭa regards Imagination as the first equipment necessary for a Poet, he declares that, erudition, arising from a close study of world and worldly life is another essential equipment, thereby revealing his conviction that, a Poet is not to be carried too far by Imagination, saying good-bye to Reason, because Imagination and Reason both are equally necessary for production of really great Poetry. Reason is to Imagination as the instrument to the agent,—as the body to the spirit,—as the shadow to the substance. Mammaṭa's dissertations on *Kāvya* indicate that he belongs to that school of critics, who think that, a Poet is partly born and partly made: as *Śakti* is an inborn faculty, a Poet is a born genius: as *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa* are acquired through effort, so far as these are concerned, a Poet is made.

Hemacandra, however, thinks that, a Poet is born, and not made. He describes *Pratibhā* as the only cause of Poetry and explains it as an intellect, competent to find out freshness in old things and thereafter to draw ever-new descriptions of familiar objects. This *Pratibhā*, he continues, is two-fold in nature: natural and acquired. Natural faculty manifests itself as ignorance shrouding it vanishes, and in this respect is comparable to the splendour of the Sun, that expresses itself in its undimmed glory, as the row of clouds, covering it disappears; acquired faculty, on the other hand, is caused by factors as incantation and favour of Gods: although its manifestation like that of the natural one is consequential upon removal or waning of ignorance, yet it is differentiated from *Sahajā-Pratibhā*, and is called *Aupādhikī* because its revelation depends on such seen factors as application of magical formulae, propitiation of Gods and others¹¹². Both these types of *Pratibhā*, Hemacandra continues, are polished by *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa*: these two go only to sharpen Poetic Intuition and are incapable of being regarded as causes of Poetic creations directly, inasmuch as, they do not bear any fruit whatsoever in case of persons, completely bereft of *Pratibhā*¹¹³. Following Mammaṭa closely, Hemacandra explain *Vyutpatti* as proficiency in the ways of the world, consisting of the immovable and the movable, in the different branches of learning such as Grammar, Metrics, Lexicons, the Vedas Legendary and Historical works, Logic, Dramaturgy and Erotics, as also in the poetic creations of master artists; he says that, imagination, which is rendered elegant by this proficiency creates Poetry, incorporating such descriptions as do conform to the ways of the world and the principles, enumerated in different branches of Sciences, showing thereby that, as a poet is allowed to handle any and every subject in his Poetry, it is better for him to possess certain amount of proficiency in the ways of the world, as also in the different branches of learning¹¹⁴. In explaining *Abhyāsa*, he maintains that, it consists in repeated application to Poetry on the part of one, who is trained by writers as well as connoisseurs of Poetic art: imagination, rendered elegant by this repeated practice,

he says, provides like an wish-fulfilling cow an inexhaustible stock of emotional mood¹¹⁵. As regards the training of a Poet, he observes that, it comprehends such practices as non-mention of even the actual, mention of even the non-actual, the process of shadow-borrowing, use of borrowed phraseology, filling up the gaps and similar other methods, revealing thereby clearly the influence exercised on him by Kṣemendra¹¹⁶.

Vāgbhata describes Imagination as the cause of Poetry: he thinks that culture ornaments, while practice polishes it. Like Kṣemendra he advises an aspiring Poet to undergo carefully a course of training, which includes among others composition of even unmeaning stanzas and verse-filling. Following Rājaśekhara, he describes early hours, acquaintance with the different branches of learning and company of Poets as the sources of inspiration. Vāgbhata, thus, in his conclusions on this point is indebted to Hemacandra, Kṣemendra and Rājaśekhara and there is hardly anything original in his own treatment.

The tendency to regard Imagination, Culture and Practice as conjointly constituting the causal factor of Poetry manifests itself after a brief interval in the speculations of Jayadeva, who believes that, *Pratibhā*, attended with *Śruta* and *Abhyāsa* gives rise to Poetry in the same way as a seed, coming in contact with earth and water gives rise to a creeper¹¹⁷. Kavikarṇapūra expresses the same idea in a veiled way. He defines a Poet as one endowed with *Vīja* and maintains that, this *Vīja* consists in an impression implanted in previous births,—an impression, without which it is possible neither to compose nor to appreciate Poetry: at the same breath he observes that, it is necessary for a Poet to possess *Pratibhā*, responsiveness and proficiency in the different branches of learning, and following the ancients, explains *Pratibhā* as an intellect, competent to present ever-fresh ideas. While Daṇḍin and Mammaṭa clearly mention *Pratibhā*, *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa* as conjointly forming the cause of Poetry, Kavikarṇapūra points out that, the equipments necessary for a Poet are *Pratibhā* and *Sarvāgamakovidatva*, but at the same time he defines a Poet as

one endowed with an impression, that leads to sprouting of *Kāvya*, and thereby, cleverly recognises the importance of repeated practice, that owes its existence to this impression¹¹⁸.

The *Kāvya-kalpalatā-vṛtī* of Arisimha and Amaracandra is a treatise on *Kaviśikṣā* and naturally, it emphasises the importance of Practice in production of Poetry. It furnishes hints on construction of different metres, conversion of one metre into another, use of particles for filling up the verse, subjects for descriptive Poetry, the display of word-skill of various kinds, tricks of producing double-meaning verses and riddles, construction of similes and such other figures and uses of appropriate parallelisms. In this connection it gives a long list of conventions observed by the Poets and states what to describe and how to describe. The authors, whose main intention is to write a guide-book for a student-poet indulge in too much of spoon-feeding and by formulating a set of stereotyped rules narrow down the field of an aspiring poet's activity.

The doctrine that *Pratibhā* constitutes the sole cause of Poetry finds a staunch supporter in Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, who refutes the contentions of earlier theorists on the subject and establishes his own proposition with irrefutable logic. Jagannātha mentions poetic genius or imagination as the sole causal factor in creation of Poetry, and explains it as an intellect of the Poet, absorbed in selecting sound and sense, appropriate to an emotional mood, intended to be depicted in a specimen of Poetic Art. The Dhvanivādin believes that, at the time of composition of Poetry, not only do ideas come out from the heart of the Poet : expressions, too, gush forth spontaneously in ceaseless succession from the fountain-head of his imagination, as he remains completely absorbed in contemplation of the emotion concerned. It is said that, a Poet, who has to search for suitable words and meanings cannot compose real *Kāvya* of high merit, as in doing so his mind becomes distracted from the final aim, which is nothing other than depiction of sentiment. For this reason, while laying down the principles of using poetic figures, Ānandavardhana remarks that, only that figure for the

improvisation of which no additional effort is necessary on the part of a Poet is regarded as intimately related to Poetic Art¹¹⁹.

Jagannātha thinks that the attribute Imaginationness, or *Pratibhā* constitutes the determinant of the cause of Poetry and is capable of being explained either as a universal element or as an unanalysable ultimate concept.¹²⁰ The question of furnishing two different explanations arises, because there is divergence of opinion on the exact nature of *Pratibhā*. The Mīmāṃsaka regards *Pratibhā* as an unseen power, capable of being inferred only from its effects ; this power, he says, is something different from substance, quality or action, and consequently, *Pratibhā* is not a generality or *jāti*, because an attribute, that inheres in a species of substance or quality or action, and not in others is accepted as a *jāti*, provided it is not vitiated by the fallacy of cross division. The acceptance of the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine renders *Pratibhā* a specimen of non-*jāti*, but nevertheless, it is an attribute, incapable of being analysed into component parts, as also of being defined in clear-cut terms ; and so, Jagannātha describes it as an ultimate concept (*akhaṇḍa upādhi*). The view of Ānandavardhana on the nature of *Pratibhā*, however, presents a completely different picture. Ānandavardhana and following him, many others define *Pratibhā* as a faculty of knowing, which the *Vaiśeṣikas* describe as a quality, belonging to the soul ; as *Pratibhā* is an attribute inhering in a quality, these scholars think that, it is possible to grant the status of *jāti* to it ; this, they continue, is a species belonging to the genus *Guṇa*.

While earlier writers accept *Pratibhā* as a natural (*sahajā*) faculty, being the outcome of impressions made on the soul in countless births, Jagannātha regards it as a cultivated (*utpādyā*) one : in some cases, this poetic faculty, he says, is produced by good fortune, caused through grace of God and great men, and in others is generated by a special type of proficiency and repeated practice in creation of Poetry.¹²¹ *Pratibhā*, that is caused through different sets of cause, thus, bears analogy to the fire, generated from grass, stick and stone, acting separately, and not

to the jar, produced by potter, his rod and wheel, working conjointly. It is wrong to assert that good fortune, special type of proficiency and repeated practice conjointly constitute the cause of poetic faculty, because this genius is noticed even in children, who have never before studied the ways of the world and poetical compositions or have never attempted to write specimens of Poetry. The argument that, in case of such children, culture and practice, acquired in previous births contribute towards the production of *Pratibhā* is unacceptable, because, firstly, such presumption leads to complexity; secondly, there is no evidence to show that, these three factors conjointly constitute the cause of poetic intuition; and thirdly, there is no logical necessity of postulating such a theory,—the effect being accountable otherwise.¹²² It is equally wrong to maintain that, religious merit is the sole cause of poetic faculty, because, men, who in earlier years could not compose Poems are found to do so in later years after attainment of superior culture and undertaking of constant practice. The argument that, in these cases, also, religious merit plays its own part in production of the desired effect is untenable, since it renders inexplicable non-manifestation of *Pratibhā* in such persons in their earlier years before acquisition of proficiency and practice. The counter-argument that, another merit impedes dawning of poetic faculty in those persons in their early life is equally unacceptable, because it entails a violation to the law of parsimony: presumption of two conflicting merits is a complex process,—the postulation of culture and practice as the cause of Poetic creation being a simpler one.¹²³ Thus Jagannātha refutes the contentions of rival theorists, and asserts, with all emphasis at his command that, firstly, *Pratibhā*, *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa* do not conjointly constitute the cause of *Kāvya*, which has *Pratibhā* for its sole causal factor, and secondly, this *Pratibhā*, also, is not caused by religious merit, culture and practice, acting conjointly, but in some cases by religious merit alone and in others by proficiency and practice acting independently. In his eagerness to show that, the causal connection postulated by him is not vitiated by the fallacy of Plurality of Causes, Jagannātha observes that, the effects

produced by the two sets of causes are different in their nature, or in other words, religious merit generates one type of poetic faculty, and culture and practice produce that of a different type: and thus, as corresponding to two sets of causes there are two sets of effects, the question of the fallacy of violation, vitiating the relation of causality does not arise. Now Poetic faculty being of two different types,—one caused by merit, and the other by proficiency and practice—the same fallacy is likely to vitiate the causal connection between *Kāvya* and *Pratibhā*. How can two different causes lead to one and the same effect? Jagannātha puts forward two solutions to this problem. The first alternative, he says, is to point out that, *Pratibhā* in general,—without any such qualification as caused by merit or culture-cum-practice is the cause of Poetry; the second one, he continues, is to state that, *Pratibhā*, caused by merit leads to one type of Poetry, while that, created by culture and practice leads to Poetry of a different type: in short, either the cause of *Kāvya* is to be posited as unitary in character or the effect of *Pratibhā* is to be described as multiple in nature.¹²⁴ In reply to the point of the opponents that, as dawning of *Pratibhā* is not found in all persons, acquiring proficiency in the different branches of learning and undertaking practice to compose Poetry under the guidance of writers and connoisseurs, so the relation of causality existing between *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa* on the one hand and *Pratibhā* on the other is likely to be vitiated by the fallacy of violation, Jagannātha observes that, such cases of violation are capable of being explained away in two different ways. The first alternative is to say that, those persons did not acquire special type of proficiency, and the cause of *Pratibhā* is not each and every combination of *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa*, but that of a special type only: the second alternative, he answers, is to state that, in those cases expected dawning of *Pratibhā* is obstructed by a great demerit. The conclusion of absence of impediment in the category of causes, he includes, is a necessary evil not only in his own doctrine, but also in that of Mammaṭa and others, according to whom, *Śakti*, *Vyutpatti* and *Abhyāsa* conjointly constitute the causal factor of Poetic

creation.¹²⁵ And this is necessary in order to account for non-composition of Poetry on the part of a Poet, who has to his credit a number of fine specimens of poetic art at a particular period, when emanation of his expressions and ideas is hampered through magical formula, applied by his opponent, as also to explain away similar other cases of violation.

V

Classification of Poetry.

Consistently with his doctrine that, *Dhvani* or suggested sense forms the soul or essence of Poetry, Ānandavardhana classifies Poetry into three types, according to the place occupied by this implicit idea in a poetic creation. It is said that in a *Dhvanī-kāvya* or a best type of Poetry, the expressed word and sense, subordinating themselves, manifest the suggested content of paramount importance.¹²⁶ Mammaṭa, following Ānandavardhana defines it as a type of Poetry in which the implicit idea is more charming and consequently of more importance than the explicit one.¹²⁷ As an illustration of this suggestive specimen of Poetic Art, Mammaṭa cites the verse :

Niḥśeṣacyutacandanam stanataṭam nirmṛṣṭarāgo 'dharo
Netre dūramanāṇjane pulakitā tanvī taveyam tanuḥ/
Mithyāvādinī dūti bāndhavaajanasyājñātapīḍāgame
Vāpīm snātumito gatāsi na punastasyādhamasyāntikam//

which means this : 'The slopes of breasts have their sandal-paste completely washed off,—the lower lip has its red colour rubbed off,—the eyes have lost their collyrium at the corners,—and this slender form has put on horripilation. O ye messenger ! liar ! unaware of the agony suffered by your friend ; You had gone indeed to the lake to have a dip, and not to the vicinity of that wretch'. It is pointed out that, here the idea of dalliance is conveyed through suggestion by the expressed sense, constituted of a number of changes, appearing in the limbs of the messenger, and the implicit idea is comprehended by a refined appreciator, who is thoroughly acquainted with the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context : it is further

asserted that, in the matter of suggestion of the implicit, the expression 'adhama', meaning 'wretched' plays a prominent role. Mammaṭa is of opinion that, in the verse under consideration, the unexpressed is more attractive, and as such, is of more importance than the expressed, because the semblance of love-in-union, which is the dominant emotional mood here depends for its emergence more on the former than on the latter. Ānandavardhana attempts to connect the concept of *Dhvani* with the somewhat mystical speculations of the Vaiyākaraṇas on *Sphoṭa* and asserts that, the designation *Dhvani*, applied to this species of Poetry is based on an analogy of use of the same expression by the Vaiyākaraṇas. The Vaiyākaraṇas use the term '*Dhvani*' to signify momentary and isolated sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs,—sounds, that go to suggest the eternal indivisible word-essence called '*Sphoṭa*', which alone is the real significant entity ; taking cue from them the Ālankārikas also use the term *Dhvani* to signify a piece of poetic creation, that goes to bring into light an inexplicably charming unexpressed idea, which alone constitutes the secret of Poetry.¹²⁸

The second class of Poetry in which the suggested sense is not predominant but subordinate is called *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya Kāvya* or Poetry of subordinated suggestion : in it the suggested plays a subordinate part, in so far as it serves to emphasise or embellish the expressed¹²⁹. Ānandavardhana cites a number of cases in which the unexpressed renders itself subordinate to the expressed : it does so (1) in such figures as *Samāsokti*, *Aparastuta-praśamsā* and the like, in which suggested matter goes to embellish the expressed, (2) in the poetic figure *Dīpaka*, in which suggested figure goes to emphasise the expressed *Alaṅkāra* and (3) in the poetic figure *Rasavat*, in which the suggested emotional mood goes to heighten the beauty of another suggested mood or expressed sense. His *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* comprehends such cases also in which the implicit idea itself or the fact that, the expression conveys an implied meaning is expressed through the function of denotation and thereby, the unexpressed looses its charm, springing from concealment,—a charm that constitutes the essence of *Dhvanīkāvya*. The verse :

Śaṅketakālamānasam vīṭam jñātvā vidagdhayā /
 Hasannetrārpitakūṭam līlāpadmam nyamīlayat //, meaning :
 'Knowing that the profligate person is eager to have an idea
 of the time of union, the intelligent lady, revealing her desire by
 blooming eyes contracted her pleasure-lotus' serves as an
 illustration to the point : here the expressed meaning of the
 first half of the stanza itself shows that, the contraction of the
 pleasure-lotus is intended to give a hint¹³⁰. Following
 Ānandavardhana, Mammata, also, defines *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* as
 a type of Poetry, in which the unexpressed does not excel the
 expressed in point of charm and asserts that this is Poetry of
 mediocre class¹³¹. His commentators says that, this subordi-
 nation of the unexpressed consists in its being either of equal
 or inferior prominence. They are of opinion that, this variety
 occurs when the suggested sense in a *Kāvya* does not acquire
 prominence by itself, but plays a second fiddle to the expressed,
 which is more striking on account of some peculiar mode of
 expression. As an example of this type of Poetry, Mammata
 cites the verse :

'Grāmataruṇaṃ taruṇyā navavaṇjulamañjarīsanāthakaram /
 Paśyantā bhavati muhurnitarāṃ malinā mukhacchāyā //,
 which means this : 'the complexion of the young girl, as she
 repeatedly looks at the village-youth, holding a cluster of fresh
 Asoka blossoms in his hand is becoming extremely pale'. He
 points out that, in this verse, the explicit idea is the paleness of
 the complexion of the young girl and the implicit one is her
 failure to keep appointment with the village-youth in the bower
 of Asoka ; of these two ideas the explicit one is more attractive,
 and as such, of more importance than the implicit one, because
 the manifestation of the emotional mood, which is a semblance
 of love-in-separation depends on the former,—the paleness of
 complexion being its effect (*anubhāva*), and not on the
 latter. Ānandavardhana maintains that, in the matter of
 determining whether the expressed or the unexpressed is
 principal or subordinate, the sole criterion is charm¹³² : in
Dhvani, the suggested is more attractive,—in *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*,
 the expressed is more charming.

Ānandavardhana is of opinion that *Dhvani* and *Guṇībhūta-
 vyāṅgya* types of Poetry are specimens of Poetic art in the
 strictest sense of the term, because both contain suggestive
 elements, and suggested idea constitutes the essence of Poetry.
 A type of Poetry that is completely devoid of suggested element
 and is merely 'pictorial in word' or 'pictorial in sense' is
 regarded as *Citrakāvya* or the lowest class of Poetry : this,
 Ānandavardhana says, is two fold in nature : *śabdacitra* and
arthacitra. A *Śabdacitra kāvya* abounds in figures of sound and
 flatter the ear by sound-effect, while an *Arthacitra-kāvya*
 abounds in figures of sense and consequently, evokes admiration
 through pictorial representation.¹³³ In this Poetry, the
 intention of the Poet does not lie in depiction of sentiment, and
 as such, it is not competent to bring an emotional mood into
 light : the beauty of this *Kāvya*, that is devoid of a suggested
 element lies in mere strikingness of sound and sense. This
 Poetry, Ānandavardhana continues, is not real Poetic creation,
 but an imitation thereof, as is evident from the very
 nomenclature given to it. Abhinavagupta endorses this view
 and observes that, *Citrakāvya* does not contain a suggested
 element, that forms the essence of Poetry and is only a copy of
 a true Poetic creation.

The question as to how is it possible for a *Kāvya* to be devoid
 of a suggested sense arises in the mind of Ānandavardhana and
 he himself discusses it threadbare. It is possible for a Poetry, he
 says, to be bereft of suggested fact and figure ; but there is no
 such *Kāvya* that is devoid of suggested emotion. And this is so,
 because each and every subject-matter of Poetry is intimately
 related to *Rasa*, being either a *Vibhāva* or an *Anubhāva* : there
 is no such thing on earth that does not evoke one or other
 feeling. In reply to this question, Ānandavardhana maintains
 that, though it is not possible for a *Kāvya* to be devoid of a
 suggested emotion, yet a *Citra-kāvya* is regarded as such theoret-
 ically, because in it there is no intention of developing an
 emotion and it is taken up only with the object of bringing
 about a strikingness of sound and sense : this is called *Nīrasa*,
 as the apprehension of *Rasa*, that is smothered beneath poetic

figures is weak in it.¹⁸⁴ This *Citra*, he continues, is admitted to the category of Poetry, because poets are seen producing this type of poetic creation, the end of which is not delineation of emotion, but an ostentatious display of the creator's literary craftsmanship. Ānandavardhana is of opinion that, a Poetry, in which the intention of the poet is to develop an emotion is bound to be a *Dhvanikāvya*, because even insentient beings described by him become instrumental in depiction of emotion. Great poets do not want to make a parade of their skill in improvisation of poetic figures, nor do they handle such things as are not related to *Rasa*: and the result is that, their creations always turn out to be specimens of *Dhvanikāvya*. In support of his contention that, the things incorporated by a poet, whose intention is to develop an emotion become helpful towards the suggestion of the desired emotion, Ānandavardhana quotes a verse of the ancients, according to which, the universe, as described by a Poet whose object is to delineate an erotic emotion becomes full of flavour, while the same, as presented by one, averse to worldly affairs appears dry and insipid: it is further pointed out that, a master artist presents even inanimate beings as animate ones, attributing consciousness to them and even insentient beings as sentient ones, and consequently is comparable only to the supreme creator. Thus, Ānandavardhana concludes, for a master artist there is only one type of *Kāvya*, and that is *Dhvani*: *Citra* is for a beginner only.¹⁸⁵

Although Mammaṭa recognises the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya*, he, in deference to Ānandavardhana, regards *Citra* as a variety of Poetry, and defines this lowest type of Poetry as one striking in word and sense and devoid of suggested idea (*avyaṅgya*). In explaining the term '*avyaṅgya*', he, following his great master Ānandavardhana says that, this Poetry is not characterised by any distinct suggested element, or in other words, comprehension of implicit idea is not quite clear in it, and this is so because the poet takes it up only with the object of bringing about a strikingness of sound and sense. As an illustration of *Śabdacitrakāvya*, he cites the stanza:

Svacchandocchaladacchakacchakuharacchātetarāmbucchaṭā

Mūrcchanmohamaharsiharṣavibitasnānāhnikāhnāya vaḥ /
Bhidyādudyadudāradarduradarī dīrghādaridradruma-

Drohcdrekamahormimeduramadā mandākīnī mandatām //
meaning: 'May the Ganges quickly remove your dullness,—wherein bath and daily rites are performed with delight by great sages, whose infatuation is destroyed by masses of swift and clear waters, surging up at will in the crevices of the banks,—the Ganges, which has valleys containing large jumping frogs and whose currents gain momentum due to long waves that rise high on account of falling in of tall and rich trees'. The commentators point out that, cognition of love of the poet for the Ganges is feeble here, because that feeling is completely suppressed by the huge mass of *Anuprāsa*, on the improvisation of which, the mind of the creator is completely absorbed: his purpose is to make a display of his literary craftsmanship,—and not to develop the feeling referred to. As an illustration of *Arthacitrakāvya*, Mammaṭa cites the verse:

Vinirgataṃ mānadamātmamandirāt
Bhavatyupaśrutya yadṛcchayāpi yam /
Sasambhramendradrutapātītārgalā

Nimīlitākṣīva bhiyāmarāvatī // meaning: 'King Hayagrīva destroyed the pride of his enemies and bestowed honour on his friends: hearing of this king as having gone out of his palace even casually, the City of Gods, with gates being quickly bolted by Indra in a flurry remained, as if, closing her eyes through fear'. In explaining this verse, his commentators observe that, though it contains a suggested element in the shape of Heroic Sentiment, with heroism of Hayagrīva as its basic mood, yet as that implicit idea is completely suppressed by the poetic figure *Utprekṣā*, on the improvisation of which the whole effort of the poet is concentrated, the stanza is, as if, devoid of suggested element.¹⁸⁶

Although Mammaṭa, in deference to Ānandavardhana speaks of *Citra* as the lowest variety of *Kāvya*, Viśvanātha rejects its claim as Poetry altogether; and this he does in consistency with his own definition that, a sentence, capable of giving *Rasa* into expression is Poetry. He is of opinion that, there are

two divisions of Poetry only : *Dhvani* and *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* ; in the first, the *Rasa* involved is primarily suggested, in the second it is collateral. Criticising the definition of *Citra-Kāvya*, as furnished by Mammata, he observes that, the very term 'avyaṅgyam' used in the definition rejects the claim of this type of composition to be regarded as Poetry, because in order to constitute a specimen of poetic expression, a sentence is to present *Rasa* either essentially or collaterally. The argument that, by 'avyaṅgyam', complete absence of suggested element is not meant, but what actually is meant is presence of slight or feeble implicit idea does not solve the difficulty. The so-called indistinct implicit meaning is either capable of being relished or incapable of being so experienced : in case *Rasa*, presented in the linguistic expression is relished, the composition is either *Dhvani* or *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* ; in case it is not relished, the composition does not constitute Poetry at all.¹³⁷ In order to establish his own proposition, Viśvanātha seeks the protection of an observation of Ānandavardhana, according to which, the criterion of Poetry is revelation of suggested element—whether circumstantial or essential—and an expression, that is devoid of this element is not real Poetry, but only a copy thereof.

Kavikarṇapūra, to start with, classifies Poetry into three types : *Uttama*, *Madhyama* and *Avara*. In *Uttamakāvya*, the suggested meaning is prominent, in *Madhyamakāvya* it is of secondary importance and in *Avarakāvya*, it is totally bereft of charm and as such, is lifeless, so to say. In continuation, Kavikarṇapūra points out, the capacity of the implicit idea to suggest another subtle sense as also strikingness of sound and sense infuse additional beauty into *Uttamakāvya* and converts it into one of *Uttamottama* type. He thinks it improper to group a Poetry, containing a single suggested element with this under the same head. In a similar manner, Kavikarṇapūra observes, a *Madhyamakāvya*, characterised by strikingness of sound and sense is converted into *Uttamakāvya* and an *Avarakāvya*, ornamented by charm of language and meaning is transformed into Poetry of *Madhyama* type.¹³⁸ The speculations of

Kavikarṇapūra reveal a more rational approach to the problem of classification of Poetry, in as much as, he arranges it in different categories according to the difference in charm, inherent in the composition, as a whole, and not in any one of its elements, or in other words, according to difference in appeal of respective *Kāvyas*. Although by recognising the importance of strikingness of sound and sense he takes a retrograde step, his observations are of great consequence, at least, from the historical point of view, because they serve the foundation of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha's theory on the issue.

Jagannātha classifies Poetry into four types and names them as *Uttamottama*, *Uttama*, *Madhyama* and *Adhama*. In his first type of Poetry, it is said, the expressive word and the expressed meaning, rendering themselves subservient, go to suggest an inexplicably charming unexpressed idea.¹³⁹ The manifestation of a sense that remains concealed in such a manner, that even men of refined taste fail to catch it does not render a specimen of Poetic Art a Poetry of *Uttamottama* type : and such is the case with revelation of an implicit idea, that is clearly cognised even by persons, devoid of poetic sensibility. It is admitted by the *Dhvani* Theorists that, in order to constitute a true *Dhvanikāvya*, the word and expressed meaning must make themselves subordinate to the prominent suggested idea ; this peculiar feature of the best type of poetic creation is referred to by Ānandavardhana through the expression '*Upasarjanī'ṣṭa-svārthau*' and by Jagannātha through '*Guṇībhāvitātmānu*'. Thus it is clear, Jagannātha's *Uttamottamakāvya* corresponds exactly to *Dhvanikāvya* of Ānandavardhana and Mammata. As in *Aparāṅga* and *Vācyaśiddhyaṅga* varieties of *Kāvya*, Jagannātha continues, the implicit idea is of secondary importance, they are incapable of being regarded as specimens of the best type of Poetic creation. As an example of this type of Poetry Jagannātha cites the verse :

Śayitā savidhe' pyanīśvarā saphalīkartumaho manorathān/

Dayitā dayitānānānbujam daramīlannayanā nirakṣate//

meaning ; 'the girl, though lying by the side of her beloved, yet unable to fulfill her desires is looking at his face with her

eyes slightly closed' Jagannātha is of opinion that, the suggestion of erotic emotion extends to this stanza the status of *Uttamottama Kāvya*; here the lover being the person, with reference to whom love is generated is the *ālambanavibhāva*, lying in seclusion being the excitant cause is the *uddīpanavibhāva*, gazing at the face of the beloved being an ensuent of love is the *anubhāva* and bashfulness and anxiety of the girl being accessories to love are *vyabhicāribhāvas*: these, it is said, go to suggest the feeling of love of the heroine for the man, which being developed turns into *Śṛṅgārarasa* and is relished by the appreciators at the time of perception of Poetry. Thus according to Jagannātha, the stanza furnishes an illustration of *Rasadhvani*, and not of *Bhāvadhvani*, an example of which is afforded by the verse:

Gurumadhyagatā mayā natāṅgī nihatā nīrajakorakeṇa
 mandam/
 Darakuṇḍalataṇḍavam natabhrūlatikaṃ māmavalokya
 ghūrṇitāsīt//,

meaning: 'as the slim-figured lady sitting in the midst of her superiors was struck by me with a lotus-bud, she stared at me and then turned her face away in such a manner that, her earrings went slightly upwards and eye-brows moved downwards'; it is the indignation of the lady, that is principally experienced by refined readers, and so prominence belongs to it and not to its cause—the feeling of love. In this connection, Jagannātha quotes a verse, which is said to constitute an example of *Rasadhvani* of *Samlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type; it runs as:

Talpagatāpi ca sutaṇuḥ śvāsāsaṅgaṃ na yā sehe/

Samprati sā hrdayagatam priyapāṇim mandamākṣipati//,
 and means: 'the fine-figured girl, who could not bear the touch of her husband's breath even when reclining on bed is now (on the night prior to the departure of the husband) mildly repelling his hand placed on her breasts'. In pointing out the difference between this stanza and the first one, Jagannātha observes that, whereas in the first verse, the sequence between cognition of the expressed and that of the unexpressed is imperceptible, in this one, this sequence is perceptible, or in other words, the

first one is a case of *Asamlakṣyakramavyaṅgyadhvani*, while this one is a case of *Samlakṣyakramavyaṅgyadhvani*.

The question as to whether the expressed meaning bears any definite relation to the unexpressed one or not forms the subject-matter of a hot controversy, as is evident from Jagannātha's animadversion of the explanation of the stock illustration of *Dhvani*: *Niḥśeṣacyutacandanam stanataṭam* etc., as furnished by Appayadīkṣita. Appayadīkṣita thinks that, the expressed meanings, presented in the verse, namely the changes appearing in the limbs of the messenger are capable of being caused only through dalliance, and consequently, this idea of dalliance is brought into light through the function of suggestion; he is of opinion that, the primary meanings of the different expressions, used in the verse preclude all doubts, concerning the cause of such changes, as complete disappearance of sandal-paste from the slopes of the breasts and the like: they point out clearly and unhesitatingly to embraces and kisses,—all of which are subservient to enjoyment, and thereby, help the revelation of the principal suggested content, namely, dalliance.

In criticising the doctrine of Appayadīkṣita, Jagannātha observes that, first of all, the explanation of the verse in question, as presented by his opponent is not in agreement with that furnished by Mammaṭa, and other ancient critics of repute. According to Mammaṭa, neither the wiping away of sandal-paste applied to the slopes of the breasts nor the complete disappearance of redness from the lower lip bears the relation of universal concomitance to dalliance, and as these are capable of being produced both by bath and enjoyment, the sense of dalliance is not comprehended through *Anumāna*: the changes, appearing in the limbs of the messenger being inconclusive reasons do not, he says, lead to a valid inference of the idea of enjoyment. Secondly, Jagannātha continues, the proposition of Appaya is opposed to all logic, in as much as, nothing is gained by establishing the fact that, the disappearance of sandal-paste and redness is not caused by bath: this fading away is capable of being produced by a number of factors, of which bath and enjoyment are some. Moreover, the attempt of Appayadīkṣita

to show that, the changes described in the limbs of the lady are definite and conclusive pointers to enjoyment lands *Vyañjanā* itself in jeopardy. The Dhvani Theorists maintain that, uncommonness of the suggestive expressed meaning instead of being helpful to operation of *Vyañjanā* is detrimental to it, as in that case *Anumāna* steps in to replace it, or in other words, uncommonness, which is but another name of universal concomitance is harmful to suggestion being favourable to inference.¹⁴⁰ Thirdly, in the body of the unexpressed sense, Jagannātha points out, there are two portions, of which the first one is the idea of approaching the lover and the second one is the motive of coming up to him, which is enjoyment. The acceptance of the explanation of the verse, as furnished by Appaya renders the first part of the suggested sense an indicated one, because, as he says, it is not possible to establish logical connection of disappearance of sandal-paste from slopes of the breasts and fading away of redness from the lower lip with a dip in the lake, and consequently, *Lakṣaṇā* is bound in this case to come to our rescue by presenting such meanings as are competent to remove this incompatibility: and these meanings here are quite contrary to the primary ones, or in other words, through *Viparīṭtalakṣaṇā* the expressions '*Gatā*' and '*Na Gatā*' convey respectively the idea of 'not-approaching' and 'approaching'. Thus as the sense of approaching the lover on the part of the messenger is conveyed through *Lakṣaṇā*, it can not be regarded as the suggested content; no sense can be brought into light through the functions of Indication and Suggestion at the same time. The argument that, the second portion of the unexpressed content, namely the idea of enjoyment is quite competent to bestow the status of *Uttamottamakāvya* on this stanza does not hold good, because Appaya himself regards that idea as being comprehended through logical postulation, and a sense that is arrived at through *arthāpatti* does not constitute a śabdārtha, since such presumption entails a violation to the maxim: '*ananyalabhyaḥ śabdārthah*'. Moreover, Jagannātha continues, the explanation offered by his opponent renders the stanza a specimen of *Vācyasiddhyānga* variety of

Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya, in which the expressed meaning depends for its establishment on the unexpressed, instead of making it an instance of *Dhvanikāvya*, as it actually is. As the explanation of the stanza, offered by Appaya is vitiated by all these defects, Jagannātha rejects it outright and maintains that, the primary meanings of the expressions, used by the intelligent lady are, and as should be, equally applicable to both the explicit idea—a dip in the lake and the implicit one—enjoyment: and the suggested content, that does not naturally follow from the expressed one is cognised by a connoisseur of Poetic Art, thoroughly conversant with the speciality of the speaker, the person spoken to, context and such other factors. Thus while in the view of Appaya the suggestive expressed sense bears some definite relation to the unexpressed idea and is an unfailing pointer to it, in the view of Jagannātha, the explicit meaning bears no relation whatsoever to the implicit one: it is, he says, the transcendental function of suggestion, that brings into comprehension a suggested content not related in any way to the expressed one.

Jagannātha regards a specimen of Poetic creation, in which the suggested content, though always subordinate in relation to all meanings becomes the source of charm as a *Kāvya* of *Uttama* type. He thinks that, a specimen of Poetry, in which a suggested sense is prominent in relation to the expressed meaning, but subservient in relation to another implicit idea constitutes *Uttamottama Kāvya*, and not *Uttama* one, because in order to form *Kāvya* of this variety, it is necessary for the unexpressed content to remain subordinate under all circumstances. An example of this type of Poetry is furnished by the stanza:

Rāghavavirahajvālāsantāpitasahyaśailaśikhareṣu /

Śīṣire sukhaṃ Śayānāḥ kapayaḥ kupyanti pavanatanayāya//,
meaning: 'the monkeys sleeping snugly in winter on the peaks of the Sahya mountain, heated by Rāma's anguish of separation are showing anger towards Hanumān'. It is pointed out that, here the expressed meaning is the sudden indignation of the monkeys, and the suggested sense is the idea that, Rāma has

been comforted by him through delivery of the message of Sītā : this suggested matter is the cause of establishment of the expressed idea and as such justifies it, in as much as, the cognition and acceptance without question of the explicit idea depends on a knowledge of the implicit one. For this reason, the suggested sense renders itself subordinate to the expressed one, but nevertheless, in the verse under consideration, it becomes a source of inexplicable charm. It is interesting to note that, while Ānandavardhana is of opinion that, the sole criterion of determining prominence of a meaning is charm and consequently, identifies *Prādhānya* with *Cārutva*, Jagannātha makes a difference between the two and observes that, *Prādhānya* does not necessarily co-exist with *Cārutva*, and consequently, it is possible for a suggested sense to render itself subordinate to another idea and still retain its beauty. Another interesting study is the point whether the verse :

Ayam sa rasanotkarsī pīnastanavimardanaḥ /

Nābhyūrujghanasparsī nīvīvisraṃsanaḥ karaḥ //, meaning : 'this is the hand, that pulled our girdles, handled our breasts, touched our naval and thighs and untied the knots of our garments' constitutes a specimen of *Uttamottama* or *Uttama Kāvya*. Some critics point out that, though the erotic emotion is subordinated to the tragic one, whose beauty it heightens, yet it is prominent in relation to the expressed meaning ; and so the verse is an illustration of *Uttamottamakāvya*. Nāgeśa challenges this observation and maintains that, the erotic emotion, whose apprehension is momentary is not more prominent than the expressed meaning : and this is so, because the hero being dead, the Erotic is unable to manifest itself in its full splendour due to absence of its *Vibhāva* : consequently, Nāgeśa observes, the stanza furnishes an illustration of *Uttama* or *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* variety of Poetry, as maintained by Mammata and Viśvanātha.¹⁴¹

Jagannātha's *Madhyama* or mediocre variety of Poetry is that Poetry in which the charm of the expressed meaning excels that of the unexpressed : here the beauty of the unexpressed is, as if, swallowed up by that of the expressed.¹⁴¹ The expression :

'Tanayamainākagaveṣaṇalambikṛtajaladhijāṭharapraviṣṭa-himagi-ribhujāyamānāyā bhagavatyā bhāgīrathyaḥ sakḥī', meaning : 'A friend of the Ganges, which is, as if, an arm of the mount Himalaya sent to the fathoms of the Ocean in search of his son Mainaka' furnishes an illustration of this variety of Poetry. This Poetry, Jagannātha points out, is, no doubt, characterised by revelation of a suggested content in the form of whiteness and depth of the river, because no such expressed, as is untouched by an unexpressed is competent to generate impersonal pleasure : but the charm of this content is swallowed up by that of the expressed imaginative mood '*Utprekṣā*' in the same way as the complexion of a village-girl is engulfed by cosmetics and paints. The above discussion makes it clear that, in both *Uttama* and *Madhyama* types of Poetry, the suggested sense is subordinate, but whereas in the first variety, this is a source of great charm, in the second, this is not so. Jagannātha observes that, all poetic creations, abounding in figures of sense are capable of being comprehended under either of these two types. Thus in the poetic figure *Samāsokti*, the unexpressed goes to embellish the expressed and as such, is subordinated to it, but nevertheless appears as a source of great charm, and consequently a Poetry, possessed of this *alaṃkāra* belongs to *Kāvya* of *Uttama* variety : in the poetic figure *Dīpaka*, on the other hand, the expressed imaginative mood excels the subordinate suggested *Upanū* in charm, and hence a Poetry, endowed with this *alaṃkāra* belongs to *Kāvya* of *madhyama* variety.

Jagannātha's fourth or the lowest variety of Poetry is that in which the charm of sound, embellished by that of sense is of more importance : in it the beauty of sound completely swallows up that of meaning. An example of this type of Poetry is afforded by the verse :

Mitrātriputranetrāya trayīśātravaśatrave /

Gotrārigotrajatrāya gotrātre te namo namaḥ //, meaning : 'Our obeisance is to Lord Viṣṇu,—a protector of the Gods, springing in the family of Indra,—a foe of the demons, inimical to the Vedas,—Viṣṇu, who has the Sun and the Moon for his eyes'. Here, Jagannātha points out, the beauty of sense is

totally engulfed by that of sound, on the improvisation of figures, belonging to which the whole energy of the poet is expended. He further maintains that, though it is possible to count a fifth type of Poetry, which abounds in strikingness of sound and is totally devoid of charm of sense, as are such obscure figures and conundrums as *Yamaka*, *Padmabandha* and the like, that are accepted as Poetry by established practice of the Poets, yet it is ignored here, because it does not conform to the definition of Poetry, adumbrated before : riddles and obscure figures do not bring a charming idea into expression, and, accordingly, do not constitute specimens of *Kāvya*, at all.¹⁴³

The scheme of classification of Poetry, followed by Jagannātha differs in many respects from that, adopted by Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa. Jagannātha's *Uttamottama* type of Poetry corresponds exactly to *Dhvanikāvya* of Ānandavardhana, —the essential trait of this Poetry being prominence and exquisite charm of the unexpressed. In his treatment the *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* and *Citra* types of Poetry of the ancients are split up into three cases : (1) Poetry, in which the suggested content, though rendered subordinate is the cause of charm, (2) Poetry, in which the beauty of the subordinate unexpressed is excelled by that of the expressed, and (3) Poetry, in which the charm of sound, attended with the beauty of sense is of more importance, being the chief object of relish. It is pointed out that, Poetry, abounding in figures of sense falls under either first or second of these cases, or in other words, under Poetry of *Uttama* or of *Madhyama* type, and that, abounding in figures of sound comes under the third case, or in other words, Poetry of *Adhama* type. Jagannātha asserts that, it is improper to group Poetry, abounding in figures of sense and sound under the same head, because appreciable difference in charm, and appeal, consequential upon it is traceable in them.¹⁴⁴ The attempt to place them under one head inspite of this difference in charm, as is experienced by connoisseurs of Poetic Art cuts at the very root of the problem of classification of Poetry, and sounds ridiculous. The observations of the ancients, who place *śabdacitra* and *arthacitra* on the same

footing, Jagannātha says, bespeak lack of critical acumen and sense of originality on their part. Secondly, the divisions of Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa are not mutually exclusive, in as much as, such poetic figures as *Samāsokti*, *Aprastutaprasaṃsā* and the like are capable of being comprehended under both *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* and *Citra* types of Poetry—under mediocre Poetry, because the unexpressed is of lesser attraction and importance than the expressed, and under Poetry of the lowest variety, because its illustrations abound in figures of sense. And this happens, because, according to the learned Dhvanikāra. the criterion of judging whether a *Kāvya* belongs to the second or third category is to see whether the intention of the Poet is to develop an emotional mood or not : if the poet aims at developing a suggested sentiment, the *Kāvya* is of second variety and if he aims at making a display of his skill in improvisation of figures of speech, the *Kāvya* is of third variety. This intention of the Poet, that forms the cardinal point in discussion does not admit of easy ascertainment, and consequently, much room for confusion is left. For this reason, Jagannātha sets forth a new scheme of classification, in which no consideration is given to the intention of the Poet : he splits up *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* and *Citrakāvya* of the ancients into three cases, and observes that whereas figures, characterised by revelation of a charming subservient suggested content belong to the first case (*Uttamakāvya*), those marked by manifestation of an unexpressed of lesser charm belong to the second case (*Madhyama*), and those, in which the beauty of sound is of more importance come under the third category (*Adhama*). This splitting up is advantageous in another respect also : it dispenses with the necessity of subdividing *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* type of Poetry into eight sub-types, as is done by Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha. Thus Jagannātha's scheme of classification is an improvement on that adopted by his learned predecessors : it places *śabdacitra* and *arthacitra* varieties of *Kāvya* under different heads,—removes the possibility of the division being an over-lapping one, and dispenses with the necessity of subdividing *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* class of Poetry.

CHAPTER II SOUND AND SENSE

I

Nature of word and meaning

The problem of an accurate definition of Poetry leads us to a more intricate problem of determining the exact nature of word and meaning. The question that confronts us is whether a significant word is not different from the letters that constitute it or is it something different from the sounds that go only to reveal it. The Naiyāyika believes in the transitoriness of words and consequently, holds that, these words do admit of production and annihilation : he thinks that, they are not different from the letters that go to constitute them. The objectors argue that, letters individually are not significant entities, in as much as, such presumption renders letters other than the first one unnecessary ; nor does a group of letters fare better, because no such group is possible since the previous letter ceases to exist when the succeeding letter is heard, and an assemblage is possible only between entities that co-exist. And a letter, they point out, ceases to exist the next moment it is pronounced. In reply to this, the Naiyāyika says that, although it is not possible to have an assemblage of letters, that are transitory units and last only for a moment, yet a word as comprised of them is capable of being perceived in these three ways : (1) each succeeding letter is regarded as being united with each preceding letter through the impression left behind by it and this process continues till the cognition of the last letter, (2) sounds produced by the preceding letters give rise to new sounds, which in their turn give rise to fresh sounds and this process continues till the cognition of the last letter and thus nothing stands in the way of comprehension of the whole word-unit by the auditory organ, (3) letters apprehended in succession leave behind abiding impressions, which together

with the comprehension of the last letter go to deliver the meaning, or in other words, the cognition of the last letter being reinforced by simultaneous re-collections of the preceding ones goes to convey the particular concept. Consequently, he argues, a significant word is nothing different from the letters constituting it, and the unitary conception of a word in spite of multiplicity of letters is only illusory in character.

The Vaiyākaraṇā, however, fails to see eye to eye with the Naiyāyika on this issue. Nāgeśa records the observations of the Naiyāyika and maintains that, none of the explanations furnished by him, concerning the comprehension of the whole word-unit as also verbal cognition of the concept signified by it is acceptable. The first explanation does not help us, because an existent letter is not competent to unite with a letter that has ceased to exist, in as much as, an assemblage is possible only between entities that co-exist and secondly, of letters that last only for the moment they are pronounced, the question of sequence does not arise. Equally unhelpful is the second explanation, that takes recourse to *śabdajaśabda-nyāya* and thus attempts to account for comprehension of the whole word-unit : no doubt, it explains cognition of a word, but does not go to establish the existence of a significant word as comprised of constituent letters. The argument that, even a non-existent word is endowed with expressiveness lands us into further troubles, because by applying the same logic it is possible to state that a destroyed jar contains water, which, however, sounds absurd. The third alternative also, that seeks to explain verbal knowledge as ensuing from cognition of the last letter, along with the impressions left by the preceding ones is not free from incongruencies. As there is no hard and fast rule about the existence of impressions of letters in the same order in which they are realised, the word *nadī* is likely to convey the idea signified by the word *dīna*, both being constituted of the same component letters.¹ As against the theory of the Naiyāyika that a word is nothing but a multitude of letters, the Grammarian points out that, this doctrine renders difference in meanings of such Sanskrit words as *Saro* and *Raso*, *Nadī* and *Dīna*, *Jarā* and *Rājā* unaccountable,

—pairs, in which the constituent letters are the same. The difference in order does not make any difference to the multitude : a forest is seen as such, whether it is viewed from this side or that,—a textile is cognised as such, whether it is seen from this end or that ; and this rule is likely to apply in case of a word also, which, according to the Naiyāyika, is nothing but multitude of letters. Our experience, however, reveals that such pairs as *Nadī* and *Dīna* present different ideas and in a word, not only the constituent letters, but also the order of arrangement is of importance. This leads the Vaiyākaraṇa to reject the Naiyāyika doctrine and postulate the existence of an eternal word-unit as something different from the multitude of letters forming it.

The grammarian contends that meanings are not signified by momentary sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs, but by an indivisible and eternal word-unit known as *Sphoṭa*, that is revealed by such transient sounds : scrupulously he makes a distinction between momentary and isolated sounds on the one hand and eternal word-essence on the other,—between unmeaning and significant sounds. Bhartṛhari speaks of these two types of words—*Nāla* and *Sphoṭa* : the first, he says, reveals the latter and the second alone signifies the concept ; this doctrine, he continues, proves the unity of word in spite of multiplicity of letters,—a fact, which is directly perceived and consequently, is incapable of being repudiated.² The *Sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari continues, is permanent and indivisible and is devoid of any idea of sequence : the different forms of this *Sphoṭa*, which is unitary in character are asserted in relation to the momentary sounds, only, that go to bring it into light. Like the same crystal appearing as red or yellow, when present by the side of a red or an yellow object and like the same face appearing as long or round, when reflected in a sword or a mirror, the same word-essence appears as *varṇa-sphoṭa*, *pada-sphoṭa* or *vākya-sphoṭa*, as the case may be, when revealed by sounds, taking the shape of letters, words and sentences. Although *Sphoṭa* is devoid of physical structure and sequence, the structure and sequence, belonging to the *Nāda* that manifests it are attributed to it and

accordingly it appears as one endowed with form and sequence. In order to explain this characteristic feature of *Sphoṭa*, Bhartṛhari introduces the parallelism of the orb of the moon, which though fixed appears as quivering when seen through the ripples of a river : just as the motion of the waves, he says, is attributed to the moon itself, similarly, the peculiar traits of *Nāda* are attributed to *Sphoṭa*.

The grammarian thinks that the difference between the physical structures of two sounds—*ka* and *kha* is unreal, being the result of an illusion and the ultimate germ giving rise to both the sounds is one and the same. He believes in the existence of a reservoir of air in some part of our body and asserts that, in the evolution of sound, air plays a great part. The subtlest form of speech, which is nothing other than *Śabdabrahman*, he maintains, remains in the *Mūlādhāra* or the seat of eternal consciousness from which all active impulses come out. The next gross manifestation of this *Para Vāk* is *Paśyantī*, which is brought into light by air, reaching up to the navel region : this *Paśyantī* is grasped only by our mental apparatus, and not by the auditory organ. It is said that these two subtle forms of speech form the content of indeterminate and determinate types of knowledge respectively of a *Yogin*, who gets a glimpse of the Eternal Verbum in moments of deep meditation. The next gross manifestation of *Paśyantī* is *Madhyamā*, which is brought into light by the same air, as it reaches, the region of our heart : it is mental in constitution and is apprehended only by our internal sense-organ—the mind, and not by an external sense-organ. The grammarian says that this less gross manifestation of speech is cognised when one shuts up his ears or goes on contemplating on *mantras*. The grossest manifestation of speech, he continues, is *Vaikharī*, which is brought into light by the same air, as it reaches the cavity of our mouth, strikes the palate, and then, turning back touches the different places of articulation : this speech is endowed with a physical form and is apprehended by the external auditory organ.³ He thinks that, the *Vaikharī* form of speech is incompetent to signify concepts ; the momentary sounds or *Nādas* comprehended by our auditory

organs signify meanings, because they possess both the elements of *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*, and it is the former alone that brings ideas into light, the latter being as nonsensical as a sound emanating from a drum and other instruments. The grammarian regards the *Madhyamā* form of speech as identical with *Sphoṭa*, which, as the name suggests, is the only significant entity, and, in its turn, is capable of being equated with *Śabdabrahman* or the Eternal Verbum.

The concept of *Śabdabrahman* is the greatest contribution of Bhartṛhari to the field of the philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar. He declares that, the word-essence or the subtlest form of speech is the only transcendental reality, which lies beyond time and space and eludes all descriptions by means of positive and negative predicates : this ultimate principle of being, bliss and consciousness manifests itself in the line of word, as also that of meaning as the cosmic process starts, and consequently, though in the empirical plane, words and meanings are distinct from each other, in the transcendental plane, they are identical in essence. Bhartṛhari is of opinion that, the universe is a *vivarta* of this *Śabdabrahman*, which is without beginning and end. The term *vivarta*, which Bhartṛhari uses does not convey the technical sense to connote which it is used in later Vedānta works. So while some of his commentators explain the universe as an unreal representation of this supreme principle, others point out that, this is nothing but material transformation of the Absolute Reality. Milk changing into curd illustrates the doctrine of material transformation (*Parīṇāma*) : here the curd is as much real as the milk ; a string appearing as a snake or a mother-o'-pearl appearing as a piece of silver, on the other hand, illustrates the doctrine of formal appearance (*Vivarta*) : here the string is not actually transformed into snake, there being only a case of error of ordinary perception.⁴ Bhartṛhari describes the Eternal Verbum as the underlying principle of the universe and thereby attempts to bring out the supreme importance of the word-element. This importance, he continues, is realised from our ordinary experience also. A reality, to denote which there is no term does not form the content of our knowledge :

a fiction, on the other hand, such as a rabbit's horn or a sky-flower, when conjured up by a verbal expression appears to have existence and becomes amenable to logical predication.⁵ For this reason, the Eternal Verbum is described as the supreme light, that illuminates all objects—realities and fictions alike. It is interesting to note that, while Bhartṛhari himself regards *Paśyantī* as the Eternal Verbum itself and not as its first manifestation in the direction of word, his commentator Puṇyārāja, influenced possibly by Śaiva philosophers describes *Parā* as the Eternal Verbum and *Paśyantī* as its first manifestation in the line of word, the other two subsequent manifestations being *Madhyamā* and *Vaikharī*.⁶ Bhartṛhari maintains that a consummate study of the science of grammar leads the devotee, first of all, to draw a line of demarcation between *Sādhūśabda* and *Apraśabda* and through religious merit, accrued from constant use of *Sādhūśabda* prompts him to leave the plane, of articulate speech and reach step by step to the plane of *Paśyantī* or *Parā*, coming to which he becomes blessed with the vision of *Śabdabrahman*. This is the highest spiritual plane—the summum bonum of all devotees. And so Bhartṛhari describes the science of language as the doorway to emancipation,—the straight King's Highway leading to salvation.⁷

The doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇa is this that, a word is not an assemblage of letters : it is a separate indivisible unit revealed by momentary sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs. As regards the process of comprehension of this significant unit called *Sphoṭa*, that does not admit of division into component parts, Bhartṛhari maintains that, each sound of a simple word reveals the same *Sphoṭa*, and not different ones, because *Sphoṭa* is unitary in character. Thus in the case of the simple word '*Gauh*', which is comprised of three sounds—*ga*, *au* and *h*, he points out, each of the three sounds manifests the same *sphoṭa*. In reply to the objection that, in case of manifestation of the same word-unit by each and every sound, the succeeding sounds become superfluous units, Bhartṛhari says that, although each sound reveals the whole word, there is a qualitative difference in each act of revelation. The first

revelation is indistinct and so subsequent revelations by succeeding sounds are necessary in order to make the comprehension of *Sphoṭa* distinct and clear. As each revelation leaves behind an impression of *Sphoṭa* on the mind, it gradually acquires greater and greater aptitude for comprehending the word-essence, and when the last sound is heard and manifestation of *Sphoṭa* consequential upon it is made, the word-essence is apprehended in its undimmed glory.⁸ A close parallel to this process of comprehension, Bhartṛhari points out, is to be seen in the case of understanding the import of a section of the Vedas or a verse. Each time a particular section or a particular verse is read, we do not have the idea that we are reading new sections or verses, presenting different meanings: rather with each reading the same sense is comprehended, and consequentially, the notion of distinction disappears yielding place to that of identity. Although each reading presents the same idea, the first cognition is not so clear as the second one,—the second one is not so distinct as the third one, and so on. Each subsequent recitation presents clearer and clearer idea, because the preceding readings leave behind their impressions on the mind, and reinforced by these impressions, the mind acquires greater and greater aptitude for comprehending the sense distinctly. Our mind, Bhartṛhari asserts, is such an apparatus that, it requires successive rubbings and polishings in order to have a glimpse of *Sphoṭa*.⁹

The above discussion makes it clear that, while in the view of the Naiyāyika, a word is an assemblage of momentary sounds, in the view of the Vaiyākaraṇa, it is an indivisible eternal and significant word-essence, that is brought into light by the momentary sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs. Although the Mīmāṃsaka believes in the eternality of sounds, he does not favour the *Sphoṭa*—theory of the Vaiyākaraṇa. He does not regard a sound as a momentary phenomenon, as the Naiyāyika thinks, but considers it to be an eternal and omnipresent entity. Thus as it is not impossible for eternal and omnipresent sounds to form into an assemblage, the Mīmāṃsaka does not feel the necessity of falling in line with

the Vaiyākaraṇa and of postulating the entity of *Sphoṭa*. In reply to the possible objection that all the sound-units, conveyed by individual letters being equally permanent and omnipresent, it is difficult to determine which of them would form a group to convey a particular concept, and in case of such non-determination, verbal cognition would become an absurd proposition, he points out that, in order to form into a word and convey a definite idea, the eternal and omnipresent sounds stand in need of manifestation by our speech-organs: it is not possible for unuttered and unmanifested sounds to form into a group called 'word' and thus to signify a particular concept. This assertion of the Mīmāṃsaka refutes, at the same time, the contention of the opponents that, sounds being permanent and present everywhere, the idea of sequence does not arise with reference to them, because the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine clearly states that, words are formed not by unuttered sounds, but by manifested ones only, and it is quite possible to attribute sequence to manifestation of sounds. For this reason, the Mīmāṃsaka maintains, the sequence of sounds is of great importance in a word and a change in this sequence results—as is evident from the words *Saraḥ* (Lake) and *Rāsaḥ* (flavour)—in a change of ideas, as well. He argues that, although manifestations of sounds are momentary actions, and consequently, it is not possible for the manifested sounds to form into a group, yet recollection of all the sound-units simultaneously in the same order in which they were manifested takes place, as the last sound of a word manifests itself, and this happens, because the last manifestation is aided by impressions left on the mind by earlier manifestations, and as recollection of all the sound-units occurs at a time, the particular idea is comprehended. He contends that, the sounds, conveyed by letters apprehended in succession leave behind abiding impressions, which together with the comprehension of the final sound delivers the meaning, and thereby, attributes to memory-impressions an unbelievable capacity, namely, that of delivering the meaning. In reply to the charge that, the Mīmāṃsaka Theory fails to explain the unity of a word, in as much as, it renders it a combination of

sounds, conveyed by letters and thereby invests it with the attribute of multiplicity and thus postulates something opposed to our experience. he states that, in reality, word is nothing but a group having for component parts sounds, conveyed by letters, that form the content of a single cognition, and when one explains a word as a unity, he only transfers the unity of cognition to the content of that cognition, or in other words, the sense of unity of a word is nothing but an illusion. It is interesting to note that though the Mīmāṃsaka standpoint on the nature of a word finds expression in the writings of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, his disciple Maṇḍana-miśra upholds enthusiastically the reality of the *Sphoṭa* as a metaphysical entity and, thus, lends his full support to the doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇa.

The Ālambkārika, as is evident from his express statement that, the theory of Dhvani is based on the doctrine of *Sphoṭa* follows the viewpoint of the Vaiyākaraṇa on the nature of a word. He classifies a word-unit into three types: *vācaka*, *lakṣaka* and *vyañjaka* and maintains that, this classification relates merely to designations and not to the things designated: to state more clearly, there is no separate list of *vācaka*, *lakṣaka* and *vyañjaka* words,—the same word being used as each of these three units under different circumstances.¹⁰ A word that conveys a sense through the function of denotation is called *vācaka*, one that signifies a meaning through the function of Indication is called *Lakṣaka*, and one that brings an implicit idea into expression through the function of suggestion is named *vyañjaka*. Corresponding to these three types of words, there are, he asserts, three types of meaning: *vācya*, *lakṣya* and *vyañya*, that are brought into light respectively through the functions of *Abhidhā*, *Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyañjana*. And this he does, because the relation between a word and its corresponding meaning is by no means such as one can deny. Bhartrhari maintains that, the existence of this relation is sufficiently borne out by the very nature of a word and its meaning: the simple fact that a word is called *vācaka* (one that denotes the sense) and the thing is termed *vācya* (the thing that is denoted) is in itself a strong evidence as to their mutual connection. When it

is said that, 'this thing is denoted by this word' and 'this word denotes this thing', it is necessarily understood that, there is some kind of connection between *vācaka* and *vācya*.¹¹ The ascertainment of exact nature of relation existing between a word and its corresponding idea forms an interesting study, because the different schools of Indian thought seek to explain it in different ways.

II

Abhidhā—the primary denotative Power

The Vaiśeṣika does not regard verbal cognition as a separate valid source of knowledge, which, in his opinion, is two-fold in nature: perception and inference.¹² He thinks that, inference comprehends the case of verbal knowledge, or in other words, conceptual cognitions are cases of inference: the word stands in the same relation to its corresponding idea as does a Probans to a Probandum^{12(a)}. The opponents may here retort that, in order to have a genuine case of Inference, he continues, it is necessary for the Probans and the Probandum to have a fixed and invariable relation between each other, such as conjunction, inherence, causality, identity etc. *Śabda*, however, does not possess conjunction with *artha*, because it is a quality of ether, and a quality does not possess another quality. Secondly, things that are formless and inactive by nature are incapable of making themselves mutually related to one another without the intervention of any external force. Thirdly, the term 'cow' in such expression as: 'the cow does not exist' does not convey the idea of conjunction between the term itself and the thing signified by it, of which nothing but negation is predicated. The same line of argument, the opponent continues, is competent enough to set aside the question of relation of inherence existing between a term and its import.¹³ Nor is the relation of identity capable of being established between a word and its meaning.

In reply to the question as to what then is the relation

existing between a word and its corresponding idea, the Vaiśeṣika points out that, this is a conventional relation and consequently owes its existence to the convention of a particular community : accordingly, this, he says, is artificial and not natural. Thus in the view of the Vaiśeṣika, a word, which is a Probans in inference leads to knowledge of an object, that does not form the content of perception and as such is regarded as a Probandum in the same way, as smoke leads to knowledge of fire, that does not form the object of perception.¹⁴ The Vaiśeṣika points out that, in the case of inference, first of all, the person, who has already known the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum perceives the probans (in the subject) : next he remembers the universal concomitance subsisting between the probans and the probandum. Then arises the synthetic judgement (*parāmarśa*) in the form of 'the subject-as-determined-by-the-probans-as-pervaded-by-the-probandum.' Thereafter, the probandum is inferred in the subject. Likewise in the case of verbal knowledge, the Vaiśeṣika asserts, one must beforehand cognise the denotation of particular words. Thereafter he hears those words and at once remembers the denotation, i.e. the conventional relation subsisting between the words and their corresponding meanings. Then and then only, he understands the meaning of the entire sentence, i.e. to say, his knowledge is verbal in character. The inference may be presented thus : These words possess conventional relation with their respective denotations, which have already been remembered, for the simple reason that, they form a group of words, possessing mutual expectancy, compatibility and proximity.

The Philosophers belonging to the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools, however, do not accept this Vaiśeṣika stand-point as the correct one. They point out that, verbal knowledge does not fit in with the scheme of syllogistic reasoning, as it is said to be by the Vaiśeṣika. The word, no doubt, represents the Probans and the meaning the Probandum, but the subject, which is represented by the hill in the syllogism : *Parvato vahnīmān dhumāt* is conspicuous by its absence. The meaning is incapable of being regarded as the subject, because it does not form the

object of perception, while the subject in all cases is a known and perceived entity. The argument that, the word itself represents the Probans and the subject both involves the fallacy of *Petitio principii*. Secondly, in case of a genuine inference, the Probans and the Probandum remain spatio-temporally associated, but it is not possible to assert this association of *śabda* and *artha*, because while the former resides in the ear-drum, the latter remains in the outside world and the two do not go hand in hand. Thirdly, they point out that, in case of a genuine inference, the Probans invariably and unfailingly leads to the knowledge of the particular Probandum under all circumstances ; for example, smoke always leads to cognition of fire and never to that of water. This characteristic feature of inference, however, is absent in case of our conceptual cognition, in which different ideas are signified by the same word in different countries. Verbal knowledge, therefore, the Naiyāyikas conclude, is something different from inferential cognition, and consequently, the Vaiśeṣika doctrine has no legs to stand upon. The Naiyāyikas further contend that, Inference presupposes an unconditional relation (*svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ*) between the Probans and the Probandum, i.e. to say, the knowledge of the Probans unconditionally without the interference of any external factor leads to the knowledge of the Probandum. But the situation appears totally different in case of verbal knowledge, where the knowledge of denotation (*Samketagraha*) is invariably a determinant factor. Unless and until it is already known, the cognition of word does in no way lead us to the understanding of its meaning.

Although the Mīmāṃsaka joins hand with the Naiyāyika in controverting the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, he differs from the logician on a vital point, in as much as, while the latter regards the relation existing between word and meaning as the product of divine volition, he declares it to be eternal and natural. The words and their corresponding ideas, he says, are not first produced and then get themselves connected with one another : their reciprocal association, he affirms, is fixed by nature.¹⁵ And this he does in his eagerness to maintain the unquestion-

able trustworthiness of the Vedas. According to the Mīmāṃsaka the property of expressiveness inheres eternally in words in the same way as the property of burning inheres in fire. In reply to the question as to why the meanings of words are not grasped by all, he points out that, the power of expressiveness of a particular word with reference to the particular object signified by it, though eternal and natural, stands in need of the knowledge of the conventional relation, prevalent in a particular community in order to generate conceptual cognition. A parallel is to be found in case of sense-organs: though endowed with eternal power of comprehending respective objects, they stand in need of establishing contact with those, if they are to reveal them.¹⁶ As regards the charge that, the use of the same word to convey different meanings in different regions goes to refute the Mīmāṃsaka thesis of inherent eternal power of expressiveness with regard to words, he points out that, though the property of expressiveness is natural and unchangeable, yet conventional relation, knowledge of which goes to make it operative is changeable, and this variation of meaning is due to variation of conventional relation in different countries and communities. Thus the Mīmāṃsaka maintains with all emphasis at his command the thesis of eternal inherent power of expressiveness with regard to words and asserts that, the entity of conventional relation is necessary in order to make this inherent power effective and operative, thereby showing that, the power of expressiveness or *Śakti* or *Abhidhā* is to be distinguished from conventional relation or *Samaya* or *Samketa*.

The Naiyāyika fails to see eye to eye with the Mīmāṃsaka in ascribing the eternal potency of expressiveness to words. This power, he argues, does not stand on a same footing with that of burning inherent in fire, because while the power of burning does not stand in need of its knowledge in order to make it operative, the power of expressiveness depends for its operation on a knowledge of conventional relation, existing between a term and its idea. Thus when it is an imperative necessity to posit conventional relation as an auxiliary factor

in generating verbal cognition in addition to the inherent potency of expressiveness, the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, the Naiyāyika says, entails a violation to the law of simplicity, and as such is to be controverted. The Naiyāyika contention that, the Will of God represents the relation between word and meaning, and there is no such thing as the power of expressiveness, as separate from it, on the other hand, he maintains, is in conformity to the law of parsimony.

The Naiyāyika like the Vaiśeṣika takes care to show the hollowness of the stand-point which explains the relation between a word and its meaning as an eternal one. He denies the existence of any natural relation linking the two, because, as he says, no evidence—either perception or inference—is available in support of this contention.¹⁷ This relation, he continues, is incapable of being explained as conjunction or inherence, because language and meaning does not remain in the same locality: the former originates in the vocal apparatus of the speaker, while the latter lies on earth. But at the same time, it is not possible to assert that, there is no relation, whatsoever, between a term and its corresponding idea. What then is the relation existing between the two? In reply to this query, the Naiyāyika maintains that, the cognition of meaning is not due to any natural connection, but it issues forth from the Will of God, which expresses itself in the following form: 'Let this meaning be comprehended from this word' or 'Let this word signify this meaning'. This Will of God, he says, is the connection that exists between a word and an object symbolised by it, and is identical with the real denotative power of word or *Śakti*.¹⁸ Although the Will of God expresses itself with reference to three factors—*śabda*, *artha* and *bodha*, yet the sound alone is regarded as *vācaka*, because it produces cognition of meaning, and in a similar manner the sense, alone, is regarded as *vācya*, because it forms the content of such cognition, and consequently, there is no possibility of the cognition itself being designated *vācaka* or *vācya*. The Naiyāyika regards a sentence as the only significant unit of speech and points out that, verbal testimony or *śābdabodha* is produced by words.

only when they are related to one another in such a way as to constitute a logically significant sentence.¹⁹ Of this verbal testimony, he says, the primary cause is constituted by knowledge concerning words and the function by recollection of meanings, caused by such words: the knowledge concerning Śakti, he adds, is auxiliary to conceptual cognition, in as much as, a man, bereft of this knowledge fails to recollect objects, even when words are comprehended by him.²⁰ The Naiyāyika contends that, hearing of a particular term leads to recollection of its corresponding idea, with which it is linked on the basis of conventional relation, superimposed by Divine Volition. And this it does, because knowledge of one of the two related things invariably brings in through association of ideas the recollection of the second related entity. Thus the Naiyāyika identifies Śakti or *Abhilāṣā* with *Samketa* or conventional relation which, he says, is wholly artificial, improvised as it is by Divine Will, and his doctrine differs from that of the Mīmāṃsaka in this respect that, while the Mīmāṃsaka differentiates Śakti or power of expressiveness, pertaining to words from *Samketa* or conventional usage, he equates *Samketa* with Śakti and remarks that conventional relation, superimposed by the Will of God alone constitutes the sole cause of conceptual cognition. As to the exact denotation of the term 'samketa', the Naiyāyikas differ among themselves: while ancient logicians refer to the Will of God as the true interpretation of *samketa*, the neo-logicians maintain that the term refers to convention of human origin, as well; thus, according to the neo-logicians, any will—be it human or divine—that expresses itself in the following form: 'Let this meaning be comprehended from this word' constitutes *samketa*.²¹

The Vaiyākaraṇa challenges the doctrine of the Naiyāyika and asserts that, the Will of God is incompetent to link *śabda* with *artha*. A relation, he maintains, is different from the related things and at the same time is responsible for such qualified cognition as the relata are endowed with the particular relation. Thus in case of conjunction of jar with the earth, the relation of conjunction itself, which is different from both the

jar and the earth leads to such knowledge as the earth is possessed of conjunction with the jar. In case of Divine Will, however, which, is said to constitute the relation between word and meaning, we do not have such idea, as this particular word is possessed of Divine Volition or this particular idea is endowed with it. Consequently, the Vaiyākaraṇa concludes, the volition on the part of God does not represent the relation, existing between a word and an object, symbolised by it.²² And this he says, because, according to him, relations always lead to qualified cognition, or in other words, to cognition of the related entities, as possessed of those particular relations, and in his scheme there is no place for such relations, as do not lead to this qualified cognition. The first type of relation is technically known as *Vṛttiniyāmaka* and the second type as *Vṛtṭyāniyāmaka*. The Naiyāyika, however, grants recognition to both these types of relation, and this difference in their epistemological schemes accounts for difference of opinion, concerning the role of Divine Volition between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiyākaraṇa.

Following the footsteps of the Mīmāṃsaka, the Vaiyākaraṇa, also, describes the relation between word and meaning as natural and eternal. This relation, he says, bears analogy to the relation, existing between the sense-organs and the objective world: both are without beginning and end.²³ If words were, he argues, naturally unconnected with their meanings, nobody could have associated the one with the other in any possible way. For this reason, Patañjali, with all emphasis at his command, declares a word, its corresponding idea and the relation existing between the two as eternal entities.²⁴ The Vaiyākaraṇa agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka in another point also. Like the latter, he, too, differentiates Śakti or denotative power from *Sambandha* or the relation existing between the two and maintains that, this *Sambandha* is auxiliary to comprehension of the eternal denotative power, pertaining to words. Following the Mīmāṃsaka's line of argument, he says that, the eternal denotative power of a word stands in need of ascertainment of relation, existing between that particular word and the meaning signified by it

in order to make itself effective and operative. A close parallel is to be found in the illuminative power of a lamp : though this power is inherent in a lamp, yet it operates and illuminates objects, only when connection of lamp with the objects concerned is established. In a similar manner, he says, *Śakti* becomes operative and produces conceptual cognitions, only when the relation of a word with the object symbolised by it is ascertained. *Śakti*, he continues, is to be scrupulously distinguished from *Sambandha* or *Samketa*, and in support of his contention refers to such expressions as : 'This idea constitutes the conventional meaning of this word', 'This meaning is signified by the denotative power of this word' and the like, showing, thereby, the distinction of denotative power from conventional usage or relation.

As regards the nature of actual relation linking *Śabda* and *Artha*, reference is to be made to the *Śabdādhyāsavāda* of the Vaiyākaraṇa. The Vaiyākaraṇa maintains that, although in the empirical plane sound and sense are totally dissimilar and discrete, in popular usage they are completely identified, as is evident from such expressions : 'Om stands for Brahman', 'The two-syllabled word Rāma vanquishes the pride of archers' and the like. To state more clearly, in popular usage the term '*Rāma*' not only stands for an assemblage of four sounds, namely —*R*, *Ā*, *M* and *A*, but also for the man designated by the term. This identity between two distinct entities—*śabda* and *artha*, the Vaiyākaraṇa asserts, is not real : but is caused by an illusory superimposition of the former on the latter. Thus the Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine states that, our popular usage presupposes the complete identity of *śabda* and *artha*, which, however, is unreal being caused by illusory superimposition of one on the other. Now as superimposition takes for granted the real difference between the thing superimposed and the object of superimposition, it is clear that, the Vaiyākaraṇa accepts the thesis that, *śabda* and *artha* are entirely different from each other, but at the same time he affirms that in popular usage identity of *śabda* is superimposed on *artha* through illusion, or in other words, according to him, the relation existing between sound and sense

is difference-cum-identity.²⁵ This explanation of the Vaiyākaraṇa is competent enough to controvert the counter-argument of the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka that, if word and concept were identical, then the utterance of the sound *agni* (fire) would have been accompanied by burning sensation, because, according to him, the difference between word and concept is real and their identity is unreal, being a product of illusory superimposition (*adhyāsa*). But there are other defects in the Vaiyākaraṇa thesis that stand in the way of its acceptance without question. Kumārila points these out and asserts that *Śabdādhyāsavāda* has no legs to stand upon. It is said that, the peculiar doctrine is likely to render all objects signified by homonymous words identical, since things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another : conversely again, it is likely to convert synonymous words into those expressive of different ideas, because such words differ in respect of their constituent letters.²⁶ It is further pointed out that, the basis of superimposition of *śabda* on *artha* is absolutely absent in the present case : neither the two are similar to each other, nor are they spatio-temporally associated in such a way that, the quality of one is capable of being transferred to the other.²⁷

These objections seem to emanate from an insufficient or distorted understanding of the logical character of the meaning-relation. The logic of language demands that meaning as an epistemic relation should primarily belong to the conceptual plane. A very illuminating passage of Helārāja's commentary on the second verse of *Sambandha-samuddeśa* in the third book of *Vākyapadīya* leaves no doubt about what the Vaiyākaraṇa really means to say. Even the opponents should admit that, for the sake of the logical possibility, the apprehension of meaning must move hand in hand with the universalisation of both the word and its meaning. The word as a purely physical existence is not 'a word', but differs from man to man and from utterance to utterance. If we would take the word as a physical sound-series, obviously the speaker and the hearer could not have participated in the apprehension of the same word nor could have a man understood the same thing by the same word

for the second time. Yet the very possibility of communication between man and man depends on the incontestable fact that different individuals must understand the same thing by the same word; otherwise the society would have lost its social character and the individual man would have been exiled into a non-communicative insularity of impervious existence. Hence a word to be the same must transcend its particularity as a physical instance of articulation, and be sublimated to a universal in the realm of conceptual understanding. The meaning too must pass through the same process of purification. When we seem to understand the same 'thing' dog by the word 'dog', we are not supposed to have had perceived the same instance of the canine quadruped barking, hopping and running. Our retained impressions of the past percepts are individually peculiar to each individual. Different impressions of the different individuals are isolated psychic factors carrying an insular existence in the individual minds. Yet we understand each other well enough in linguistic communication to be able to say that we mean the same thing by the same word. Moreover, words are not meant for reference to a thing in its physical presence. They are used for reference to a common meaning when the things are absent. Thus we can communicate with one another only in so far as we can participate in a common fund of meaning. That shows that the thing dog must be universalised into a conceptual understanding before meaning becomes possible.

In the realm of Concepts, the word and its meaning pass into each other and coalesce into a single and monolithic existence. This coalescence is so complete that one can only try to separate the two by violating the very character of the word as the meaningful expression and that of the meaning as the meant referent. Hence Helārāja carefully explains that in the word as the carrier of meaning there is no place for the acoustic sequence of an articulated series. The terms *Vācya* and *Vācaka* are categories of logical analysis. As real categories of conceptual existence they are not two, but one inseparable whole. The meaning is so much fully interpenetrated by the

word that the referential function is also an act of self-reference at the same time. This is the famous doctrine of *Svarūpa-vācya* or *Grāhya śakti* of a word, as it has been propounded by Bhartṛhari and interpreted by Puṇyārāja and Helārāja. If the meaning-relation is a conceptual relation and if the meaning cannot stand in consciousness without being sustained by the word that means, it logically follows that the referential function of a word is impossible without its self-reference. In other words, the word turning on its meaning is the word turning on itself, that is, we cannot take the meaning in consciousness without taking in the word that means, since the two bear a monolithically inseparable existence.

Now if we accept the fundamental position of the *Śabdādvaita* Philosophy, it is only meet to say that, the word passing into its meaning (*arthapakṣanikṣipta*) is the same as the word appearing as its meaning. The meaning then is a superimposition on the word as its sustaining substratum, just as in the rope-snake illusion, the snake is a superimposition on the rope. In the realm of conceptual consciousness, the word appearing as the meaning is the reflection of the metaphysical process in which the one *Śabda-Brahman* appears as the phenomenal world. The word passes into the meaning-consciousness and the meaning-consciousness passes into the objective world. Thus the word is the final substratum sustaining consciousness and the object. These three are at last united in One. Nāgeśa, while showing the meaning-relation as the universal mode of conceptual relation gives a succinct summary of Bhartṛhari and Helārāja on this point.^{27(a)}

In order to fortify the thesis of the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, Nāgeśa advances a number of arguments, of which the most important is the reference made to the use of such expressions as: 'The Jar exists (*Ghaṭo'sti*)' and 'The Jar does not exist (*Ghaṭo nāsti*)'.²⁸ In the first expression, in which existence is predicated of the jar, the term '*asti*', denotative of existence is used in addition to the term '*Ghaṭa*', which is not sufficient to signify existence of the jar in outside world: in the second expression, in which negation is predicated of the jar, the term

'*nāsti*', denotative of non-existence is used side by side with the term '*Ghaṭa*', which does not refer to a jar, that has existence in the objective world. The argument that words signify things as they reside in outside world renders use of the term '*asti*' in the first sentence superfluous and that of the term '*nāsti*' in the second one absurd, because in that case the term '*Ghaṭa*' alone becomes sufficient to denote an existent jar in the first expression; and in the second one it becomes impossible to predicate the negation of an existent entity. Nāgeśa's doctrine, however, explains away these difficulties, in as much as, it maintains that the word '*Ghaṭa*' denotes a jar, residing in the realm of our intellect and consequently, the use of the terms '*asti*' or '*nāsti*' is necessary in order to refer to its existence or non-existence in the outside world. In support of his own doctrine, Nāgeśa quotes the observations of his predecessors, though in some cases he gives them a little twist in order to suit his purpose. Thus, he refers to the detection of reciprocity of casual connection between word and meaning by Bhartṛhari, and maintains that, this is a definite pointer to his own doctrine of identity between *Sphoṭa* and *Bauddhārtha*. Word, Bhartṛhari holds, is an immediate antecedent from which the intended meaning is generally understood and a word, again, is comprehended through the instrumentality of meaning, that is previously ascertained by intellect.²⁹ This observation presupposes the fact that, spatio-temporal association exists between *śabda* and *artha*, because the relation of cause and effect does not exist between entities residing in different times and regions, and as spatial association is incapable of being asserted of word and object, symbolised by it, as residing in the external world, what a word signifies is an object, remaining in the realm of our intellect. In course of explaining the rule '*upadeśe janunāsikāḥ*', Patañjali raises a question as to the identity of Devadatta, and himself answers saying that, the one wearing bangles and earrings and having broad chest and round arms, such is Devadatta. The proposition that, words signify objects as they exist in the outside world renders the use of the expression 'such is' superfluous, in as much as, all the terms used in

the sentence refer to the same object. The contention that, *Bauddhārtha* is signified by a word, however, saves the situation, because the expression—'such is' seeks to establish identity between Devadatta, residing in the outside world and the wearer of bangles and the like, residing in the realm of our intellect. In a similar manner, in course of explaining the rule '*Hetumati ca*', he cites such illustrations as, causes to slay Kāṃsa, causes to bind down Bali, and himself raises the question of propriety of use of verbs in present tense in the sentences quoted: to our common sense it seems that, such use of verbs is improper, because the slaying of Kāṃsa or binding down of Bali is not an incident of present times, but nevertheless to our discerning mind it seems perfectly proper, in as much as, Kāṃsa and his death are capable of remaining present in the realm of one's intellect.³¹ Kaiyaṭa, also, expresses the same opinion in his exposition on the observations of Patañjali under *Matupśūtra*. With the help of a number of illustrations, he makes it perfectly clear that, words signify objects, as they reside in our understanding and not in the outside world of our experience: when existence in the outside world is sought to be predicated, such terms as '*asti*', '*jāyate*' etc. are used in addition to those, denotative of objects themselves. Nāgeśa claims that, his doctrine enjoys the support of the speculations of thinkers, affiliated to different philosophical schools. Thus he quotes the observation of Gautama, according to which, as something cannot grow out of nothing and nothing out of something, an effect, though non-existent in the world of our experience prior to its production and after its destruction resides in the realm of understanding; similarly, he cites the theory of Vācaspati, which states that, the conscious, first of all, gives a stamp of name and form to each and every object of thought and thereafter creates the tangible object in the outside world by bestowing upon it the said name and form: this theory justifies the use of the second case-ending, which is usually added to *Karmakāraka* after *Ghaṭa* in the expression—'*Ghaṭam karoti*', since though the jar is in the process of creation in the world outside, in the realm of our understanding it is an accom-

plished entity. Reference is also made to the *Smṛti* texts, which assert that, all objects from the universe down to the smallest atom reside in the domain of our intellect and not in outside world : as an evidence for this conclusion, they point out to realisation of objects in dreams, errors and states of infatuation, in which the sense-organs do not establish connections with their respective objects of enjoyment.³² Nāgeśa claims further that his doctrine is in conformity to the thesis of Patañjali, according to which *Vikalpajñāna* consists in the cognition of an object, which though an unreal entity appears as real, being conjured up by a mere verbal expression : such an object, though a fiction, it is said, appears in the domain of our understanding following solely the comprehension of a word, significant of it. Bhartṛhari takes note of this magical power of a sound-unit, and maintains that, existential status is conferred by a small verbal form on an object, whose existence is denied by perceptive or inferential knowledge. The doctrine that words signify such objects as are purely intellectual in character, Nāgeśa concludes, justifies the use of such sentences as 'This barren woman's son is going, holding on his head a chaplet of sky-flowers : he has bathed himself in tortoise-milk and is holding a bow of hare's horn'. If the meanings of words were objects residing in the outside world, then such terms as '*Bandhyāsuta*' and the like would not have been used with inflections added therein, in as much as, the case-terminations are added only to *Prātipadikas* and an unmeaning assemblage of letters is not treated as a *Prātipadika*. As, however, meanings of words are objects residing in the realm of our intellect, such terms become significant entities and consequently, capable of being treated as *Prātipadikas*, even though the objects signified by them have nothing to correspond to in the outside world of reality. Thus with irrefutable logic Nāgeśa establishes his own thesis that, *śabla* and *artha* remain identical in our intellect prior to outward manifestation.³³ This indicates him to be an out and out monist, in as much as, it is from the standpoint of all-devouring non-dualism, wherein all distinctions fade away, that the word and its corresponding idea are viewed as identical—as two

undifferentiated aspects of one and the same thing i.e., Supreme Consciousness. This is an extension of Bhartṛhari's doctrine that, the Eternal Verbum is the only Absolute Reality, which manifests itself in the line of name as also of form, as the process of creation goes on. Consequently, in the transcendental plane they are one and the same, though in the empirical plane their manifestations appear to be distinct from one another. Bhartṛhari himself declares sound and sense to be essentially the same, and commenting on this observation. Puṇyarāja maintains that, there is no fundamental difference between word and concept, and they appear to be distinct from each other only in popular usage.

It is interesting to note that, though the *Vaiyākaraṇa* differs from the *Naiyāyika* on many vital points, he agrees with him at least once, in as much as, he too, regards a sentence as the only significant unit of speech. But while the *Naiyāyika* recognises the reality of words and concepts signified by them, even though they be isolated from a sentence, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* defends with a marvellous tenacity the indivisibility of a sentence and repudiates completely the reality of word-units. Gifted with a true Vedantic insight as he is, Bhartṛhari voices the opinion of the ancient seers that, it is the indivisible alone, which is real and it is the divisible, which is unreal. He asserts that, just as letters do not admit of division into component parts, similarly words do not admit of division into component units, and words, again, have no existence of their own apart from the sentence. Puṇyarāja describes in unequivocal language the unreality of word-units and maintains that, this is quite in keeping with the views of both Pāṇini and Patañjali. Both of them take note of the analytical method adopted in the science of language in breaking up a sentence and its component words into units and sub-units and opine that, this artificial method is useful for the understanding of unintelligent people : this, they assert, is a necessary evil, because it helps one to arrive at the supreme truth. In consistency to his doctrine of indivisibility of a sentence, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* attempts to maintain the indivisibility of the meaning, also, signified by it.³⁴ He says

that, just as in the expression—*Brāhmaṇakambalam*, meaning a blanket for a Brahmin, the meaning of the word '*Brāhmaṇa*' has no separate existence of its own apart from the idea conveyed by the whole expression, similarly, the meaning of each individual word loses its separate existence and merges itself absolutely in the complete unit of thought—the meaning of the whole sentence.³⁵ Thus, according to the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, the idea of each individual word loses itself entirely in the concept, expressed by the proposition in its harmonious unity, or in other words, words isolated from a sentence do not actually convey separate meanings. The *Naiyāyika* challenges this doctrine of the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, and says that the very fact that change of words in a sentence is followed by a resultant change in the import of the whole sentence goes to establish the capacity of individual words to signify meanings of their own.³⁶

The *Naiyāyika* describes knowledge of words as the cause of verbal testimony and comprehension of denotative power or *śakti* as auxiliary to it: the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, however, opines that, knowledge of words, as endowed with the power of signification constitutes the cause of verbal cognition. Thus while the *Naiyāyika* mentions the cognition of word and that of its denotative power separately as the causes of verbal cognition,—the first being the primary one and the second being secondary—the *Vaiyākaraṇa* asserts that, the comprehension of words, as possessed of its power of signification alone constitutes the primary cause of verbal cognition. In order to ensure that, his statement does not lead to complexity, he says that, verbal cognition concerning a particular object is caused by a knowledge, qualified by the power of signification, ascertained with reference to that particular object, and commenting on it asserts that, the concept of word is understood automatically through *Samasarga*. Thus, this knowledge qualified by the power of signification, that is put forward as the cause of verbal testimony, he continues, co-inheres in the same substratum with the excited impression of the power of signification and embraces for its content the word, that forms the resort of this power. For this

reason, verbal cognition, it is said, does not accrue to one, who has not ascertained the denotative power of a word or to one, who has lost the memory of such power or to one, who is not conversant with the particular word itself. It is interesting to note that, though the *Naiyāyika* mentions the knowledge of the primary function of denotation (*śakti*) as a secondary cause of verbal cognition, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* regards knowledge, qualified by function in general (*Vṛtti*) as its cause, and in continuation of his assertion states that, power of signification in general or *Vṛtti* appears either in the aspect of denotation (*Śakti*) or in that of Indication (*Lakṣaṇā*) or in that of Suggestion (*Vyañjanā*). Although the *Vaiyākaraṇa* primarily deals with the formation of words and analysis of sentences, and as such does not stand in need of granting recognition to *Vyañjanā* as a separate *Vṛtti*, yet he does so in conformity to his doctrine of *Sphoṭa* in order to account for revelation of the eternal word-essence. Thus in the scheme of the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, *Vyañjanā* exists in mere name, and as regards *Lakṣaṇā*, he maintains that, this is nothing but an unfamiliar *Śakti*, whose operation, is marked by mature intellects only. Consequently, the *Vaiyākaraṇa*'s use of the term '*Vṛtti*', denotative of the function of signification in general in place of the *Naiyāyika*'s '*śakti*', denotative of the primary function of denotation does not change the position much, though in other vital points the views of the two are wide apart from each other.³⁷

On major points the *Ālamkārika* follows the *Vaiyākaraṇa*: as the latter posits the existence of the function of denotation (*śakti*) as something distinct from conventional relation, existing between word and its corresponding concept, so the former, too, scrupulously makes a distinction between denotation and conventional relation, and asserts that, the function of denotation is something different from this relation. Thus both *Mamṣa* and *Viśvanātha* formulate the definition of *Abhidhā* as the primary function capable of bringing the conventional idea (*saṁketito'rtha*) into expression,—a definition, that presupposes the absolute distinction of *Abhidhā* from *Saṁketa*.³⁸

As the writers, affiliated to different philosophical schools

differ among themselves on the nature of relation existing between word and meaning, as also on the justifiability of recognising the power of denotation as something distinct from this relation, so, they differ, also, on the exact nature of conventional meaning, signified through *Abhidhā*. What does a word actually connote? Does it connote the class-element or the individual or the quality and action associated with it? Does the word 'Cow' refer to the generality 'Cowness' or to an individual cow or to qualities and actions, belonging to it? This is a most pertinent question, in furnishing replies to which most of the philosophical sects have expended their substantial energies.

At the first sight it seems plausible that, words connote individuals only and neither generalities nor qualities inherent in them: thus, for instance, the word 'Cow' refers to cow-individual, and neither to the universal element of cowness nor to such qualities as whiteness or blackness, belonging to the cow-individual. This theory is more adoptable to our experience, as it is the individual alone that is capable of being engaged into an action or of being dissuaded from it on account of its capacity of performing purposive action. A close examination of the doctrine, however, reveals that it is vitiated by a number of fallacies, and as such, is unacceptable. The contention that, words refer to individuals only places before us two alternatives, acceptance of neither of which seems sound. Thus the proposition that, the term 'Cow' refers to all cow-individuals leads to the fallacy of endlessness, because it is not possible to know all the cow-individuals of past, present and future times simultaneously. Equally fallacious is the argument that, the term 'Cow' refers to a particular cow-individual, because in that case it is not proper to use the term 'Cow' to signify other cow-individuals, in as much as, such use entails a violation to the maxim that, words connote only those meanings with reference to which their respective conventions are accepted. In ordinary use, however, the term 'Cow' does not refer to a particular cow-individual, but to all individuals belonging to the class, and consequently, the fallacy of violation creeps in. The argument that although a particular cow-individual is

present before our visual organ, yet all the cow-individuals form the content of extra-ordinary perception through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti*, in which the universal element itself serves as the link between the sense-organ and its object of perception, and consequently it is not impossible to ascertain convention of the term 'Cow' with reference to all cow-individuals,—argument, introduced in order to avoid the two fallacies, referred to above does not help us in any way, because, first of all, the existence of *Śāmānyalakṣaṇā-pratyāsatti* itself is open to great controversy and secondly, the contention that the term 'Cow' connotes all cow-individuals, which is based on the correctness of this argument leads to complexity.³⁹ Moreover, the theory that, individuals alone are connoted by words prompts us to treat all the terms in the expression: 'A white moving cow *Dittha*' (*Gouḥ śuklaścalo ditthaḥ*) as synonymous units, in as much as, all of them refer to the same cow-individual and thus renders all attempt to draw the line of demarcation amongst the scopes of different words unreasonable and ridiculous.⁴⁰

As this theory, concerning the connotation of words is untenable, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* adumbrates a new doctrine, according to which, words connote attributes, belonging to the individual and not the individual itself. In the first instance, he classifies an attribute (*upādhi*) into two types: an attribute inherent in a thing (*vastudharma*) and an attribute, superimposed according to the sweet will of the speaker (*vākṛtyadṛcchāsanniveśita*). An attribute inherent in a thing is grouped under two heads: that which is an accomplished entity (*siddha*) and that which is in the process of accomplishment (*sādhya*). An accomplished attribute is further classified into two sub-types: the class-element (*jāti*) and quality (*guṇa*). A *jāti* is an eternal attribute, which inheres in all individuals, belonging to a particular class. The *Vaiyākaraṇa* refers to this attribute as that, which gives the very life to an entity: he says that, by means of its connection with a thing, it renders the thing a proper content of thought and object of expression. *Mamata* quotes an observation, ascribed to *Bhartṛhari*, according to which, a cow-

individual by itself is neither affirmable as a cow nor is distinguishable from non-cows : its positive character of being a cow, as also the negative character of being different from other entities is not intrinsic, but is derived from the inherence of the universal element of cowness in it.⁴¹ In explaining this observation, Jagannātha points out that, the very fact that a cow is neither recognised as a cow nor is differentiated from non-cows so long as the universal element of cowness remains uncognised and is so recognised and differentiated as soon as the universal element is comprehended goes to show that *jāti* alone forms the basis of all affirmative, as well as negative cognitions.⁴² The Vaiyākaraṇa thinks that, such class-names as cow, horse and the like connote the universal elements of cowness, horse-ness etc. as the case may be, and not the cow-individuals, horse-individuals and the like, as they are supposed to be. Illustrations of words signifying qualities are afforded by such terms as 'red' and 'white', that connote the qualities of redness and whiteness respectively. Patañjali explains a quality as something different from generality, action and substance, and describes it as an eternal or transitory attribute, distinct from a substance and appearing in and disappearing from it and found to inhere in individuals, belonging to different species. Thus mahattva, belonging to space is eternal : redness belonging to jar is transitory, being capable of production and destruction : both are regarded as qualities. This description of *guṇa*, as drawn by Patañjali enables us to draw the line of demarcation between a *jāti* and a *guṇa* : while a *jāti* is never found dissociated from the individual in which it resides and distinguishes one class from another, a *guṇa* is capable of being dissociated from an individual and distinguishes a thing from others belonging to the same class or to a different one.⁴³ In drawing the distinction between *jāti* and *guṇa*, Mammaṭa succinctly states that, the universal imparts life to an individual and as such forms its very essence, but a quality is not of the same nature : it is merely a differentiating factor, serving only to mark an individual off from others belonging to the same genus or to a different one. Illustrations of words, signifying actions

are afforded by such terms as '*Gacchati*' and '*Pacati*', that connote the actions of going and cooking respectively. Although an action, also, serves to mark off an individual from others and consequently, becomes a differentiating factor, yet the distinction between *Guṇa* and *Kriyā* is so palpable that it does not stand in need of categorical assertion, in as much as, while *Jāti* and *Guṇa* are accomplished entities, *Kriyā* is in the process of accomplishment : possibly for this reason, Mammaṭa does not proceed to draw the line of demarcation amongst these. An action, it is said, is comprised of a number of sub-actions, amongst which there is a definite sequence : thus, for example, the action-unit of cooking does not refer to a single act, but to a series of movements,—each of which occupy a successive portion of time,—beginning from the lighting of the stove to putting it off. The word '*Pacati*', the Vaiyākaraṇa says, connotes all these events taken together, showing, thereby, that an action has temporal and sequential significance.⁴⁴

A word, significant of a *Samjñā*, the Vaiyākaraṇa says, is different from other categories of words, in this respect that, while others connote attributes inherent in things, this word connotes an attribute, that owes its origin to the caprice of the speaker. As regards the exact nature of this attribute, superimposed on such entities as '*Dittha*', '*Davittha*' and the like according to the sweet will of the speaker, he asserts that, it consists not in the assemblage of sounds, perceived by our auditory organ, but in the eternal word-essence or *Sphoṭa*, which is divested of all idea of sequence and is revealed by the transitory sounds, pronounced by our places of articulation. Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa, the eternal *pada-sphoṭa*, as revealed by a particular proper name is connoted by that name, and not the individual on which it is superimposed.⁴⁵ Jagannātha points out that, though *sphoṭa*, in reality, constitutes an attribute of space, yet it is attributed to the individual according to the whim of the speaker and as such rests on the individual indirectly. Mammaṭa faithfully represents the stand-point of the Vaiyākaraṇa, but other scholars differ among themselves in their interpretation of the Vaiyākaraṇa thesis. Jagannātha

records a few of these observations : while some scholars, he says, assert that the connotation of a proper name consists in the assemblage of sounds, conveyed by letters and endowed with a definite sequence, others maintain that, it is comprised of a substance, as devoid of all objective attributes like the universal, the quality or the action. The second group of scholars, of which Viśvanātha is one, refers to a *Samjñā-śabda* as a *dravya-śabda*, because, in their opinion such a *śabda* refers to the substance itself,—shorn of all attributes that remain unexpressed. Writers who regard the eternal *pada-sphoṭa* or the transitory assemblage of sounds as the connotation of a proper name are of opinion that, the knowledge of the individual follows from the knowledge of the attribute, while those, who regard a substance, that constitutes the substratum of all unexpressed attributes as the connotation of a proper name think that, the cognition of the individual, as divested of all qualities appears straightway : thus while according to the former, the individual forms the content of a determinate cognition, according to the latter, it constitutes the content of an indeterminate one.⁴⁶

The Vaiyākaraṇa thus, speaks of four-fold connotation of terms, which, as he points out, are illustrated by the words, used in the expression : 'A white moving cow Dittha', wherein the words 'cow', 'white', 'moving' and 'Dittha' connote respectively the universal, the quality, the action and the eternal word-essence. The thesis that, words, signifying qualities and actions connote qualities and actions respectively is exposed to the fallacies of endlessness and violation, that go to vitiate the *vyakti-vāda*, in as much as, qualities and actions differ from individual to individual : thus the whiteness of snow is different from that of conch-shell, which again is different from that of milk,—the process of cooking molasses is different from that of preparing rice, and this being the case, it is possible to accept the convention of the word 'whiteness' neither with reference to all patches of whiteness, inhering in all white-individuals nor to some patches of whiteness, residing in some white individuals. In reply to this animadversion, the Vaiyākaraṇa argues that, the data on which the opponent bases his conclusion are wrong,

and as such his criticism of his own doctrine is unsound. The quality of whiteness, he continues, is always one and the same : it presents an appearance of difference on account of difference in substrata only : and such is the case with the act of cooking. A parallel to these is to be found in the face, which though one and the same, appears to be of differing types, when reflected in sword, mirror or oil : it looks long, when reflected in a sword,—round, when reproduced in a mirror and graceful, when caught in oil. Thus, the Vaiyākaraṇa concludes, the unity of the quality and the action is real, their diversity being apparent only, and consequently, the question of vitiation of his theory by the fallacies of *vyabhicāra* and *ānantya* does not arise at all.⁴⁷

The question whether the word '*Paramāṇu*', meaning an atom signifies the universal element of atomness or the quality of a particular measurement forms an interesting study. The Vaiśeṣika regards measure as a quality, of which atomness, shortness or length are but different types and so he is of opinion that, the word *Paramāṇu* signifies a quality. He does not find it possible for him to regard this word as connotative of the universal atomness, because, in his scheme atomness is not a universal element at all. Following a section of the Naiyāyika, the Vaiśeṣika recognises cross-division as an impediment, standing in the way of an attribute receiving the status of a universal. It is said that in those cases, where more than one universal elements co-inhere in the same substratum, a close examination reveals the universals to be associated through the relation of comprehensive and comprehended ; if this relation does not exist between them and yet they are found to co-inhere in the same substratum, they are not capable of being regarded as universals in the strictest sense of the term. Thus the attribute of substanceness (*Dravyatva*), which comprehends within its scope that of earthness (*Prthivītvā*), which, again, includes within its domain that of jariness (*Ghaṭatva*) is found to inhere in the same jar along with the attributes comprehended under it, and accordingly, all these attributes are competent to receive recognition as universals.

Of *Bhūtatva* and *Mūrtatva*, however, the case is a different one : though both these attributes co-inhere in earth, water, fire and air, yet the relation of comprehensive and comprehended does not exist between them, in as much as, while *Bhūtatva* alone resides in space, *Mūrtatva* alone exists in mind ; and for this reason the Vaiśeṣika denies the status of universal element to both these attributes. The attribute atomness (*Paramāṇutva*), the Vaiśeṣika thinks, stands on the same footing with *Bhūtatva* and *Mūrtatva*, because while in an atom of earth it co-inheres with earthness, the relation of comprehensive and comprehended does not exist between the two : this is evident from the fact that, while in an earthen jar, the attribute of earthness, alone, of the two is present, in an atom of water, the attribute of atomness alone resides. This consideration leads the Vaiśeṣika to deny the status of *Jāti* to *Paramāṇutva*, which he regards as a *Guṇa* and consequently, he maintains that the term '*Paramāṇu*' is significant of a quality. The *Ālankārika* differs from the Vaiśeṣika in the justifiability of regarding cross-division as a *jāti-vādhaka* : following the Vedāntin and a section of the Naiyāyikas, he challenges the propriety of doing so, because, as he argues, a strict application of this principle is likely to deny the status of universal element to all attributes of wider scope, such as *Prithivīatva* and the like, in as much as, though such attributes are found to reside in the same substrata in some cases along with the attributes of lesser scope, in other cases, they inhere in substances alone. He thinks that, absolute sameness of cognition itself is competent to extend the status of *Jāti* to an attribute : as with reference to atoms, we have identical cognitions, nothing stands in the way of '*Paramāṇutva*' being reckoned as a universal. For this reason, he regards the term '*Paramāṇu*' as one significant of universal element : its *Guṇavācakatva*, he continues, is purely technical.

In consistency to his own thesis that, objects are eternally related to eternal words, the Mīmāṃsaka holds that, meanings, also, are eternal entities and accordingly, all terms are connotative of universals. He challenges the propriety of regarding individual qualities, actions and substances as the connotation of

terms, as the Vaiyākaraṇa thinks, because, as he points out, these are susceptible to change and destruction, and as such, incapable of being brought into permanent relation with eternal words. The Mīmāṃsaka holds that, all words, without fail connote the universal or class-element. Thus the term 'cow' signifies the universal cowness, the term 'white' the universal whiteness and the term 'cooking' the universal cookingness. In contradiction to the position advocated by the Vaiyākaraṇa that, the unity of qualities, actions and substances is real and their diversity is only apparent, the Mīmāṃsaka asserts that, these are actually of diverse types and the identical recognition of all of them is a definite pointer to the inherence of universals in them. Thus, he argues, though the quality of whiteness differs from individual to individual, yet due to the presence of the universal element of whiteness in the different patches of the same colour, the term 'white' is used to denote all of them, and consequently, what constitutes the connotation of the term 'white' is the universal whiteness : and the same is the case with the term 'cooking'.⁴⁸ The Mīmāṃsaka goes so far as to declare that even proper names connote universals and he establishes his position in this way. The substance, signified by the proper name '*Dittha*' constantly changes its form and colour, yet the same term '*Dittha*' is used to denote all these different substances because the objective universal *Ditthatva* is present in all of them : this universal, the Mīmāṃsaka points out, constitutes the connotation of proper names. He further points out that, even if the substance, denoted by the term '*Dittha*' be taken as always remaining one and the same, a *śabdagata-jāti* is capable of being put forward as the connotation of the term. Thus, though the sound *Dittha*, as pronounced by an octogenarian is different from that uttered by a child, which again is distinct from that chattered by a parrot, yet we recognise these three sound-groups as being essentially identical : and this recognition points out to the existence of a universal element '*Ditthatva*', common to all utterances of the sound-group. The Mīmāṃsaka asserts that, the proper name '*Dittha*' connotes either the universal element, common to all forms of the substance or the

generality, common to all utterances of the sound group.⁴⁹ Thus, with strongest arguments, he establishes his own thesis that all words primarily signify the universal. In order to account for comprehension of the individual, which is certainly understood in such expressions as 'a cow is to be slaughtered', the Mīmāṃsaka relies on *Lakṣaṇā*: thus, according to him, the individual, that forms the substratum of the universal is brought into light through *Lakṣaṇā*, while the latter is denoted through *Abhidhā*.⁵⁰

The Naiyāyika does not agree with the Mīmāṃsaka on this issue also. The Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, first of all, he points out, does not enable us to relate the sense of the case-endings with that of the stem, to which they are added.⁵¹ A *Vibhakti*, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa signifies three ideas taken jointly—vocal, number and gender, and these ideas, are incapable of being asserted of a universal, which is essentially shapeless and unitary in character. The attempt to save the situation by taking recourse to the argument that, the individual, which is comprehended through *Lakṣaṇā* is capable of being construed with *Kāraka*, *linga* and *saṁbhyā* and as such the difficulty referred to above does not arise proves futile. This argument states that, the universal is first cognised through *Abhidhā*, then the individual is apprehended through *Lakṣaṇā* and subsequently gender and number are construed with the individual. This type of conceptual cognition, however, does not conform to our experience, in as much as, gender and number are always construed with the conventional meaning, signified through *Abhidhā*, and the intervention of *Lakṣaṇā* seems absurd. Moreover, *Lakṣaṇā* presupposes temporal sequence, which, however, is not traced between comprehension of the universal and that of the individual: our experience reveals that the individual is cognised simultaneously with the universal, which does not remain without a substratum.⁵² Secondly, the Naiyāyika argues, the Mīmāṃsaka doctrine renders the words 'Go' and 'Gotva' synonymous units—both signifying the sense of the universal element of cowness, and thus converts the suffix 'tva' into a non-entity, having no special significance of its own. Thirdly,

he points out, it is not in conformity to the thesis that, the contents of perceptual and conceptual cognitions are identical. When a cow is seen, not only the universal cowness is perceived but the qualities and actions, as also the physical arrangement of the cow is known through perception: similarly, when the word 'cow' is heard, not only the universal cowness is comprehended, but the universal, the quality, the action, the substance,—all these taken together are cognised.⁵³ The Mīmāṃsaka doctrine, he argues, does not take notice of our ordinary experience and thus is not rational from the empirical point of view. As the Mīmāṃsaka thesis does not stand the test of criticism, the Naiyāyika, the most rational of all the philosophers puts forward his own thesis, according to which, the connotation a term consists in the universal, the individual and the configuration taken together, or in other words, a word connotes the individual, as characterised by the universal and possessed of a physical arrangement.⁵⁴ The Naiyāyika maintains that, though the connotation of terms is cumulative in character and as such, all the three constituents of it, namely, the universal, the individual and the physical arrangement are equally present in all cases, yet the emphasis placed on one of these elements, varies from place to place: in some instances, the universal is in the forefront,—in others, the individual is principally connoted, and in yet others, the configuration or physical arrangement is the main content; thus, in the proposition: 'A cow is not to be touched by feet', the emphasis is on the universal,—in the proposition: 'Tether the cow' it is on the individual,—and in the sentence: 'Draw the picture of a cow' it is on the configuration.⁵⁵ The Naiyāyika takes care to show that though his doctrine includes the individual within the connotation of terms, yet it is not exposed to the fallacies of *Anantya* and *Vyabhičāra*, because, as he says, a particular individual, possessing a particular colour or a particular action is not connoted by a term,—but what actually is connoted is the individual that forms the substratum of the universal: thus, as the universal constitutes one of the constituents of connotation, the possibility of vitiation of the theory by the fallacies,

referred to above does not exist. As the individual is comprehended through *Abhidhā* in his theory, the Naiyāyika does not feel the necessity of taking the help of *Lakṣṇā* in order to account for its cognition; his theory, he says, explains the simultaneous comprehension of the universal and the individual, and thereby shows that, no temporal sequence exists between the cognition of *jāti* and that of *vyakti*. It enjoys another advantage over the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsaka, in as much as, it renders construction of gender and number with the connotation of a term possible, because though the universal is amorphous, the individual is not so. The Naiyāyika advances another purely scholastic argument in order to show that his doctrine is more in conformity to the law of parsimony than that of the Mīmāṃsaka. Thus the proposition that the term connotes the individual, as the substratum of the universal renders the universal itself a determinant of connotation: the theory that the term connotes the universal, alone, however, renders the attribute universalhood a determinant of connotation. Of the two concepts: the universal and the universalhood,—to put it more clearly, of *Gotva* and *Gotvatva*,—the latter is much more complex than the former, because while *Gotva* is an attribute common to all cows, *Gotvatva* is an attribute that inheres in the universal, residing in all cow-individuals and serves to differentiate cows from non-cows. Thus as the body of the determinant of connotation (*śakyatūnacchedaka*) is much more long in the second instance, than in the first one, the Naiyāyika asserts, the first is to be preferred to the second.⁵⁶

In conformity to his metaphysical doctrine, the Buddhist fails to accept any one of the views, adumbrated by orthodox philosophers on the issue of connotation of terms. Nothing is, he contends, constant and lasting in the continuous flux of changes, and accordingly, the individual entity is a momentary one. As regards the universal, he points out that, its existence as a positive entity itself is open to great controversy: neither does it subsist eternally nor is it shared by all individuals, who are really discrete and as such, unable to share it in common. But, nevertheless, we comprehend all cow-individuals

as cows and use the same term 'cow' to signify all of them. In reply to the question as to what leads to this identity of cognition and verbal usage, the Buddhist points out to the property of being different from non-cows, and asserts that this property is shared equally by all cow-individuals. Thus though the Buddhist denies the existence of the universal as a synthesising principle, he recognises the power of the negative concept of negation of the contrary to synthesise things in the same way as is done by the positive concept of the universal. The universal, it is said, presents itself in two aspects: positive and negative; in its positive aspect it creates similar or identical cognitions, and in negative aspect differentiates a thing from others, belonging to other class: to quote an illustration, differentiates a cow from not-cows. The Buddhist takes note of this negative aspect only and asserts that the term cow connotes the negative concept of being not not-cow, or to put it in a more general way, the connotation of a term consists in 'negation of the contrary'. The doctrine that a word signifies negative concept, having no objective reality helps the Buddhist to establish the falseness of verbal cognition.⁵⁷

Mammaṭa records these conflicting doctrines, but true to the tradition of an Ālankārika, who follows the Vaiyākaraṇa on vital points endorses the Vaiyākaraṇa stand-point on this issue. Thus in his *Śabdavyāpāravicāra* he makes express mention of four-fold connotation of terms and in his treatment of *Virodhūlankāra* speaks of ten possible cases of this figure, resulting from conflict between any two of the four ontological categories—the universal, the quality, the action and the substance. Viśvanātha follows the footsteps of Mammaṭa, and Jagannātha, too, asserts that the causes of application of words to signify particular objects to the exclusion of other words are four, showing, thereby, that the whole cognisable universe is capable of being grouped under any one of the four above-mentioned categories.⁵⁸ It is interesting to note that, though Mammaṭa and Jagannātha are in agreement with the doctrine of the Vaiyākaraṇa, they lend their support to *Jātiśaktivāda*, as well, as is evident from fuller treatment given to this

doctrine in their respective works. And this they do, because this theory enjoys the support of the great grammarian-philosopher Bhartṛhari. In his speculations on the exact nature of *Padārtha*, he introduces the concept of the great universal, that permeates the entire universe and manifests itself in different forms and individuals. A word whether connotative of the universal or the individual, Bhartṛhari points out, ultimately connotes this great universal, that gives the loftiest notion of a class one can conceive of : and this, he asserts, is true of stems, verbal roots and suffixes.⁵⁹ This makes it clear that Mammāṭa and Jagannātha extend recognition to *Jātiśakti-vāda*, not so much out of respect for the Mīmāṃsaka as in deference to the peculiar doctrine of Bhartṛhari.

According to the *Vaiyākaraṇa* and the *Ālankārika*, *Abhidhā* or the power of expressiveness is of three different types : *Rūḍhi*, *Yoga* and *Yogarūḍhi*. The first type of expressiveness is determined simply by convention, the second type merely by derivation and the third both by convention and derivation. Corresponding to these three types of the power of expressiveness, there are three distinct groups of words : *Rūḍha*, *Yaugika* and *Yogarūḍha*. The first group is comprised of such words as '*Gauḥ*' and the like, whose derivative or analytical meaning does not correspond with their innate signification ; thus the analytical meaning of the term '*Go*' is a moving being, but its popular signification, to convey which it is used, is the cow-individual, not affected in any way by the derivative meaning, referred to above. The second group is comprised of such words as '*Pācaka*', '*Pāṭhaka*' and the like, which denote the same meanings as are conveyed by component parts into which such words are capable of being grammatically analysed. Thus while a *Rūḍha* word denotes its innate idea alone, a *Yaugika* simply signifies its derivative meaning. The third group of *Yogarūḍha* words is comprised of such words as '*Pañkaja*' and the like, which combine in themselves twofold signification—conventional as well as derivative : of these words, the derivative meaning, qualifies the conventional one, and thus, the word '*Pañkaja*' denotes neither a lotus alone, nor anything grown in

mud, but it refers to a lotus, that grows in mud. Quoting the authority of Patañjali, Nāgeśa states that, in some cases *Yogarūḍha* words denote simply the idea assigned to them by convention and in others convey merely the derivative meaning ; in such cases, he continues, either the *Yoga-śakti* or the *Samudāya-śakti* is restricted by intention of the speaker. Others, however, fail to agree with Nāgeśa on this point. They maintain that such words are to be recognised as belonging to a different group, known as *Yaugikarūḍha* words. Illustration of this group, it is said, is afforded by the word '*maṇḍapa*', which conveys two distinct meanings—'house' and 'one who takes gruel'—one following from the word as a whole, and other from its etymological interpretation. The *Yaugika-rūḍha* is incapable of being equated with the *Yogarūḍha*, because there is considerable difference between the two.⁶⁰ Thus while of a *Yoga-rūḍha śabda* the conventional and derivative meanings emanate at the same time, of a *Yaugika-rūḍha śabda* the conventional alone is comprehended in one case, and the derivative alone in another : secondly, while the two meanings, denoted by the former mutually correspond with each other, the ideas denoted by the latter are quite distinct, that is to say, the meaning conveyed by *samudāya-śakti* seems to be altogether different from that conveyed by *avayava-śakti*.

Another problem that deserves mention is the question whether an *apaśabda* is endowed with expressiveness or not. Patañjali uses the two terms *apabhraṃśa* and *apaśabda* as synonyms, and says that, a single Sanskrit word '*go*' gives rise to a number of *apaśabdas* as *Gāvī*, *Gonī* etc. *Apaśabda*, he says, represents any corrupt form of speech, that has lost its pristine sanctity. Thus, while, on one hand, it comprehends words that do not conform to the rules of Sanskrit Grammar, on the other hand, it includes all forms of *Prākṛta*, because they are nothing but corruption in relation to Sanskrit. Bhartṛhari mentions two divergent views as regards the expressiveness of an *apaśabda* : according to one view, an *apaśabda* is not significant by itself, but its apparent expressiveness depends upon inference of the correct word, which alone is the significant unit : according to

another view, an *apaśabda* is equally endowed with the power of denotation, the only difference between a correct and corrupt form of speech lying in the fact that, while use of the former leads to religious merits, the use of the latter produces demerits.⁶¹ The first view, recorded by Bhartṛhari represents the Naiyāyika thesis and the second the Vaiyākaraṇa one. The Naiyāyika denies expressiveness to an *apaśabda*: he says that, when a corrupt word is comprehended, its corresponding correct word is recalled and the sense is conveyed through the power of denotation belonging to this correct word. This proposition, however, seems unacceptable, because the meaning of a corrupt word is cognised even without recalling its corresponding correct form: moreover, sense is comprehended even by uneducated people who are blissfully ignorant of Sanskrit.⁶² To obviate this difficulty, Gaṅgeśa suggests another process: he maintains that, the power of denotation of an *apaśabda* is the result of false attribution, or in other words, sense is comprehended from such a word, because it is erroneously regarded to be endowed with expressiveness.⁶³ Thus in a most ludicrous manner the Naiyāyika attempts to explain away the cognition of a meaning from a corrupt word, because his peculiar doctrine that, words owe their expressiveness to Divine volition compels him to deny denotative power to such words. The process suggested by Gaṅgeśa, however, does not take us out of the woods, because conceptual cognition resulting from comprehension of a corrupt word is experienced as a right notion, and is not sublated by other notions, gathered later. The very fact that when an uneducated man fails to grasp the exact meaning of a Sanskrit term, to signify which precisely, its corresponding corrupt form is used goes to show that, an *apaśabda* is as much endowed with the power of denotation as is a *śabda*.⁶⁴ So the Vaiyākaraṇa does not deny expressiveness to an *apaśabda*: he thinks that the meaning is as regularly denoted by it as by the so-called correct word. But, nevertheless, he asserts, a line of demarcation is capable of being drawn between them: while use of a correct word leads to religious merit, that of a corrupt word leads to demerit, and consequently, the first is to be preferred to the

second. This theory, he further maintains, justifies the attempt on the part of the Mīmāṃsaka and the Vaiyākaraṇa to distinguish between two meanings of the same word—one used among the Aryans and the other among the Mlecchas. Thus the word *Yava* is used among the Aryans to denote barley-corn: among the Mlecchas, however, it is used to denote long-pepper. In reply to the question as to which of these two meanings is more authoritative and acceptable, the Mīmāṃsaka answers that, the sense to signify which the word is used in the Vedas is to be regarded as more authoritative than that in which it is used among the Mlecchas: and following him, the Vaiyākaraṇa also says that, the meaning supported by the *śiṣṭas* is to be preferred to that, backed by the Mlecchas.⁶⁵ He further asserts that, constant use of correct words leads to religious merit as well as an intellectual training, and thereby helps us to have a vision of the Absolute Reality. For this reason, he tenders advice to study reverentially the science of language, which, as he says, is the treatment, capable of curing the impurities of speech,—the open gateway to liberation. These linguistic speculations and assertions point out to eagerness of ancient teachers to preserve the pristine sanctity of Sanskrit, by checking the infiltration of loan-words into its vocabulary.

III

Lakṣaṇā—the secondary power of signification

Just as a great controversy rages over the role of *Abhidhā* and exact connotation of terms, similarly the nature of *Lakṣaṇā* also forms the subject-matter of an animated discussion. The *Ālankārika* defines it as a function that brings into comprehension a meaning, connected with the primary one: this function, he says, starts to operate relying either on usage or on some motive when the primary meaning, signified through the function of denotation becomes incompatible with the rest of the sentence.⁶⁶ This definition gives us an idea of the three things needed for operation of *Lakṣaṇā*, which are (1) inappli-

cability of the primary meaning in the given context, (2) existence of some definite relation between the primary and secondary ideas, and (3) usage or purpose. Of these three requisites, the first supplies the reason for operation of *Lakṣaṇā*, in as much as, it says that, the help of this function is sought, when it becomes impossible to establish logical connection of the primary meaning of a particular word with concepts of other words, used in a sentence; the second gives us a clue to the acceptance of a particular meaning, other than the conventional one to the exclusion of other ideas: it says that, *Lakṣaṇā* conveys only that sense, which is related in some form or other to the explicit one; the third presents the justification for taking recourse to this round-about process, by showing that it serves a definite purpose: it asserts that, in those cases where *Lakṣaṇā* is not based on usage it brings home a motive and thus bears fruit. Thus according to the *Ālankārika*, *Lakṣaṇā* is a function capable of bringing a secondary sense into light: just as he does not equate *Abhidhā* with *Samketā* or the conventional relation, existing between word and its corresponding concept and says that, the power of expressiveness is something different from this conventional relation, similarly he does not define *Lakṣaṇā* in terms of a relation existing between the primary and secondary ideas, but, on the other hand, mentions this relation as a factor necessary for operation of this function, and thereby shows that the function itself is something different from relation.

As an illustration of *Lakṣaṇā* based on usage, Mammāṭa quotes the expression: '*Karmāṇi kuśalaḥ*', in explaining which he says that, as the primary meaning of the term '*Kuśala*', which 'a cutter of *kuśa* grass' is inapplicable in the present context, what actually is comprehended through *Lakṣaṇā* is the idea of an expert, who is similar to the cutter of *Kuśa* grass in point of discrimination: this *Lakṣaṇā*, he points out, is based on usage, because the term '*Kuśala*' itself has gained currency to convey the idea of the expert. Viśvanātha criticises this observation of Mammāṭa and maintains that, the idea of the expert itself constitutes the conventional meaning of the term '*Kuśala*', and

consequently, it does not stand in need of taking the help of Indication for its expression. As regards the sense of the cutter of *Kuśa* grass, he is of opinion that, it merely forms the etymological meaning of the term, which is not identical, in all cases, with its conventional meaning: and this happens, because, while etymology is regulated by the convenience of grammarians, convention is regulated by usage and practice. The expression: '*Gaṇjāyāṇ ghōṣaḥ*', meaning 'a herd-station on the Ganges', Mammāṭa adds, furnishes an example of *Lakṣaṇā* based on motive. In explaining it, he says that, as logical connection of a flowing mass of water, which constitutes the primary meaning of the term '*Gaṇjā*' is incapable of being established with a herd-station, *Lakṣaṇā* brings the idea of the bank of the Ganges into light: this function, he continues, leads us to think of the excess of coolness and purity,—an idea, which is not likely to be comprehended from such simple expression: 'A herd-station on the bank of the Ganges'. Viśvanātha, also, cites it as an illustration of Indication based on purpose: in fact, this stock-example is quoted by all later writers on the subject. As regards an accurate example of Indication based on usage, Viśvanātha puts forward the expression: '*Kaliṅgaḥ sūhasikaḥ*', meaning 'the Kaliṅga is brave', in which, the term '*Kaliṅga*' is said to signify through *Lakṣaṇā* the idea of an inhabitant of the land named Kaliṅga. Here the relation linking the primary meaning with the secondary one is that of container and the thing contained, and the particular term is used in the secondary sense because it is the usual practice of men to use that particular term to convey that particular idea. Indication based on usage is similar to the function of denotation, in as much as, both bring such ideas into light as are handed over by tradition. For this reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa denies the status of a separate *Vṛtti* to Indication based on usage: he says that *Nirūḍhi-Lakṣaṇā* is identical with *Abhidhā*.

According to the *Ālankārika*, *Abhidhā* is a power belonging to words, while *Lakṣaṇā* is a function belonging actually to the primary meaning, and not to the word-unit. He says that, when the explicit idea of a term becomes incompatible with the

concepts of other terms used in the proposition, the explicit idea itself conveys the secondary sense through the function of Indication, belonging to it : this function, however, is attributed to the word, significant of that explicit idea and the word-unit, also, is said to be possessed of it through transference of epithet. Thus Mammāṭa describes *Lakṣaṇā* as '*Sāntarārthanisṭhaḥ śabdavyāpārāḥ*', which clearly indicates his view that, though Indication is commonly regarded as belonging to a word-unit, it actually belongs to the primary meaning, whose comprehension intervenes cognition of word and that of the secondary sense : and Viśvanātha more clearly expresses his opinion that, though *Lakṣaṇā* does not belong naturally to a word, it is attributed to it, showing, thereby, that a word-unit is said to be possessed of Indication only through courtesy.⁶⁷ The Ālankārika thinks that, this function pertains not only to the explicit meaning of a term, but to the import of a whole proposition, as well. Thus he cites the sentence : 'O friend, by doing great good to me you have shown your goodness ; behaving in this fashion may thou live for hundred autumns' ! as an illustration of *Dhvanī* based on Indication and says that, in the sentence under consideration, the import of the whole proposition conveys through *Lakṣaṇā* the idea that, great harm has been done to the speaker by the person spoken to.⁶⁸

Like the Ālankārika the Mīmāṃsaka also considers *Lakṣaṇā* as a function belonging to the primary meaning, conveyed through the function of denotation. He is of opinion that, in all cases, *Abhidhā* connotes the universal, and thereafter ceases to function : it is *Lakṣaṇā* that brings the idea of the individual into comprehension, and subsequently signifies the import of the proposition. Kumārilabhaṭṭa makes it abundantly clear⁶⁹ and following him Mukulabhaṭṭa cites the expression : '*Gourambandhyak*', meaning : 'a cow is to be immolated' as an example of *Lakṣaṇā*. In explaining this, he says that, as establishment of logical connection between immolation and the universal cow-hood is an absurd proposition, the universal being an eternal entity, what actually is understood is that the cow-individual is to be sacrificed, and this idea of the individual

is signified through Indication. Mammāṭa challenges this observation of the Mīmāṃsaka, and asserts that, *Lakṣaṇā* is incompetent to signify the idea of the individual, because all the factors necessary for its operation are not present,—the so-called Indication being based neither on usage nor on purpose. In reply to the question as to what then brings the idea of the individual into light, he points out to Presumption or *Arthāpatti*, which though recognised as a separate source of knowledge by the Mīmāṃsaka is comprehended under *Anumāna* by the Naiyāyika. This Presumption, it is said, consists in postulation of a cause, competent to explain the known effect which is to be accounted for : in its stock-example : '*Pino Devadatto divā na bhunkte*', meaning : 'Fat Devadatta does not eat during day-time', the taking of nocturnal meal by Devadatta is posited in order to account for the fatness of Devadatta. Mammāṭa thinks that, in the expression : 'a cow is to be sacrificed', the sense of the individual is capable of being cognised through *Arthāpatti*, because, the universal does not reside without its substratum—the individual, and consequently, the existence of the universal necessarily implies that of the individual.⁷⁰ This theory of the Ālankārika, however, is open to serious objection, in as much as, it entails a violation to the maxim that an object, known through conceptual cognition alone is capable of being brought into harmonious relation with other such objects, forming the content of verbal knowledge or in other words, an expectancy, raised by a *śabdārtha* is to be fulfilled by a *śabdārtha* alone. And a *śabdārtha* is an object, that is cognised from a word through any one of the functions of *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā* merely : a meaning that is known through implication or inference is not regarded as a *śabdārtha*. The proposition that, a meaning known through implication or inference, also, constitutes a *śabdārtha* gives it a wide scope, so as to include the concepts of an able-bodied sacrificer and a sharp weapon within the import of the proposition : 'A cow is to be sacrificed', which, however, seems absurd. Thus, it is possible to point out that, if the Ālankārika doctrine concerning the comprehension of the individual were accepted, it would not

have been proper to enter it into verbal concordance with others, since such action would have thrown to winds the principle: 'Śābdī hi ākāṅkṣā śabdenaiva pūryate'. For this reason, the Naiyāyika, whose approach to most of the problems is very rational from the empirical point of view, instead of depending either on *Arthāpatti* or on *Lakṣaṇā* for the cognition of the individual, simply states that, the universal, the individual and the configuration conjointly constitute the connotation of terms.

While most of the Ālankārikas posit the existence of two types of *Lakṣaṇā*—one based on usage and the other on purpose, the Mīmāṃsaka, though granting recognition to the first type, namely, Indication based on usage asserts that, this is as good as *Abhidhā*, because like the latter conveying an idea fixed by convention, this, too signifies a sense, assigned to the word by tradition.⁷¹ This observation, possibly, supplies a clue to Mahimabhaṭṭa to declare the absolute identity of *Nirūḍhi-Lakṣaṇā* with *Abhidhā*.

In his eagerness to establish the correctness of an *Arthavāda*, which merely extols the *Vidhi* and, thereby, indicates in a round-about manner the advisability of following the injunction, the Mīmāṃsaka feels the necessity of describing *Lakṣaṇā* as a function pertaining, as well, to the import of a proposition, and accordingly explains it as a power, competent to bring into comprehension an idea, related in some form or other to a complete thought-unit, presented by a significant entity.⁷² This explanation renders an *Arthavāda* a proper field of its operation, in as much as, such a sentence merely praises a Vedic rite and the idea that, performance of such a rite is beneficial is brought into light through Indication alone. The Mīmāṃsaka takes every care to establish his proposition and shows that in the expression: '*Gabhīrāyām Nadyām Ghoṣik*', meaning 'a herd-station on the deep river', the concept of the bank of the fathomless river is signified through Indication neither by the term, '*Gabhīrā*' alone, nor by the word '*Nadī*' singly nor by both the words severally: this concept, he asserts, is conveyed through Indication by both the terms

conjointly. Thus, the word '*Gabhīrā*' does not convey the idea of the bank, because such an eventuality renders its connection with the sense of the word '*Nadī*' hopelessly difficult, in as much as, the bank is not identical with the river itself: nor does the word '*Nadī*' signify the sense of the bank, since it is equally difficult to establish connection of bank with depth, in as much as, the bank itself is not fathomless. Nor do both the words convey their respective secondary meanings separately,—the one signifying 'deep bank' and the other 'the bank of the river',—because what is actually cognised is the idea of the bank of the fathomless river and a total of these two concepts—'deep bank' and 'the bank of the river' does not make up the sense of the bank of the fathomless river. The argument that either the word '*Gabhīrā*' alone signifies the sense of the bank of the fathomless river and the word '*Nadī*' helps us to ascertain the intention of the speaker and fix up the exact secondary meaning or the term '*Nadī*' alone conveys the afore-said idea and the term '*Gabhīrā*' helps us in the same manner to determine the desire of the speaker proves futile, because for want of decisive evidence it is very difficult to choose between the two alternatives; the point that the term '*Nadī*' is denotative of a tangible object, whose connection with the bank is more intimate and real and consequently, the second of these two alternatives is acceptable leads us nowhere, because equally forceful is the point that the word '*Gabhīrā*' is connotative of a quality, whose connection with the bank is more intimate, in as much as, a quality does not reside without a substratum and hence the first alternative is the better of the two. Thus as none of these alternatives stand the test of reason, the Mīmāṃsaka concludes, the intended idea of the bank of the fathomless river is conveyed through Indication by a collection of two mutually related words—'*Gabhīrā*' and '*Nadī*' conjointly.

The Naiyāyika doctrine, however, presents a completely different picture of *Lakṣaṇā*. In consistency with his doctrine that, *Śakti* is identical with the relation, existing between a word and its corresponding concept, as is fixed by Divine

Volition, the Naiyāyika defines *Lakṣaṇā* also in terms of a relation and asserts that it consists in the relation linking a secondary sense with the primary one. Here also he relies upon the principle that, of two related things, cognition of one leads to recollection of the other, and asserts that just as in case of comprehension through *śakti*, the knowledge of the word-unit causes remembrance of its conventional meaning, similarly in case of apprehension through *Lakṣaṇā* also, the knowledge of that conventional meaning causes recollection of the secondary sense and from such recollection ensues conceptual cognition.⁷³ As regards the exact nature of relation existing between an object primarily denoted by a term and that, secondarily signified by it, he maintains that, it presents itself in any of the following five forms: (a) in the form of a connection existing between a container and the thing contained, (b) in the form of that lying between imitator and imitated, (c) in the form of proximity, (d) in the form of association, and (e) in the form of relation existing between benefactor and beneficiary. Of these different types of connection, illustrations are furnished respectively by the expressions: 'The cradles are laughing', 'The boy is a lion', 'The hamlet on the Ganges', 'Admit the sticks' and 'The stakes are Indra'.⁷⁴ The Naiyāyika does not accept the proposition that, incompatibility of the primary meaning with the concepts of other terms used in the sentence paves the path for operation of Indication; this proposition, he points out, leaves out of the scope of *Lakṣaṇā* such expressions as 'Admit the sticks' or 'Protect the curd from crows', because there is no inapplicability of the concept signified primarily by any one of the terms used in these. Moreover, as the incompatibility under consideration is capable of being removed in other ways also, the same sentence is likely to give rise to a number of meanings,—different terms presenting different ideas through Indication. Thus parallel to the argument that, as logical connection of a herd-station can be established with the bank, so the term 'the Ganges' conveys through Indication the sense of the bank in the expression: 'A herd-station on the Ganges' runs the counter-reasoning that as logical connection of a row of

fish can be established with the flowing mass of water, so the term 'herd-station' conveys through Indication the idea of fish. These arguments and counter-arguments result in a deadlock and render it extremely difficult to ascertain the exact meaning of the proposition. And this is true of all sentences, that constitute the fields for operation of *Lakṣaṇā*. In order to obviate these difficulties, the Naiyāyika says, the reason that paves the path for operation of this function is not inconsistency of the conventional meaning, but rather its inability to bring out the intention of the speaker.⁷⁵ This view, he points out, justifies the working of *Lakṣaṇā* in such expressions as: 'Admit the sticks' and 'Protect the curd from crows'; the intention of the speaker of the first sentence is to allow the holders of sticks to enter and that of the speaker of the second is to protect the curd from all destroyers: as these two ideas are incapable of being expressed through the primary meanings of the terms 'sticks' and 'crows' respectively, what these two words bring into light through Indication are the concepts of the holders of sticks and the destroyers of curds. Moreover, it explains comprehension of a definite meaning from a single expression, in as much as, the intention of the speaker is always the same in a particular sentence and it is asserted that a meaning, which brings out this intention,—the primary meaning failing to do so—constitutes the indicated meaning. The argument that the cause which gives rise to operation of *Lakṣaṇā* is furnished in some cases by inconsistency of primary meaning and in others by inability of this sense to bring out the intention of the speaker leads to complexity and consequently is unacceptable. Thus the Naiyāyika suggests a modification in one of the three requisites necessary for working of Indication: in place of *Anvayānupapatti* as described by others, he incorporates *Tātparyānupapatti*, and asserts that this paves the path for operation of this function. As regards the third necessary factor, namely usage or motive, he rejects the first alternative, namely traditional usage and maintains that Indication based on it is nothing but another name of *śakti*.

In conformity to his thesis that *Lakṣaṇā* is comprised of a

relation which the secondary idea bears to the primary one and that the recollection of the conventional meaning is caused by comprehension of the word, with which alone its relation is fixed by the Will of God, the Naiyāyika maintains that, a sentence or a collection of words mutually related to one another does not constitute the field of its operation. And this is so because no idea is assigned to a sentence as a whole by Divine Volition and consequently, the question of existence of a type of connexion of the secondary concept with this idea does not arise. In reply to the question as to how then the sense of a herd-station on the bank of the fathomless river is cognised from the sentence: '*Gabhīrāyāṃ Nadyāṃ Ghoṣaḥ*', the Naiyāyika answers that, the term '*Nadī*' conveys through Indication the idea of the bank of the river and the concept signified by the term '*Gabhīrā*' becomes connected with the river through the relation of identity. The objection that an idea cannot establish its connection with only a portion of a complete sense-unit, he points out, does not hold good, because such connection is traced in such expressions as: '*Śaraiḥ śātītapatraḥ*', '*Caitrasya Gurukulam*' and the like. In view of the possibility of this objection being carried too far, the Naiyāyika suggests another solution to the problem, as well: he says, the term '*Nadī*' alone brings out through *Lakṣaṇā* the sense of the bank of a deep river, and the term '*Gabhīrā*' helps us merely to ascertain the intention of the speaker, and, thereby, determine the exact form of the indicated meaning.⁷⁶ This line of argument, he further maintains, explains comprehension of idea from a compound-word, which as a whole is possessed neither of *Śakti* nor of *Lakṣaṇā*, because no conventional meaning is assigned to it as a whole by the Will of God: nevertheless, a sense is cognised from it and this cognition, he says, is effected either through *Śakti* or through *Lakṣaṇā* of its members. Thus in the compound *Rājapurusaḥ*, which forms an illustration of *Ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa*, the first member conveys through Indication the idea of one belonging to the king, and subsequently, this idea gets connected with the sense of the second member through the relation existing between qualification and the thing

qualified. In the compound *Citragu*, which is an example of *Bahuvrīhi*, either the second member conveys through Indication the sense of owner of the cows and the idea of the first member qualifies merely that of the cows, which constitutes only a portion of the complete indicated meaning or the second member alone indicates the sense of owner of variegated cows, the first member helping us merely to ascertain the intention of the speaker. Similarly in the compound *Upakumbham*, which is an example of *Avyayībhāva*, the second member signifies through Indication the idea of one, related to a jar and the meaning of the first member goes subsequently to identify itself with that idea in such a manner that its prominence is retained, or in other words, the resultant conceptual cognition embraces for its content the idea of proximity, identical with one, related to the jar. In *Itaretaradvandva* and *Karmadhāraya*, *Lakṣaṇā* does not operate,—*Śakti* of component members being competent to bring their respective ideas into light. In *Samāhāradvandva*, however, which refers to the aggregate of two members, the second member alone conveys through Indication the idea of the whole compound,—the first member serving merely as a pointer to the exact intention of the speaker: in *Ekakṣeṣa*, in a similar manner, the only word left brings out through Indication the meanings of other words, as well, and hence from *Pitarau* the idea of parents is cognised. Thus unlike the Mīmāṃsaka, the Naiyāyika denies both *Śakti* and *Lakṣaṇā* to a collection of words, mutually related to one another: and this he does in conformity to his metaphysical scheme, which is essentially theistic.⁷⁷

It is interesting to note that, though himself an Ālankārika Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha follows the Naiyāyika stand closely and explains both *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā* in terms of relation in the manner of a true Naiyāyika. Thus his *Abhidhā* consists in a relation which *śabda* bears to *artha* and *artha* bears to *śabda*; and *Lakṣaṇā* is comprised of a relation which the secondary idea bears to the primary one. These descriptions are not in consistency with the tradition of an Ālankārika and point out to the great influence exercised by Navyanyāya on scholarly world at the time of Jagannātha.⁷⁸

The Vaiyākaraṇa does not regard *Lakṣaṇā* as a power absolutely distinct from *Śakti*: he thinks that when *Śakti* or the function of denotation brings into comprehension as the primary meaning of a word to which it belongs an unfamiliar object, with the nature of the familiar object superimposed on it, it is designated *Lakṣaṇā*. Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa in the stock-example: 'A herd-station on the Ganges', the function of Indication presents the idea of bank with the state of flowing stream attributed to it. While the Naiyāyika thinks that the bank is cognised as bank, the Vaiyākaraṇa is of opinion that the bank is comprehended as the flowing stream itself, or in other words while the Naiyāyika makes a difference between the determinants of primary and indicated meanings, the Vaiyākaraṇa maintains that, these two are identical. Thus in the expression: 'Protect the curd from the Crows', the term 'Crow' signifies any animal that destroys curd, which is taken as identical with the crow itself and to this power of signification, the Vaiyākaraṇa gives the name *Lakṣaṇā*. Here the Naiyāyika points out, the term 'Crow' conveys through Indication any destroyer of curd, which bears similitude to a crow in respect of eating the curd up. This difference in explanation shows that whereas, according to the Naiyāyika, a line of demarcation is drawn between a *śakyārtha* and a *lakṣyārtha* in the realm of our intellect, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa, as the identity of the former is superimposed on the latter, no difference, whatsoever, is cognised between the two.⁷⁹

The Vaiyākaraṇa explains that in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges', the bank is comprehended as the flowing stream itself. This knowledge of one thing as another, however, constitutes an erroneous notion as is exemplified by knowledge of a mother-o'-pearl as a piece of silver. For this reason, the opponents point out, the comprehension of bank as identical with the flowing stream itself which is a wrong notion is not likely to lead to cognition of coolness and purity, that are attributes belonging to the stream alone. In reply to this criticism, the Vaiyākaraṇa maintains, the sense of identity of the bank with the flowing mass of water is comprehended

through *Vyañjanā* and the validity of a knowledge, caused through *Vyañjanā* is incapable of being challenged or rejected by an idea of incompatibility; thus though the cognition of the bank as identical with the flowing stream is the result of an illusory superimposition, yet as the idea of identity between the two is brought into light through the function of suggestion, that does not follow the path of reason, the soundness of the cognition is unshakable.⁸⁰

The Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine that *Lakṣaṇā* leads to cognition of an object, with the identity of the object, primarily signified by the term, to which it pertains superimposed on it claims to enjoy the support of some of the great thinkers, affiliated to different Philosophical schools. Thus, Patañjali, it is said, in course of furnishing an explanation of the *sūtra*: *Puṁyogā-dākhyāyām*, points out that, the superimposition of identity of one on the other is caused by any one of the relations existing between the two: (a) that of container and the thing contained, (b) that of imitator and the imitated, (c) that of proximity and (d) that of association: in illustrating these four types of superimposition, caused by four different kinds of relation, he cites the expressions: 'The cradles laugh', 'The boy is a lion', 'A herd-station on the Ganges', and 'Admit the sticks'. In commenting on these observations, Kaiyaṭa remarks, the use of the term 'laugh' in the expression 'The cradles laugh' shows that the identity of cradles is superimposed on children, reclining on them and this superimposition furnishes a clue to the use of the word 'cradles' in order to signify children resting on them. Gautama, the Nyāyasūtrakāra, also, takes note of this factor of superimposition, which consists in attribution of the state of one thing to another and is caused by numerous types of relation existing between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition: stickness, he says, is attributed to a Brahmin who is associated with the stick and consequently such expression as: 'Admit the sticks' is used: in a similar manner, the state of the God of death is superimposed on the king, who imitates him, the state of life is attributed to rice, which sustains it, the universal scaleness

to sandal-wood, which is weighed by the balance and so on. In commenting on this, the Vārttikakāra remarks, the universal stickness, which constitutes the cause of application of the term 'stick' to denote it to the exclusion of other words resides primarily in the stick: this universal, which inheres in the stick associated with the Brahmin is subsequently transferred to the Brahmin himself and as a result of this attribution, the Brahmin is called stick.⁸¹ The Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine claims another advantage over the Naiyāyika thesis, in as much as, it justifies the expression: 'To the Ganges belong both fish and hamlet' (*Gaṅgāyāṃ Mīnaghoṣau stak'*), which is much in vogue in popular use. The use of the *Dvandva* compound in *Mīnaghoṣau*, which demands existence of fish and hamlet in the same substratum puts the Naiyāyika in a difficulty, because, according to him, Indication presents the bank as the bank, on which exists the hamlet but not fish, residing in the flowing stream alone. The Vaiyākaraṇa however, does not face this difficulty: he is of opinion that, *Lakṣaṇā* presents the bank as the flowing stream itself, or in other words, simultaneous comprehension of water and land as identical with the flowing stream arises; of these two objects that constitute the content of simultaneous cognition—water and land,—the first forms the resort of fish and the second that of hamlet; and thus, as fish and hamlet reside in a substratum, determined by the same attribute, nothing stands in the way of formation of the *Dvandva* compound.⁸²

The Vaiyākaraṇa doctrine finds a more clear expression in the Paramalaghumañjūṣa of Nāgeśa: basing his theory on the speculations of earlier thinkers, affiliated to his own school, here, he denies in unambiguous language the status of a separate *Vṛtti* to *Lakṣaṇā*. The Naiyāyika thesis, which grants recognition to Indication as a separate function states that, this relation leads to recollection of an object, connected in some form or other with the thing, primarily signified by a term and thus posits the existence of two different attributes, one determining the object primarily signified by a term and the other determining the object indicated by it. The Vaiyākaraṇa thesis, how-

ever, maintains that the so-called *Lakṣaṇā* leads to cognition of an unfamiliar object, as determined by the attribute of the object primarily signified by a term and thus recognises the existence of only one determinant. Consequently, Nāgeśa points out, the Vaiyākaraṇa stand is more in conformity to the law of parsimony than the Naiyāyika one, and this is all the more simple, because while the Naiyāyika feels the necessity of postulating two separate *Vṛttis* in order to account for comprehension of the secondary sense, the Vaiyākaraṇa explains this cognition away with the help of one *Vṛtti* only. Moreover, it is not proper, he continues, to extend recognition to *Lakṣaṇā* as a separate *Vṛtti* in the manner of the Naiyāyika and the Ālaṅkārika, who think that it operates only after the operation of *Abhidhā* and consequently, as the name '*jaghanyā*' given to it suggests, treat it with contempt; they opine that help of this function is to be sought only when *Śakti* or *Abhidhā* fails to bring out the intention of the speaker and that much help is to be taken as is competent to bring this intention out by removing all incompatibilities. A function, that is despised and yet accepted should rather, he affirms, be rejected, particularly when an unfamiliar power of denotation is competent to remove all inconsistencies and, thereafter, bring the intention of the speaker into light. Accordingly, Nāgeśa speaks of two types of the power of expressiveness, pertaining to words: one common or familiar and the other uncommon or unfamiliar. The first is ascertained by dullards and intelligents alike, while the second is determined only by men of mature intellect. Thus, the term 'the Ganges', Nāgeśa points out, signifies through its usual *Śakti* the idea of the flowing stream and that of the bank through its unusual *Śakti*, showing, thereby that *Lakṣaṇā* of others is capable of being equated with uncommon denotation or *aprisddha-śakti*. This theory, he claims, is based on the principle enunciated, by Patañjali himself,—the principle, that each and every word is competent to signify any and every sense, if the intention of the user to convey that particular idea by that particular word is there.⁸³ In reply to the question as to why then the idea of a jar is not conveyed by the term '*Kaṭa*', he answers that the

wanted intention is not there : as regards this intention, he says, that it pertains actually to God and is handed over to us through tradition. In support of his theory, Nāgeśa cites the observations of Bhartṛhari, according to whom, although a word signifies both a primary and a secondary meaning, yet both the ideas are not apprehended simultaneously, because such factors as context and the like, that are auxiliary to comprehension of ideas differ in each case : when a factor, conducive to cognition of the primary meaning is there, this meaning is comprehended : when a factor, conducive to cognition of the secondary one is there, that idea is apprehended. Bhartṛhari himself applies this principle to the term 'Go' and shows that it is competent to convey the ideas of both a cow and a carrier : of these two concepts, the idea of cow, as signified by the usual power of denotation of the term constitutes the primary meaning and the idea of carrier, as signified by the uncommon power of denotation forms the secondary meaning. Thus Bhartṛhari ascribes unrestricted power to words and asserts that all possible meaning is capable of being signified by the same term ; and this he does in conformity to his metaphysical scheme, according to which, as the cosmic process starts, the same *Śabīlabrahman* manifests itself in the line of word as also of concept : when all words and meanings are nothing but evolutions of the same Eternal Verbum, and in the transcendental plane they remain one with that eternal entity, the power to signify any and every concept is inherent in a word, and consequently, it is but natural for it to denote anything under the Sun. Against this assumption that, words are endowed with a capacity to denote any and every object, Bhartṛhari himself anticipates an objection that, the proposition is likely to nullify the doctrine of eternality of relation, linking the word with its corresponding idea. If the term 'cow' denotes both the cow-individual and the dull carrier, how can it be described, he asks, as bearing natural and eternal relation to its corresponding concept. In reply to this, he points out that, the term 'cow' actually connotes the universal cow-hood : as this universal resides primarily in the cow-individual and secondarily through superimposition in the carrier, the term

'cow' is used to denote both the objects and consequently, the question of negation of eternality of relation existing between word and meaning does not arise.⁸⁴ The problem can be solved in another way, as well. Some thinkers maintain that, the form of the word itself constitutes its connotation ; this they say, because every knowledge is associated with a verbal expression and no object, that has no corresponding significant unit to denote it forms the content of our cognition. Thus the self of the word 'cow' which constitutes the true connotation of the term, these thinkers observe, is associated primarily with the cow-individual and secondarily with the carrier and hence, the use of the same term to denote two objects does not make invalid the theory of eternality of *śabdārtha-sambandha*. In this manner, with irrefutable logic and astounding polemics, Nāgeśa establishes his proposition that *Lakṣaṇā* is but an unfamiliar power of denotation and consequently does not deserve recognition as a separate *Vṛtti*.

Contrary to the Naiyāyika thesis that, the power of denotation does not belong to a compound-word as a whole, and it is *Śakti* or *Lakṣaṇā*, pertaining to component members, that brings idea from such word into expression, the Vaiyākaraṇa thesis asserts that, the power of expressiveness belongs to a compound-word as a whole and *Śakti* of component members is unable to bring the unified idea of a compound into light. The Naiyāyika doctrine, Nāgeśa points out, fails to explain addition of case-endings to a compound-word, in as much as, these suffixes are attached only to a *Prātipadika*, the status of which is extended only to an expressive word-unit. The argument that, as the component members are significant units, the whole compound also is bound to be a highly expressive entity is misleading, because a collection of two or more significant words does not make up an expressive unit : this is made abundantly clear by Patañjali in his exposition on the rule, formulating the definition of a *Prātipadika*.⁸⁵ Nāgeśa challenges the contention of the Naiyāyika that, in the compound-word '*Rājapuruṣa*', the first member conveys through Indication the idea of one related to the king : this explanation, he says, is improper, since it does

not tally with the meaning of *Vigrahavākya*, in which the sixth case-ending is added to the first member (*Rājñah puruṣaḥ*), showing thereby, that the first word signifies the idea of relation with the king and not that of the related. The contention that, the first member of the compound signifies through Indication the sense of mere relation is equally unacceptable, because the identity of an employee, who is conveyed by the second member is incapable of being established with the relation itself. Hence, Nāgeśa concludes, a compound-word is as much endowed with the power of expressiveness as any other word, and through this power it conveys a unified sense, which is different from the individual meanings of component members, as also from a collection of them.⁸⁶ Thinkers who deny expressiveness to a compound-word as a whole feel the necessity of formulating a number of rules in order to put under taboo the use of such adjectives as qualify only a component member, as also the use of gender and number in accordance with that of an object, conveyed by one of the component members. The *Vaiyākaraṇa*, who recognises the function of denotation as pertaining to a compound-word as a whole, in the same manner as it belongs to a *Yogarūḍha śābala*, however, does not stand in need of formulating such rules, because, according to him, a compound-word signifies a unified meaning, in which the ideas of component members completely merge their separate existence, and consequently, the qualification of any one of such members by adjectives or determination of number and gender of the compound according to those of any one of the members does not arise. Thus, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* thesis, Nāgeśa points out, is more in conformity to the law of simplicity than the *Naiyāyika* one and as such is to be preferred to the latter. All this, he says, in accordance with the observations of Bhartṛhari, who ascribes, with irrefutable logic, expressiveness to a compound-word as a whole, which he asserts, signifies a unified idea.⁸⁷

Broadly speaking *Lakṣaṇā* admits of classification into two types: *Śuddhā* and *Gauṇī*,—the principle of classification being the nature of relation, linking the primary and the secondary concepts. Through *Gauṇī-Lakṣaṇā* is comprehended an object,

which is similar to that conveyed primarily by the term, while through *Śuddhā-Lakṣaṇā* is apprehended an object, which is connected with that, denoted primarily by the term through a relation other than that of similarity: thus while *Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā* brings into comprehension an object similar to that signified by *Abhidhā*, *Śuddhā-lakṣaṇā* brings into light a thing connected to that denoted by *Abhidhā* through any relation other than that of similitude. The expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges (*Gaṇṭhāyām ghoṣaḥ*)' furnishes an example of *Śuddhā* type of Indication, because here the function leads to cognition of the bank of the Ganges, which is connected with the flowing stream through the relation of proximity: of *Gauṇī* type, the stock-illustration is afforded by the expression: 'The carrier is a bull' (*Gourvāhikāḥ*), in which the function of Indication leads to comprehension of the idea of the man, who is similar to the bull in point of laziness and dullness.⁸⁸

On the proper explanation of the expression: '*Gourvāhikāḥ*' and the exact nature of the indicated meaning in it, scholars differ among themselves. Both Mammāṭa and Viśvanātha record three theories on the issue, all of which seek in their own way to explain the exact nature of conceptual cognition, resulting from comprehension of the proposition. The first theory regards the qualities of dullness and laziness, associated with the universal cow-hood, that is conveyed through denotation as the indicated meaning of the term 'cow' in the expression: 'The carrier is a cow': subsequently, these attributes, belonging to the cow individual leads the function of denotation to operate for a second time and cause comprehension of the idea of the man, or in other words, presence of similar indicated attributes in the man prompts one to use the term 'cow' to denote him to the exclusion of other words. Thus, according to this view, the term 'cow' first of all, signifies the idea of cowness through *Abhidhā*: then it conveys the idea of sluggishness and stupidity, belonging to the cow-individual through *Lakṣaṇā* and subsequently brings out the idea of the individual carrier through *Abhidhā* again. In criticising this theory, Viśvanātha points out that, it envisages the signification

of the sense of the individual carrier through the function of denotation from the term 'cow' and therein lies its weakness. *Abhidhā* or *Śakti* of the term 'cow' is unable to bring the idea of individual carrier into light, because with reference to this, its power is not ascertained through convention. Nor is it possible for *Abhidhā*, that looses its potency after connoting the universal cow-hood to revive for a second time and convey the idea of the man, because, as the theorists say, Denotation knows no resurrection. This inherent weakness of the theory makes it unacceptable and allows an opportunity to the second theory to offer its own explanation. The second theory maintains that, the qualities of sluggishness and stupidity, pertaining to the individual carrier, which are taken as identical with similar attributes, belonging to the cow-individual are conveyed through the function of Indication. As regards the comprehension of the sense of the individual carrier, this theory does not depend, as the previous one does, on the efficacy of *Abhidhā*, which is said to be revive and operate for a second time; but explains it as being cognised through logical postulation or inference. The apprehension of attributes, belonging to the individual carrier, it states, necessarily leads to knowledge of the man, since qualities are inseparably associated with him, and the existence of attributes necessarily presupposes that of its substratum. Thus, while the first theory describes the idea of attributes belonging to the cow-individual as the *lakṣyārtha*, the second theory states that the idea of such attributes, belonging to the individual carrier,—now taken as identical, on account of excess of similitude with those, pertaining to the cow-individual—constitutes the indicated meaning: then again, while the first theory depends for the cognition of the sense of individual carrier on *Abhidhā*, the second theory puts forward logical postulation or inference as the means of such understanding. As the second theory does not ascribe a capacity to revive to *Abhidhā*, it is an improvement on the first one, but nevertheless, it has its own weakness, which renders it, also, untenable. Viśvanātha points out this defect and says that, it is not possible for the sense of the individual carrier, implied

by invariable association to determine the concordance of words, because such attempt leads to violation of the well-known maxim that, an expectancy, raised by a word is to be fulfilled only by a word and not by a sense, cognised from contemplation of inseparable association. This defect prompts both Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha to reject it and formulate a new theory on conceptual cognition of the expression under discussion. According to this theory, neither the idea of attributes, belonging to the cow-individual, nor the sense of qualities, belonging to the individual labourer is presented through Indication: what actually is conveyed through *Lakṣaṇā* is the sense of the individual carrier, who bears similarity to the individual cow, in as much as, both of them share in common the attributes of sluggishness and stupidity. The motive of taking recourse to *Lakṣaṇā* in the present case is to bring home an idea of excessive laziness and stupendous stupidity of the man concerned. This theory seeks to explain the relation existing between the primary and secondary meanings by pointing out that, the attributes belonging to the cow-individual are invariably associated with the universal cow-hood, that constitutes the conventional meaning of the term 'cow': these attributes resemble similar attributes, pertaining to the individual labourer: these attributes, in their turn, are related to the man through the relation of container and the thing contained. Thus it shows the existence of a connection, however, remote it may be, between the universal cow-hood and the individual labourer, which represent the primary and the secondary ideas respectively, revealing, thereby, the intention of its adherents that, existence of such a remote connection does not stand in the way of operation of *Lakṣaṇā*. On this point the Naiyāyika meets on a common platform with the Ālankārika, in as much as, he too, believes that the function of Indication is competent to bring into light even an object, that bears remote connection with the thing, signified by denotation: this is evident from the explanation of the term '*dvirepha*', furnished by him: this term, it is said, primarily refers to the word '*bhramara*' which denotes a bee, and consequently, the term

'*dvirepha*' is said to convey through Indication the sense of the bee.

• It is interesting to note that though the *Ālankārika* and the *Naiyāyika* accept *Gauṇī* as only a type of *Lakṣaṇā*, the *Mīmāṃsaka* extends recognition to it as a separate *Vṛtti*. And this he does, because, he thinks that, Indication is competent to bring only that object into light, which bears an intimate connection with the thing, signified through denotation. Thus *Kumārila* says, when the acceptance of a primary meaning becomes impossible being opposed to our ordinary sources of knowledge, such as perception and the like, then that function, which brings into comprehension an idea, associated with the expressed one is regarded as *Lakṣaṇā*, and the other function, which conveys the sense of an object, associated with the attributes, signified through *Lakṣaṇā* is regarded as *Gauṇī-Vṛtti*.⁸⁹ In explaining *Gauṇī-Vṛtti*, he quotes the expression 'The boy is fire' (*Bahnirmūṇvakah*) and points out that the term 'fire' connotes the universal fire-hood through *Abhidhā*; and conveys the idea of individual fire through *Lakṣaṇā*; subsequently *Gauṇī-vṛtti* brings out the sense of the boy, who resembles the individual-fire in points of colour and splendour. Thus *Kumārila* draws a line of demarcation between *Lakṣaṇā* and *Gauṇī*, and maintains that the latter conveys an object that is similar to a thing, signified by the former, revealing, thereby, that the meanings presented by these two functions differ in point of time of their cognition. *Nāgeśa* gives his tacit consent to this difference, as is evident from his assertion that, *Gauṇī* is more inferior to *Śuddhā*; he maintains that, in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' the state of a flowing stream is falsely superimposed on the bank, which is close to the stream, while in the proposition 'This man is a bull', the universal cow-hood is superimposed on the man, who possesses attributes similar to those, possessed by the cow-individual, and consequently, the apprehension of the exact secondary sense is more delayed in the latter than in the former. This leads *Nāgeśa* to arrive at the conclusion that *Gauṇī*, coming in the trail of *Śuddhā Lakṣaṇā* is much more inferior to it, or in

other words, is *atijaghanyā* in comparison to *Śuddhā*, which is *jaghanyā*.⁹⁰ The *Mīmāṃsaka* thinks that, when recognition as a separate *Vṛtti* is extended to *Lakṣaṇā* on the ground of its operation being preceded by that of *Abhidhā* and consequential inferiority to the latter, recognition as a separate *Vṛtti* is also to be extended to *Gauṇī*, which works even after the working of *Lakṣaṇā* and as such is inferior to that also. The *Ālankārika*, however, thinks that, *Gauṇī* is only a type of *Lakṣaṇā*, and is called qualitative, because, in it is traceable connection through qualities,—the thing indicated being understood to possess qualities of that by which it is indicated. This, he says, is mixed up with *upacāra*, which consists in concealment of apprehension of difference between two things, which are altogether distinct on the strength of extreme likeness of the two, as that of fire and a boy, who is so fiery-tempered that we call him a perfect fire. Thus, while the *Naiyāyika* and the *Ālankārika* declare *Gauṇī* as merely a type of *Lakṣaṇā*, the *Mīmāṃsaka* maintains that it is to be posited as something separate from Indication,—as a *tertium quid*.

According to another principle of classification, the *Ālankārika* classifies *Lakṣaṇā* into two types: *Upādāna-lakṣaṇā* and *Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*.⁹¹ In the first type, the primary meaning implies another meaning in order to establish itself: in it, the object signified through *Abhidhā* hints at something else, which is required in addition for establishment of its logical connection with other concepts, presented in the sentence; in the second type, on the other hand, the primary meaning surrenders itself completely for the sake of the secondary sense: in it, the object, denoted through *Abhidhā* completely gives it up in order to facilitate establishment of logical connection amongst the indicated thing and other objects, conveyed by other terms used in the sentence. Of *Upādāna-lakṣaṇā* the stock-example is 'The lances are entering' (*Kuntāḥ praviśanti*): here indication brings out the idea of lancers, which comprehends within it the concept of lances, in as much as, it is not possible to know the lancers without cognising the lances; of *Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*, the stock-illustration is 'A hamlet on the Ganges' (*Gaṅgāyām Ghaṇṣaḥ*):

here Indication brings out the sense of the bank, which does not comprehend within its scope the concept of the flowing water. Thus while in *Upālāna-lakṣaṇā* the primary meaning finds a place in the body of the indicated idea, in *Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā* it does not find such a place, or in other words, it is left completely out of the purview of the indicated meaning. For this reason, the Naiyāyika designates these two types as *Ajahatsvārthā* and *Jahatsvārthā* respectively. In explaining the characteristic feature of *Jahatsvārthā-lakṣaṇā*, some of the Naiyāyikas point out that, in it, the primary meaning does not enter into connection with those, with which the secondary idea effects its connection. This principle makes the expression: 'Feed the lances' (*Kuntān bhojaya*) an illustration of *Jahatsvārthā*, since the lances themselves, that constitute the primary meaning do not enter into connection with the act of eating, with which the holders of lances effect their connection. This view, however, is opposed to tradition; in as much as, the Naiyāyikas themselves quote the expression as an illustration of *Ajahatsvārthā*, and not of *Jahatsvārthā*. In his *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, Viśvanātha introduces an interesting discussion on the exact type of *Lakṣaṇā*, exemplified by the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges': he remarks that, if the relation of flowing stream is ascertained with sheer bank, then this idea of bank alone is sure to be conveyed through Indication; if on the other hand, the relation of the stream is ascertained with the bank of the Ganges, then the concept of bank of the river is sure to be indicated. Commenting on this, Dinakarabhaṭṭa observes that, the acceptance of the first alternative makes the sentence a specimen of *Jahatsvārthā*, while that of the second one renders it an example of *Ajahatsvārthā*.⁹² The *Ālamkārika*, however, cites the expression as an illustration of *Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*: he thinks that, the relation which the bank bears to the flowing stream is capable of being known through implication, in as much as, Indication brings only that idea into light, which bears a relation to the primary one, and consequently, the entry of this relation into the body of the indicated meaning as its determinant is superfluous and at the same time, opposed to

all logic, since it entails a violation to the maxim, which states that an idea, not known through any other source of knowledge alone constitutes the content of conceptual cognition.

Mammatā thinks that the classification of *Lakṣaṇā* into *Upālāna* and *Lakṣaṇa* varieties relates only to *Suddhā* type of Indication, and is incapable of being asserted of *Gauṇī* type. The reason is quite clear. In *Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā* the thing, secondarily signified bears similitude to that primarily signified, or in other words, the two meanings are mutually related through the relation of *sāṃśaya*. This *sāṃśaya*, writers point out, consists in possession of a number of attributes, pertaining to one by another, which is absolutely distinct from the former. Thus *Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā* presupposes the existence of *sāṃśaya* between the primary and indicated meanings and *sāṃśaya*, in its turn, presupposes absolute distinction of one idea from other: consequently, the primary meaning never finds a place in the body of the indicated sense in such type of Indication. Viśvanātha, however, takes note of *Gauṇī-upālāna-lakṣaṇā*, an illustration of which is furnished by the expression: 'These oils, extracted from sesame-seeds are pleasant in the winter (*Etāni tailāni hemante sukhāni*). In explaining this expression, he points out that, the term 'taila' primarily refers to tila-oil, but secondarily conveys the idea of any oil, that resembles tila-oil,—both being liquids pressed from kinds of vegetables. Viśvanātha says, the concept of any oil includes within its scope the idea of tila-oil, and hence the sentence constitutes an illustration of *upālāna-lakṣaṇā*. This view of Viśvanātha does not stand the test of reason, because the indicated meaning in the present case, which is any liquid pressed from anything, that resembles tila-oil does not comprehend the idea of tila-oil itself, since the assertion that, one resembles the other presupposes absolute distinction between the two and thus rules out the possibility of such comprehension. For this reason, Jagannātha does not classify *Gauṇī* into *Jahatsvārthā* and *Ajahatsvārthā* sub-types: *Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā* is necessarily one of *Jahatsvārthā* or *Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā* type. The opponents might contend that, in ordinary expressions the term 'taila' is used to signify the idea of any oil,

that resembles tila-oil, including that oil itself and hence, recognition is to be given to *Gauṇī-upādāna-lakṣaṇā* in deference to such expressions. In reply to this, it may be pointed out that, in such cases the term 'taila' conveys the idea of tila-oil through *Abhidhā* and that of any liquid, pressed from anything, that resembles tila-oil through *Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā*. The objection that two functions, pertaining to a single word cannot operate simultaneously does not cut much ice, because such operation of two functions is seen in such expression as: 'Fish and hamlet relating to the Ganges (*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ matsyaśca staḥ*)' also: here the idea of the flowing stream, as also that of the bank is cognised,—denotation and indication bringing respectively the two ideas into light. The argument that, the term 'taila' conveys through indication the sense of oil, associated with tila-oil, and as such, the *Lakṣaṇā* is of *Upādāna* variety renders the *Lakṣaṇā* one of *Śuddhā* type, in which the relation existing between the primary and secondary meanings is anything other than the relation of similarity and thus instead of saving the situation, lands *Gauṇī-lakṣaṇā* into jeopardy.

Mukulabhaṭṭa draws the line of distinction between *Śuddhā* and *Gauṇī* types of Indication in a novel way. He says that, in Qualitative Indication, the identity of expressed and indicated meanings is apprehended, while in Pure one, the difference between these two ideas is realised: thus the former is characterised by a sense of identity between the primary and secondary meanings, while in the latter, the second stands aloof from the first without being tinged by it in any way. Mammaṭa challenges this observation and asserts that, neither *Gauṇī* nor *Śuddhā* is characterised by aloofness amounting to distinction, i.e. to say in none of these varieties there is a clear cognition of distinction between the objects, primarily denoted and secondarily signified. Thus in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges', he points out, the bank is cognised as identical with the stream itself and this apprehension is caused by *Vyañjanā*. As the bank is taken as identical with the flowing mass of water, the idea of excess of coolness and purity, which are attributes pertaining to the stream alone, he continues, is comprehended through *Vyañjanā*

as pervading the hamlet. The point of Mukulabhaṭṭa that the bank is cognised as absolutely distinct from the flowing stream places the indicative expression, under consideration on a same footing with the expressive unit: 'A hamlet on the bank of the Ganges', in which, also, the bank is understood as something different from the river and, thus, fails to explain the comprehension of the idea of excess of coolness and purity.

According to another principle of classification, *Lakṣaṇā* is arranged into two classes: *Sāropā* and *Sādhyavasānā*. In the first of these two classes, the object of superimposition, as also its substratum, both are mentioned in words, in such a way that their peculiar traits are revealed: in it, the thing superimposed and the object whereon it is placed are expressed in words, having the same case-ending, that is to say, are stated in grammatical co-ordination with their distinction non-concealed. In the second class, on the other hand, only the thing superimposed is mentioned in words and this swallows up completely the substratum of superimposition, which is left unmentioned.⁹³ The expression: 'The carrier is a bull' (*Gourvāhikah*) furnishes an illustration of *Sāropā*, while the proposition: 'The bull prattles (*Gourjalpati*)' affords an example of *Sādhyavasānā*. As both the bull and the carrier are clearly stated in words in the first expression, the cognition of identity between the two is preceded by an apprehension of difference between them, in as much as, the peculiar trait of the man remains non-concealed: in the second expression, however, this trait is concealed and so what is cognised is sheer identity between the man and the bull. Thus while in *Sāropā*, the comprehension of identity between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition is preceded by a cognition of distinction between the two, in *Sādhyavasānā*, the apprehension of identity between these two is not preceded by any such knowledge of difference between them. Jagannātha records a number of views, which attempt to explain the exact nature of conceptual cognition in cases of *Sāropā* and *Sādhyavasānā* *Lakṣaṇā*, and, thereby, draw a line of demarcation between the two. As an illustration of *Sādhyavasānā* type of

Indication, he cites the expression : 'On the palace-tops of this city there shine rows of moons' (*Pure'smin saudhasikhare Candrarājī virājate*), in which *Lakṣaṇā* makes one think of the identity with moon of the face, which is completely swallowed up by the former. According to one theory, the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the idea of face, as endowed with its peculiar attribute the universal faceness, but at the time of conceptual cognition, the idea of moon, as endowed with its special characteristic appears and its identity with the face is comprehended. This theory believes in the capacity of *Lakṣaṇā* to present two different meanings : one at the initial stage and the other at the time of deriving verbal knowledge, and thus asserts that, the attributes of faceness and moonhood both are comprehended as belonging to the same entity at the time when conceptual cognition occurs. Another theory does not believe in this great power of *Lakṣaṇā* : it states that Indication presents the idea of face, as possessed of the universal faceness, and the resultant conceptual cognition occurs in the corresponding way ; it is only at a late stage that, *Vyañjanā* brings out the idea that the face is identical with the moon. Like the first theory, this theory, also, maintains that, the attributes of faceness and moonhood both are cognised as belonging to the same entity, but this knowledge does not occur when conceptual cognition takes place : the sense that the attribute moonhood qualifies the face is effected by *Vyañjanā*, which operates later. These two theories try to draw the line of demarcation between *Sāropā* and *Sādhyavasānā* by pointing out that, while in the latter the attributes of moonhood and faceness are cognised straightway as residing in the same substratum, in the former such comprehension of both the attributes, as pertaining to the same thing does not arise. A third theory approaches the problem in a different way. It states that, in *Sādhyavasānā* the face is cognised as the moon itself and not as the face, and explains that, it is this non-comprehension of the idea of faceness that differentiates this type of Indication from that of *Sāropā* type. As an illustration to the point, the adherents of this theory

cite the parallelism of cognition of a piece of silver on a mother-o'-pearl : when the mother-o'-pearl is known as a piece of silver, its comprehension as a nacre does not arise, because the two knowledges are mutually opposed to each other. In a similar way, they point out, the knowledge of face as the face and that of it as the moon are mutually opposed to each other, and consequently, when the face is known as the moon, apprehension of its real nature does not arise.⁹⁴ Commenting on this theory Jagannātha remarks that, if experience of connoisseurs of poetic art reveals that the peculiar trait of the substratum of superimposition is cognised in *Sādhyavasānā Lakṣaṇā*, then the statement that the knowledge of *Viśaya* and that of *Viśayī* stand in the relation of cognition concerning nacre and that concerning silver is unnecessary ; if, on the other hand, his experience indicates that, the peculiar trait of the *Viśaya* is not comprehended in such cases, then conception of such a relation becomes an imperative necessity. Thus Jagannātha leaves the correctness of the third theory entirely to the experience of refined readers, revealing thereby, his agreement with the first and second views.

The exact form of conceptual cognition, as derived from cases of *Sāropā-lakṣaṇā* poses a more difficult problem, because on a correct determination of this rests the existence of the poetic figure *Rūpaka* as something distinct from *Upamā*. The *Ālaṃkārika* maintains that, *Sāropā-lakṣaṇā* forms the basis of *Rūpaka*, as is exemplified by the expression : 'The face is the moon' (*mukham candrah*) ; here, he points out, the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the idea of one, which is similar to the moon and the resultant verbal cognition takes the form that, the face is identical with one, which resembles the moon itself. Against this Jagannātha raises a possible objection. If in the expression : 'The face is the moon', the term 'moon' is explained as signifying the sense of one similar to the moon, then, wherein does lie its difference with the proposition : 'The face is similar to the moon' ? And what then is the necessity of recognising the poetic figure *Rūpaka* as something distinct from *Upamā* ? The argument that in the

expression : 'The face is the moon', the conceptual cognition takes the form that, the face is identical with one which resembles the moon (*Candrasadṛśābhinnam mukham*), whereas in the sentence : 'The face resembles the moon', this knowledge takes the shape that, the face is identical with one, which constitutes the substratum of similitude determined by the moon (*Candranirūpitāsādṛśyāśrayābhinnam mukham*)—the difference being caused by use of one word 'Candra' in the first expression and that of two different words 'Candra' and 'sadṛśa' in the second one—and consequently, there is considerable difference between the scopes of *Rūpaka* and *Upamā* does not take us out of the woods, because such slight difference in the form of verbal knowledge, as is caused by cognition of association in diverse ways does not lead to postulation of separate figures. This is evident from the fact that recognition as a separate figure is not extended to the expression : 'The face is like the moon' (*Mukham Candra iva*), which differs from the proposition : 'The face resembles the moon' (*Candrasadṛśam mukham*) in point of form of conceptual cognition, in as much as, in the first expression, no such idea as this that, the moon determines the similitude, as is gathered from the second one is comprehended. What then differentiates a case of *Rūpaka* from that of *Upamā* ? In reply to this, Jagannātha records four theories which offer different solutions to the problem.

The first theory states that though the form of conceptual cognition is the same in both cases, yet a difference is capable of being drawn between them on the basis of cognition and non-cognition of identity between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition. Thus, although knowledge derived from both the expressions : 'Mukham Candraḥ' and 'Candrasadṛśam mukham' appears in the same form, namely the shape that, the face is identical with one, which resembles the moon, yet while in the first one the sense of identity of face with the moon itself, as conveyed through the function of suggestion is comprehended, no such cognition occurs in the second proposition. And this happens, because while the first expression is marked by operation of *Lakṣaṇā*, the motive of taking the help of which is

to bring home this idea of complete identity of moon and face, the second one is not characterised by working of Indication, and resultant operation of suggestion, as well. The objection that, suggestion brings into light the sense of identity of moon and one that resembles the moon, (which constitutes the indicated meaning of the term 'moon'), but not that of absolute sameness of the moon and the face does not stand, because this idea is cognised automatically. First of all, *Lakṣaṇā* presents the concept of one, which resembles the moon and the conceptual cognition, consequential upon it is that, the face is identical with one which resembles the moon : subsequently, *Vyañjanā* conveys the idea of absolute sameness of a thing that resembles the moon and the moon itself and as a natural corollary to it the sense that the face is identical with the moon is comprehended, because two things that are identical with the same thing are identical with one another.⁹⁵

The second theory asserts that, *Rūpaka* differs from *Upamā* not only in point of comprehension of identity between the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition, which constitutes the motive of taking recourse to Indication, but in point of form of conceptual cognition, as well. It states that though the term 'Candra' initially conveys through *Lakṣaṇā* the idea of one which resembles the moon, yet when verbal cognition occurs, the sense of identity of the face with the moon itself is apprehended, or in other words, the resultant conceptual cognition takes the form that, the face is identical with the moon, which, in its turn is absolutely the same as the thing resembling it (*Candrasadṛśābhinnacandrābhinnam mukham*). The rule that verbal knowledge corresponds exactly to the presence of concepts through functions does not hold good in case of cognition caused by *Lakṣaṇā* : for this reason, though Indication conveys the idea of bank as endowed with its universal bankhood from the term 'Ganges', used in the expression : 'A hamlet on the Ganges', yet when verbal knowledge is derived, the bank is taken as the flowing stream itself, as a result of which the excess of coolness and purity pervading the hamlet is understood. In addition to this difference in point of form of conceptual

cognition, *Rūpaka*, based on *Sāropā-lakṣaṇā* differs from *Upama* in point of cognition of the purpose, for the signification of which Indication is resorted to, as well, in as much as, while in *Rūpaka* the peculiar traits, pertaining to the moon are cognised as belonging to the face, in *Upamā* no such comprehension arises.⁹⁶

The third theory seeks to differentiate, the scopes of two poetic figures under consideration by pointing out to the difference in the nature of similarity, that forms the very foundation of them. The similarity, that forms the basis of *Upamā*, it says, is an analysable concept, 'comprehending' within its scope the idea of difference, as well; while the similarity that forms the basis of *Rūpaka* is an unanalysable attribute, which does not presuppose the existence of absolute distinction between things in which it inheres. Thus the idea that the face, though different from the moon is endowed with attributes belonging to it—is cognised from the expression: 'The face is similar to the moon', whereas, the idea that the face is possessed of qualities, pertaining to the moon—is known from the sentence: 'The face is the moon'. This theory claims to enjoy another advantage over the first two theories, because, as it says, it does not stand in need of advancing arguments in order to remove the apparent contradiction between initial cognition of difference between the moon and the face and the ultimate comprehension of identity between them.⁹⁷

The neo-ālamkārikas adumbrate an altogether new theory on the issue; they seek to explain conceptual cognition ensuing from such propositions as: 'The moon is the face', 'The carrier is a bull' and the like without resorting to Indication. They think that, in such cases identity is established between primary concepts, i.e., to say, between the face and the moon in the first expression and between the carrier and the bull in the second one. The point that the sense of incompatibility stands in the way of production of such knowledge, in as much as, no identity can be established between the face and the moon in the world of experience is without any value, because this sense of incongruity does not obstruct verbal cognition in the

same way as it does not an artificial knowledge. A passionate lover regards the face of his fiancée as the moon, even though his knowledge of it as the face persists, and this happens because his strong desire serves as an excitant. An impediment is one which hampers the production of an effect in spite of the presence of its causal factors and an excitant or a stimulant is one which takes away the obstructing power of the impeding factor and allows the causes to produce the desired effect. An impediment is illustrated by a moon-stone which does not allow the fire to consume, while a stimulant is exemplified by a sun-stone, which takes away the power from the moon-stone and allows the fire to produce its desired result. The adherents of this theory assert that, although no conceptual cognition ensues from the expression: 'Sprinkles with fire', yet it follows from the proposition: 'The moon is the face', because, while in the first case there is no stimulant, competent to take away the power of the impeding factor, in the second case an excitant in the shape of strong desire of the speaker exists and this does not allow the impeding factor to hamper the production of verbal knowledge. They claim that their doctrine is in conformity to the principle enunciated by the ancients, which states that, a verbal expression is competent to produce knowledge, concerning those objects even, that do not exist in the outside world.⁹⁸ In support of their contention that in *Rūpaka* actual identity is established between two *vāc्यārthas* and as such, *Lakṣaṇā* plays no part whatsoever there, these theorists cite a number of expressions and show that in each of them absolute sameness is established not between *Viśaya* and *Viśayisadṛśa*, but between *Viśaya* and *Viśayī* themselves. Thus in the expression: 'The Goddess of fortune is embracing you—a *Rājanārāyaṇa*', what is cognised is not the idea that the king resembles Lord Nārāyaṇa, but the sense that he is identical with the Lord himself. In criticising the view-point of the ancients that in the expression: 'The face is the moon', the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the sense of one, which resembles the moon, the Neo-ālamkārikas maintain that, such a stand renders the scopes of *Upamā* and


Rūpaka identical. Moreover, such a theory considers similarity as the determinant of the indicated sense, which is the idea of one, which is similar to the moon in the present case. This similarity, which consists in sameness of attributes refers neither to resemblance in point of certain specific qualities nor to that in point of attributes in general. And this is so, because the acceptance of the first alternative vitiates such expressions as: 'The beautiful face is the moon' and the like by the defect of tautology and the acceptance of the second one renders such a proposition as 'The face is the moon' an instance of *Upamā*, in as much as, the idea of possession of same attributes in general is conveyed through Indication. Hence, these theorists conclude, in *Rūpaka* identity is established between two primary concepts and *Lakṣaṇā* plays no part there; in *Upamā*, on the other hand, no such identity is established and this differentiates a case of the poetic figure *Rūpaka* from that of *Upamā*.

Jagannātha challenges this contention of the neo-ālamkārikas: the strikingness of a *Rūpaka*, he points out, depends not merely on cognition of sheer identity between two objects, but on comprehension of such identity, as is caused by possession of similar attributes and consequently, the proposition of the Navya that, in *Rūpaka* sheer identity is established and cognised takes away from this figure charm, which constitutes the very essence of an *Alamkāra*. The point that, the strikingness of a *Rūpaka* lies in cognition of identity, caused through possession of similar attributes is established by the fact that, the expression: 'The Mahābhārata is veritable Heaven' is not regarded as an instance of this figure, although in it identity of the Heaven is established on the Great Epic; it is recognised as an instance of *Rūpaka* only when the sense of the expressions, denotative of similar attributes such as '*suparvālamkṛtam*' (The Heaven is embellished by Court of the Gods and the Mahābhārata by chapters) and the like is apprehended. The same thing, Jagannātha continues, happens in the case of the expression: 'The face is Moon', which furnishes a stock-illustration of this poetic figure; there, also, the absolute same-

ness of the moon and the face, as caused through possession of such similar attributes as the capacity to please and the like is understood: the difference between the two expressions lies in the fact that, whereas in the stock-illustration, the common attribute being very familiar does not stand in need of expression through words, in the unfamiliar instance, it stands in need of being categorically stated in terms. The argument that, identity presupposes possession of common attributes and as such, though in an expression absolute sameness of two objects is merely established, the fact that they are endowed with common attributes is understood automatically does not help the Navya much, in as much as, the wrongness of the proposition is established by the sentence: Rama may deviate from the path of truth only when fire loses its heat and water its cold touch, in which mere sense of identity of fire and heatless, as also that of water and coldless is cognised, and no comprehension of common attributes, whatsoever, occurs.⁹⁹ Equally unhelpful is the argument that, the expression 'The King does not resemble a lion, but is lion himself' proves the contention of the Navya that, the poetic figure *Rūpaka* consists in sheer superimposition of identity of one on another, without any reference to the existence of similarity between them,—an argument, advanced in order to substantiate the position that, comprehension of identity in *Rūpaka* is not preceded by that of similarity and as such, in illustrations of this figure *Lakṣaṇā* does not step in to convey the idea of *Viśayi-saḍṛśa*. Those thinkers, who maintain that *Rūpaka* is based on *Lakṣaṇā*, also, assert that, in it, the sense of identity between two objects is comprehended through *Vyañjanā* and this explains the necessity of taking recourse to Indication: these thinkers further maintain that in this figure an idea of identity, as caused through similarity is apprehended. In reply to the objection as to how, then, can the similarity of the King and the lion be negated and absolute sameness between them be established in the same expression, it is possible for these thinkers to point out that, what is intended in the expression is to deny the difference between the King and the lion and,


thereafter, to establish their absolute identity. And this is so, because while the similarity, that constitutes the essence of *Upamā* comprehends the concept of difference, that which forms the basis of *Rūpaka* is an unanalysable concept, having no association with any idea of distinction. With these arguments Jagannātha rejects the theory of the Navya, which denies the operation of *Lakṣaṇā* in the expression : 'The face is the moon', which constitutes an instance of the poetic figure *Rūpaka*. He agrees with the ancients on this issue and maintains that in the expression under consideration, the term 'moon' conveys through Indication the idea of one, which resembles the moon, but, nevertheless, it is differentiated from the sentence 'The face resembles the moon', which constitutes an illustration of *Upamā*, in as much as, while the idea of identity between the two objects is cognised in the former, no comprehension of such sense occurs in the latter : and this is so, because while *Lakṣaṇā* operates in the first, it does not in the second. Moreover, Jagannātha points out, the theory that *Lakṣaṇā* operates in instances of *Rūpaka* is in agreement with the views expressed by such great thinkers as Patanjali and Kaiyaṭa, who extend recognition to this secondary power of signification and as such, is to be accepted in preference to that, adumbrated by the Navya, which is not backed by any authority.¹⁰⁰

Mammata classifies *Lakṣaṇā* into six varieties, which, he arranges in the following order :



This classification is not scientific, in as much as, it is vitiated by the fallacy of overlapping division ; thus the expression : 'The carrier is a bull' not only illustrates *Sāropā*, but *Lakṣaṇa lakṣaṇā*, as well, because the primary meaning of the

term 'bull' completely gives it up in favour of another meaning : in a similar manner, the sentence : 'A hamlet on the Ganges' exemplifies not merely *Lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*, but *Sādhyaivasānā*, as well. For this reason, the commentators of Mammata propose another scheme of classification, which is capable of being tabled in the following form :



Jagannātha, first of all, classifies *Lakṣaṇā* into two broad types : *Nirūḍhi* and *Prayojanavātī*. The second of these two types is further split up into two sub-types : *Gāuṇī* and *Śuddhā*. Of these two sub-types, *Gauṇī* is again classified into two sub-classes : *Sāropā* and *Sādhyaivasānā* and *Śuddhā*, in its turn, into four varieties : *Jahatsvārthā*, *Ajahatsvārthā*, *Sāropā* and *Sādhyaivasānā*. Thus Jagannātha accepts the scheme of classification, drawn by Mammata and so his classification also is not scientific. Viśvanātha gives a scientific division of *Lakṣaṇā*, which, according to him, has eighty varieties. First of all, *Lakṣaṇā*, he says, is of two types : *Rūḍhimūlā* and *Prayojanamūlā*. Each of these types has two sub-types : *Upādāna* and *Lakṣaṇa*. Each of these varieties, again, admits of classification into two sub-varieties : *Sāropā* and *Sādhyaivasānā*. Each of these eight types of *Lakṣaṇā*, Viśvanātha continues, may either be of *Śuddhā* or of *Gauṇī* variety, the total sub-divisions of *Lakṣaṇā* being sixteen, of which eight are based on usage and the other eight on motive. This *Prayojanamūla-lakṣaṇā* is two-fold on account of the abstruseness or obviousness of the suggested sense and consequently, may be said to possess sixteen varieties. Then again, this type of *Lakṣaṇā* admits of a further division through the fact

that, the fruit pertains either to the thing indicated or to one of its qualities. Thus there are thirty-two varieties of *Prayojananūlā-lakṣaṇā*, and these, along with eight varieties of *Rūḍhi-mūlā-lakṣaṇā* bring the total number of sub-types of *Lakṣaṇā* to forty. In view of Viśvanātha, each of these types admits of a further division according as the power of Indication is exercised by the import of a proposition or by that of a term, and so the total number of varieties of *Lakṣaṇā* come up to eighty.

IV

Vyañjanā—the function of paramount importance

Although the Mīmāṃsaka and the Naiyāyika differ from each other on such vital issues as the nature of relation existing between sound and sense, the exact connotation of terms and the like, both of them agree in denying the status of a separate *Vṛtti* to *Vyañjanā*. The Mīmāṃsaka makes no mention of it and the Naiyāyika equates it with *Lakṣaṇā*, the secondary power of signification. Jagadīśa cites the expression: 'The face displays smiles in full blossom' (*mukhaṃ vikaṣitasmitam*), in which the term '*vikaṣita*' is said to convey through suggestion the idea of fragrance and attractiveness of the face according to the Ālankārika. The Ālankārika thinks that, *Abhidhā* or *Śakti* of the term is unable to bring the sense of fragrance into light, because that does not constitute the conventional meaning of the word: nor is *Lakṣaṇā* competent to bring this sense into comprehension, because, inability to establish connection, that forms one of the three factors necessary for operation of this function is absent. In criticising this view Jagadīśa points out, inability to establish connection amongst the primary concepts does not produce *Lakṣaṇā*, which is defined in term of a relation, which a secondary concept bears to the primary one: nor does it indicate its operation, since the fact that, the term 'Ganges' conveys through Indication the idea of the bank comprehended through inference: nor does it lead to

cognition of association among concepts signified through *Lakṣaṇā*, and consequently; constitute a causal factor of such cognition, since from the expression: 'Admit the sticks'—the sense of allowing the holders of sticks to enter is understood, even though the so-called cause, namely inability to establish connection among the primary concepts is conspicuous by its absence. Thus, Jagadīśa asserts, inability to establish logical connection among the concepts signified through *Abhidhā* is not a necessary requisite of *Lakṣaṇā*, and when this is so, the view of the Ālankārika that, due to the absence of this necessary factor *Lakṣaṇā* is unable to operate and bring out the idea of fragrance and attractiveness of the face falls through. With all emphasis at his command, he maintains that, the sense, under discussion is comprehended through Indication and as such, the postulation of a separate function of suggestion in order to account for its cognition is unnecessary. As an additional proof of existence of *Vyañjanā* the Ālankārika cites such expressions as: '*Ayaṃ gauravito mahān*', in which the contextual sense, namely the idea that, this great man is venerable, indeed, is signified through *Abhidhā* and the non-contextual sense, namely the idea that this cow is better than this sheep is conveyed through *Vyañjanā*. The Ālankārika thinks that, as the function of denotation is restricted to the contextual meaning, it is not possible for it to bring the non-contextual idea into comprehension, as well, and so postulation of the function of suggestion, competent to bring out this idea becomes an imperative necessity. Jagadīśa challenges the proposition of the Ālankārika and asserts that in such cases cognition of the non-contextual idea does not occur at all, since the knowledge that there is no intention of the speaker to signify this non-contextual stands in the way of its production. If cognition of the non-contextual occurs at all, he continues, such cognition is not verbal, but mental, effected somehow. The argument that, verbal cognition, effected through *Vyañjanā* alone produces transcendental bliss carries no weight, since a knowledge that occurs in mind automatically without the help of other factors and cognitions, also, produces supreme

delight. Thus as comprehension of *Rasa* as well, which leads to supreme bliss is capable of being explained as one effected in mind automatically without the help of *viṣayendriyasannikarṣa*, *parāmarśa* or *śaktijñāna*, the postulation of *Vyañjanā* to account for cognition of this element is unnecessary.¹⁰¹

With irrefutable logic and astounding polemics, the *Ālaṃkārika* meets this challenge of the *Naiyāyika*. The idea of fragrance and attractiveness of the face, as is gathered from the expression 'The face bears smiles in blossom' is not comprehended, he asserts, through *Lakṣaṇā*: and this is so, because all the factors necessary for operation of this function are absent. The argument that cognition of the non-contextual does not occur in those cases, where multi-meaninged words are used, since in such instances the idea that, the non-contextual is not intended to be conveyed hampers such cognition is not sound. The mere use of multi-meaninged words to the exclusion of others by the poet goes to show that his intention is to convey both the contextual and the non-contextual. Equally unsound is the argument that, the cognition of the non-contextual is not verbal, but mental, being effected automatically in the mind. A verbal expression, the *Ālaṃkārika* points out, does not cease to function after signifying the primary meaning alone: the *Naiyāyika* himself maintains that, it conveys through *Lakṣaṇā* the secondary idea, as well, in some cases. Thus when the status of a verbal cognition is granted to the comprehension of the indicated meaning, brought into light through the function of Indication, there is no reason to deny this status to apprehension of the suggested content, which ensues in the manner of the indicated idea from cognition of word. The point that although this cognition follows from comprehension of word, yet it is regarded as mental in character, because mind thinks out the idea under consideration is dangerous, because its application is likely to withdraw the status of separate sources of knowledge to perception and inference, in as much as, these being types of cognition are caused by common cause—the mind. Thus the *Ālaṃkārika* controverts the *Naiyāyika* thesis that, the understanding of the implied

meaning being *mānasīpratīti* does not fall within the purview of conceptual cognition: he firmly maintains that, comprehension of this sense is caused by a new *śabdavyāpara*, which he names *Vyañjanā*.

In extending recognition to the function of *Vyañjanā*, the *Ālaṃkārika* claims to enjoy the support of the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, whom he follows closely on many vital problems concerning sound and sense. The *Vaiyākaraṇa* defines *Vyañjanā* as an impression, which when called into play by such factors as knowledge of speciality of the speaker, the person spoken to and the like, as also, by an appreciative genius brings into light an idea, other than the conventional one: in order to differentiate it from *Lakṣaṇā*, he points out that, *Vyañjanā* does not depend on incompatibility of the primary meaning for its operation: nor does it convey a meaning, that is related in some well-known form with the primary one; *Vyañjanā*, he asserts, is competent to signify a sense, which bears direct or remote or even no connection with the primary one. For the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, the acceptance of *Vyañjanā* should follow as a corollary from the fundamental philosophical position according to which the *Śabdabrahman* reveals itself as the phenomenal world. This inverted revelation is the play of *Avidyāśakti* which leads the common man to accept the revealed empirical world as a reality over and above the consciousness. The common man labours under this illusion due to eternal *Vāsanā* or *Saṃskāra*. Thus *Vyañjanā* or appearance of the phenomenal world is the concrete expression of the force of an eternally inverted pre-disposition, which is instilled in man by *Māyā* or *Avidyā*. Thus when the *Vaiyākaraṇa* takes *Vyañjanā* as a form of *Saṃskāra* or pre-disposition, it has a logical link with the metaphysical position. On the conceptual plane of meaning-relation, too, we have seen how the word as the substratum and sustainer reveals itself as the meaning. In this fundamental sense, it should have been said that, every meaning is *vyañjya* or revealed, being superimposed on the word that means. But on the purely empirical plane, as a mark of concession to logico-epistemic analysis, the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, too, has distingui-

shed among different dimensions of meaning and accepted *Vyañjanā* as the tertiary dimension. Yet here, too, he has not forgotten to emphasise the importance of *Vāsanā* or *Samskāra* as the force, the resurgence of which, he has equated with *Vyañjanā*. When the grammarian for the sake of empirical logic, has restricted the term *Vyañjanā* to its technical sense, he has noted the importance of pre-disposition and the law of association in resurrecting the suggested meaning. When a burglar hears the statement 'the Sun has set' uttered by someone in some other context and remembers that it is time to go for burglary, he does not remember any previously cognised meaning-relation between the statement and the sense suggested to him. His habit of life has formed an association between the nocturnal darkness and the act of burglary. The act formed into a habit lies silent as a disposition in his mind. The statement directly asserting the fact of the Sun going down stimulates his pre-disposition into the remembrance of his task at hand. The suggestion of the task as the sense of the statement is nothing but the stimulated resurgence of his slumbering pre-disposition. Hence *Vyañjanā* is called *saṃskārod-bodhaka* by Nāgeśa. Though in the direct meaning-relation or *Abhidhā-śakti*, too, *Samskāra* plays a part, yet here conscious knowledge of the relation between the word and the meaning (*Śaktigraha*) is necessary for apprehending the meaning directly by the corresponding word, i.e. *Śaktijñāna* is necessary in that case. But in *Vyañjanā*, *Vyañjanājñāna* is not necessary, since the pre-requisite of suggestion is not the fact that the burglar should have previously grasped in consciousness a meaning-relation between the statement 'the Sun has set' and the act of burglary ahead. The very existence of the pre-disposition is enough, the statement acting only as a stimulus in response to which the *saṃskāra* emerges as the suggested sense. Hence it is said—*Vyañjanā svarūpasatī hetuḥ*.

Moreover, according to the doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, the one monolithic word is gradually manifested by the succession of sound-series. The gradual manifestation is nothing but resurgence of the previously formed flowing impressions printed on

the mind by evanescent auditory perceptions. By describing *Vyañjanā* as an impression, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* makes it clear that, while *śakti* ascertained with reference to a particular meaning in this birth conveys an idea, this function, cognised in previous birth, as well, signifies the implied meaning and consequently, one is different from the other. He feels the necessity of postulating this function, because as Nāgeśa points out, this is necessary in order to explain revelation of the eternal sound-unit *Sphoṭa*, which according to him, is the only significant entity. The *Vaiyākaraṇa* thinks that, the momentary sounds pronounced by our speech-organs do not signify an idea: what they do is that, they reveal the eternal sound-unit, which because of its expressive character is regarded as *Sphoṭa*: the revelation of this *Sphoṭa*, he believes, is effected through the function of suggestion. Moreover, Nāgeśa continues, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* thesis that *Vyañjanā* exists is in conformity to the doctrine of Bhartṛhari, which regards a *nipāta* as a *dyotaka*, drawing, thereby, a line of demarcation between *vacaka* and *dyotaka* units. Thus in the term '*Prajapati*', meaning: performs an excellent penance, the prefix '*Pra*' conveys no meaning of its own: it only indicates that the verb '*japati*' itself conveys the idea of performance of an excellent penance. When the prefix '*Pra*' conveys no primary meaning of its own, it is unable to signify any sense through *Lakṣaṇā* as well, because *Lakṣaṇā* brings out only such a meaning, as is connected with the primary one, and as such is regarded as an extended power of denotation or *aprasiddhā-śakti*: it only suggests the capacity of the verb lying near it to convey the particular sense.¹⁰² This observation is competent to distinguish *Vyañjanā* from *Lakṣaṇā*, also, because while the latter is only an extended power of denotation, the former is not so. As regards the substratum of this function, the *Vaiyākaraṇa* says that, it resides in word, sentence, meaning, portion of a word, letter, style, movements and such other numerous entities, thus making it clear that, word, letter, meaning and even unmeaning sound and movement—all these are able to bring out an implicit idea through the function of suggestion. The *Ālambkārika* endorses

this view of the *Vaiyākaraṇa*, as is evident from the observation of Mammaṭa that, the function of *Vyañjanā* pertains to all types of meanings, as well and that the conveying agents of a *Vyangyārtha* are words, their fragments, meanings, letters, compositions and even such units as gestures and sideglances, that do not come under the purview of *śabda*.¹⁰³ The *Vaiyākaraṇa* thinks that, the knowledge of speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and such other things is only auxiliary to comprehension of a particular implicit idea and as such, is not indispensable in all cases.

Viśvanātha defines *Vyañjanā* as a function that brings the implicit idea into comprehension when the three well-known functions of *Abhidhā*, *Lakṣaṇā* and *Tātparya* cease to operate after conveying their respective ideas. It is not possible for any one of these functions to signify its special meaning and in addition to it bring out the implicit sense, because the function pertaining to a word operates only once. In support of this contention, Viśvanātha quotes an observation of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, which states that a function, pertaining to a word, a valid source of knowledge, such as perception and the like and a sacrificial act intended to fulfil a particular aim operate only once and know no resurrection: thus the term '*Ghaṭa*' once pronounced causes cognition of the jar only once,—perception of smoke in hill once derived leads to inference of fire only once, and performance of *Aśvamedha* for one time only leads to Heaven only once. This function of suggestion, he continues, belongs to *śabda*, *artha*, *prakṛti*, *pratyaya* and other elements and is referred to by such terms as *vyañjanā*, *dhvanana*, *gamana* and *pratyāyana*.¹⁰⁴

The *Ālankārika* classifies *Vyañjanā* into two types: *Śābdā* and *Ārthā*, according to the part played by the sound or sense-element in the suggestion of the implicit sense. The *Ālankārika* thinks that both *śabda* and *artha* play their part in bringing the suggested content into light: this, he points out, is evident from the fact that, no implicit idea, whatsoever, is comprehended from an expression, whose explicit sense is not understood, as also from the fact that, an idea, not expressed through

words, does not bring a relishable suggested sense into light.¹⁰⁵ Thus, though in all cases, the sound and the sense-elements go to convey through *Vyañjanā* the implied meaning, yet in some cases, the sound-element plays a prominent role,—the sense-element being auxiliary to it and in others, the case is just the opposite. The *Ālankārika* says that those cases of suggestion where *śabda* plays a greater part are regarded as instances of *Śābdā-Vyañjanā* and those, where *artha* plays a greater part are regarded as instances of *Ārthā-Vyañjanā*. As regards the criterion of determining whether the sound plays a prominent or subordinate part, he says that, prominence belongs to *śabda* in those instances where the words actually used do not admit of replacement,—the manifestation of the implicit idea being hampered in case of such substitution and prominence belongs to *artha* in those instances, where the words admit of replacement,—the revelation of the unexpressed not being impeded in any way by such substitution, or in other words, in *Śābdā-Vyañjanā*, the sound-element is *parivṛtṭyasaha* while in *Ārthā-Vyañjanā*, this is *parivṛtṭi-saha*. Against the view of the *Ālankārika* that, both *śabda* and *artha* go to suggest the implicit in all cases, an objection that, the cognition of sound and that of expressed sense being not simultaneous, it is not possible for both these elements to combine and perform the same function is likely to be raised. It is quite natural to point out that, at the time of comprehension of sound, that of sense does not occur and at the time of apprehension of the explicit, that of sound disappears, and as such, simultaneous existence of the sound and sense-elements is a myth. In reply to this objection, it is possible for the *Ālankārika* to assert that, this is not so, because the connotation of a word comprehends the form of the word itself and consequently, at the time of apprehension of primary meaning, the sound-element, which, also, is included within it is understood. Hence when the simultaneous cognition of the sound and the sense-elements arises, the objection that, it is not possible for both these units to combine and bring out the implicit does not stand. The stand of the *Ālankārika* that the form of the word itself

constitutes the primary meaning of a word is based on the doctrine of Bhartṛhari that, every possible cognition is determinate, the determining factor being an articulate form, as also on the observation of the grammarian that, a difference in sound-element leads to a corresponding difference in sense-element.¹⁰⁶ For this reason, Jagannātha points out, in the expression: 'The Sun rises red and sets red: the great remain the same in prosperity and adversity', the term 'red' does not admit of substitution by any synonym, since such replacement makes a difference in meaning, as well, and endangers the very existence of the poetic figure *Arthāntaranyāsa*, which consists in corroborating a particular statement by a general one or the vice versa.¹⁰⁷

The Ālankārika classifies a *Śābdī-Vyañjanā* into two types, according to the function that constitutes its basis: of these, *Lakṣaṇāmūlā-Vyañjanā*, as the name suggests, is based on Indication and *Abhidhāmūlā-Vyañjanā* is based on denotation.¹⁰⁸ In contradiction to the Naiyāyika thesis that, a simple mental cognition of the unexpressed occurs, the Ālankārika maintains that, verbal knowledge of the motive, for the signification of which *Lakṣaṇā* is taken recourse to appears, as is evident from the fact that, comprehension of the idea of excess of coolness and purity from the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' ensues from cognition of word: he, further maintains that, the word brings this idea into light through the function of suggestion. *Abhidhā* is unable to convey the idea of excess of coolness and purity, because that does not constitute the conventional meaning of the term 'Ganges'. Nor is *Lakṣaṇā* competent to do so, because help of this inferior function—this necessary evil—is sought only to remove the obstacle standing in the way of establishment of logical connection among the concepts; and this is done only when *Abhidhā* fails to bring out such concepts among which logical connection is capable of being effected. Thus *Lakṣaṇā* conveys only that meaning, as is absolutely necessary in order to remove the inconsistency, and does nothing more. In the stock-illustration, accordingly, it signifies merely the idea of the bank of the Ganges,—a concept,

that is indispensable in order to establish its logical connection with development of a diary-form and does not proceed further to convey the idea of excess of coolness and purity, as well. To an obstinate opponent the Ālankārika points out, *Lakṣaṇā* is unable to bring the idea of excess of coolness and purity into comprehension, because the factors necessary for its operation are absent. First of all, the sense of the bank neither forms the primary meaning of the term 'Ganges', nor is it incongruous in the present context, that is to say, logical connection can very well be established of the bank with the herd-station. Thus the first condition—the inapplicability of the primary meaning remains unsatisfied. Secondly, the bank bears no direct connection with the properties of coolness and purity, which are associated only with the flowing stream of water and naturally, the second condition, also, is not satisfied. Thirdly, if the motive also is said to be conveyed through Indication, then the necessity for positing another motive arises: in reality however, no such second purpose is traced. So none of the conditions necessary for operation of *Lakṣaṇā* is satisfied. The argument that the motive is not understood at all—is without any value, since it is opposed to the experience of all appreciators. For this reason, Ānandavardhana, and following him, Mammaṭa assert that, the capacity of a word to bring out the purpose for the signification of which *Lakṣaṇā* is resorted to is not impeded by such hindrances as incompatibility of the primary meaning and the like and consequently, it conveys the said purpose straightway, showing, thereby, that the motive is not brought into light through the function of *Lakṣaṇā* itself.¹⁰⁹

Mammaṭa says that, if for arguments' sake, it is contended that, the motive is nothing but an indicated meaning and in order to explain the operation of this Indication, a second motive is posited, then a serious fallacy vitiating the whole system is expected to crop in: if the *prayojana* of the first *Lakṣaṇā* is supposed to be conveyed through another *Lakṣaṇā*, and the *prayojana* of that subsequent one is said to be communicated through a third *Lakṣaṇā* by positing another *prayojana*, then the

fallacy of *Regressus-ad-infinitum* is likely to arise and land even the basic *Lakṣaṇā* in jeopardy ; to state clearly, as in such case, the minds of readers are likely to remain absorbed in search for a series of motives, it is not possible for them to apprehend even the first indicated meaning.

Indian thinkers speak of different varieties of reasoning, which include self-dependence (*ātmaśraya*), mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) vicious circle (*cakraka*) and the vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). The reasoning of self-dependence consists in the situation when a thing directly and immediately presupposes its ownself in respect of genesis, subsistence and cognition. If it were contended that A was the cause of A, that is, its ownself, then A would be split up into two entities which are not identical and as such the reasoning would be defective : in a similar manner if it were contended that a man existed in his ownself, or in other words, were his own container and contained, then the man would be split up into two entities which are never identical and the reasoning would be invalid. These cases of self-dependence are defective, because they stand in the way of production, subsistence or cognition of the thing concerned. The reasoning of mutual dependence arises when between two terms the first term presupposes the second term and vice versa immediately and directly for its genesis, subsistence or cognition. The argument that a seed produces a sprout and a sprout a seed, or that the man is sustained by earth and the earth by man, or that the cognition of the jar requires that of the picture and the knowledge of the picture requires that of the jar furnishes an illustration of this type of reasoning. The reasoning of vicious circle arises when between two terms the first requires the second, and the second requires the first through the intervention of third or the fourth. The argument that a seed produces a sprout, a sprout a flower and a flower a seed or that the cup exists in the earth, the earth in space and the space in the cup or that the cognition of the jar presupposes that of the picture, which, again, presupposes that of the monastery, which, in its turn, presupposes that of the jar furnishes an illustration of this type of reasoning. In each of these three types of

reasoning the same term is required to serve as the condition and the result, and their difference lies only in the number of steps involved in between : thus when A requires A immediately and directly, it becomes a case of self-dependence,—when A requires B immediately and directly and B requires A immediately and directly, it becomes a case of mutual dependence,—when A requires B, B requires C and C requires A, then the argument becomes a case of vicious circle. The reasoning of the vicious infinite consists in continuity of the chain of probans and probandum, of ground and consequent without limit. The argument that, the seed produces the sprout, the sprout another seed, this second seed a second sprout and so on infinitely or that the man is sustained by the earth, the earth by the quarter-elephants, the quarter-elephants by the tortoise, the tortoise by the space and so on or that the cognition of the jar requires that of the picture, whose knowledge requires that of the monastery, which, in its turn, requires that of the mat and so on affords an example of this type of reasoning. Of these three specimens of arguments, the first one, however, differs from the other two in this respect that, whereas in the last two, the infinite series is vicious in the first one, it is legitimate or valid, because the continuity, herein, is endorsed by recognised canons of proof. The seed is the cause of the sprout and the sprout again is the cause of the seed ; this is established by legitimate organ of knowledge. And for this reason, causal relation between seed and sprout is capable of being established, even though this chain is bound to be pursued infinitely in the past and to have an infinite future career, as well. The *raison d'être* of infinite series acting as a *reductio ad absurdum* lies in the fact that, it stands in the way of genesis, subsistence or cognition of a particular thing. In the present case, however, there is no mutual dependence between the seed and the sprout in respect of genesis, subsistence or cognition : the individual seed which is the cause of the individual sprout is not the effect of that sprout, but of a different individual sprout that occurred in the past, or in other words, the pairs of cause and effect are numerically different, and hence, there is no mutual dependence. It would

have been a vicious series had the self-same individual seed and the self-same individual sprout been required to serve as cause and effect alternately. The fact that series is an infinite one is due only to the fact that no arbitrary limit can be set to the history of the physical world, which is an uninterrupted one. The second and third specimens of arguments, on the other hand, fail to explain a datum, the necessity of which impels its advocate to postulate a series, of which there is no last term, which could justify the original datum. Hence infinite series in these is vicious: it militates against the original datum, which is the starting point of the series. Jayantabhaṭṭa draws scrupulously a line of demarcation between the infinite series, which is vicious, lands as it does, the original datum in jeopardy and that which is legitimate, and maintains that the first one only is regarded as fallacious. The critic who is of opinion that, the motive for the signification of which *Lakṣaṇā* is resorted to is conveyed through *Lakṣaṇā* renders the original *Lakṣaṇā* dependent on a subsequent Indication, since the motive constitutes one of the essential factors necessary for its operation: this second *Lakṣaṇā* again depends on another for its subsistence and the third on a fourth, and in this way an unending series of *Lakṣaṇā* goes on. This unending series obstructs the genesis of original *Lakṣaṇā* and at the same time stands in the way of cognition of the purpose for the signification of which this first *Lakṣaṇā* is resorted to and as such militates against the original datum which constitutes the starting point. This infinite series, to quote Mammaṭa, is *Mūlakṣatikārinī*; and is to be avoided.¹¹⁰

In the view of some critics, opposed to the theory of Dhvani, the motive of Indication has no existence separate from that of the indicated meaning, and what actually is comprehended is not the secondary sense only, but the sense endowed with a particular motive. Thus, according to these scholars, the secondary meaning of the term 'Ganges', used in the expression: 'A hamlet on the Ganges' is the bank endowed with the qualities of coolness and purity and the purpose is the apprehension of an idea, that can be gathered in excess to that derived

from the simple expression: 'A hamlet on the bank of the Ganges'. Thus as *Lakṣaṇā* conveys a meaning, qualified by a motive, the postulation of a separate function for signification of this purpose is not necessary. In reply to this view of the opponents, Mammaṭa emphatically asserts that, the indicated meaning can in no case be one endowed with a motive, or in other words, the proposition of *Viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā* is untenable. And this is so, because it leads to violation of the well-known axiom: *Jñānasya viśayo hyanyaḥ phalamanyadudāhṛtam*. Commentators differ widely among themselves on the correct interpretation of this dictum, in which the use of the ambiguous term '*phalam*' poses a serious problem. The explanation that by *phala* a produced fruit is meant and the axiom conveys the idea that, the content of knowledge is something different from the fruit of such knowledge which is a produced entity is unacceptable, since it fails to bring out any inconsistency in the proposition of *Viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā*. The fruit of *Lakṣaṇā*, here, is cognition of the idea of coolness and purity and this is certainly different from its content, which is the bank, endowed with the said attributes. The qualities of coolness and purity themselves are incapable of being regarded as the fruit of knowledge, because *Lakṣaṇā* does not go to generate them. The explanation that by the term *phala* an indicated fruit is referred to and what the axiom means is this that, the fruit of a knowledge, which is not a produced entity but an indicated one is different from the content of the knowledge concerned—renders the qualities of purity and coolness themselves fruits of such knowledge and at the same time brings out an inconsistency in the proposition of qualified indication, which makes the attributes of coolness and purity the content as well as the fruit of knowledge caused by *Lakṣaṇā*, and is thus an improvement on the first one, but, nevertheless, this also is untenable, since it is based on a wrong datum and is not in conformity to the explanation offered by Mammaṭa himself in his *Vṛtti* thereon. This explanation takes it for granted that the fruit of knowledge consists of the attributes of coolness and purity themselves, which, however, is not a fact, in as much as *Lakṣaṇā* leads to

comprehension of the said qualities and not to the qualities themselves : and this comprehension is certainly different from the idea of the bank, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity and consequently, the maxim does not stand violated. Moreover, in his *Vṛtti* on this maxim, Mammaṭa describes *Prakaṭatā* or *Samvitti* as the fruit of knowledge, both of which are produced entities, showing, thereby, that what is understood by *phala* in the dictum is a produced fruit, and not an indicated one. In order to avoid these difficulties clever commentators take recourse to an ingenious subterfuge : they point out that what actually the maxim states is that, just as the content of a knowledge is different from the knowledge itself, similarly, the fruit, accruing from it, also, is different from it, or in other words, knowledge, object of knowledge and its fruit—all these are mutually exclusive. In the case of perception of a blue thing, the content of cognition is the blue thing itself and the fruit is either *Prakaṭatā* belonging to the object or subjective cognition *Samvitti*, pertaining to the perceiver. In the view of the *Mīmāṃsaka*, when a thing becomes known either through perception or through inference or through any other source of knowledge, an attribute, regarded as 'knownness' is produced in the thing : this, he says, is the fruit of knowledge. The *Naiyāyika*, on the other hand, holds that, when a thing is comprehended, knowledge concerning cognition arises in the mind of the knower, and this serves as the fruit of knowledge. The advocate of the doctrine of qualified indication states that, in the expression : 'A hamlet on the Ganges', the content of cognition, caused through *Lakṣaṇā* is the bank of the river, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity and its fruit is comprehension of an additional meaning, which is nothing other than an excess of the said qualities : thus he identifies fruit of knowledge with knowledge itself throwing the well-established maxim into winds and consequently, his doctrine becomes untenable.

In his magnum opus '*Kāvya-tattva-samīkṣā*', Dr. N. N. Choudhuri offers an altogether new explanation of the dictum which seems very reasonable, in as much as, it does not want

to evade the problem. Dr. Choudhuri says that, the term '*phala*' refers to a produced fruit : in the stock-illustration the fruit of knowledge caused by *Lakṣaṇā* is cognition of the attributes of coolness and purity, which, however, are regarded as fruits themselves through transference of epithet. He points out, further, that the term '*anya*' in the dictum conveys not merely the idea of a different thing, but that of a thing, which appears in a different time, and thus the dictum asserts that the content of knowledge is entirely different from the fruit of such knowledge, there being temporal sequence between them,—the content being cognised first and the fruit next. The advocate of the doctrine of Qualified Indication does not take note of this and explains that *Lakṣaṇā* conveys the idea of the bank, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity, which, however, is an absurd proposition, in as much as, the sense of the bank is comprehended first and that of the attributes next. To state more clearly, as there is difference in point of time of cognition of the unqualified secondary sense and that of the motive, which is said to qualify it, the same function cannot bring into light both the ideas simultaneously.

There are other grounds that go to establish the untenability of the proposition of *Viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā*. The inferior function of Indication is taken recourse to in order to establish logical connection among the concepts conveyed by terms used in a proposition and it brings out only that idea as is absolutely necessary for establishment of this logical connection. As in the expression under consideration, the sense of sheer bank is competent to solve the difficulty which faces us, in as much as, association of hamlet with the bank is capable of being effected, it is neither possible nor proper for *Lakṣaṇā* to bring out the idea of the attributes of coolness and purity, as well,—an idea, that does not contribute in any way towards establishment of this connection. The parallelism of sandal-paste, which, though applied in order to allay heat generates coolness, as well, introduced in order to explain the double function of *Lakṣaṇā* does not cut much ice, because sandal-paste is an unconscious being, while *Lakṣaṇā* is in the form of a knowledge and consequently,

the two do not meet in a common platform. Secondly, in order to have knowledge of a qualified object, the qualifications are to be known first; to put it more precisely, in order to derive knowledge of the bank, endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity, the attributes are to be known first. No source of valid knowledge, however, can bring these attributes of bank into consciousness, because these qualities pertain to the stream alone, and not to the strip of land. Of course, in case of erroneous knowledge, attributes belonging to one thing are superimposed on another, but the knowledge of coolness and purity, as pertaining to the bank cannot be described here as an erroneous knowledge, because such description completely defeats the purpose of postulation of Indication. When the function of *Abhidhā* goes to the point of generating an error, the primary meaning being incompatible with the rest of the sentence, then *Lakṣaṇā* comes to our rescue: it brings the secondary sense into light and thereby creates a right notion. If *Lakṣaṇā*, also, is supposed to generate a false idea, then the very purpose of adopting this round-about process as an expedient after rejection of *Abhidhā* becomes defeated. Thus it is not possible for *Lakṣaṇā* to convey the idea of the bank, as endowed with the attributes of coolness and purity,—attributes, that do not pertain actually to it. The Dhvanivādin says that, although *Lakṣaṇā* fails here, *Vyañjanā* succeeds: it brings the idea of the bank, endowed with the said attributes into light even though the existence of those attributes in the bank is opposed to legitimate sources of knowledge. For this reason, Jayantabhaṭṭa, the noted logician pronounces a note of warning to the effect that, the function of suggestion, which owes its genesis to the poetic intuition of a poet is never to be challenged by arguments, since it does not follow the path of reason and logic: it is difficult even for great scholars, he asserts, to pursue steadily its line of action, which is most unpredictable.¹¹¹ These points go to establish the untenability of the proposition of *Viśiṣṭa-lakṣaṇā*. And so the Ālankārika concludes, in no case can there be an Indication with reference to a qualified object, i.e. to say Indication can never convey a meaning

accompanied by a motive: what actually is understood through *Lakṣaṇā* is an unqualified object, the qualities belonging to which are conveyed through *Vyañjanā*; and, hence, postulation of this function, which is designated by the terms 'reverberation' and 'illumination' as well, is an imperative necessity.¹¹²

While *Lakṣaṇāmūlā-vyañjanā* conveys the motive for the sake of which Indication is resorted to *Abhidhāmūlā-vyañjanā* brings into comprehension that sense, which does not form the primary meaning of a multi-meaninged word. Both Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha define it as a process, which causes cognition of an idea other than the conventional one, when the expressive power of a word having more possible meanings than one is restricted to one meaning by such restrictive factors as conjunction, disjunction and the like.¹¹³ In support of their contention, both cite a couplet of Bhartṛhari, which states that, in case of non-determination of actual meanings of homonym, the elements that go to point out the exact idea are conjunction, disjunction, association, antagonism, purpose, context, special characteristic, proximity to another word, ability, propriety, place, time, gender, accent and such other factors.¹¹⁴ As an example of this type of *Vyañjanā* Mammaṭa quotes the verse:

Bhadrātmano duradhirohatanorviśālavamṣonnateḥ

kṛtāśilīmukhasaṃgrahasya

Yasyānupaplutagateḥ paravāraṇasya dānāmbusekasubhagaḥ

satatam karo'bhūt

Here, he points out, multi-meaninged words are used, the denotation of which is restricted to the contextual sense of the king and the non-contextual idea of the tusker is brought into light through the function of suggestion. The contextual idea in the verse is this: 'The hand of the king, who possesses a magnanimous soul, whose form is unassailable,—who is eminent in a great family,—who has made a store of arrows,—who is of unimpeded march and a repeller of enemies always becomes lovely by the sprinkling of waters used at the time of making gifts'. A true connoisseur of Poetic Art, however, understands that the verse has a second application, which

is as follows : The trunk of lordly elephant, who belongs to the Bhadra species, whose body is difficult to mount upon,—who is as tall as a lofty bamboo, who has attracted a collection of bees and whose gait is majestic is beautiful as it emits ichor. Mammaṭa is of opinion that, this non-contextual meaning of tusker is incapable of being comprehended through *Abhidhā*, because it is restricted to the contextual idea of the king. Nor is *Laṅkā* competent to bring this idea into light, since the factors necessary for its operation are absent. Hence, he remarks, the postulation of the function of *Vyañjanā* becomes necessary. Elsewhere, following the footsteps of Ānandavardhana, he maintains that, *Vyañjanā* not only conveys the non-contextual, but brings out the relation, subsisting between the contextual and the non-contextual, as well. Thus in the verse cited above, the function of suggestion conveys the idea of the mighty tusker, as also, the relation of similarity, linking the two apparently discrete ideas : and so the Dhvanivādin quotes it as an illustration of Upamādhvani.

The fact whether the non-contextual is actually conveyed through the function of suggestion or not forms the subject-matter of an animated discussion as is evident from the four different theories on the issue recorded by Abhinavagupta. One theory states that, the second sense is comprehended only by such person, who has seen the use of that particular word in that particular sense, and as in such case, the function of denotation is restricted to the contextual, cognised first, the second is conveyed through the function of suggestion. Another theory states that, the non-contextual is signified through the function of *Abhidhā*, but this is different from the function of denotation, which brings the contextual into light in this respect that, while the latter conveys an idea with the help of sheer conventional relation, the former does it with the help of such additional accessories as capacity of the primary meaning to suggest the implicit and so on, and as such is transformed into *Vyañjanā*. A third theory points out to the principle, according to which, difference in concepts leads to difference in words and asserts that, in case of homonyms, also, words actually differ, because

no one word can convey two ideas ; only in such cases the words are of same appearance. Thus in those instances where multi-meaninged words are used, the cognition of the second sense is always preceded by an understanding of its corresponding significant word. In such poetic figures as *Śleṣa* and the like, the mind of the appreciator thinks out this second word-unit being aided by the function of denotation, while in case of *Śabda-śaktimūla-dhvani*, it apprehends the second word-unit through the function of suggestion. This theory recognises the non-contextual as a suggested unit and as such bears affinity to the first one, the only difference between the two lying in the fact that, while the former assumes difference in words corresponding to difference in meanings, the latter does not take this distinction for granted. A fourth theory holds that, though *Abhidhā* is restricted to the contextual, it comes back to activity being aided by *arthaśāmarthyā* and conveys the non-contextual, as well. Subsequently, *Vyañjanā* brings out the idea of such relation as similarity or identity, linking the contextual and the non-contextual. Comprehension of this relation, it continues, is an imperative necessity, because, otherwise, the sentence becomes significant of discrete ideas like the raving of a mad man and consequently, a specimen of invalid proposition. Thus, according to this theory, the non-contextual is brought into light not through *Vyañjanā* but through *Abhidhā* : *Vyañjanā* only goes to convey the relation linking the two apparently discrete ideas in such cases.¹¹⁵

Taking cue from these theories mentioned by Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha introduces an interesting discussion on the comprehension of the non-contextual. Scholars, he says, differ widely among themselves on the question of the actual part played by such factors as conjunction, disjunction and the like, that are said to restrict the power of denotation. Some are of opinion that, as the convention of a homonym is accepted equally with respect to all meanings, all of them are cognised as soon as the word is heard ; then a doubt arises as to the intention of the speaker to solve which the hearer takes note of conjunction, disjunction and other factors, that are definite

pointers to the said intention ; subsequently, a second recollection, having for its content the contextual only, which is intended to be conveyed by the speaker occurs and accordingly, the contextual alone enters into association with other ideas. The theory propounded by these scholars asserts that, a homonymous word leads to recollection of two ideas in the first instance and to that of the contextual alone in the second after the determination of the intention of the speaker : in conformity to its accepted principle that, a word leads to recollection of its corresponding concept through association of ideas, it points out that, though the second recollection is intervened from cognition of the word-unit by a knowledge concerning the intention of the speaker, yet remembrance of the contextual alone ensues for the second time, since the knowledge of the said intention comprehends that of the homonym itself, in as much as, the hearer understands that this word is used to signify this particular idea. In reply to the point as to why the contextual alone forms the content of this second recollection, it maintains, the knowledge of conjunction, disjunction and such other factors or that of the speaker's intention, which is consequential upon it obstructs the remembrance of the non-contextual : this assumption, it affirms, is an imperative necessity in order to explain logically conceptual cognition, resulting from a homonym,—cognition, which does not embrace for its content a number of ideas. In support of this observation, the adherents of this theory cite the couplet of Bhartṛhari quoted above and explain it as conveying this idea that, conjunction, disjunction and such other factors impede the remembrance of the non-contextual and thereby cause recollection of the contextual alone in those cases where homonyms are used and as such, comprehension of the real intention of the speaker becomes highly doubtful. They further maintain that, in such cases apprehension of the non-contextual, as well, occurs and in order to explain this comprehension postulation of the function of suggestion becomes absolutely necessary. The argument of the opponent that in the first instance, *Abhidhā* brings the contextual alone into light, since the recollection of

the non-contextual is obstructed by such restrictive factors as conjunction and disjunction, but in the second instance the self-same function brings out the non-contextual, as well, and consequently, postulation of *Vyañjanā* is unnecessary is without any weight, because the knowledge of the restrictive factors that go to impede the remembrance of the non-contextual persists at that stage even and accordingly it is not possible for *Abhidhā* to convey that idea. Equally weightless is the counter-argument that the knowledge of restrictive factors hampers the presentation of the non-contextual through *Vyañjanā* also, because comprehension of this sense is experienced by all appreciators and *Abhidhāmūlā-vyañjanā* is posited in order to account for this comprehension. In conformity to all this it is said that, the knowledge of the restrictive factors obstruct such recollection of the non-contextual, as is not effected through *Vyañjanā* : as an alternative to this, it is pointed out that, the knowledge of *Vyañjanā* itself serves as an excitant ; it takes away the power of the impeding factors and thereby allows the recollection of the non-contextual to occur freely. For this reason, Mammaṭa speaks of *Nīyantraṇa* of *Abhidhā* : what he means by *Nīyantraṇa* is this that, the factors conjunction, disjunction etc. obstruct the remembrance of the non-contextual, and, thereby, allow the contextual only to present itself through the function of denotation : in such cases, the non-contextual, he points out, is cognised through *Abhidhāmūlā-Vyañjanā*.¹¹⁶

On the exact role of the so-called restrictive factors another section of scholars holds a completely different view. They are of opinion that, knowledge of real intention of the speaker is an indispensable requisite for conceptual cognition, resulting from use of multi-meaninged words : thus, when it is understood that, the intention of the speaker is to convey the idea of Lord Viṣṇu then that sense is cognised from the term 'Hari' ; when on the other hand, it is noticed that, his intention is to signify the sense of a lion, then that meaning is apprehended from the same term. These scholars point out that, in the first instance, cognition of a multi-meaninged word leads to recollection of the contextual and the non-contextual alike : then the purpose of

the speaker is ascertained by conjunction, disjunction, context etc., and after that the idea that constitutes the content of the intention of the speaker alone enters into concord with other concepts. In such cases, they continue, the comprehension of the non-contextual, which occurs later is effected through *Vyañjanā*: *Abhidhā* is incompetent to cause this comprehension, since ascertainment of the purpose of the speaker is a causal factor indispensable for a cognition effected through *Abhidhā* and the intention of the speaker in such cases is not to convey the idea of the non-contextual. The factor which prevents *Abhidhā* from conveying this idea does not prevent *Vyañjanā*, as well, from signifying this sense, since knowledge of the speaker's purpose is not regarded as an essential requisite for a cognition, effected through *Vyañjanā* in all cases. These thinkers claim that their theory is an improvement on that adumbrated by others in this respect that, it neither feels the necessity of asserting that recollection of a meaning ensues for the second time nor that of postulating a capacity pertaining to conjunction, disjunction etc. to obstruct remembrance of the non-contextual: hence, they point out, this is more in conformity to the law of parsimony than the one, cited before. In reply to the query that, if recollection concerning the contextual alone is not regarded as an essential requisite for conceptual cognition resulting from a homonym, then how can the term '*Viśeṣasmitihetavaḥ*' used in the couplet of Bhartṛhari be justified and that, if the fact that remembrance of the non-contextual is obstructed be denied, then what does Mammaṭa mean by *Niyantrāṇa* of *Vācakatva*, these thinkers explain that, these two terms really convey different ideas: by describing conjunction, context etc. as *Viśeṣasmitihetu*, Bhartṛhari means that, these factors help one to ascertain the actual intention of the speaker, which is to convey the contextual only: in a similar manner, by *Niyantrāṇa* of *Vācakatva* Mammaṭa makes it clear that, these factors lead to ascertainment of the speaker's purpose and thereby makes *Abhidhā* competent to cause conceptual cognition concerning the contextual alone. In such cases, they continue the comprehension of the non-contextual, which

does not constitute the content of the speaker's intention is caused through *Vyañjanā*. Thus, while the upholders of the first theory assert that, the restrictive factors obstruct the very recollection of the non-contextual, the followers of the second maintain that, this remembrance is not impeded, but the non-contextual does not get itself associated with other concepts and this happens, because knowledge concerning intention of the speaker, which embraces for its content the contextual only is admitted as indispensable for conceptual cognition, ensuing from a multi-meaninged word.¹¹⁷

Jagannātha, however, does not accept either of these theories. The observation that, the so-called restrictive factors lead to recollection of the contextual alone, which gets itself connected with other concepts, in as much as, remembrance of the non-contextual is obstructed, he points out, seems absurd, since, it is opposed, firstly, to our experience. Moreover, as the cognition of the contextual alone is capable of being explained otherwise by positing the knowledge concerning the intention of the speaker as an indispensable factor for conceptual cognition, resulting from a homonym, the assertion that recollection of the non-contextual is obstructed seems unnecessary. Thirdly, this recollection is bound to occur, since the knowledge of the word is there and this word is related with the non-contextual in the same way as it is with the contextual: in case of verbal cognition, knowledge of the word leads to recollection of its corresponding concept in accordance with the principle that of two related, the knowledge of one leads necessarily to that of the other and when the non-contextual, as well, is linked with the word nothing stands in the way of its comprehension. The argument that, knowledge concerning conjunction, disjunction, context etc. or that concerning intention of the speaker, which is consequential upon the former obstructs recollection of the non-contextual is unsound, since recollection of a particular thing is caused by revival of an impression left by it in the mind and when in the present case the impression deposited by the non-contextual is excited by cognition of its significant word-unit, nothing is competent to prevent its recollection. The point

that the knowledge of the so-called restrictive factors obstructs the recollection of the non-contextual in those cases where multi-meaninged words are used, even though the conditions of such remembrance are present is without any weight, since such assumption is opposed to our experience. The cognition of such homonym as 'Payas' leads to comprehension of all meanings—whether contextual or not—in the minds of those persons even, who are thoroughly acquainted with context, place, time and such other factors. This is evident from the fact that, when doubt appears in the mind of an unintelligent person about the exact meaning of the term 'Payas' in the expression: 'Payo ramanīyam', a man thoroughly acquainted with context and such other factors clears away his doubt by pointing out that, the intention of the speaker is to convey the idea of milk and not that of water. Had the recollection of the non-contextual been obstructed by conjunction, disjunction, context etc. then it would not have been possible for this intelligent person to cognise the non-contextual, as well, and to assert that the speaker does not want to convey this sense. Hence, Jagannātha concludes, the assumption that, the knowledge of context etc. or that of the intention of the speaker, which follows from it obstructs the very recollection of the non-contextual is unsound and unwarranted.

Equally unacceptable is the second theory, which states that, when it is ascertained through the help of the so-called restrictive factors that, the intention of the speaker is to convey a particular sense, then that idea alone forms the content of conceptual cognition effected through *Abhidhā* and an idea other than that is conveyed through *Vyañjanā*. To the adherents of this theory, who regard knowledge of the speaker's purpose as a causal factor of comprehension of meaning, ensuing from cognition of a multi-meaninged term, Jagannātha puts this question: does in all such cases *Vyañjanā* leads to cognition of the non-contextual or does it lead to this apprehension in some cases? The acceptance of the first alternative or in other words, the assumption that *Vyañjanā* causes cognition of the non-contextual in all cases renders the proposition that knowledge of the

speaker's purpose is indispensable for conceptual cognition useless, in as much as, the contextual and the non-contextual equally form the content of verbal knowledge. The argument that the said proposition relates only to conceptual cognition, effected through *Abhidhā* and is to be accepted in order to show that cognition of the contextual alone occurs through *Śakti*—the non-contextual being comprehended through *Vyañjanā* is unsound, since when both the meanings are cognised in all cases, there is no point in describing one as being conveyed through *Abhidhā* and the other as being signified through *Vyañjanā*, particularly when the former is competent to bring out both the ideas: and when this is so, postulation of *Vyañjanā* in order to explain cognition of the non-contextual leads to complexity and as such is to be avoided. Equally unsound is the argument that the proposition is necessary in order to explain the fact that cognition of the contextual occurs first and that of the non-contextual happens next,—the former being effected through *Abhidhā* and the latter through *Vyañjanā*,—because *Abhidhā* is quite competent to bring both the contextual and the non-contextual into light in the same manner in which it brings out a number of ideas in illustrations of the poetic figure *Śleṣa*. The point that a case of the poetic figure *Śleṣa* is completely different from that of *Abhidhāmūlā-vyañjanā*, in as much as, while in the former both the meanings form the content of speaker's intention, in the latter the purpose of the speaker is to convey only one idea and as such, while both the ideas are conveyed through *Abhidhā* in the first, in the second only one idea is comprehended through it—is without any meaning, since the very assumption that the knowledge of the intention of the speaker is a causal factor indispensable for conceptual cognition effected through *Śakti* is without any foundation. But this does not go to make such knowledge absolutely redundant, because, as Jagannātha points out, in some cases, it removes the doubts of the man who cognises and thereby prompts him to do a particular job: thus when the sentence 'Saindhavamānaya' is uttered, he, in some cases, brings salt and in others a steed. Thus as knowledge of the intention of the

speaker does not constitute a cause of conceptual cognition effected through *Abhidhā* even in those cases where multi-meaningful words are used, both the contextual and non-contextual are capable of being conveyed through the function of denotation and consequently, the postulation of a separate function of suggestion in order to account for cognition of the non-contextual is unnecessary. The acceptance of the second alternative or in other words, the assumption that, *Vyañjanā* causes cognition of the non-contextual in some cases renders the situation still more difficult, because there is no criterion to determine definitely where *Vyañjanā* steps in to bring out the *aprākāraṇika* and where it does not. The argument that knowledge of intention of the poet to signify the implicit furnishes this criterion, and in those cases where the poet desires to bring out the non-contextual content, *Vyañjanā* appears to convey it and in others, where the poet does not intend to bring home an idea other than the contextual one, *Vyañjanā* does not step in—is misleading, since it goes against the accepted principle of these theorists themselves,—the principle that, the knowledge of the speaker's intention is not necessary for understanding the implicit. Moreover in some cases an indecorous sense is apprehended through suggestion,—a sense, which is incapable of being explained as forming the content of the poet's intention. The expression : *Jaiminīyamaloṇi dhatte rasanāyāmayam dvijaḥ* furnishes an illustration to the point : here the idea that this Brahmin is well-versed in the doctrines of Jainism is conveyed through *Abhidhā* and the sense that he bears in his tongue the stool of Jainism is signified through suggestion ; the poet does not certainly intend to bring out this highly indecorous content, but, nevertheless, it is apprehended by a refined appreciator. The very fact that suggestion brings out an idea, that is not intended to be conveyed by the poet goes to prove the falseness of the proposition that the knowledge of the poet's intention to signify the unexpressed leads to its comprehension through suggestion. The reasoning that the appreciative genius of the appreciator furnishes this criterion and it invites *Vyañjanā* to operate and

bring out an idea, which is charming only—is, in no way, an improvement on the former, because it fails to explain understanding of the unexpressed, which is not in the least charming in the expression cited above. The solution that no indecorous implicit is cognised from the expression is meaningless, in as much as, the very experience of a true connoisseur goes against it. Moreover, the simpler process is to assert that the appreciative genius of the appreciator brings back the restricted power of denotation to life and allows it to convey the non-contextual, as well. The untenability of the proposition that the appreciative genius of the connoisseur of Poetic Art invites *Vyañjanā* to bring the charming unexpressed into light is capable of being proved in other ways also. The acceptance of this proposition renders cognition of the unexpressed compulsory in those cases where the non-contextual is charming : in reality, however, the knowledge of the attractive non-contextual does not occur without fail, in as much as, it is comprehended only by such a person, who knows that the non-contextual constitutes the conventional meaning of the term and remembers it. The reasoning that cognition of a particular sense through *Vyañjanā* is caused by a knowledge that, that particular sense constitutes the conventional meaning of the term or in other words, *Śaktijñāna* is indispensable for understanding the implicit, introduced in order to avoid the difficulty pointed out above—lands one into further troubles. This *Śaktijñāna* is not a necessary factor in all cases : this is evident from the fact that the stanza : '*nīśeṣacyutacandanaṁ śtanatīṭam*' cited as an illustration of *Dhvani* conveys through suggestion the idea that, the messenger had been to the wretched hero for dalliance, even though none of the terms used in it is denotative of this sense of enjoyment. Had the idea of dalliance formed the conventional meaning of some of the terms, then that sense would have been conveyed through *Abhidhā*, and the postulation of *Vyañjanā* in order to account for its revelation would have been needless. Nor is *Śaktijñāna* a necessary factor in some cases, where multi-meaningful words are used and the function of denotation is restricted to the contextual sense : and this is so,

because the restriction of the function of denotation itself is open to serious controversy. Moreover, when the assumption that *Śaktiñāna* is a causal factor of comprehension of the non-contextual through *Vyañjanā* is felt necessary, the simpler process is to state that, cognition of this idea is caused by *Śakti* or *Abhidhā* straightway. In his eagerness to protect his conclusion that the cognition of the non-contextual is caused through *Vyañjanā* from the attack of opponents, the Dhvanivādin takes recourse to a clumsy subterfuge: he points out that, in those cases, where the non-contextual is compatible with the concepts conveyed by the rest of the sentence, *Abhidhā* brings the non-contextual into comprehension; but in those cases, where it is incompatible with the concepts, conveyed by other terms, it is incapable of being signified through *Abhidhā*, and consequently, is brought into light through *Vyañjanā*. As an illustration to this point, he cites the expression: '*Jaiminīyamalaṃ dhatte*', etc. referred to above and explains that the indecorous sense sounds absurd and as such is not capable of being conveyed through *Abhidhā* and consequently, of being associated with other concepts: hence, he asserts, the necessity of positing *Vyañjanā* in order to explain cognition of the indecorous idea arises. Although *Abhidhā* is unable to bring an unreasonable idea into light, *Vyañjanā* is quite competent to do so, since, as the Dhvanivādin maintains, it does not follow the path of reason and logic. In reply to this Jagannātha points out, the idea of incompatibility or absurdity of a sense does not stand in the way of conceptual cognition concerning it: and this is all the more true in Poetry, which abounds in such poetic figures as *Atiśayokti*, *Rūpaka* and the like. Comprehension of an idea, he continues, certainly ensues from cognition of such expressions as: 'The Goddess of learning has come down to Earth in the guise of Patañjali' or 'The Palace-tops of this city meet the Sun', though the imports presented by them seem absurd in their very appearance. The argument that in these expressions, also, *Vyañjanā* appears to bring the unreasonable idea into light is untenable, because it gives *Vyañjanā* a wider scope, making each and every specimen of poetic figure the proper field of its

operation. Thus with strongest reasoning, Jagannātha refutes the contention of the ancients that, in those cases, where homonyms are used, the function of suggestion steps in to bring the non-contextual into comprehension, and asserts that, cognition of this idea is caused by the function of denotation: what suggestion brings out is the relation between the contextual and the non-contextual, and not the non-contextual itself.¹¹⁸

It is interesting to note that though Mammaṭa and Jagannātha draw profusely from the same source book—the Dhvanyaloka of Ānandavardhana, yet both differ widely among each other on the process of comprehension of the non-contextual idea in those cases where homonyms are used. Thus while Mammaṭa thinks that the *aprākaraṇika* is conveyed through suggestion, which brings out the relation, as well, which it bears to the *prākaraṇika*, Jagannātha is of opinion that the *aprākaraṇika* is signified through denotation and suggestion goes only to convey the relation linking the two ideas: or in other words, while Mammaṭa holds the first of the four theories, recorded by Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha subscribes to the last one. And the germ, which gives rise to these different doctrines is traceable in the speculations of Ānandavardhana himself. In his dissertation on *Śabdaśaktinūla-dhvani*, the learned Dhvanikāra simply states that the cognition of the non-contextual is effected through *Śabdaśakti*, without making it clear whether this function is *Abhidhā* or *Vyañjanā*, and, thereby, leaving much room for doubt.¹¹⁹ Elsewhere, he maintains that, the function of suggestion brings out a charming idea, which loses much of its charm when conveyed through the function of denotation, showing, thereby, that the test of ascertaining whether a sense is signified through *Vyañjanā* or *Abhidhā* is to see whether it is charming or not.¹²⁰ Mammaṭa thinks that the non-contextual is more charming than the contextual and so he describes it as a suggested content: Jagannātha, however, regards the contextual and the non-contextual as equally unattractive and so he refers to both as expressed ideas; what is most attractive is the relation linking the two apparently discrete ideas, which, he says, is comprehended through sugges-

tion. In the absence of any decisive evidence, it is difficult to maintain with any amount of precision whether the *aprākāraṇika* is brought into light through denotation or suggestion, particularly, in view of the point raised by Jagannātha that *Śakti-jñāna* is indispensable for understanding of the unexpressed.

With astounding arguments Jagannātha shows that *Abhidhā-mūlā-vyāñjanā* operates in other cases also, where homonyms are conspicuous by their absence. In some expressions, abounding in *Yogarūḍha* words, cognition of purely derivative meaning occurs after the comprehension of the meaning signified by the word as a whole : in such cases *Abhidhā* conveys merely the idea signified by the word as a whole, the derivative meaning going only to qualify it, and consequently, the cognition of the idea, conveyed merely by its component parts is effected through *Vyāñjanā*. *Abhidhā*, Jagannātha points out, is unable to bring out the unqualified derivative meaning, since such an assumption goes against the principle which states that, *Śakti* pertaining to a word as a whole is more powerful than that belonging to its component parts and as such prevails over the latter. Nor is *Lakṣaṇā* competent to bring this sense into light, because the conditions necessary for its operation are absent. So, Jagannātha concludes, the postulation of *Vyāñjanā* in order to explain cognition of this unqualified charming derivative meaning is an imperative necessity : this *Vyāñjanā*, he names, *Abhidhāmūlā-vyāñjanā*. As an illustration to this he cites the verse :

Abalānām śriyaṃ hṛtvā vārivāhaiḥ sahāniśam/
Tiṣṭhanti capalā yatra sa kālaḥ samupasthitah//,

which signifies through *Abhidhā* the idea that, the rainy-season has approached, in which flashes of lightning vanquish the beauty of ladies and get themselves constantly associated with clouds. Jagannātha points out that, after the cognition of the idea mentioned before, comprehension of another meaning, namely the idea that, courtesans have squeezed money from incapacitated persons, but are enjoying the company of drawers of water—occurs : this comprehension, he continues, is caused through *Vyāñjanā*, and neither through *Abhidhā* nor through *Lakṣaṇā*. *Abhidhā* fails to bring this sense into light, since it

constitutes simply the derivative meaning of some of the terms used in the verse : *Lakṣaṇā* equally fails to bring it out, since the conditions indispensable for its operation are not present. The same thing happens in those instances also, where *Yogarūḍha* words are used. Thus in the verse :

Cāñcalayogi nayanam tava jalajānām śriyaṃ haratu /

Vipine' tvacañcalānāmapi ca mṛgānām katham harati //,

Abhidhā conveys the idea that, there is no wonder that, the quivering eyes of the girl steal away the charm of the lotus : the fact that it takes away the grace of more unsteady deer is most astonishing ; it is pointed out that, after cognition of this sense, another idea that it is easy for thieves to steal away the riches of fools, but it is very difficult to rob an intelligent of his fortune is comprehended through *Vyāñjanā*. Jagannātha thinks that, positing of *Vyāñjanā* is an imperative necessity in order to explain understanding of this idea. As *Śakti* belonging to the word as a whole takes away the power of *Śakti*, pertaining to its component parts, the idea is not conveyed through *Abhidhā* : nor is it conveyed through *Lakṣaṇā*, since the first idea does not, in any way, seem incompatible. The argument that, according to a *Naiyāyika*, the first condition necessary for operation of *Lakṣaṇā* is not incompatibility of the primary meaning, but its inability to convey the intention of the speaker, and as in the verse under consideration, the speaker intends to convey the second, and not the first idea, so the said idea is signified through *Lakṣaṇā*—is ludicrous, since it puts the cart before the horse. The idea that the intention of the speaker is to convey the second sense is understood only after the cognition of the second sense itself, for the signification of which *Vyāñjanā* is resorted to, and consequently, the question of *Lakṣaṇā* replacing it does not arise. Jagannātha calls this *Vyāñjanā* *Abhidhāmūlā-vyāñjanā* and remarks that it is called into play by the appreciative genius of the appreciator : he describes it as a function, which brings a derivative meaning, as well, into comprehension, when *Śakti*, belonging to component parts of a *Yogarūḍha-śabda* is regulated by that belonging to the word as a whole. Thus Jagannātha's *Abhidhāmūlā-vyāñjanā* brings into light unquali-

fied derivative meaning in those cases where *Yogarūḍha* words are used and the relation linking the contextual and the non-contextual in those cases where homonyms are used. Although Jagannātha differs from Mammaṭa and other ancients on the process of cognition of the non-contextual itself, in conclusion, he maintains that as postulation of *Vyañjanā* is necessary in order to account for understanding of the relation linking the contextual and the non-contextual, the less clumsy process is to explain the cognition of the non-contextual itself as being effected through *Vyañjanā*, and so the view-point of the ancients is not totally wrong.¹²¹

The factors that lead to comprehension of one idea of a number of ideas, presented by a homonym and consequently, restrict the function of denotation of such terms to one meaning are, according to Bhartṛhari, *Samyoga*, *Viprayoga*, *Sāhacarya*, *Virodhitā*, *Artha*, *Prakaraṇa*, *Liṅga*, *Anyasābdasya sannidhi*, *Sāmarthyā*, *Aucilī*, *Deśa*, *Kāla*, *Vyakti*, *Svara* and such other things. While Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha simply quote illustrations of these, Jagannātha furnishes their definitions, as well, which help us to draw the line of demarcation amongst the scopes of these restrictive factors. Thus he defines *Samyoga* or conjunction as a type of relation, having for a relatum only one thing, conveyed by a multi-meaning word: while this relation is not known to link a particular object with the ideas whose recollection is obstructed, it is commonly known to link it with only one idea whose remembrance occurs unimpeded. The expression: 'Hari with conchshell and discus' furnishes an illustration to this; here the denotation of the term 'Hari' is restricted to the idea of Lord Viṣṇu by the relation which it bears to conch and discus; no object other than Lord Viṣṇu is commonly known to hold these two weapons. *Samyoga* or conjunction is to be differentiated from *Liṅga* or characteristic, because while the latter is never found in any thing, other than that characterised by it in past, present and future, the possibility of the former differentiating other objects, as well, is not altogether ruled out: thus while wrath is a peculiar feature of cupid and is not traced in ocean, which

constitutes another meaning of the term '*makara lhaṇa*', conjunction of conch and discus is not absolutely incapable of being traced in Lord Indra, which forms another meaning of the word 'Hari', in as much as, it is possible for Lord Indra to hold conch and discus in certain occasion.¹²²

Viprayoga or disjunction is defined as separation of a particular thing from one object to the exclusion of others,—all of which are conveyed by a single homonym. The expression: 'Hari without conch and discus' affords an example of this factor restricting the function of denotation of the term 'Hari'; Jagannātha points out that, though in the expression referred to above, conjunction is competent to restrict denotation, in as much as, disjunction presupposes the idea of conjunction, or in other words, separation that of union, yet it is put forward as an example of *Viprayoga*, because here the idea of disjunction is prominent and that of conjunction is subservient. And this explains separate enumeration of disjunction as a restrictive factor. Those cases where conjunction being the principal element leads to recollection of one particular meaning to the exclusion of others are instances of *Samyoga* and those cases where separation is prominent and union goes only to play a second fiddle to it are examples of *Viprayoga*.¹²³

Sāhacarya or association is commonly defined as mutual dependence of each other for the performance of actions.¹²⁴ The ancients cite the expression: 'Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa' as an example of this and point out that, the meaning of the term Lakṣmaṇa restricts the denotation of the word Rāma to the sense of son of Daśaratha, because Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa, the two sons of Daśaratha are seen to work conjointly. Jagannātha challenges this proposition and asserts that, *Sāhacarya* refers neither to reliance upon another for the performance of all conceivable actions nor to that for the accomplishment of a few actions: and this is so, because the acceptance of the first alternative renders the example: 'Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa' a defective one, since Rāma does not depend on his brother for the performance of all actions; the acceptance of the second alternative, on the other hand, invests the term 'Ghaṭa' with

the capacity to restrict the denotation of the term 'Rāma', since Rāma may depend on a jar for the accomplishment of a particular action. Moreover, Jagannātha continues, this definition of *Sāhacarya* fails to explain logically the expression: 'Rāma and Ayodhyā'. 'Raghu and Rāma' as fields of operation of this factor, because it is possible neither for Rāma and Ayodhyā nor for Rāma and Raghu to combine and perform an action conjointly. To avoid this difficulty some scholars explain *Sāhacarya* as a celebrated relation which an idea conveyed by a term used near a homonym bears to one of the concepts, signified by the homonym itself: in the expression: 'Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa', it is that which exists between brothers; in 'Rāma and Sītā', that as exist between husband and wife; in 'Rāma and Ayodhyā', that as present between possessor and the possessed and so on. But this view, also, is unacceptable, because by describing both *Samyoga* and *Sāhacarya* as well-known relations, it fails to draw the proper line of demarcation between the fields of operation of these two factors. The reasoning that where this relation is conjunction, the denotation is to be understood as being restricted by *Samyoga* and where the relation is anything other than conjunction, it is to be accepted as being regulated by *Sāhacarya* is untenable, since it does not assign any reason to separation of conjunction from the whole body of relations and decides the whole thing arbitrarily. The argument that in the field of operation of *Samyoga* the relation of conjunction is clearly stated in terms, while in that of *Sāhacarya* only the related, and not the relation itself is clearly mentioned in words—is equally misleading, because violation to this is traced in the expression: 'Salakṣmaṇo Rāmaḥ', where though the relation between the two is clearly stated in terms, yet *Sāhacarya* goes to regulate recollection of meanings. In the midst of these confusing arguments and counter-arguments Jagannātha gives his considered opinion on the issue. *Samyoga*, he says, is relation in general: in those cases, where this relation is a celebrated one and is clearly stated in terms, this factor is to be taken as the restrictive one: in those cases, on the other hand, where two related

entities enter into a Dvandva compound, *Sāhacarya* is to be taken as the restrictive factor. This, he asserts, is the real intention of the ancients: thus, while the expression: *Sagāṇḍīvo'rjunah* illustrates the capacity of *Samyoga* to regulate recollection of ideas, the compound-word '*Gāṇḍīvārjunau*' exemplifies that of *Sāhacarya* to do so.¹²⁵ Nāgeśa holds a different view on the issue. He is of opinion that only two similar things are competent to get themselves associated, and consequently, what is meant by *Sāhacarya* is similarity. Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa are similar to each other and so the concept conveyed by each of these terms restricts the denotation of the other: as restriction of *Śakti*, pertaining to both the terms occurs simultaneously, the fallacy of mutual interdependence does not step in to vitiate the proposition.¹²⁶

Virodhitā, is defined as well-established antagonism; non-existence of two things in the same place and in the same time is also regarded as *Virodhitā*. As an illustration of the first variety of this factor, the ancients cite the expression: *Rāmārjunagatistayoh*, in which antagonism between Paraśurāma and Kārtavīrjārjuna is said to restrict the denotation of the terms—Rāma and Arjuna. Appyadīkṣita finds fault with this illustration and asserts that antagonism is unable to regulate recollection of ideas in the present case, because both the terms Rāma and Arjuna are multi-meaninged units and so *Śakti*, pertaining to each depends for its restriction on that, belonging to the other, or in other words, the determination of the exact sense of the team Rāma depends on ascertainment of the real import of the word Arjuna and vice versa and thus, the entire proposition is vitiated by the fallacy of mutual interdependence. In reply to the question as to where does this *Virodhitā* restrict denotation, Appaya says that it does so in such cases, where the concept conveyed by an one-meaninged word is antagonistic to one idea only of a number of ideas ensuing from a multi-meaninged word: he thinks that the expression: *Rāmarāvaṇau* constitutes the proper field of operation of this factor. Jagannātha criticises this view of Appaya, and points out that in the compound-word *Rāmarāvaṇau* denotation is restricted by

Sāhacarya, which consists of any celebrated relation, comprehending within its scope that of enmity even. Secondly, the proposition that, this factor regulates recollection of ideas in those cases only where an one-meaning word is used along with a multi-meaning one is wrong, since this is found to restrict denotation of the component words of the compound *harināgasya*, both of which are homonyms. The question of the fallacy of mutual dependence going to vitiate the explanation of the compound *harināgasya* does not arise, because *Śakti*, pertaining to both the terms is restricted simultaneously by antagonism, brought into light by a third element,—the singular number used after the compound : this singular number brings out the idea that, hostility exists between the lion and the elephant, without pointing out specifically whether the former quarrels with the latter or the latter does so with the former. In a similar manner, Jagannātha asserts, in the expression : *Rāmārjunagatistayoh*, meaning : their relation is like that between Rāma and Arjuna, put forward by the ancients as an example of *Virodhitā*, the idea of antagonism, brought into light by context, made known through the use of the word 'tayoh' restricts denotation of both the words simultaneously and consequently, the charge of Appaya that the whole thing is vitiated by the fallacy of mutual dependence does not stand. As an instance of *Virodhitā* of second type, namely that, which consists in non-existence of two entities in the same substratum at the same time, Jagannātha cites the compound '*Chāyātapau*', where hostility between sun-light and its absence regulates the recollection of ideas ensuing from cognition of the term '*Chāyā*'.¹²⁷

Artha is purpose and is conveyed by words ending in the fourth and other usual case-endings : it consists in the fruit of an action for the attainment of which that particular action is performed. This *Artha* restricts denotation of the term *Sthānu* in the expression : '*Sthānum bhaja bhavacchide*', meaning : 'Propitiate *Sthānu* for the destruction of worldly existence' to the idea of Lord Śiva, in as much as, propitiation of Śiva alone leads to liberation from worldly bondage. At the first sight it seems that, *Linga* or

characteristic regulates the recollection of idea, ensuing from cognition of the term *Sthānu* in the present case, because the capacity to form the object of worship having for its end salvation belongs to Lord Śiva and not to any other thing, conveyed by the homonym *Sthānu*. Jagannātha, however, is of opinion, that this expression does not exemplify the field of operation of *Linga*, since the characteristic feature itself does not form the content of conceptual cognition resulting from comprehension of the expression : the characteristic he points out, is conceived mentally and this mental conception follows verbal knowledge. Some scholars try to draw the line of demarcation between the scopes of *Artha* and *Linga* in a different way : they say that a characteristic is conveyed by a single word : without being associated with any other concept it goes to restrict denotation of a homonym to one idea ; an *Artha*, however, as is evident from the present illustration, is conveyed by a number of words, the concepts, signified by which get associated with one another and, thereafter, go to regulate recollection of ideas.¹²⁸

Prakarana or context is existence in the intellect of the speaker and the person spoken to : this is time, place, character etc. as they flash in the mind of the speaker and the hearer. This is also regarded, as a restrictive factor. Thus when the sentence 'Deva knows all' is addressed by an employee to the king, *Prakarana* restricts the denotation of the 'Deva' to the idea of the monarch.¹²⁹

Linga is a special attribute, clearly expressed through words and residing only in one thing to the exclusion of others, all of which are conveyed by a multi-meaning word. In the expression : '*Kupito makaradhvajah*', this factor restricts the denotation of the term '*makaradhvaja*' to the idea of Cupid, in as much as indignation is a characteristic feature of Cupid and not of any other entity, signified by the homonym.¹³⁰

Jagannātha describes *Śabdasyānyasya sannidhi* as proximity to a multi-meaning word, only one idea conveyed by which is able to get itself associated with only one sense, signified by the homonym near which it is placed. In those cases where two homonyms are used and logical connection is capable of

being established between one concept conveyed by each to the exclusion of other ideas, this factor is supposed to restrict denotation of both the terms to the contextual. The expression: 'Kareṇa rājate nāgaḥ' meaning: the elephant shines with its trunk—affords an example of the field of operation of this restrictive factor, which regulates recollection of ideas ensuing from the cognition of the terms: 'kara' and 'nāga', both of which are homonyms. The fallacy of mutual dependence does not come in to vitiate the proposition, since the denotation of both the terms is restricted simultaneously and this happens, because no other concepts conveyed by the terms are capable of being associated with each other. As an illustration of this restrictive factor, Mammāṭa cites the expression: 'Devasya purārāteḥ', meaning: Of Lord Śiva, the enemy of the Asura,—where the denotation of the term Deva is supposed to be restricted to the idea of Śiva. Jagannātha criticises this and points out that though both the terms used in the expression are multi-meaninged ones, in as much as, the first conveys the ideas of king and Lord Śiva and the second those of enemy of the cities and hostile to Asura, yet Śakti, pertaining to neither of these is restricted and this is evident from the fact that the idea of king is as much compatible with that of enemy of the cities as is the concept of Lord Śiva with that of one inimical to the demon. In order to avoid this difficulty Govinda in his Pradīpa slightly modifies the example and reads it as 'Devasya tripurārāteḥ', thereby, converting the second term into a single-meaninged one, but by suggesting this modification he lands himself into further troubles, because the illustration becomes a field of operation of *Liṅga*, hostility to the three cities being a special characteristic of Lord Śiva. In conformity to this illustration, Govinda defines *Śabdasyūnyasya sannidhi* as agreement in gender, number and person of a homonym with an one-meaninged term,—the two standing in the relation of noun and adjective. This definition, Jagannātha points out, fails to explain the operation of this restrictive factor in the illustration *Kareṇa rājate nāgaḥ*, cited above and at the same time allows its scope to coincide partly with that *Liṅga*, and hence is untenable.¹³¹

Sāmarthya consists in the fact of being a cause of a particular effect: in the expression: *madhuṇā mittaḥ pikaḥ*, denotation of the term 'madhu' is restricted to spring-time, because that alone leads to intoxication of the cuckoo. The scope of this factor seems to coincide with that of *Liṅga*, in as much as, the capacity to intoxicate the cuckoo is a special characteristic of spring and it is perfectly reasonable to point out that this peculiar feature regulates recollection of ideas. The argument that the capacity to madden this particular bird only is not a characteristic of spring, in as much as, it intoxicates the entire animal-world—is dangerous, since it rejects the claim of *Sāmarthya* itself to be regarded as a restrictive factor. Jagannātha, in this connection, opines that, it is possible to draw a line of demarcation between the scopes of these two restrictive factors, by pointing out that in those cases where *Liṅga* regulates recollection of ideas, the special characteristic itself forms the content of conceptual cognition and is clearly expressed by one term while in those cases, where *Sāmarthya* regulates this, 'the special characteristic is conceived mentally, as it constitutes the unified form of concepts, conveyed by a number of words.'¹³²

Aucitī is competency: in the expression: 'Pānu vo dayitāmukham' the denotation of the term 'mukha' is restricted to the sense of favourableness, since this alone is competent to protect the love-stricken from love-sickness.¹³³

Sometimes place also restricts Śakti of homonyms: thus, in the expression: 'Bhātyatra Parameśvaraḥ', the place in the form of capital, as conveyed by the term 'ātra' goes to show that by *Paramēśvara* the king is meant, and not the divine lord. And this is so, because the assumption that the homonym conveys the idea of God renders the very term 'ātra' redundant, in as much as, God pervades the entire universe and consequently, His existence in a particular place does not stand in need of specific mention. Another illustration of place regulating recollection of ideas is afforded by the proposition: *Vaikunṭhe Harirvasati* where the mention of the place *Vaikunṭha* shows that the term *Hari* refers to Lord Viṣṇu and not to any other thing, conveyed by the term.¹³⁴

After place comes time : in the expression : there shines *Citrabhānu*,—the sense of the term *Citrabhānu* is restricted to Sun by day and to fire by night : in a similar manner, time restricts the denotation of the term *Hari* to the idea of Lord Viṣṇu in the proposition : *Hari* sleeps for four months and so on. *Vyakti* is gender, which appears in the aspect of masculine or feminine or neuter : in '*Mitram* shines' the sense of the term '*Mitra*' is restricted to the idea of a friend through neuter gender, while in '*Mitra* shines' this is restricted to the sense of the Sun through masculine gender. *Svara* refers to accent : in the compound '*Indraśatru*' this accent leads to apprehension of a particular meaning ; when the accent is on the last vowel then the idea of one who slays *Indra* is conveyed : when on the other hand, this is on the first vowel, the idea of one, who has *Indra* for his killer is signified.¹³⁵ Mammāṭa maintains, accent leads to comprehension of a particular meaning in the Vedas only, and not in Poetry of classical period and consequently, he does not furnish any illustration of *Svara* regulating recollection of ideas in ordinary Poetry. Depending on this observation of his learned predecessor Viśvanātha ridicules the proposition of the ancients that, *Svara* in the form of modulation of voice or accent leads to comprehension of one idea of a homonym : this *Svara*, he continues, brings the suggested content into light only, and does not go to regulate recollection of ideas in any way. Moreover, the proposition that, *Svara* restricts denotation of a multi-meaning word to one particular idea, he points out, cuts at the very root of *Śleṣālaṃkāra* where comprehension of a number of meanings ensues from cognition of a homonym, whose denotation is not restricted by such usual factors as conjunction, disjunction, context etc. Apart from these factors, there are others, also, that go to restrict denotation of homonyms : thus, in the verse . 'the girl possesses breasts of this much size, and petal like eyes of this much measure', it is gesture, which leads to cognition of the exact meaning'.¹³⁶

Jagannātha hesitates to recognise *Artha*, *Sāmarthyā* and *Aucitī* as three distinct restrictive factors : in the field of

operation of each of these three factors, he points out, it is the relation of cause and effect, which goes to regulate recollection of ideas : thus, in 'Propitiate *Shānu* for liberation from worldly bondage', this relation is traced between propitiation and salvation, in 'The cuckoo is intoxicated by spring' between spring and intoxication of cuckoo and in 'may the favourableness of the beloved protect thee' between favourableness and removal of love-sickness, and consequently, the more simple process is to regard the relation of cause and effect itself as the restrictive factor in these cases. The ancients describe a *Liṅga* as a special characteristic feature, which implies that, other restrictive factors are attributes common to both contextual and non-contextual. This theory is wrong, because an attribute that is common to both the ideas of a homonym is unable to regulate recollection of ideas and effect remembrance of the contextual only. The argument that though such elements as conjunction, disjunction etc. are common to both, yet they are regarded as uncommon or special to the contextual only through tradition—renders the other factors practically identical with *Liṅga*. Hence, Jagannātha asserts, the only restrictive factor is *liṅga*, which comprehends within its scope the other elements, such as conjunction, disjunction and the like.¹³⁷

Whereas *Śābīrī-vyañjanā*, a function belonging to words brings into light the non-contextual meaning of multi-meaning terms, according to the ancients and the derivative meaning of a *Yogarūḍha-śabda*, according to Jagannātha, *Ārthī-vayañjanā*, a function belonging to meanings conveys an implicit idea being aided by the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, time place, context and such other things. The simple expression : 'The Sun has set' signifies only one explicit sense, but it conveys a number of implicit ideas, according to difference in the nature of the speaker and the person addressed. But sheer knowledge of these elements is not able to produce comprehension of the suggested content, for the understanding of which presence of appreciative genius is necessary in the minds of refined readers. As Rājasekhara says, creative genius (*Kārayitrī-pratibhā*)

induces a poet to discover new ideas in old things : it produces an efflux of emotions at the sight of ordinary things even in his mind ; appreciative genius (*Bhāvayitrī-pratibhā*), on the other hand, enables a connoisseur of poetic art to share the feelings of a Poet and derive impersonal pleasure from perception of his creation. Dull grammarians and insipid logicians fail to catch subtle ideas presented in Poetry and are not able to appreciate even best specimens of Poetic Art, because they lack in this *Bhāvayitrī-Pratibhā*. As Yāska remarks, it is not the fault of the poet that, the blind man does not see it : it is the fault of the man concerned. The existence of this type of appreciative genius is a necessary condition for comprehension of an implicit idea, and as such, the Dhvanivādin points out, *Anumāna* does not comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*.¹³⁸

V

Proposition and its Import

A Proposition is usually defined as a collection of terms, which satisfy the triple requirements of expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*), competency (*Yogyatā*) and proximity (*Āsatti*). Though the Ālankāraika differs from the Naiyāyika on many vital issues, yet as regards the nature of a proposition both of them hold the same opinion, in as much as, both maintain that a proposition does not consist in grouping together isolated words, irrespective of any syntactical consideration. Thus Jagadīśa defines it as an accumulation of terms, endowed with mutual expectancy and in his *Vṛtti* on it remarks that, a collection of words which are mutually expectant in the sense that, the concept conveyed by one term is favourable to comprehension of association, which the concepts, conveyed by other terms bear to it is regarded as a valid proposition. The view-point of Amarasimha that, a group of words, ending in case or/and root-terminations goes to constitute a sentence, Jagadīśa points out, is unacceptable, because it is vitiated by the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition. The theory that, a sentence consists of a number of

words ending in case-terminations or root-terminations, extends, the status of a valid proposition to a group of such isolated terms as '*Ghataḥ Pataḥ*' or '*Pacati Gacchati*', which do not, in reality, constitute specimens of sentence ; the doctrine that, sentence consists of a number of words ending in case and root-terminations, on the other hand, denies the status of a proposition to such individual terms as '*Ghataḥ*' or '*Pacati*', which in reality, constitutes specimen of sentence. This assertion of Jagadīśa goes to show that, he does not insist on the presence of a verb as an indispensable condition of a sentence, although he is of opinion that, in some cases, a verbal form alone is sufficient to constitute a sentence. He maintains that, a sentence is a combination of mutually expectant and consistent words, but does not lay so much stress, as the ancients do, on the inclusion of the verb. As in most cases, an action is easily understood from the very nature of the context, Jagadīśa does not find any logic in the dictum of the ancients that, there can be no sentence without the verb.¹³⁹ Viśvanātha, following the footsteps of the Naiyāyika defines a sentence as a group of words, possessed of expectancy, compatibility and proximity, showing, thereby, that each of these is an essential causal factor towards, cognition of the import of a proposition : thus, the group of words—'sprinkles with fire', he remarks, does not constitute a sentence, since, instrumentality of fire is incompatible with the act of sprinkling : the group of isolated terms 'cow, horse, man, elephant' does not make up a proposition, since the words are not mutually expectant,—the term '*Devadatta*' does not go to form a sentence being related with the term 'goes', pronounced twenty-four hours after the first term, since there is no immediacy of the concepts intended to be related.¹⁴⁰

The first requirement of a proposition is expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*). Nāgēśa describes it as a factor that leads one to ascertain the expressiveness of a sentence : it is the desire to know a thing, competent to get itself associated with another thing, conveyed by a word, already cognised : without the knowledge of the former the sense remains incomplete and the collection of terms fails to present a complete idea. This non-comple-

tion of idea intended to be conveyed in the absence of any one of the concepts signified by the constituent terms, Nāgeśa points out is *Ākāṅkṣā*. *Ākāṅkṣā* or expectancy primarily resides in the mind of the hearer, who expects to comprehend a related concept on understanding a concept, expressed by a term already known, and as such, does not belong to the concepts themselves which are insentient beings : but, nevertheless, this is attributed to the concepts, that form the content of expectancy or inquisitiveness of the hearer, and accordingly, concepts are described as being possessed of expectancy only secondarily. The usage that words are endowed with mutual expectancy seems incorrect, since the desire to know neither pertains to the words primarily nor are capable of being transmitted to them, in as much as, they do not form the content of such inquisitiveness, which is produced after comprehension of concepts resulting from their cognition : but it is secondarily justifiable by pointing out that, the usage conveys the idea that, the concepts expressed by constituent terms are mutually expectant. Thus the statement that, the term 'Bring' expects the words 'the jar' is equivalent to the statement that, the concepts conveyed by the term 'Bring' expects the concepts, expressed by the words 'the jar' for the completion of the sense intended to be conveyed.¹⁴⁰ In support of his observation that a word is incapable of expecting another word, Nāgeśa cites the explanation of Patañjali on the rule '*Samarthaḥ Padavidhiḥ*', which clearly states that, the proposition that terms are mutually expectant tantamounts to the statement that concepts signified by them are expectant : thus the usage that the term '*rājan*' expects the word '*puruṣa*' and vice versa is equivalent to the statement that, the king expects the employee thinking him to be his own and the employee expects the king thinking his own self as belonging to him. The explanation that *Ākāṅkṣā* consists in expectancy or inquisitiveness is likely to extend the recognition of a valid proposition to the group of words—'*Ghataḥ karmatvaṃ ānayanam kṛtiḥ*' which does not in reality, constitute a specimen of sentence. In order to avoid this difficulty, Nāgeśa suggests a modification in his own definition of this foremost requirement of a proposi-

tion : he maintains that, it consists in the expectancy which a concept bears to another concept, which either gives rise to a desire to know the former or forms its object or gives rise to the said desire and at the same time forms its object. In the group of words '*Ghataḥ karmatvaṃ ānayanam kṛtiḥ*' the desire to comprehend the concept expressed by the term *Karmatvaṃ* is neither caused by the concept, conveyed by the word *Ghataḥ* nor does the latter form in any way the *viṣaya* of the former. In the group of terms '*Devadatta cooks rice*' (*Pacati taṇḍulam Devadattaḥ*), on the other hand, the concept conveyed by the term *Pacati* gives rise to an inquisitiveness to know the concept signified by the term '*taṇḍulam*' which at the same time, forms the object of the act of cooking and the concept expressed by the term '*taṇḍulam*' gives rise to desire to cognise the concept denoted by the term '*Pacati*', which embraces the former for its object : in a similar manner, in the collection of terms '*Paśya mṛjo dhāvati*' the concept conveyed by the term *Paśya* gives rise to a desire to understand the idea signified by the other two terms,—an idea which forms the object of the act of seeing. Hence, Nāgeśa argues, while these two groups of terms constitute specimens of a sentence, the first group does not.¹⁴²

The Naiyāyika fails to accept the proposition of the Vaiyākaraṇa that *Ākāṅkṣā*, the first requirement of a valid proposition consists in inquisitiveness. Udayana asserts that, the untenability of the doctrine is proved by the fact that, judgmental cognition arises even in case of an indifferent person, who is not in the least eager to gather any knowledge. In reply to the question as to what then constitutes *Ākāṅkṣā*, he points out that, it is an element competent to give rise to the inquisitiveness of the hearer : in explaining this, he further says that, it is equivalent to pre-non-existence of the relational thought, in the mind of the hearer—thought, concerning interdependent constituent concepts, which are necessarily related to one another or are related to the ideas, implied by these concepts. As the pre-non-existence of the relational thought is absent in case of an uninflected stem there is no *Ākāṅkṣā* amongst the concepts expressed by these and consequently, a group of pure stems,

divested of inflexional endings does not constitute a valid proposition.¹⁴³ Vardhamāna, the commentator on the Kusumāñjali, however, refutes this contention of Udayana. The view of Udayana that, propositional expectancy is equivalent to the pre-non-existence of the relational thought, he maintains, is likely to extend the status of a sentence to an isolated word, as well, in as much as, there being no comprehension of relational thought, ensuing from such isolated term, the pre-non-existence of such thought is there. Thus as the definition of Udayana is unacceptable, Vardhamāna formulates a new definition of *Ākāṅkṣā*, which, he says, consists in nothing but the non-completion of the relational sense intended to be communicated by the speaker. Thus a substantive is said to have propositional expectancy with reference to a declensional suffix and the vice versa, because non-cognition of either of these leads to non-comprehension of the relational judgment: and such is the case with a radical stem and a conjugational suffix also. Hence, to communicate an idea, Vardhamāna remarks, the constituent concepts are to be expressed by their verbal counterparts in such a succession of the stem, the nominal inflexion, the root and the radical suffix, as the understanding of the particular relational thought-unit becomes psychologically possible, revealing thereby that, *Ākāṅkṣā* consists practically in a particular sequence (*Ānupūrvā*) of stems, roots, suffixes and words,—sequence, which is favourable to comprehension of the idea concerned.¹⁴⁴ For this reason, though in his Bhāṣāpariccheda, Viśvanātha at the outset remarks that, a particular term bears propositional expectancy with reference to another term, if the absence of the latter is responsible for non-cognition of the idea of relation, of which the former is one of the relata, in conclusion, he maintains that, as the concept of proximity (*Āsatti*) comprehends that of expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*), as it exists between a verb and a vocable and similar other words, expressive of the interdependent concepts, what actually exemplifies *Ākāṅkṣā* is the sequence between a stem and a nominal suffix and a root and a verbal suffix,—an arrangement, without which cognition of the intended idea becomes impossible. Thus in order to communicate the idea 'Bring the

jar' it is necessary to express the concepts by their verbal counterparts arranging them in such an order as the stem, the declensional suffix, the root and the conjugational suffix, or in other words, it is necessary to follow the particular sequence: *Ghaṭa, am, ā- ni, hi*. Knowledge of this sequence, he asserts, is a causal factor towards judgmental cognition, which does not, consequently, ensue from the string of terms: *Ghaṭaḥ karmatvaṃ ānayanam kṛtiḥ*, in which the constituent concepts are not expressed by their verbal counterparts arranged in regular succession.¹⁴⁵ Jagadīśa also makes this clear in his magnum opus Śabdasaktiprakāśikā.

The next requirement of a valid proposition is *Yogyatā* or competency, whose knowledge, the Naiyāyika contends, is a causal factor of verbal cognition. Though in the group of words: 'sprinkles with fire', the syntactical expectancy is there, yet it is not recognised as a valid proposition, because there is no syntactical possibility between the constituent concepts, the instrumentality of fire being incompatible with the act of sprinkling. Viśvanātha defines *Yogyatā* as the relation which one concept bears to another concept: as the knowledge of this relation or rather possibility of this relation is not there in case of the string of words: 'sprinkles with fire', relational thought, he says, is not comprehended from the said group, which does not necessarily constitute a valid proposition.¹⁴⁶ In reply to the point that, as this *Yogyatā*, which consists in the relation which one concept bears to another is incapable of being known before deriving verbal knowledge, it is not proper to regard *Yogyatā-jñāna* as a causal factor of conceptual cognition, Viśvanātha says, when recollection of different concepts ensues from cognition of their corresponding denotative words, it is possible to have knowledge of the relation existing between these concepts, as well: in some cases this knowledge, being confirmed by perceptual experience takes the form of a right notion and in others, having no experience to confirm it assumes the form of a doubtful cognition. Vardhamāna, the commentator on Udayana's Kusumāñjali furnishes a more accurate definition of *Yogyatā*: this, he says, consists in the

absence of any such cognitive instrument, which is capable of controverting the relational idea sought to be expressed by a particular collection of terms¹⁴⁷ The expression: 'sprinkles with fire' lacks in this *Yogyatā*, in as much as, the act of sprinkling with a non-liquid substance as fire is contradicted by the cognitive instrument of Perception. Hence, the expression neither constitutes a valid proposition nor leads to cognition of any relational idea. Nāgeśa defines *Yogyatā* as possession of such attributes by two or more things as renders their mutual association possible: the sentence 'sprinkles with water' is characterised by presence of this *Yogyatā*, because water is endowed with an attribute, pertaining to a liquid, whose connection is capable of being effected with the act of sprinkling and the act, in its turn, possesses a universal element inhering all actions of rendering wet,—a universal element which makes its association with the instrumentality of water possible. The group of words: 'sprinkles with fire', on the other hand, lacks *Yogyatā*, because fire being a non-liquid substance is not endowed with an attribute inhering all liquids and consequently is not competent to effect its connection with the act of sprinkling. No relational thought, the Naiyāyika contends, is comprehended from such group of words, which are not instances of valid proposition; but, nevertheless, cognition of discrete and isolated concepts only, occurs in such cases from individual terms.¹⁴⁸

Nāgeśa himself, however, does not acquiesce in such a view; he does not believe in the proposition that knowledge of syntactical possibility is indispensable for conceptual cognition, and necessarily he thinks that, comprehension of contradictory ideas does not prevent the cognition of the relational thought-unit, intended to be conveyed by the expression: 'sprinkles with fire'. The particular relational thought is certainly understood, he points out, from this expression, because though in the external world it is not possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance, in the realm of our intellect it is quite possible to establish connection of the act of sprinkling with the instrumentality of fire,

and words, in reality, denote things, as they reside not in the external world, but in the realm of our intellect. The very fact that from such a sentence as, 'There goes the barren woman's son with a garland of sky-flowers on his head' the relational thought is cognised goes to show, Nāgeśa asserts, the absurdity of the proposition that, the knowledge of the absence of any possible contradiction i.e. to say of *Yogyatā* is the cause of comprehension of relational thought. The Naiyāyika thesis regards the group of words: 'sprinkles with fire' as totally insignificant, because, as it says, the relation of the act of sprinkling with the instrumentality of fire is contradicted by perception. The untenability of this doctrine is proved, Nāgeśa continues, by the simple fact that, whenever one hears somebody speaking the words: 'sprinkles with fire', he immediately ridicules the speaker thereof, saying that, it is not possible to sprinkle anything with a non-liquid fiery substance. Had these words been completely non-sensical, then it would not have been possible for the hearer to accost the speaker with the sarcastic remark, which is consequential upon comprehension of the idea by him, and instead of making such comment he would have remained silent. Moreover, the adoption of the Naiyāyika doctrine is likely to render all philosophical queries and replies thereto ipso facto absurd and impracticable. In all serious discussions, philosophers anticipate the objection of the opponents and demolish the points raised by them: and all these they do in order to place their own theories on sound footing. In these cases, the view-point of the disputant is contradicted by the theory of the philosopher, who is out to establish his own doctrine, and consequently, the arguments, introduced by the opponent are sheer non-sensical and unintelligible utterances to him, in view of the syntactical impossibility of the concepts, expressed by words, used by the former from the view-point of the latter. Thus the acceptance of the Naiyāyika thesis is likely to lead to an insoluble deadlock.¹⁴⁹ Then again when a false curse is uttered against us or somebody calls us by name, we feel angered, because we become fully aware of the relational thought, intended to be conveyed by the words used,

even though the knowledge of absurdity of such relation immediately dawns on our mind. And, such is the case with such metaphorical expressions as 'moon-face' and the like also, comprehension of relational thought ensuing from which leads to experience of joy in the mind of a connoisseur of Poetic Art. These and similar other numerous instances go to controvert the Naiyāyika position and establish the Vaiyākaraṇa stand that, syntactical possibility or its knowledge is not necessary as a causal element of judgmental cognition, or in other words, the knowledge of contradiction does not impede or arrest the comprehension of relational thought in case of verbal cognitions. And what is true of verbal cognition, Nāgeśa continues, is also true of perception and inference, where, too, the emergence of determinate relational cognition is not hampered by the idea of contradiction. In support of the contention he quotes an observation of Bhartṛhari, which states that, words refer to such ideas, as do not possess the least objectivity and as such reside in the realm of our intellect only. The Naiyāyika attempts to thwart the Vaiyākaraṇa stand by pointing out that, while cognition of relational thought, ensuing from the proposition : 'sprinkles with water' is followed by a positive activity, in as much as, the hearer starts, throwing water, that of association, ensuing from the group of words : 'sprinkles with fire' is not followed by any such activity : this, he argues, shows that, while comprehension of the idea of association among the concepts, conveyed by the terms used in the first proposition occurs, no knowledge of such idea is derived from the second collection of terms. The Vaiyākaraṇa however, is clever enough to meet this objection : he points out that, the cognition of thought-unit is not followed by any pragmatic activity in the second case, because the proposition lacks in objective validity. It is wrong, he continues, to say, as the Naiyāyika does that, no comprehension of relational thought occurs from the proposition : 'sprinkles with fire' ; knowledge of this thought, he asserts, occurs certainly : the expected pragmatic activity, however, is checked afterwards, as the knowledge of objective validity of the relational cognition is contradicted by stronger

instruments as perception and inference.¹⁵⁰ This difference of interpretation as regards the absence of positive activity following from understanding of the idea, presented by the sentence : 'sprinkles with fire' between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiyākaraṇa happens, because while the former identifies completely the formal validity of a proposition with its objective validity, the latter draws a line of demarcation between the two, and asserts that, in order to be formally valid, a proposition does not stand in need of possessing *Yogyatā* or syntactical possibility.

The Naiyāyika says that, in order to constitute a regular sentence a group of words is to possess another requirement, which is *Āsatti* or proximity. In his *Bhāṣāpariccheda* Viśvanātha defines *Āsatti* as immediacy of two words, which are related to each other, and maintains that knowledge of this immediacy is a causal factor towards comprehension of relational thought, intended to be conveyed by a sentence. In his explanation, however, he modifies his own view and says that, what is necessary for cognition of the idea of association is immediacy of two concepts, that are intended to be related, and not the knowledge of immediacy of two words. For this reason, he points out, from the group of words : 'The mountain has eaten is fiery Devadatta' no relational thought is cognised and a wrong idea is comprehended from the string 'The blue jar is a thing picture'. This definition of *Āsatti* fails to explain cognition of relational thought between more than two concepts in those cases where a number of adjectives go to qualify the same noun, as in the proposition : 'The holder of umbrella,—the bearer of ear-ring and the wearer of cloth Devadatta', where the first adjective is intervened from the noun, which it qualifies by the second one, the second by the third one and so on. The opponent says that, in such cases, recollection of each preceding word is put to an end by that of each succeeding one and consequently, the knowledge that all the adjectives are contiguous to the noun, qualified by each of them does not occur. Viśvanātha solves this difficulty in this way. He says that, impressions left by cognitions of the preceding words, being reinforced by reali-

sation of the last letter go to usher in a single recollection concerning all words used in the sentence : when this happens, all the corresponding concepts are remembered at a time,—concepts, which become related with one another simultaneously through the relation of verb and vocable,—substantive and attribute. In support of his solution, he cites a principle, enunciated by the ancients, which states that, just as all pigeons, young and old rush at the same time towards the same granary, similarly, all the concepts become simultaneously related to one another.¹⁵¹ So in the ultimate analysis, *Āsatti* of the Naiyāyika is reduced to immediacy of two or more concepts that are intended to be related. This is also described as absence of intervention of words, expressive of these concepts by such word or group of words, as does not contribute in any way towards comprehension of relational thought, not being connected with the words so intervened. Such intervention necessarily breaks immediacy of concepts intended to be related and consequently, absence of such interference constitutes *Āsatti*. This immediacy is broken, as well, by utterance of words, expressive of concepts intended to be related at different times and so that also constitutes *Āsatti*. It is for this reason that, Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa* defines *Āsatti* as the absence of break in understanding, or rather as an uninterrupted cognition.¹⁵² The Mīmāṃsaka maintains that, in addition to the concept of immediacy, *Āsatti* embraces another concept of expression of the ideas, intended to be associated through the medium of words, so that in those cases, where all the concepts concerned are not clearly stated in words, but are cognised through perception or recollection, the intended judgmental cognition does not occur. Thus just as the term 'bring' does not get associated with the terms 'the jar', which are pronounced at a different time and the desired relational thought is not comprehended, similarly, from the simple statement : 'Tether the cow', intended to convey the idea of tethering both a cow and a horse, present before us, the desired relational thought is not gathered with reference to the horse. This leads us, the Mīmāṃsaka asserts, to conclude that in a valid proposition, only those

concepts, as are expressed through the medium of words get related to one another.¹⁵³

The Vaiyākaraṇa rejects the contention of the Naiyāyika that *Āsatti* or contiguity is an essential element of syntax : he maintains that, it might be necessary for quick comprehension of the judgment by a man of immature intellect, but is absolutely superfluous to a man of mature intellect, who understands quickly the relational thought-unit simply from syntactical expectancy. Our ordinary experience shows that intended relational ideas are comprehended from verses, where words are usually jumbled up together and thus the concepts, intended to be brought into syntactical relation are separated from one another by other concept or concepts. Had the knowledge of syntactical contiguity been essential for cognition of the sense of association, desired to be conveyed by a sentence, then such sense of relation would not have been comprehended from such stanzas. The observation that, syntactical contiguity is not a pre-requisite of judgmental cognition, Nāgeśa points out, enjoys the support of Patañjali. In his exposition on the rule : '*Na Padānta*' etc., Patañjali makes it clear that, cognition of relational thought arises, even though words, expressive of concepts, intended to be related lack in syntactical contiguity.¹⁵⁴ As an illustration to this, he cites the seemingly non-sensical group of words : '*anaḍvāhamudahari yā tvaṃ harasi śirasā kumbhaṃ bhagini sācīnamabhidhāvantaṃadrākṣiḥ*', which though arranged in a slipshod manner conveys the relational idea—viz. 'O ye sister, who are carrying a pitcher on your head : have you seen a bull running in a zigzag course' ? Thus, while the Naiyāyika holds that, syntactical expectancy, possibility and contiguity—all these are essential pre-requisites of judgmental cognition, the Vaiyākaraṇa maintains that, the only element absolutely necessary is syntactical expectancy : the other two elements of syntactical possibility and contiguity, he asserts, are capable of being dispensed with.

The question whether the function of denotation is competent enough to bring the import of a proposition into light forms another interesting study. Two different schools of the

Mīmāṃsakas, who claim themselves to be *Vākyatattvajñas* hold completely divergent views on the issue : these two schools are represented by Kumārilabhaṭṭa and his followers, who are regarded as Bhāṭṭas and by Guru or Prabhākara and his followers, who are regarded as Prābhākaras. While Kumāṛila and his followers regard an isolated term as a unit of expression and an isolated concept as a unit of sense, Prabhākara and his followers recognise a sentence as a unit of expression and the corresponding relational thought as the unit of sense : and this accounts for the divergence between the two theories, adumbrated by each.¹⁵⁵

According to the doctrine of Kumāṛila individual terms, used in a proposition, first of all, convey through the function of denotation their corresponding unrelated concepts. This function of denotation, it states, is unable to bring out the sense of relation between different concepts, which constitutes the import of the sentence itself. In reply to the question as to how then the idea of relation is comprehended from the sentence, this theory points out that, it is conveyed through the function known as *Lakṣaṇā*, which pertains to the concepts denoted, and not to the words expressive of them¹⁵⁶. The import of a proposition, thus, is attained through the instrumentality of individual concepts by virtue of their possession of syntactical expectancy, possibility and contiguity : and does not constitute the direct connotation of component terms. The advocates of Kumāṛila's doctrine take care to show that, there is every justification for regarding the meaning of the sentence, as being conveyed through *Lakṣaṇā*, in as much as, the conditions necessary for its operation are present.¹⁵⁷ The words in a sentence, they argue are chosen in order to give expression to a related integrated meaning and the primary meanings, which are nothing but universals in the view of the Mīmāṃsakas are absolutely incapable of giving expression to this relational thought. Secondly, the relationship between the primary meaning and the secondary meaning is not wanting in the import of a sentence, because while the primary meaning consists of universals, the secondary meaning is comprised of individuals and

their relation,—individuals in which the universals inhere. Thirdly, it is the common practice to convey the idea of association of concepts through the medium of a sentence, in which constituent terms are related to one another,—and not through that of an isolated term. Thus, according to Kumāṛila's thesis, in the sentence : '*Ghaṭamānaya*', the word *Ghaṭa* signifies through *Abhidhā* the universal jar-hood, the second case-ending '*am*' the idea of *Karmatva*, the root that of the act of bringing and the termination the sense of directive : the idea of relation between these concepts is comprehended subsequently through the function of *Lakṣaṇā*. In their eagerness to show that though the concepts themselves directly convey the idea of relation independently of terms, yet the relational thought as signified by a sentence is different from that cognised through other instruments of knowledge, the advocates of this theory maintain that, while in verbal cognition, the concepts, relation amongst which is comprehended—is expressed through the agency of words, in cognitions, other than verbal one, these concepts are presented through other means. Thus the relational cognition that, a white horse is running, which occurs in one's mind on seeing a moving white mass and hearing the sound of hoofs and neighing is incapable of being explained as an instance of verbal cognition, because the concepts amongst which relation is comprehended is presented through preception, and not through the agency of words : here the knowledge of the intended relation is effected through inference or logical 'postulation and consequently, it does not constitute a case of verbal cognition.

The Abhihitānvayavādin claims that the procedure that isolated words first convey the isolated concepts, which in their turn lead subsequently to judgmental cognition is confirmed by an impartial analysis of our verbal cognitions. A man labouring under some psychological delinquency is found to comprehend isolated concepts, presented by terms used in a valid proposition, even though he fails to grasp the relational thought, and this, he says, goes to establish the point that, words are competent enough to generate the idea of isolated concepts destitute of

the relation that links them together. The opponent argues that, the doctrine of the Abhihitānvayavādin, which asserts that isolated concepts, independent of the words expressive thereof constitute the immediate causes of comprehension of resultant relational thought renders postulation of the concepts themselves as the seventh instrument of valid cognition in addition to the already existing other six necessary. In reply to this the Abhihitānvayavādin points out that, in the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsaka *śruti* (direct assertion), *liṅga* (mark), *vākya* (syntactical connection), *prakaraṇa* (context), *sthāna* (position) and *saṃvākyā* (nomenclature)—these six are equally regarded as different categories of the same source of knowledge, namely verbal testimony : of these six, *śruti*, *vākya* and *saṃvākyā* alone are capable of being counted properly as instances of verbal testimony, in as much as, they are verbal in essence ; the other three—*liṅga*, *prakaraṇa* and *sthāna* belong actually to a different category of the class of concepts.¹⁵⁸ But the Mīmāṃsaka classes all the six factors together as instances of the same verbal testimony and this reveals his idea that, there is no necessity of postulating concepts themselves as the seventh instrument of cognition. The procedure that is adopted in case of enumeration of the different instances of verbal testimony, the Abhihitānvayavādin asserts, is capable of being followed in this case also. In defence of his thesis, he further asserts that, though concepts alone constitute the proximate cause of relational thought, the actual causal factor of this thought is afforded by the verbal statement composed of isolated terms, in as much as, the cognition of the isolated concepts is generated by the isolated terms. It is the words alone, he continues, that are invested with the power of causation in respect of the final judgmental cognition and the recollection of individual concepts is only an inter-medium, being merely a subsidiary function of the words themselves.

The doctrine of the Abhihitānvayavādin, however, does not find favour with all sections of the Mīmāṃsakas. It is pointed out that, this Bhāṭṭa view throws to wind the basic principle of the Law of Parsimony, since it leads to postulation of a

plurality of functions. It maintains that, in addition to the capacity inherent in words to convey their corresponding concepts, the concepts themselves are endowed with a capacity to generate cognition of the relational thought and the isolated terms are further possessed of an efficiency in respect of investing the isolated concepts with the said capacity of generating cognition of the final relational judgment. Thus, the opponents argue, the Bhāṭṭa thesis is based on assumption of three functions and as such is vitiated by the defect of complexity. For this reason, the Anvitābhīdhānavādin propounds a new theory, which, as he claims, is strictly in conformity to the Law of Simplicity.

The Anvitābhīdhānavādin challenges the proposition of the Abhihitānvayavādin that isolated words signify isolated concepts. He observes that, nowhere in practice is a word used singly to convey an isolated idea,—the meaning cognised even from a single word being one associated with the concept of existence. Of all the means of comprehending meanings from words, he continues, the first and consequently the most important is the usage of elderly people, who use a full sentence, and not an isolated word in order to engage one in the performance of an action or in order to dissuade him from that ; thus, he asserts, what is proper is that propositions signify judgments. A child, first of all, hears a sentence, e.g. bring the cow, uttered by one occupying a superior position to his subordinate : then he sees the movement of the cow from one place to another and, thereafter, ascertains the significance of the sentence as a whole. He does not as yet realise the composite character of the proposition or the thought-unit ; to him both the proposition and judgment are indivisible units of expression and thought respectively. Subsequently, by a close inspection of insertion and extraction of the component words and the corresponding variation in the significance of the sentence, he determines the meanings of individual terms : thus, he understands that, the meaning of the term 'cow' is the cow-individual, as related to the act of bringing, that of the term 'horse' is the horse-individual, as related to a particular

action-entity, that of the term 'bring' the concept of bringing as related to a particular object, and so on. When meanings of individual terms are cognised in this way, the comprehension of an isolated concept is a myth. In sharp contrast to the doctrine of the Abhihitānvayavādin that, taking recourse to *Lakṣaṇā* becomes an imperative necessity in order to account for signification of the sense of association or relation, the thesis of the Anvitābhidhānavādin maintains that, as relation itself enters into the very constitution of the concepts signified by individual terms, there is no necessity of postulating this additional function (*Lakṣaṇā*), pertaining to the concepts themselves with a view to the cognition of relation,—*Abhidhā* alone being competent to bring this idea into light. .

The thesis of the Anvitābhidhānavādin, which holds that words signify related concepts is likely to be confronted with a serious problem. Does the word 'cow' as in the proposition : 'bring the cow' signify the cow-individual, as related to a concept, not necessarily conveyed through the mechanism of a word? Or does it denote the cow-individual as related to a concept, conveyed through a word? The first alternative is untenable, since its acceptance renders verbal cognition possible even in those cases where of two terms constituting a proposition only one is present. The second alternative is equally untenable, since it vitiates the entire proposition by the fallacy of mutual dependence, which arises as the knowledge of the meaning of the term 'bring' becomes necessary for cognition of the meaning of the term 'cow', which is the cow-individual, as related to the concept of bringing and that of the idea of the term 'cow' becomes essential for comprehension of the concept, signified by the term 'bring', which is nothing but the action of bringing as related to the cow-individual.¹⁵⁰ In order to avoid this difficulty, the Anvitābhidhānavādin adopts a new course of reasoning. He rejects the first alternative and accepts the second one : but there also to avoid the fallacy of mutual dependence, points out that, the cognition of related concepts is preceded by their comprehension in non-relational aspect. In reply to the question as to what

causes this primary comprehension of isolated concepts in their non-relational aspect, he says that, this is simply an outcome of recollection, and is not caused by *Abhidhā* or denotation which is responsible for effecting subsequent comprehension of the concepts as related to one another. Thus the Anvitābhidhānavādin thinks that, isolated terms primarily lead to recollection of isolated concepts and subsequently denotation conveys the concepts in their relational character. As regards the relation, which is supposed to be communicated by the denotative capacity of words, the Anvitābhidhānavādin asserts that this is general in character. But there is no fixity and uniformity in the relations conveyed by different verbal propositions, the composite relational significance of the same term varying according to the change in action from one proposition to another : thus while in the proposition : 'Bring the cow', the term 'cow' signifies the concept cow as syntactically related with the act of bringing, in the proposition : 'Tether the cow', the same term signifies the concept cow as syntactically related with the act of tethering. In reply to the question as to what leads to comprehension of the exact particular relation which varies in different propositions, the Anvitābhidhānavādin says that, this is determined through syntactical association of terms based upon the triple requirements of expectancy, competency and contiguity : thus while in the sentence : 'Bring the cow' the term cow denotes the concept of the cow as related with the action bringing, because the meaning of the latter occurring in it is associated with that of the former, in the sentence : 'Tether the cow', the same term denotes the concept of the cow as related with the action tethering, because in it the word 'cow' is brought into relation with the word 'tether'. In conformity to the Law of Parsimony, which is so devoutly clung to by him, the Anvitābhidhānavādin holds that a single unvariant denotative efficiency conveys different composite judgments, and in support of his contention, he puts forward the parallelism of the self-same efficiency of revealing colour as inherent in the visual organ giving rise to different images like white, black, red, blue and so on according as it is

brought into contact with objects, characterised by those colours.¹⁶⁰

Jayantabhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī* gives a faithful resume of these two doctrines, which, however, he criticises in the end. The Abhihitānvayavādin, he points out, commits a great blunder by regarding an isolated term as a unit of expression, which is opposed completely to our ordinary experience. In our daily life a sentence is used in order to convey a relational thought, which is comprehended, as well, by the hearer : consequently, terms have no isolated status and their meanings are necessarily interlocked with one another in the verbal judgment ensuing from a proposition.¹⁶¹ Secondly, he continues, by explaining that the syntactical relation is brought into light through *Lakṣaṇā*, a function pertaining to meanings, which is set to activity after the words go out of office, the Abhihitānvayavādin converts the meaning into an independent instrument of cognition, and consequently, renders the judgment ensuing from a proposition anything but verbal.¹⁶² By saying that a sentence is a real unit of expression, the Anvitābhīdhānavādin, Jayanta observes, marks a definite improvement in the domain of analysis of conceptual thought, but he also makes a mistake in regarding a single unvariable denotative efficiency as competent to bring out the idea of relation, which varies from proposition to proposition. As the power of denotation is always confined to the data previously known and the relational thought, conveyed by a proposition is an unknown entity, it is not possible for the denotative capacity to signify the sense of relation, for the comprehension of which, postulation of a function distinct from it is necessary. Thus, Jayanta points out, the Anvitābhīdhānavādin fails to distinguish between two actually distinct powers, which work simultaneously.¹⁶³ Secondly, his doctrine, he (Jayanta) continues, fails to justify the use of both the terms in a proposition, comprised of two words, in as much as, the concept of one, as related with another is capable of being expressed by one of the two terms. As both these doctrines are vitiated by serious defects, Jayanta and following him other Naiyāyikas do not agree with any one

of them.¹⁶⁴ After summing up the position of the two theories he gives his own verdict on the issue. He asserts that, all the parts of speech in a sentence co-operate to produce the verbal judgment and do not communicate it like their usually accepted meanings. First of all, Jayanta points out, by virtue of the denotative capacity, the parts of speech denote the meanings, which are invariably associated with them : then by another power—*Tātparyāśakti*, which pertains to the words themselves, they give rise to the relational thought. This power is more creative than communicative in character : it works in unison with the denotative power and does not cease until a complete self-sufficient verbal judgment is produced.¹⁶⁵ Thus like the Abhihitānvayavādin he thinks that, words convey unrelated concepts through denotation at the first instance, but does not agree with the former when he says that, the relational thought is signified later by the concepts themselves through Indication : then again like the Anvitābhīdhānavādin he believes that, words are significant only when they are members of a sentence, but he differs from the former when he says that, the unknown relational meaning is comprehended through denotation. In order to account for comprehension of this thought, Jayanta feels the necessity of postulating a new capacity in addition to the well-known capacities of *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā*. This capacity is not capable of being equated with the other two functions, because it is not possible to know previously the relation between it and the relevant meaning. Jayantabhaṭṭa calls it *Tātparyāśakti*, while the logicians affiliated to the new school name it *Samśargamaryādā*.¹⁶⁶

It is painful to observe that, all the Ālankārikas misrepresent the doctrine of Abhihitānvayavāda, as propounded by Kumārila. Unfortunately, they call what is really the Nyāya Theory by the name of the doctrine of Abhihitānvayavāda. Abhinavagupta sets the ball rolling by representing the theory in a manner which is consistent with the view of Jayantabhaṭṭa. While maintaining that an Abhihitānvayavādin is led per force to grant recognition to *Vyāñjanā* which brings an implicit idea into comprehension,—the capacities of other powers being exhausted

through performance of their respective functions,—he observes that, a champion of the said doctrine recognises the existence of three powers : *Abhidhā*, *Lakṣaṇā* and *Tātparya*. The function of *Tātparya*, however, is posited not by the sponsors of Abhihitānvayavāda, but by the Naiyāyikas, affiliated to old school. Mammaṭa relies possibly on the scanty information given by Abhinavagupta for ascertaining the intricacies of the theory, but he keeps himself immune from the charge of mis-representation by explaining it in a cryptic language. He simply states that the meaning of the proposition is the intended meaning (*Tātparyārtha*) and that the import of the proposition is not merely the sum-total of the imports of individual terms used in it, implying thereby that the verbal judgment is not denoted by the parts of speech.¹⁶⁷ But as regards the nature of the function which brings out this import of a proposition, which consists in relational thought, he remains silent and does not specifically mention whether this is *Lakṣaṇā* or *Tātparya*. Possibly he does this intentionally in order to conceal his ignorance of the intricacies of the doctrine, propounded by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, with whose works themselves he does not seem to be familiar. The error committed by Abhinavagupta and Mammaṭa persists in works of their successors, as well, who leave it uncorrected and unchallenged. Thus Govinda observes that the theory of Abhihitānvayavāda is advocated in the Nyāya and Nāgeśa maintains that the stand of Kumārila finds support in other systems, as well.¹⁶⁸ Viśvanātha creates a hopeless confusion and observes that, the function of *Tātparya* is postulated by the Abhihitānvayavādin in order to account for comprehension of the import of a proposition, which constitutes the real intended meaning : this function, he continues, pertains to the sentence as a whole, and neither to isolated terms nor to isolated concepts.¹⁶⁹ This, however, is exactly the Nyāya Theory, as recorded by Jayantabhaṭṭa. It is really a pity that the appraisal of the doctrine of Abhihitānvayavāda, as made by reputed critics of the stature of Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha is based upon hearsay and guesswork, and not upon firsthand knowledge of the works of the great master Kumārila.

CHAPTER III

SUB-TYPES OF POETRY

Ānandavardhana divides *Dhvanikāvya* or Poetry par excellence into two broad classes : *Avivakṣitavācya* and *Vivakṣitānva-paravācya*. The characteristic features of these two types are evident from their very designations : in the first case, the expressed idea is not meant, i.e. to say is not intended to be accepted as such ; in the second case, it is certainly meant, but ultimately it leads to manifestation of the suggested, to which it renders its own self subservient. The first is obviously based on *Lakṣaṇā*, which the poet employs consciously with the sole purpose of bringing the implicit into comprehension, and consequently, it is characterised by use of expressions in their transferred sense. The second is based on *Abhidhā*, the sense expressed by which ultimately amounts to the unexpressed.¹

Of these two broad classes of *Dhvani*, the first, namely *Dhvani* of *Avivakṣitavācya* type is divided into two sub-types : *Arthāntarasamkramitavācya* and *Atyantatiraskṛtavācya*, according to the nature of *Lakṣaṇā*, that forms its basis.² In the first type, which, as the name suggests is based on *Upādānalakṣaṇā*, the expressed sense, though not totally incompatible, is transformed into one characterised by new attributes, while in the second, which is based on *Lakṣaṇalakṣaṇā*, the expressed being totally incompatible is abandoned altogether in favour of a new idea. As an illustration of the first sub-variety, Ānandavardhana quotes the Prākṛta Gāthā :

Tālā jānti guṇā jalā te sahiaehim gheppanti/

Raikiraṇānnugahiāim honti kamalāim kamalāim// meaning : 'Merits become real ones, when they are appreciated by connoisseurs : the lotus becomes a true lotus, when favoured by rays of the Sun'. Here, he points out, the second term 'lotus' does not convey simply the concept of a water-lily, but that of a

lily, as endowed with attributes like fragrance and tenderness : thus the expressed is transformed from a mere thing designated (*sañjīn*) to some other sense, which includes within its scope the thing designated, as well. He further maintains that, the attributes are comprehended through suggestion and that, it is the inexplicable charm of this implicit idea, which bestows on this piece of poetic creation the status of *Dhvanikāvya*. It is a pity that an astute commentator of Gobinda Thakkura's status commits a blunder by regarding these attributes as indicated (*lakṣya*) units : this is against tradition, established by Ālaṃkārikas of repute.³ As an example of the second sub-variety of *Dhvani*, Ānandavardhana cites the oft-quoted stanza of Vālmīki :

Raviṣaṃkrāntasāubhāgyastuṣārāvṛtamaṇḍalaḥ/
Niḥśvāsāndha ivādarśaścandramā na prakāśate//, meaning :

'With its orb covered by mist and glory transmitted to the Sun, the moon does not shine like a mirror, blinded by sighs'. In explaining this, Abhinavagupta points out that, the term 'blind' is a privative term and as such presupposes the capacity for seeing, which the looking glass totally lacks. The expressed is therefore altogether abandoned in favour of a new idea, which, does not comprise the former within its scope. This new idea which is brought out through the function of *Lakṣaṇā* is the concept of the mirror, unable to reflect images : *Lakṣaṇā*, it is said, is employed with the sole purpose of bringing the unexpressed into comprehension, which, in the present case, is extreme ugliness and complete lack of utility of the glass concerned.⁴ Bhaṭṭanāyaka is of opinion that, the indeclinable 'iva' in the verse under consideration is indicative of *saṃbhāvanā* and not of *sādṛśya*, or in other words, the expression means : 'a mirror, as if blinded by sighs', and consequently, *Lakṣaṇā* does not operate here at all. Abhinavagupta, however, rejects this stand altogether. This explanation, he points out, fails to effect a plausible connection amongst different concepts, presented by the terms, used in the verse, in as much as, it renders the looking glass identical with the moon. The attempt to avoid this difficulty by repeating the indeclinable 'iva'

and connecting it in two places in the same verse, in such a way that it may convey the idea of the moon, resembling a mirror, which is, as if, blinded by sighs is ludicrous, because, as Abhinavagupta says, such repetitions and connections are allowed in treatises on Philosophy, but not in specimens of Poetic Art.

The second division of Suggestive Poetry, the *Vivakṣitānya-paravācya* is classified in its turn into two sub-varieties, according to the perceptibility or otherwise of the sequence existing between the comprehension of the expressed and that of the unexpressed. In the first of these two sub-varieties, which is named *Asaṃlakṣya-krama*, the sequence that intervenes between the cognitions of the expressed and suggested meanings is imperceptible, i.e. the expressed brings the suggested imperceptibly into consciousness : in the second sub-variety, which is named *Samlakṣya-krama*, the sequence existing between the cognition of the explicit and that of the implicit is clearly perceptible, i.e. the process of manifestation of the suggested is perceptible.⁵ Under the first group Ānandavardhana places suggestion of *Rasa*, *Bhāva* etc. by making it clear that only emotional states admit of suggestion in this way, and under the second group he places suggestions of *Vastu* and *Ālaṃkāra*, and in this way he connects the two-fold classification of Suggestive Poetry into *Asaṃlakṣya-krama* and *Samlakṣya-krama*, with the three-fold classification of *Dhvani* into fact (*vastu*), imaginative mood (*Ālaṃkāra*) and emotional state (*Rasa*). The *Dhvanikāra* calls *Rasadhvani* 'one of imperceptible process', because the experience of suggested *Rasa* by means of various factors, such as *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyābhicārībhāva* necessarily involves a process, but from its quickness the process is not perceived, like the process, as Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha put it, of the apparently simultaneous piercing of a hundred lotus-leaves placed one upon another. At the time of relishing *Rasa*, the mind of the refined appreciator becomes so much absorbed in it that, he does not notice the process which suggests it, and consequently, it is quite in the fitness of things that, this suggestion is described as 'one of imperceptible process'.⁶

The question whether this classification of *Dhvani* into *Asamlakṣya-krama* and *Samlakṣya-krama* is absolute or not forms an interesting study. The advocates of this classification place *Rasa* under the first group and *Vastu* and *Alaṃkāra* under the second. They, however, maintain that *Rasadhvani* is capable of being regarded as 'one of perceptible process', as well, in as much as, in some cases the appreciator perceives the process, which suggests the emotional state. Usually as soon as a piece of poetic creation is read, the reader becomes, as it were, simultaneously aware of the emotions, presented in it : but in those cases, where the context is not clear or the causal factors are to be thought out and as such, enjoyment of impersonal pleasure is delayed, consequential upon belated presence of these accessories, *Rasadhvani* is capable of being regarded as an instance of *Samlakṣya-krama-vyañgya* ; in these cases, there exists perceptible interval between cognition of the explicit idea of a poetic creation, consisting of such factors as ensuents, excitants and accessories and that of the emotional mood depicted in it. With these arguments Jagannātha defends the stand of the Dhvanivādin that, at times *Rasadhvani* becomes 'one of perceptible process' as well.⁷ As an example of this type of *Rasadhvani*, he cites the stanza :

Talpagatā'pi ca sutaṇuḥ Śvāsāsaṅgaṃ na yā sehe/

Samprati sā hrdayagataṃ priyapāṇiṃ mandamākṣipati//
meaning : 'The beautiful girl, who though reclining on bed, could not stand the slightest touch of her husband's breath is now repelling his hand placed on her breast mildly', commenting on which he observes that, the comprehension of the suggested emotional state is dependent on cognition of the exact sense of the term 'now' or in other words, on full understanding of the context. The feeling of love of the girl directed towards her husband is comprehended only when it is gathered that on the night before the departure of her husband the shy bride is driving back the hand of her husband placed timidly on her breast, and consequently, the process of suggestion here is perceptible. The fact that, at times a perceptible interval exists between cognition of the expressed idea of a Poem and that of the emotions

suggested by it, Jagannātha maintains, is corroborated by experience of connoisseurs.⁸ Moreover, he continues, it enjoys the approval of such great theorists as Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta. Thus Ānandavardhana quotes the famous stanza :

Evamvādinī devaṛṣau pārśve pīturaḍhomukhī/

Līlākamalapatrāṇi gaṇayāmāsa Pārvatī//under the head

Samlakṣya-krama-vyañgya and Abhinavagupta in unequivocal terms mentions that, emotional moods do not, under all circumstances constitute the contents of *Asamlakṣya-krama Dhvani*.⁹ In this connection, Jagannātha raises a pertinent question. If *Rasadhvani* becomes an instance of suggestion of perceptible process, as well, how can, he asks, *Samlakṣya-krama-vyañgya* be of twelve varieties, as enumerated by the ancients ? Its number is to be raised to eighteen. In reply to this, he points out that, such permanent feelings as love, grief and the like are elevated to the status of *Rasa* only when they are suggested by clearly exhibited excitants, ensuents and accessories imperceptibly : then and then alone, he asserts, they form the content of a contemplation productive of disinterested pleasure. When, on the other hand, these are suggested through a perceptible process, they fail to attain the status of *Rasa* and are relegated to an inferior position of *Vastu*. Hence, Jagannātha argues, there is no contradiction between the assertion that *Rasa* is capable of being suggested through a perceptible process, as well and the statement that types of *Dhvani* of perceptible process are twelve in number.¹⁰ The argument of Jagannātha is not in the least convincing, because when suggested through a perceptible process, a permanent feeling is not converted into a *Rasa*, but remains a sheer fact, there is no meaning in extending recognition of *Samlakṣyakrama-vyañgya* to *Rasadhvani*, as well. These speculations of master artists are, however, of great importance to us, because by revealing their hesitancy to accept this two-fold classification of *Dhvani* as absolute, they go to bring out its unreal character. As the suggestion of *Rasa* occasionally comes under the group of *Samlakṣya-krama*, which includes the suggestions of *Vastu* and *Alaṃkāra*, it is not possible to relate the two-fold classification with the three-fold division

of *Dhvani* into *Vastu*, *Alaṃkāra* and *Rasa*. Then again, it is possible to group the suggestions of *Vastu* and *Alaṃkāra* under the head *Asaṃlakṣyakrama*, because at the time of perception of Poetry, the mind of the true connoisseur of Poetic Art remains so much absorbed in it that, he does not notice the process which suggests the implicit and, as if, simultaneously with the cognition of the expressed he becomes aware of the unexpressed. For this reason, while commenting on the observation of Ānandavardhana that the comprehension of the implicit is preceded by that of the explicit, in the same way as the cognition of the import of a proposition is preceded by that of imports of terms, Abhinavagupta remarks that, just as the sequence between *padārtha-pratīti* and *vākyārtha-pratīti* is perceptible only to a beginner, and not to a person of mature intellect, similarly the sequence between understanding of the expressed and that of the unexpressed is noticeable only to a novice and not to a true connoisseur of Poetic Art, for whom alone a specimen of this art is intended.¹¹ This remark makes it perfectly clear that *Dhvani* is always of an imperceptible process. Thus the classification of *Dhvani* into *Asaṃlakṣya-krama* and *Samlakṣya-krama* is not perfect : it remains in theory mainly, and is introduced only to show the excellence of a suggested emotional mood to the other two suggested entities,—suggested fact and suggested imaginative mood.

Ānandavardhana takes care to show that the poetic figure *Rasavat*, which smuggles the idea of *Rasa* in the field of Poetry does not comprehend the concept of *Rasadhvani*. While the ancients define *Rasavat* simply as a figure capable of presenting emotional states, Ānandavardhana asserts that, whereas, an emotional mood suggested prominently creates the field of *Rasadhvani*, a mood, when rendered subservient to another idea of paramount importance constitutes the scope of *Rasavadalaṃkāra*. He thinks that, when *Rasa* is primarily developed in Poetry, it no longer remains an embellishment, but rather is converted into the very soul of Poetry, excelling in charm all such elements as *Guṇa*, *Alaṃkāra*, *Rīti*, *Vṛtti* etc.¹² Commenting on these remarks, Abhinavagupta observes that, just as in an *Upamā*

an object goes to embellish another object, similarly in *Rasavat* one emotional mood goes to augment the beauty of another mood or another idea, primarily developed. The learned Dhvanikāra claims that acceptance of his stand alone enables one to draw the line of demarcation between the spheres of *Rasadhvani*, such pure figures as *Upamā*, *Rūpaka* and the like and the poetic figure *Rasavat*. The acceptance, on the other hand, of the viewpoint of the ancients, who bring an instance, where the aesthetic emotion is principally developed, as also an instance, where the emotion is subordinate to the expressed sense or some other suggested idea, both under the same head *Rasavat* renders it difficult to find out independent instances of *Upamā*, *Rūpaka* etc. The argument that those passages alone, where animate beings are primarily described are instances of *Rasavat*, consisting in depiction of such permanent feelings as love, grief, heroism and the like, which relate only to conscious and living organisms, and those passages where inanimate objects like rivers or mountains are primarily described are instances of independent *Upamā*, *Rūpaka* etc. is without any value. Because even in those cases where insentient beings are painted, there exists a touch of human and conscious elements, brought in through the aid of one or other of the numerous figures of speech. And this happens, because an inanimate described simply as an inanimate does not and cannot form the subject-matter of Poetry : either the behaviour of an animate is superimposed on it or it is brought into relation with a permanent feeling, since the content of a Poetry is either an excitant or an ensuent or an accessory. Thus as in every work of art there exists a human element, however predominantly descriptive it might be of unconscious phenomena of nature, everywhere *Rasavat* creeps in, and what we exactly get in descriptions of inanimate beings is an admixture of *Rasavat* and such figures as *Upamā*, *Rūpaka* etc. and not an independent *Upamā* or *Rūpaka*. Equally valueless is the argument that the existence of *Rasavat* is to be denied even though there exists an apprehension of human element, introduced in order to save the position, because such a course of reasoning is likely to declare many fine specimens

of Poetry as utterly devoid of the capacity of aesthetic relish or in other words, as highly *Nīrasa*. And this contingency arises, because, according to the ancients, the presence of the poetic figure *Rasavat* agrees with that of *Rasa* in a poetic creation, as also the absence of the former agrees with that of the latter. No such contingency arises, if, however, the view-point of the Dhvanikāra is accepted, and this is so, because according to him, the sheer absence of the poetic figure *Rasavat* does not render a Poetic Art bereft of appeal, but it is the lack of competence to suggest emotions in the reader's mind which makes it so. So the considered opinion of Ānandavardhana on this issue is this that, a predominantly suggested emotional mood brings in *Rasadhvani*, while such a mood, rendered subservient to another prominent idea brings in *Rasavadalamkāra*. Kuntaka challenges this proposition of the Dhvanikāra : he does not regard *Rasavat* as a separate figure, because, as he says, it is a misnomer,—the possessive suffix *matup* being unmeaning and misleading even.¹³

The learned Dhvanikāra observes that, it is not possible to enumerate the different varieties of principal emotions or of elements like the excitants, ensuents and accessories or of the different types of transient feelings, as also the numerous modes of allayment or dawning of them. By permutation and combination, there are likely to arise endless varieties, which it is impossible to enumerate severally.¹⁴ Thus, for example, he remarks, erotic emotion alone presents itself either in the form of love-in-union or in that of love-in-separation : love-in-union, again, manifests itself either through wistful gazing of lovers or through dalliance or through outing and love-in-separation, in its turn, is caused by jealousy or departure of one of the parties to love to a distant place or an imprecation or by similar other factors. The excitants, ensuents and accessories of both these types of love are of numerous types, in as much as, in some cases the hero is a divine being, in others he is a man, in others he is a semi-divine personality,—in some cases he belongs to the younger group, in others he is mature in age and experience,—in some cases he meets his opposite party in the

richness of spring, in others under a canopy of cloud and so on. Thus the erotic emotion alone admits of classification into innumerable types and sub-types, the enumeration of which is humanly impossible. Taking this hint from Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa maintains that, for the sake of convenience it is better to leave out details and classify the different varieties of *Rasa*, *Bhāva* etc. under one single category, namely that of *Asaṃlakṣyakrama-dhvani*, since they possess one element in common,—the property of being suggested through an imperceptible process,—all the *Rasas* and *Bhāvas* being suggested without any perceptible sequence appearing between the cognition of the expressed, on the one hand, and final aesthetic relish on the other. Viśvanātha and Jāgannātha endorse this view of Mammaṭa and express their opinion in favour of the unitary character of *Asaṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani*.¹⁵

In sharp contrast to the *Asaṃlakṣya-krama-dhvani*, in which the sequence existing between comprehension of the expressed and that of the unexpressed is imperceptible, in *Samlakṣya-krama* this sequence is distinctly noticeable. Thus the suggested sense, emanating from this type of *Dhvani* resembles a vibration, the sequence between which and the first sound is distinctly noticeable, when a bell is rung. For this reason, this type of *Dhvani* is also called *Anusvāna-saṃniva-dhvani*. Though at the outset Ānandavardhana classifies this type of *Dhvani* into two sub-varieties, according as it is based on formal suggestiveness (*śabdaśakti-mūla*) or material suggestiveness (*arthaśakti-mūla*), towards the close of his discussion he grants recognition to a third sub-variety, as well,—a type which is based on formal-cum-material suggestiveness (*śabdārthobhayaśakti-mūla*).¹⁶ Accordingly all later thinkers, including Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jāgannātha speak of three kinds of *Samlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya* : (1) that in which the implicit idea arises from force of the word, (2) that in which the same arises from force of the expressed meaning and (3) that in which the same arises from the force of both—word and sense-units. In reply to the question as to what constitutes the criterion of determining whether suggestion proceeds from the force of a word or of a meaning or of both,

the Dhvanivādin replies that, the simple test is to see whether the expressions, manifesting the implicit meaning admit of replacement by their synonyms or not. If they admit of substitution of their synonymns, then the suggestion is to be regarded as arising from force of the meaning; if, on the other hand, they do not admit of such substitution,—the slightest change, effected in them hampering the manifestation of the unexpressed, then it is to be regarded as arising from force of the word: when, however, these two types of expressions are equally balanced, i.e. to say, some words are capable of being replaced by their synonyms and others are not so, and of these two categories of words none outnumbers the other, then the suggestion is to be regarded as arising from force of both word and meaning. Jagannātha observes that, due to the absence of any decisive evidence, it is not proper to regard such a case of *Dhvani* as either *Śabda-śakti-mūla* or *Artha-śakti-mūla*; it is also improper, he continues, to regard it as a case of admixture or *Śaṃkara* of these two types, because an instance of such admixture is found only when different implicit ideas are brought into light per force of word and meaning: in such cases, however, as both the sound and sense combine to bring the implicit idea into light, the question of such instances being recognised as specimens of *Śaṃkara* does not arise.¹⁷

Ānandavardhana thinks that an instance of *Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani* is always an instance of *Alaṃkāra-dhvani*, or in other words, in this type of *Dhvani* there necessarily exists an apprehension of a suggested poetic figure. In it such homonymous words are used, whose denotation is restricted to the contextual sense and the non-contextual, as also the relation existing between the two is comprehended through suggestion. Before citing an illustration of this type of *Dhvani* Ānandavardhana attempts to establish the thesis that, its scope is different from that of *Śleṣālaṃkāra*. And this he does, because there exists a great possibility of confounding one with the other, in as much as, both are characterised by use of homonymous words. It is a fact, he continues, that in both *Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani* and *Śleṣa* there exists an apprehension of more than one idea; but

while in the former, there arises, in addition, the cognition of an unexpressed poetic figure qua some definite relation like *Sāṃśya*, *Virodha* etc. subsisting between the two meanings—the expressed contextual and the unexpressed non-contextual, in the latter no such relation is comprehended.¹⁸ The point raised by the opponent that this distinction between the two is unsatisfactory and illogical, since in the case of *Śleṣālaṃkāra*, also, there arises at times a comprehension of such other poetic figures as *Upamā*, *Rūpaka*, *Virodha* etc. is untenable, because while in *Śleṣa*, the figures, whose apprehension remains mixed up with that of the former are conveyed through the function of denotation, in *Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani* these figures are brought into light through the function of suggestion; and this makes all the difference between the two categories. Thus, he observes, the verse running as

Tasyā vināpi hāreṇa nisargādeva hāriṇau/

Janayāmāsatuḥ kasya vismayaṃ na payodharau//, and meaning: 'The breasts of the lady, though devoid of a necklace, yet possessed of it (charming) caused wonder to all' constitutes an illustration of admixture of *Śleṣa* and *Virodhābhāsa*,—the former paving the path for the latter,—and not that of *Śabda-śakti-mūla-dhvani*. The expression:

'Atrāntare kusumasamayayugamupasamharannajṛmbhata Grīṣmābhidhānaḥ phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso Mahākālāḥ', meaning: 'In the meantime, putting an end to the spring season approached unbearable summer, in which the palaces became white with jasmine flowers in blossom (like Lord Śiva, the God of destruction, with his violent laughter as white as full-blown jasmine flowers appearing—foreboding the annihilation of Cupid), on the other hand, exemplifies this type of *Dhvani*, and not *Śleṣa*. In explaining this, Abhinavagupta points out that, here in utter violation to the maxim, which states that, of expressiveness, attributed by derivation and expressiveness, pertaining to the word as a whole, the latter prevails over the former, the denotation of the multi-meaninged term '*Mahākāla*' conveys the idea of long unbearable summer, to which it is restricted through context, and subsequently the sense of Lord Śiva, as also the relation

of similarity subsisting between the two are comprehended through suggestion : hence, he says, this is a case of *Upamā-dhvaḥ* i.¹⁹ This remark of Abhinavagupta is of great importance, in as much as, it betrays his belief that, the principle, according to which, in case of a conflict between *Rūḍhi-śakti* and *Yaugika-śakti*, the former is to be preferred to the latter is applicable in those cases only, where such factors as conjunction, disjunction and the like do not go to delimit the scope of denotation to the field of the contextual sense alone. The Dhvani Theorists maintain that, in this illustration, the function of suggestion brings out the idea of Lord Siva, as also that of similarity existing between the unbearable summer and the terrible Lord : the relation of similarity, they argue, is apprehended, for in the absence of such a relation, the two ideas would remain discrete and the poet would be charged of incongruity for using expressions, that yield ideas that have no bearing on the topic at hand. This relation of similarity, which forms the basis of the poetic figure *Upamā*, they continue, is comprehended through the function of *Vyañjanā* alone, since there do not exist any such terms as *iva*, *vā* etc., which are denotative of the idea of similitude or any such words as *pratipakṣa*, *pratispardhā* etc. which are indicative of the said idea : hence, this constitutes an illustration of *Upamā-dhvani* of *Śabdaśaktimūla* variety. Following Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha cite similar illustrations of this variety of *Dhvani*, in which the poetic figure *Upamā* is said to be conveyed through the function of suggestion. Mammaṭa cites the stanza :

Ullāsyā kālakaravālamahāmbuvāham

Devena yena jarāṭhorjitagarjitena/

Nirvāpitaḥ sakala eva raṇe ripūṇām

Dhārājalaistrijagati jvalitaḥ pratāpaḥ//, in which, as he says, the relation of similarity, subsisting between the contextual king and the non-contextual Lord Indra is brought into light through *Vyañjanā* : Viśvanātha quotes the verse :

Durgālāṅghitavigraho manasijaṃ sammīlayaṃstejasā

Prodyadrājakalo gr̥hītagarimā viśvagvṛto bhogibhiḥ/

Nakṣatreśakṛteḥṣaṇo girigurau gāḍhām rūciṃ dhārayan

Gamākramya vibhūtibhūṣitatanūrājatyumāvallabhaḥ//, in which, as he explains, the relation of similarity existing between the contextual king and the non-contextual Lord Mahādeva is comprehended through *Vyañjanā*. Appaya Dīkṣita of much later date holds a view which is somewhat different from the traditional view, held by the Dhvani Theorists. While such great masters as Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha hold that both the non-contextual itself and the relation which it bears to the contextual are conveyed through *Vyañjanā*, Appaya thinks that, the idea of relation alone is brought into light through *Vyañjanā*. When from a particular homonym, *Prakṛta* and *Aprakṛta* ideas are cognised, he argues, both of them are equally conveyed through *Abhidhā*,—the restrictive force of factors like conjunction, disjunction etc. as enumerated by Bhartṛhari being logically unjustifiable. The non-contextual, he asserts, is not suggested as the followers of Mammaṭa would have it : what *Vyañjanā* actually causes is the apprehension of the relation only, which links the two apparently isolated ideas.²⁰

Jagannātha raises an interesting point here. He argues that, the illustrations cited before are not examples of Dhvani, but are specimens of *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya*. A close parallel of this case, he continues, is to be found in an instance of the poetic figure *Samāsokti*, in which the behaviour of the *Aprakṛta* is superimposed on the *Prakṛta* through the use of multi-meaninged adjectives, applicable to both : just as in that type of *Samāsokti*, the unexpressed behaviour of the *Aprakṛta* goes to embellish the beauty of the expressed *Prakṛta*, similarly, in these examples also, he points out, the unexpressed idea of similarity goes to augment the beauty of the expressed contextual.²¹ The argument that, in these illustrations the suggested simile does not go to impart beauty to the contextual—is untenable, since it tantamounts to sheer denial of truth, in as much as, all connoisseurs of Poetic Art realise this within the heart of their hearts. Moreover by applying the same argument it is possible to assert that in *Samāsokti* also, the suggested *Aprakṛta* does not go to beautify the expressed *Prakṛta*, and

consequently, an example of *Samāsokti* is not a specimen of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, as it is supposed to be by the learned Dhvanikāra, but rather is a specimen of *Dhvanikāvya*. Equally untenable is the argument that a case of the poetic figure *Samāsokti* is completely different from that of *Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani*, because while in the former the noun is not a homonym, in the latter it is so, and hence, the particular poetic figure and the particular type of Dhvani do not meet on a common platform. And this is so, since this course of reasoning does not go to establish the proposition that in *Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani* the unexpressed simile does not impart beauty to the expressed contextual: the simple fact that the noun also is a homonym does not go to render the suggested idea one of paramount importance and consequently, does not go to convert the expressions into specimens of *Dhvanikāvya*. The opponents, Jagannātha continues, might try to defend their position by pointing out that, as in those expressions multi-meaninged words are used with the specific purpose of bringing the relation of similarity into comprehension, which being a figure is more charming than a sheer unembellished fact, it is not possible for the suggested simile to render itself subordinate to the expressed contextual (Lord Śiva or King as the case may be): in support of their contention, they might cite the observation of the learned Dhvanikāra that those specimens of Poetry in which figures are suggested by sheer facts constitute clear cases of *Dhvani*, since in such cases the unexpressed necessarily excels the expressed in charm. As in *Samāsokti*, however, the behaviour of the *Aprastuta*, which is a fact,—and not a figure—is conveyed through suggestion, it necessarily renders itself subservient to the expressed *Prastuta*, which is ornamented by it. Thus the contention of the opponents is this that, while an instance of the poetic figure *Samāsokti* is a specimen of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, an instance of *Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani* is definitely a specimen of *Dhvani*. In reply to this contention, Jagannātha maintains that, citation of even hundreds of observations of ancients and thousands of parallelisms does not go to establish a proposition, which is not backed by strong

argument and sound logic. The point that as the intention of the poet, composing those verses is to bring the relation of similarity into light, so the suggested figure necessarily excels the expressed content in beauty—is meaningless, since the real aim of the poet is delineation of an emotional mood and consequently, what is of paramount importance is an emotional mood, and not a figure: thus, the application of this argument, Jagannātha says, is likely to render the expressions cited before specimens of *Rasadhvani*, and not of *Alamkāra-dhvani*, as the Dhvani Theorists claim them to be.²² Paṇḍitarāja anticipates another objection to his conclusion that, the expressions, cited as examples of *Alamkāra-dhvani* of *Śabdaśaktimūla* variety are in reality specimens of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*. It is possible, he argues, to point out that, an *Upamā* is comprised of three elements, namely the object of description (*Upameya*), the standard of comparison (*Upamāna*) and the common attribute (*Sādhāraṇa-dharma*), and thus, has no existence separate from any one of them: in the expression and verses quoted before, though similarity goes to augment the beauty of the object of description, yet *Upamā* itself cannot be regarded as doing so, because an *Upamā* cannot be conceived without an *Upameya*, which is comprehended within the figure itself. A similar case is to be found in the case of the poetic figure *Samāsokti*, where though the suggested *Aprastuta* goes to embellish the expressed *Prastuta*, yet the figure as a whole is not regarded as doing so, because it is comprised of both *Prastuta* and *Aprastuta* and is incomplete without either of them. In reply to this, Jagannātha asserts that, as *Upamā* and *Samāsokti* sail on the same boat and bear close resemblance to each other, it is proper to recognise both of them either as specimens of *Dhvani* or as specimens of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*.²³

Nāgeśa, the astute commentator, who defends the earlier theorists on many issues attempts to defend them on this issue also. In the verses, cited as illustrations of *Upamā-dhvani*, he maintains, the suggested simile being an excitant or an *Uddīpana-vibhāva* is more attractive than the expressed sense, which is comprised of *Ālambana-vibhāva*, and hence they consti-

tute specimens of *Alaṃkāra-dhvani* : compared to *Rasa*, however, this *Alaṃkāra* is subordinate, since *Rasa* alone constitutes the centre of gravity of all poetic creations. In *Samāsokti* on the other hand, comprehension of the idea of suggested non-contextual is essential for the establishment of the primary sense, and hence, it is proper to regard an example of this poetic figure as a specimen of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*. Thus, Nāgeśa attempts to refute the contention of Paṇḍitarāja that *Upamā-dhvani* and *Samāsokti* sail on the same boat by pointing out that, there is a marked difference between the two, but he creates a great confusion by observing at the same breath that, those cases of *Samāsokti*, where the unexpressed is more attractive than the expressed, being more intimately related to the emotional mood in question are capable of being recognised as specimens of *Dhvani*, as well : this statement practically revives the argument of Jagannātha that, *Upamā* and *Samāsokti* meet on a common platform. In reply to the point that, how is it proper to regard the poetic figure *Upamā* itself as a suggested entity, when one of its elements—the *Upameya* is conveyed through denotation, Nāgeśa says that, the term *Alaṃkāra-dhvani* does not refer to suggestion of the figure itself, but to suggestion of a charm, caused by a figure.²⁴

Though at the first sight, Jagannātha's new doctrine, going against the established tradition of the *Ālaṃkārikas* causes our admiration and wonder, yet it is difficult to accept it. It is not that the factor which differentiates a case of *Śabdaśaktimūlopaṃdhvani* from that of the poetic figure *Samāsokti* is simply the use of double-meaning noun in the former,—a noun, which is conspicuous by its absence in the latter : the two differ in their essential qualities also. In the poetic figure *Samāsokti*, the *Aprakṛta*, which is brought into light through the function of suggestion constitutes the very substratum of the behaviour of the same *Aprakṛta*, which is superimposed on the *Prakṛta*, because it is not possible for an attribute to reside without its substratum, and consequently, the suggested content renders its own self necessary for the establishment of the expressed one : here the explicit and the implicit ideas do not

seem to be totally disconnected, because, as has been pointed out, the former depends completely for its establishment on the latter. In the *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, on the other hand, the non-contextual, along with its peculiar attributes is conveyed through the function of suggestion and neither the expressed depends for its existence on the suggested, nor does the latter owe its existence to the former : here the relation of similarity, linking the contextual with the non-contextual is comprehended subsequently, in order that cognition of two independent ideas—the explicit and the implicit—may not lead to apprehension of two different propositions, one presenting the contextual and the other the non-contextual. This relation of similarity is comprehended through *Vyañjanā*, since words, denotative or indicative of the idea of similitude are not there. As this relation of similarity does not help the expressed sense in any way to establish its own self, which is independent of the former, it is not correct to place *Śabdaśaktimūlopaṃdhvani* with *Samāsokti* on a common platform, and to observe that both exemplify *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya* type of Poetry. The argument that in *Śabdaśaktimūlopaṃdhvani*, the suggested content is subordinate, because the very charm of the specimen of Poetic Art owes its existence to it and as such a case of this type of Poetry is *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya-kāvya* is misleading, since it converts a *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, which is regarded as a Poetry of mediocre type by all *Dhvanivādins* into a Poetry of the best type. Thus the arguments, advanced by Jagannātha, however ingenious they might be, are not in the least convincing : *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* and *Samāsokti* do not sail, as is maintained by him, on the same boat : while the former represents the best type of Poetic creation, the latter exemplifies Poetry of mediocre type.

Jagannātha leaves the beaten track of the *Ālaṃkārikas* on another point also : he asserts that in the stanzas : 'Ullāśya' etc. or 'Durgā' etc., what is cognised through *Vyañjanā* is the poetic figure *Rūpaka*, based on comprehension of identity between the contextual and the non-contextual,—and not the figure of speech *Upamā*, based on that of similarity between the

two, as is commonly supposed to be. In a case of the poetic figure *Śleṣa*, he says, complete identity between two concepts, presented by the same word-unit is understood by all appreciators of Poetry : in such a case the cause which leads to cognition of this idea of identity is the use of the same word-unit to signify both the concepts. What happens in case of *Śleṣa* occurs in case of *Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani*, also, where multi-meaning words are used in the same way as in the former : here, too, sameness of word or expression leads to understanding of identity between the two concepts, presented through the same sound-unit. Thus the expressions and stanzas cited by the learned predecessors as illustrations of *Upamādhvani* of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type, he maintains, are in reality examples of *Rūpakadhvani*. The argument that, there is a lot of difference between a case of *Śleṣa* and that of *Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani*, because while in the former, two ideas are conveyed simultaneously through the function of denotation and as such are cognised at the same time, in the latter, one is conveyed through the function of suggestion in contradistinction to the other which is brought out through the function of denotation and as such the comprehension of which occurs after that of the latter—is without any force, since neither the fact that *Vyañjanā* brings one of the ideas into light nor the condition that the cognition of the suggested non-contextual follows that of the expressed contextual is able to impede the comprehension of the sense of identity between the two concepts. Equally weightless is the argument that, as *Rūpaka* is nothing but *Upamā*, characterised by non-comprehension of distinction between the object of description and the standard of comparison, its cognition is always preceded by that of *Upamā*, which furnishes its very basis and consequently, it is proper to regard such stanzas as illustrations of *Upamā-dhvani*. And this is so, because the simple fact that a knowledge is derived first leads more to its rejection than to its acceptance. This happens in case of an erroneous knowledge, which though generated first is dismissed subsequently by a right notion : thus the knowledge of silver is removed as soon as the real thing—the piece of nacre is cognised and in a similar manner, that of the snake is

dismissed as soon as the rope is known. Hence, Jagannātha concludes, there is no force in the observation of some of the commentators on *Kāvya-prakāśa* that, as the cognition of *Rūpaka* is based on that of *Upamā*, the relation which connects the contextual and the non-contextual in the expressions and stanzas cited before is that of similarity : what effects this connection in these cases, he asserts, is the relation of identity, and not of similarity : to state clearly, these are instances of *Rūpakadhvani*, and not of *Upamādhvani*.

While Jagannātha regards these cases as instances of *Rūpakadhvani*, Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha are of opinion that, these furnish illustrations of *Upamādhvani* : these, they think, are characterised by cognition of similarity between the contextual and the non-contextual, which possess such attributes as are capable of being conveyed through the same expression. When such great masters as Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha differ amongst one another, it becomes very difficult for us to accept one or other of the views, but the view-point of Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha seems to be more sound, being based on logic and conforming to the experience of appreciators of Poetry. The argument of Jagannātha that, the knowledge, which is derived first is dismissed by a knowledge gathered subsequently is applicable in case of an erroneous knowledge only, and not in the case of comprehension of *Upamā* and *Rūpaka* : the idea of a snake is certainly removed by that of the rope, but the notion of *Upamā* in these illustrations is not dismissed by that of *Rūpaka*. Hence that argument is too weak to establish the proposition of Jagannātha that, the stanzas cited before are examples of *Rūpakadhvani*. In those stanzas, the comprehension of similarity and identity, both are likely to ensue from the use of the same word in order to express the attributes pertaining to the contextual and the non-contextual : yet it is proper to regard those as being characterised by cognition of similarity, and necessarily as instances of *Upamādhvani*. And the reason is this. Those cases where both the object of description and the standard of comparison are present as possessed of similar attributes and where the sense of similarity is not clearly

expressed through words denotative or indicative of it are regarded as instances of *Upamādhvani*, whereas those cases, where attributes belonging really to the standard of comparison alone are mentioned,—the said standard of comparison itself remaining unmentioned—are recognised as instances of *Rūpakadhvani*. In the stanzas cited before, the attributes, presented through multi-meaninged adjectives do not appear as pertaining to the non-contextual standard of comparison alone : in fact, in the first instance, they appear as belonging to the contextual object of description and it is only at a later stage after the comprehension of the non-contextual through *Vyañjanā* that they seem as belonging to that standard of comparison, as well. Thus as the common attribute is applicable to both the object of description and the standard of comparison,—and not to the standard of comparison alone, in the examples quoted before, it is proper to maintain that the figure comprehended through *Vyañjanā* in those cases is *Upamā*, and not *Rūpaka*, or in other words to regard those stanzas as specimens of *Upamādhvani*, as the ancients do,—and not as specimens of *Rūpakadhvani*, as Jagannātha thinks.

The learned Dhvanikāra maintains that, other relations like contradiction, excellence and sequence, consisting the basis of the poetic figures *Virodhābhāsa*, *Vyatireka* and *Yathāsaṃkhyā* respectively are capable of being conveyed through suggestion besides similarity, as already noted in *Śabdaśaktimūla* type of Dhvani.²⁵ Thus in the verse of Sūryaśataka :

Khaṃ ye'tyujjvalayanti lūnatamaso yevā nakhodbhāsino
 Ye puṣṇanti saroruhāśriyamapi kṣiptābhābhāśca ye /
 Ye mardhasvabhāsinah kṣitibhṛtāṃ ye cāmarānāṃ śīrāṃ
 syākrāmantyubhaye'pi te dinapateḥ pādāḥ śriye santu vaḥ //

the excellence of the solar rays over the feet of the anthropomorphic deity is comprehended through *Vyañjanā*, and accordingly, it affords an example of *Vyatirekadhvani*. It is silly to point out that in the stanza quoted before, the suggested idea of excellence qua the poetic figure *Vyatireka* is subservient to the sense of deep love which the poet bears for the Sun God and consequently the poetic figure is not competent to bestow the

status of Dhvani on the stanza under consideration. Firstly, as in the stanza the poet wants to give merely a graphic description of the Sun, the love which he bears for the anthropomorphic deity is not cognised at all ; secondly, all the Dhvani Theorists agree in extending recognition as Dhvani Kāvya to such pieces of poetic creation as are characterised by manifestation of suggested fact and imaginative mood, simply because of the fact that, such implicit ideas excel the explicit idea in charm, even though, they, in their turn, are excelled by suggested emotional mood in point of beauty. The argument that in order to constitute an instance of *Vastudhvani* or *Alaṃkāradhvani*, the suggested fact or figure must excel the suggested *Rasa* in charm is likely to wipe away the scopes of these two types of Dhvanikāvya completely, because in all specimens of poetic Art *Rasa* being of paramount importance is subservient to none. Jagannātha makes this point clear in his dissertation on *Śablaśaktimūla-dhvani*.²⁶ Thus in the view of Ānandavardhana, in *Śablaśaktimūla-dhvani*, there necessarily exists an apprehension of unexpressed relation to link the two apparently discrete ideas, or in other words all instances of this type of Dhvani are instances of *Alaṃkāra-dhvani*.

Over the correctness of the term '*Alaṃkāra-dhvani*', rhetoricians expend much of their thoughts and energies. It is pointed out that, the designation *Alaṃkāra-dhvani* seems, at the first sight, to be a contradiction in terms, in as much as, so long as an attribute remains an instrument of decoration, it does not attain the status of *Dhvani* or the soul of Poetry and once it attains the status of *Dhvani* it is converted into an *Alaṃkārya* and, no longer remains an *Alaṃkāra*. An *Alaṃkāra* is defined as an attribute, which pertains primarily to sound or sense, which constitutes the body of Poetry, but at the same time goes to promote *Rasa*, or in other words, to heighten aesthetic effect. This very conception of an *Alaṃkāra* is sufficient enough to bring out its subsidiary character ; being attributes of word and meaning, it cannot supersede them : nor can it supersede *Rasa* being the means employed to bring that suggested content into light. Thus the state of a poetic figure and that

of an unexpressed idea of paramount importance being mutually opposed the designation '*Alaṃkāra-dhvani*' becomes meaningless. Mammaṭa tries to defend the correctness of the term by putting forward the analogy of 'a Brahmin monk' in explaining which Govinda says that, just as a Buddhist monk, who was a Brahmin before renouncing worldly life is referred to as a *Brāhmaṇa-śramaṇa*, similarly an element which was an *Alaṃkāra* before being brought into comprehension through suggestion is referred to by the term '*Alaṃkāra-dhvani*'. Govinda observes that, though a suggested element, attaining the status of *Dhvani* being brought out prominently through the function of suggestion no longer remains an instrument of decoration and necessarily a poetic figure, yet it is called an *Alaṃkāra* only secondarily, since it resembles a poetic figure, being endowed with the capacity to beautify sound and sense in some cases: thus, according to him, the term, under consideration is capable of being explained away by taking recourse to Indication.²⁷ This explanation of Mammaṭa and Govinda, however, does not seem to be satisfactory: the parallelism of a Brahmin monk is not applicable to an '*Alaṃkāra-dhvani*'; before his conversion to Buddhism, the *Śramaṇa* was certainly a *Brāhmaṇa*, but before its signification through the function of suggestion, the imaginative mood did not exist at all,—not to speak of promoting *Rasa* through the embellishment of sound and sense. For this reason, Jagannātha puts forward another suggestion: he cites the parallelism of 'a bracelet in a box', and says that, just as a bracelet is called an *Alaṃkāra* through courtesy, even though it is always kept in a box and never put on the body, similarly an imaginative mood, when brought into light through the function of suggestion is named an *Alaṃkāra* per favour even though it does not go to beautify sound and sense, constituting the body of Poetry.²⁸ This analogy is an improvement on the one, introduced by Mammaṭa, but, nevertheless, it is not to be drawn to its logical extreme, in as much as, there is a lot of difference between a *Mañjūṣā-kāṭaka* and an *Alaṃkāra-dhvani*. The bracelet possesses the capacity of adorning the body, but the suggested imaginative mood does not: it decorates nothing,

—neither the word nor its meaning. In spite of all this, the *Alaṃkārikas* retain the term '*Alaṃkāra-dhvani*' out of deference to past tradition and prolonged usage, established by ancients.

Mammaṭa is the first critic to recognise *Vastudhvani* of *Śabdaśakimūla* variety: he observes that, in this type of *Dhvani*, not only an imaginative mood, but a sheer fact, also, is capable of being conveyed through suggestion. As an illustration of this class of Poetry he cites the Prākṛta Gāthā:

'Pañthia na ettha sattharamatthi maṇam pattharatthale gāme/
Uṇṇapaoharam pekhhia uṇa jai vasasi tā vasa//, in which, context restricts the denotation of the terms 'satthara' and 'paohara' to the meanings of shelter and cloud respectively, as a result of which the idea of absence of a suitable shelter in the village and the inadvisability of halting there at a time when the sky is overcast with clouds is brought into light through *Abhidhā*. Subsequently owing to the use of multi-meaning terms pointed before, the idea that, the residents of the village are blissfully ignorant of erotics and as such, there is every possibility of wanton enjoyment with the youthful girl of easy virtues going on unobstructed—is conveyed through suggestion: according to Mammaṭa, the suggested fact is the intention of the speaker that, the wayfarer may halt here if he is able to enjoy. Viśvanātha endorses the view of Mammaṭa, but Ruyyaka differs from him and maintains that, the Prākṛta Gāthā quoted before furnishes really an example of *Ubhayaśaktimūlavastudhvani*, and not of *Śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani*. He thinks that in the verse under consideration, also, there exists apprehension of a relation between the non-contextual and contextual ideas; this relation, however, is different from that of similarity or contradiction: it is that which exists between an indicator and an indicated. Here the expressed contextual indicates the unexpressed non-contextual, and it does so, because it is endowed with the capacity to do it. This capacity, Ruyyaka continues, is nothing other than such factors as speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, place, time and the like. Thus it is clear that in the verse under

consideration, the suggested content is brought into light not only per force of word, but per force of meaning, as well, to which capacity to suggest the unexpressed idea is imparted by such factors as speciality of the speaker and the person spoken to : the suggested sense is certainly not comprehended by one, who is unaware of the antecedents of the speaker. Consequently, Ruyyaka concludes, the stanza illustrates *Vastudhvani* of *Ubhayaśaktimūla* type, and not of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type. It is for this reason, he observes, the learned Dhvanikāra does not recognise *Vastudhvani* of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type.²⁹ It is curious to note that, though in this strain Ruyyaka criticises Mammaṭa for regarding *Vastudhvani* as a variety of *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* in his commentary called *Kāvyaaprakāśasaṃketa*, in his *Alaṃkārasarvasva*, he himself justifies the separate existence of this category of Poetry.³⁰ Jayaratha, the commentator on *Alaṃkārasarvasva* notices this incongruity between the two views of Ruyyaka as stated in two different places and in his eagerness to reconcile them says that, the criticism of Ruyyaka relates only to the particular *Prākṛta Gāthā*, cited as an illustration by Mammaṭa,—and not to the category of *Śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani* in general. Ruyyaka, he continues, certainly extends recognition to this type of Dhvani ; what he challenges is the correctness of Mammaṭa's example, which, as he says, really illustrates *Vastudhvani* of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type.³¹ Though Jayaratha tries to reconcile the incongruity between the views of Ruyyaka, these incoherent observations betray clearly his hesitancy to grant recognition to *Śabdaśaktimūla*. Possibly Ruyyaka finds a strong logic in the conclusion of Ānandavardhana that all instances of *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* are instances of *Alaṃkāradhvani*. And the logic is this. The explanation that in *Vastudhvani* of this category two unconnected and unrelated meanings are cognised from the same sentence constrains us to construe a single sentence as two different sentences, which is an unusual and complex procedure. The point put forward to avoid this objection,—the point that in such cases, some relation either of similarity or of identity is comprehended between the two ideas—renders such cases instances of *Alaṃkāradhvani*, and

not of *Vastudhvani*. It is perhaps to avoid this criticism that, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta do not make any mention of *Vastudhvani* under *Śabdaśaktimūla* category of poetry.

Jagannātha meets this objection cleverly : with astounding polemics he establishes the existence of *Śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani*. As an illustration of this variety of Poetry, he cites the stanza :

‘Rājño matpratikūlānme mahadbhayamupasthitam/

Bāle vāraya pānthasya vāsadānavidhānataḥ //, in which the function of denotation brings out the idea of the request meted out to the village-girl by the traveller to give him shelter and thus to protect him from the angry King : subsequently, it is pointed out, the idea that, as the wayfarer is unable to stand the sight of the moon and its other associates, separated as he is from his consort, it behoves the village-girl to have dalliance with him. Towards the manifestation of this unexpressed content, Jagannātha observes, the double-meaning term ‘*Rājan*’ pays maximum contribution, in as much as, replacement of this word by any of its synonyms obstructs the cognition of the said suggested sense : hence this Dhvani is of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type. The point that in this stanza, also, what is comprehended is the relation of similarity or that of identity between the King and the moon and accordingly, this verse, as well, furnishes an illustration of *Alaṃkāradhvani*—is untenable, because here of the two ideas, apprehended through homonymous words, one is intended to be merely covertly hinted at, instead of being plainly stated and the other serves as a cloak to hide the former and consequently, both the ideas are not cognised at the same time : when the expressed meaning, intended to conceal the suggested sense is known, the latter to hide which the former is presented is not cognised and once when the concealed sense is comprehended, the knowledge of the explicit idea ceases to exist. For this reason, the relation of identity or that as existing between an object of description and a standard of comparison, which is established between two entities cognised simultaneously is incapable of being placed beyond dispute between the expressed and unexpressed

sense-units in the present case.³² The objection that, such a course of reasoning leads to construction of two different sentences is not applicable here, because the question of interpreting a single proposition as two different propositions arises only in those cases where the two unrelated meanings are of equal prominence. In the present case, however, the expressed merely serves as a cloak to hide the unexpressed and as such the two ideas do not stand on an equal footing. Hence, Jagannātha concludes, postulation of *Vastudhvani* under the head of *Śabdaśaktimūla* variety is absolutely correct. The silence of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta regarding *Vastudhvani* of this type, it is evident, is not to be taken to mean that this class of Poetry is impossible and unauthorised. The learned Dhvanikāra and his astute commentator, it is true, do not mention this class: but they only point out the way, leaving it to the connoisseurs of Poetic Art to work out the details and discover many more sub-varieties of Dhvani. In fact, Ānandavardhana explicitly states that there are several other sub-types of *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, and it is for the appreciators of Poetry to discover them.³³ Hence, it is not possible to bring such a charge against Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha that, by extending recognition to *Śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvani* they have deviated from established tradition, built up by the ancients.

While in *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani* the change of the homonym or homonyms used is accompanied by the absence of the implicit idea and as such the sound-element is of more importance, in *Arthaśaktimūladhvani* it is the matter that is more important than the words expressive of it: in it a knowledge of speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, context and such other factors besides that of the matter itself is absolutely necessary for the comprehension of the unexpressed content. Ānandavardhana classifies this type of Dhvani into three categories according as the idea which brings the unexpressed into light is objectively possible or is invented by the poet's own imaginative faculty or is brought into being by the imagination of a character, created by the Muse of the Poet. Without trying to justify the plausibility of the above classi-

fication, Mammaṭa follows Ānandavardhana closely and speaks of twelve sub-types of this variety of Dhvani: the number is fixed at twelve, because as he says, the matter which suggests may take the form either of a *Vastu* or of an *Alaṃkāra* and the suggested idea, also, may in its turn appear either in the aspect of a fact or in that of an imaginative mood. In his *Kāvyaaprakāśasaṃketa* Ruṣṣaka attempts to justify this scheme of classification, adopted by Mammaṭa. In reply to the possible question as to why the suggested sense is not classified into three categories—that which is objectively possible and so on—, when the idea which suggests is classified so, Ruṣṣaka observes, the question of arranging the suggested meaning under three heads does not arise, because the character of that idea has no bearing on manifestation of the implied meaning itself. With the character of the expressed, which brings the unexpressed into light, however, the case is completely different: the nature of the suggestor exercises great influence not only on the form of the suggested, but on the process of suggestion, as well. In some cases, the expressed brings out a particular suggested, only because it is presented by the imagination of a character, introduced by the poet; when presented by the poet himself the same idea fails to bring out the particular suggested sense: and even when it is introduced by the imaginative faculty of a character, created by the Poet's Muse it does not bring any other implicit idea into comprehension. All these go to show that the nature of the expressed is as much auxiliary to cognition of the suggested sense, as is the knowledge of context, time, place etc. Hence, Mammaṭa is perfectly right in classifying suggestion based on material significance into three categories according to the difference in the character of the expressed matter alone, which goes to convey the unexpressed.³⁴ Following the footsteps of Ruṣṣaka, Viśvanātha, also accepts without challenge Mammaṭa's scheme of classification of *Arthaśaktimūladhvani*: the divisions of this Dhvani, according to these thinkers, are as follows:

- (1) suggestion of a fact by a fact, which is objectively possible

- (2) suggestion of a figure by a fact, which is objectively possible
- (3) suggestion of a fact by a figure, which is objectively possible
- (4) suggestion of a figure by a figure, which is objectively possible
- (5) suggestion of a fact by a fact, which owes its existence to the imagination of the Poet
- (6) suggestion of a figure by a fact, which owes its existence to the imagination of the Poet
- (7) suggestion of a fact by a figure, created by the Poet's imagination
- (8) suggestion of a figure by a figure, created by the Poet's imagination
- (9) suggestion of a fact by a fact, which owes its existence to the Imagination of a character, created by the Poet's Muse
- (10) suggestion of a figure by a fact, which owes its existence to the Imagination of a character, created by the Poet's Muse
- (11) suggestion of a fact by a figure, created by Imagination of a character, who himself is a creature of the Poet's Intuition
- (12) suggestion of a figure by a figure, created by Imagination of a character, who is a creature of Poetic Intuition.⁸⁴

As an illustration of an expressed idea, which resides in the outside world, as well, and does not exist in the realm of the Poet's imagination alone, Ānandavardhana quotes the stanza :

Evam vāḍini devaṛṅgau pārśve pituradhomukhī /

Līlākamalapatrāṇi gaṇayāmāsa Pārvatī //, where the counting of lotus-petals, it is pointed out, conveys the idea of bashfulness; the suggestiveness of this type of matter, Abhinavagupta remarks, is irrespective of any poetic description and imaginative remoulding. As an example of an expressed idea, which owes its suggestiveness to a new shape given to it by imagination of the Poet, he cites the Prākṛta Gāthā :

Sajjei surahimāso na dāva appai juaijaṇalakhamuḥe /
 Ahinavasahaāramuḥe ṇavapallavapattale aṇaṅassa śare //,
 where the sense that the spring-time is only arranging its shafts, which are to be aimed at ladies signifies the idea that, love-sickness, which has just now dawned in young ladies will develop gradually. In this Gāthā, Abhinavagupta observes, the expressed meaning, as invented by the Poet's own imaginative faculty brings out the desired suggested content, in as much as, the simple statement that, in spring-time the mango and other trees are rich in fresh twigs and flowers is unable to bring the intended idea into comprehension.⁸⁵ In order to illustrate an expressed idea, which is brought into being by the imagination of some one among the characters, created by the Poet, Ānandavardhana refers to the verse :

Śikharīṇi kva nu nāma kiyacciraṃ

Kimabhidhānamasāvakarottapaḥ/

Taruṇi yena tavāḍharapāṭalaṃ

Daśati bimbaphalaṃ śukaśāvakaḥ//, in

which, as he says, the idea that the opportunity to taste a Bimba fruit resembling the lower lip of the lady is certainly a result of religious merit, amassed through performance of rigorous penance by the parrot conveys through suggestion the intention of the lover to please his lady-love: in explaining this, Abhinavagupta maintains, the simple statement that the parrot is biting the red Bimba fruit is unable to bring out the said implicit idea.⁸⁶

It is interesting to note that Hemacandra detects the flaw inherent in this scheme, drawn originally by Ānandavardhana and endorsed by Mammaṭa, Ruyyaka and Viśvanātha:⁸⁷ he contends that, this classification is unnecessary and incongruous, inasmuch as the three above-mentioned categories of matter have the essential property of being the outcome of poetic imagination common to all: even a matter, which is objectively real does not form the subject-matter of a specimen of Poetic Art unless transfigured by the poet's imagination; and imaginative faculty of a character, created by the Poet's Muse is nothing different from imagination of the Poet. Jagannātha draws a new scheme; he observes that a matter invented by imagination

of the Poet and one invented by imaginative faculty of a character, created by the Poet, both these should be really classed under one single head and consequently, it is proper to speak of two types of matter—*svataḥsambhavī* and *kavipraudoktimūtranīṣpanna*.³⁸ Nāgeśa, however, defends the learned Dhvanikāra on this issue : commenting on the above observation of Jagannātha, he remarks that just as the prattle of a child is more attractive than the speech of an adult, similarly a matter invented by one of the Poet's creations is more charming than that invented by the Poet himself, and so the learned Dhvanikāra is perfectly right in drawing the line of demarcation between the two varieties of expressed sense-units.³⁹

Ānandavardhana extends recognition to a third type of *Samlakṣyakramadhvani*, in which the sound and sense-elements conjointly suggest the implicit : this type he names *Śabdārathobhayaśaktimūladhvani* ; the unit of this Dhvani is a sentence or a compound expression, half the components of which are double-meaning terms and consequently irreplaceable by synonyms, while the rest admit of substitution of synonyms in their places. Mammaṭa accepts without challenge the proposition of the learned Dhvanikāra that in addition to *Śabdaśaktimūla* variety of Dhvani there is another variety known as *Ubhayaśaktimūla* : as an example of this, he cites the verse :

Atandracandrābharanā samuddīpitamanmathā/

Tārakātaralā śyāmā sānandaṃ na karoti kam//, in which the similarity between the particular heroine and night is brought into light through suggestion. Commenting on this, Govinda observes, the verse furnishes an example of *Ubhayaśaktimūla*, because while such terms as '*Atandracandrā*' etc., are irreplaceable by synonyms, such words as '*Samuddīpita*' etc. are quite replaceable and both combine to bring out the desired suggested content.⁴⁰ Viśvanātha follows Mammaṭa on this issue, but there are others who are brave enough to strike a note of discordance. That the propriety of Ānandavardhana's scheme of classification formed the content of anxious thoughts of many Ālankārikas is evident from the attempt made by some of the commentators on *Kāvya prakāśa* to differentiate the scope of

Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani from that of Dhvani of *Śabdaśaktimūla* variety. While in the Prākṛta Gāthā : '*Pañthia ṇa*' etc. quoted as an example of *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, only two terms '*saṭthara*' and '*payohara*', which are irreplaceable by their synonyms play a prominent part in the matter of suggesting the implicit, the expressed matter playing only a second fiddle to it, in the stanza : '*Atandracandrābharanā*' etc., cited as an illustration of *Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani*, they point out, words replaceable by their synonyms and those which are incapable of being so replaced are evenly balanced, the number of each type being four—and the sound and the sense-elements combine to suggest the unexpressed. This defence of *Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani*, however is extremely weak, because the Dhvani Theorists themselves maintain that in every case the sound and the sense-elements conjointly suggest the implicit : the argument that the Prākṛta Gāthā referred to above is reckoned as an instance of *Śabdaśaktimūla*, because in it two words do not admit of replacement of synonyms—makes all the more intense and legitimate the claim of the stanza, cited as an example of *Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani*, in which as many as four words are irreplaceable by their synonyms to be regarded as an instance of *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*. Hemacandra gathers sufficient courage to go against the established tradition and to point out the inherent weakness of the classification, drawn by the ancients. He maintains that, the much-talked of *Ubhayaśaktimūla* of the ancients is nothing other than *Śabdaśaktimūla*, because there also a prominent role is played by the sound-element, without which the sense-element fails to bring the desired suggested content into light : accordingly, he cites the stanza, quoted by the ancients to exemplify *Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani* as an illustration of *Śabdaśaktimūla-dhvani*.⁴¹ The view-point of the ancients once again finds a staunch supporter in Jagannātha, who defend their scheme with seemingly strong arguments : with meticulous care he draws the line of demarcation between the scopes of these three varieties of *Samlakṣyakramadhvani* and shows that a case of *Ubhayaśaktimūla* is not an instance of admixture of *Śabdaśaktimūla* and *Arthaśaktimūla*.

Though Mammaṭa accepts Ānandavardhana's classification of

Samlakṣyakramadhvani and extends recognition to a third variety known as *Ubhayaśaktimūla* he differs from his learned predecessor on the question of the nature of the suggested content in this variety. Ānandavardhana does not give any example of *Ubhayaśaktimūla* type of Dhvani, but he cites a stanza in order to illustrate an exception to it: the stanza runs as follows:

Dr̥ṣṭyā keśava ! goparāgahṛtaya kiñcinna dr̥ṣṭam mayā
Tenaiva skhalitāsmi nātha ! patitāṃ kiṃ nāma nālabhase/
Ekastvaṃ viṣameṣu khinnamanasāṃ sarvāvalānāṃ gati-
rgopyaivaṃ gaditaḥ salesāmaivatāt goṣṭhe harirvaściram⁴²//

Commenting on this Abhinavagupta observes that the use of the word 'salesāma' meaning 'covertly' gives a fresh impetus to the function of denotation in conveying the idea that Kṛṣṇa should shower favour on the particular milk-maid by allowing her the pleasure of his company,—an idea, which otherwise would have been communicated through the function of suggestion, rendering the specimen of poetic Art an illustration of *Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani*. The idea, as pointed out by Abhinavagupta, which would have been conveyed through *Vyañjanā* is the intention of the milk-maid,—in the language of Indian Poetics—a *Vastu*. Hence the observations of the learned Dhvanikāra and his commentator reveal that both of them are of opinion that a sheer unembellished fact is capable of being comprehended through suggestion in this variety of *Dhvani*. Ruyyaka endorses this view, as is evident from his remark that, the verse: '*Pañthina*' etc. really furnishes an illustration of *Vastudhvani* of *Ubhayaśaktimūla* variety. It is interesting to note that though Mammaṭa, and following him Viśvanātha include *Vastudhvani* as one of the varieties of *Śabdaśaktimūladhvani*, both of them maintain that a poetic figure alone is capable of being suggested conjointly by sound and sense-elements, or in other words, a case of *Ubhayaśaktimūladhvani* is always an instance of *Alaṅkāradhvani*: in it a fact brings a figure into light through the function of suggestion.⁴³

The learned Dhvanikāra pronounces a note of caution in this connection: the idea conveyed through suggestion per force of word or of meaning or of both sound and sense, he asserts,

should never be expressed in any form by the function of denotation: when the sense suggested through *Śabdaśakti* or *Arthaśakti* or *Ubhayaśakti* is again expressed in words, the piece under consideration is reduced to a mere poetic figure from the status of *Dhvani* or if there be any *asamlakṣyakramadhvani* besides the suggested sense in question, the latter becomes a sort of embellishment, somewhat different from the common poetic figures and enhances the effect of the emotional mood depicted.⁴⁴ And this happens, because in such a case the very essence of *Dhvani*, which consists in charm of the unexpressed content springing from its concealment is jeopardized.

As the Dhvani theorists lay stress on the fact that, in a *Dhvanikāvya* the unexpressed content should remain concealed and thus should not be capable of being comprehended by one, not initiated into the hieroglyphics of Poetry, they maintain that, a piece of poetic creation in which the suggested sense is clear and consequently capable of being cognised by all constitutes a specimen of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*. Mammaṭa classifies this type of Poetry into eight sub-types according to the character of the suggested sense, presented in the piece, the cases of the eight varieties being as follows: (a) where the suggested sense is as clear as the expressed one and is capable of being cognised by ordinary persons as well, (b) where the suggested sense becomes a sort of embellishment and goes to enhance either the effect of the emotional mood or the charm of the expressed or other unexpressed units, (c) where the expressed is supported by the suggested, (d) where the suggested is so concealed that, it is not possible even for refined appreciators to catch it, (e) where doubt exists as to the prominence of the expressed or the unexpressed, (f) where these two ideas stand on an equal footing in respect of prominence, (g) where the unexpressed is presented by modulation of voice and (h) where the implicit is by its very nature unattractive.⁴⁵ Viśvanātha accepts this classification and quotes except in one or two cases the same stanzas, cited by Mammaṭa as examples of these types of Poetry. As an illustration of the first sub-type of *Guṇībhūtavyaṅgya*, Mammaṭa quotes the verse:

Yasyāsuhr̥t kṛtatiraskṛtiretya tapta-
sūcivadhavyatikareṇa yunakti karṇau/

Kañcīgūṇagrathanabhājanameṣa so'smi

Jībanna samprati bhavāmi kimāvahāmi//, in which

the expression : *Jīvanna bhavāmi* conveys through indication the idea that, the life of the speaker is not worth-living and the purpose for taking recourse to Indication is to bring home the point that, for him death is a boon : this suggested sense, Mammaṭa thinks, is as clear as the expressed, capable as it is of being understood even by ordinary men. As an example of the second sub-type, i.e. *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* of *Aparāṅga* variety, he cites the stanza :

Ayam sa raśanotkarṣī pīnastanavimardanaḥ/

Nābhyrujaghanasparśī nīvīvisraṃsanaḥ karaḥ// ;

here, he points out, the feeling of love goes to heighten the effect of the tragic emotion, inasmuch as, recollection of dalliance done with the hero, now slain in the battle-field goes to redouble the grief of his wives, or in other words the sentiment of love presents in fuller relief the poignancy of grief, and thereby enables it to attain the status of *Karuṇarasa*. Mammaṭa is of opinion that, examples of such poetic figures as *Rasavat*, *Preyas*, *Ūrjasvī* etc. are instances of this variety of Poetry. Taking cue from the observations of Ānandavardhana and Mammaṭa, Govinda expressly states that, illustrations of the poetic figure *Samāsokti*, as well, constitute specimens of this variety, because in all such stanzas, the expressed, as embellished by the unexpressed appears as the main source of attraction. The distinction between the second and third sub-types of Poetry which is commonly known as *Vācyaśiddhyanjyavyaṅgya* is extremely fine and so most of the commentators try to draw this line as clearly as possible. They say that, while in the second sub-type, the suggested serves as an embellishment to the expressed, established, by itself, independent of the former, in the third sub-type, it serves as the very support of the expressed, which depends entirely on it for the establishment of its own self. The verse :

Bhramimaratimalasahṛdayatām pralayaṃ mūrcchāṃ
tamaḥ śarīrasādam/

Marāṇaṃ ca jaladabhujagajaṃ prasahye kurute

viṣaṃ viyoginīnām//, it is pointed

out, exemplifies the third sub-variety, because the idea of poison, which is cognised through *Vyañjanā* from the term '*Viṣa*', *Abhidhā* of which is restricted to the sense of water serves as the very cause of establishment of the poetic figure *Rūpaka* contained in the expression : '*Jaladabhujaga*'; non-comprehension of this suggested content, Govinda observes, is likely to render the expression an example of *Sandeha-saṃkara* between *Upamā* and *Rūpaka*. As an illustration of the fourth variety of this Poetry, Viśvanātha cites a stanza in which reference is made to one King Allāvadīna who is often identified with the Muslim ruler Alauddin Khilji. The stanza runs as follows :

Sandhau sarvasvaharaṇaṃ vighrahe prāṇanigrahaḥ/

Allāvadīna-nṛpatau na sandhir na ca vighrahaḥ//

Commenting on this, Viśvanātha observes, the idea that conciliation and bestowal, only these two expedients are to be applied in case of the mighty emperor Alauddin is such a secret that, it is difficult to be cognised by appreciators of Poetry even : hence it illustrates *Asphutavyaṅgya* type of Poetry. As an example of the fifth type, i.e. the type in which the prominence of the unexpressed forms along with that of the expressed a content of doubt, Mammaṭa refers to the stanza :

Harastu kiñcit parivṛttaḥairya-

ścandrodayārambha ivāmburāśiḥ/

Umāmukhe Bimbaphalādharoṣṭhe

vyāpārayāmāsa vilocanāni//, in which, as

he points out, it is not clear as to whether prominence belongs to the expressed idea of gazing at the face of Pārvatī or to the suggested sense of desire to kiss : and this is so, because while the expressed is an *Anubhāva* of the erotic emotion, delineated in the passage, the unexpressed is a *Vyabhicāribhāva* of the same, and consequently, both are competent to bring the desired *Rasa* into comprehension, independent of each other

This type is technically known as *Sandigdhaprādhānyavyaṅgya* type. In *Tulyaprādhānyavyaṅgya* variety of Poetry, Mammaṭa continues, the expressed and the unexpressed are of equal prominence. Thus in the verse :

Brāhmaṇātikramatyāgo bhavatāmeva bhūṭaye/
Jāmadagnyastathā mitramanyathā durmanāyate//, which

furnishes an example of Poetry of this variety, he points out, the expressed, namely the idea that, Paraśurāma will court friendship with Rāvaṇa if he ceases to trouble the Brahmins is as much prominent as the unexpressed, namely the idea that, if Rāvaṇa does not pay heed to the good counsel, tendered by Paraśurāma, he will annihilate the whole host of demons in the same way as he has destroyed the group of Kṣatriyas : and this is so, because Paraśurāma intends to press home the point that, to him both war and peace are of equal rank and that he has no special fascination for either of them : the prominence of the expressed is all the more contributed to by the mode of expression, particularly, as Govinda observes, by the use of the term 'Durmanāyate'. In some cases, the implicit, presented by modulation of voice removes the incongruity of the explicit and thereby, renders it acceptable : in such cases the specimen of poetic art is known as *Kakvākṣiptavyaṅgya* variety of *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya-kāvya*. Thus in the verse :

Mathnāmi kauravaśataṃ samare na kopāt
Duḥśāsanasya rudhiram na pivāmyurastah/
Saṃcūrṇayāmi gadayā na suyodhanorū

Sandhim karotu bhavatāṃ nṛpatih paṇena//, the implicit idea of affirmation is cognised, as if, simultaneously with the explicit sense of negation, which being incongruous and inapplicable seems as absurd without the former. In drawing the distinction between *Kakvākṣiptavyaṅgya* and *Vācyaśiddhyaṅgya* varieties of Poetry, the commentators observe, while in the former, the unexpressed removes the incongruity of the expressed, already established, in the latter the unexpressed serves as the very cause of establishment of the expressed. The Dhvani Theorists maintain that, a suggested content which by its very nature is unattractive renders a piece of poetic creation

an illustration of *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya* of *Asundaravyaṅgya* type. As an example of this variety of Poetry, Mammaṭa cites the Gāthā :

Vāṇīrakuṇḍaṅguḍḍīṇasaṇīkolāhalaṃ suṇantīe/
Gharakammavāvaḍāe bahue sīanti aṅgāin//, in which the

suggested content, namely the idea that the lover, with whom an engagement was made has just now entered the grove—is not in the least charming : it is the expressed sense—the idea that the limbs of the village-girl are getting benumbed—which constitutes the centre of attraction, inasmuch as, this numbness is an effect of love, which the girl bears for the village-youth and her eagerness to meet him, consequential thereon.

In conclusion, Mammaṭa maintains that, this division is not exhaustive and the different varieties of *Dhvani*, enumerated before are capable of being traced of *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya*, as well, since the counter-instances of the former constitute instances of the latter. This, however, is to be taken with certain amount of caution, because, as Mammaṭa points out, those cases where a fact suggests a figure are never treated as instances of *Guṇibhūta-vyaṅgya*, but as illustrations of *Dhvani* alone. In support of his contention, he quotes an observation of Ānandavardhana, which states that, a piece of poetic creation, in which an expressed fact brings out a suggested figure is always regarded as an instance of *Dhvanikāvya*, because a figure is always charming than a fact, and consequently in such a piece, the suggested necessarily excels the expressed in charm.⁴⁶ Govinda raises an interesting point here. If a figure is always charming than a fact, then how is it, he asks that a case where a figure suggests a fact is often treated as a case of *Dhvani* ? In reply to this, he asserts, an idea, which when conveyed through suggestion appears as charming loses much of its attractiveness, when signified through denotation : experience of connoisseurs of Poetic Art, he continues, bears witness to it. Thus the very fact that, an idea is communicated through expression takes away beauty from it, while the fact that it is communicated through suggestion imparts fresh beauty to it. In a case where a figure suggests a fact, the figure being conveyed through

denotation loses much of its charm and the fact, on the other hand, being brought into light through suggestion gains in beauty: and so it is perfectly right, Gobinda concludes to regard it as an instance of *Dhvani*.⁴⁷ With a specimen of poetic art, in which a fact suggests a figure, however, the position is completely different: here the suggested figure excels without fail the expressed fact in charm, because first, a poetic figure by its very nature is more attractive than an unembellished fact and secondly it becomes all the more attractive being communicated through suggestion. It is for this reason that, Ānandavardhana affirms that, such a poetic creation is always to be treated as a specimen of *Dhvanikāvya*: and Mammaṭa closely follows the learned Dhvanikāra on the issue.

Following the footsteps of Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa extends recognition to *Citra* as a variety of Poetry and classifies it into two types: Poetry abounding in figures of sound and Poetry abounding in figures of sense. As every content of Poetry is capable of being grouped either under *Vibhāva* or under *Anubhāva*, *Rasa* is bound to manifest itself in each and every specimen of poetic art: still *Citra* variety of Poetry is described as *Avyāñjya*, because, as Mammaṭa maintains, in this Poetry comprehension of *Rasa* is not clear. The two-fold classification of *Citra* seems to be untenable, at the first sight, because the relation between a word and its corresponding concept being inseparable, a figure, pertaining to a word ornaments the meaning, as well, and a figure, belonging to a meaning, embellishes the word, also. For this reason, Bhāmaha while recording the view-points of his predecessors, according to some of whom a poetic figure pertaining to sense is a real instrument of decoration, since sense alone is related primarily to *Rasa* and according to others a figure belonging to sound is a true instrument of decoration since sound alone is created by a Poet, observes that, both are wrong and the correct view is this that, each type of *Alaṃkāra* serves to heighten the beauty of both word and meaning, inasmuch as, a word is as much helpful to suggestion of an emotional mood as is a concept, and a meaning

is as much a creation of the Poet's muse as is its corresponding word.⁴⁸ Thus though every *Alaṃkāra* pertains really to both sound and sense, a division is made between Poetry abounding in figures of sound and that abounding in figures of sense on the ground of prominence or subservience of either of these two types of figures of speech: in a *Śabdacitrakāvya*, the poetic figure belonging to sound is more prominent than that belonging to sense,—in an *Arthacitrakāvya* the position is just the reverse: in it the figure pertaining to sense is more prominent than that pertaining to sound.⁴⁹

CHAPTER IV THE THEORY OF RASA

I

Explanation of Technical Terms :

The postulation of *Dhvani* of *Asam'lakṣyakramavyaiṅya* type leads us to the discussion on *Rasa*, theory relating to which forms one of the most important aesthetic foundations of Sanskrit Poetics. The starting point of all discussion is the meagre text of *Rasasūtra*, formulated by Bharata, whose exposition on it is as abstruse as the aphorism itself. In reply to the query, put forward by the sages as to what constitutes the essence of *Rasa*, which is so well-known in the circle of connoisseurs of dramatic art, Bharata places forth the famous dictum, which simply states that, *Rasa* is brought into being through the combination of the factors, known as *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhiṭāribhāva*.¹ The explanation of the dictum, as furnished by Bharata himself is as ambiguous and vague as the text of the dictum : it points out that, *Rasa* is referred to by the term *Rasa*, because it is relished by refined appreciators in the same way as a fine drink is relished, both having distinctive flavour of their own. Drawing this parallelism further, Bharata states, just as a nice beverage is composed through admixture of a number of ingredients, similarly *Rasa* is brought into being through combination of a number of *Bhāvas* : just as, he continues, a plate of rice, the flavour of which is heightened by other cooked dishes of vegetable or fish or meat is tasted by appreciators, who derive pleasure at the time of tasting the food, in a similar manner a *Sthāyibhāva*, to which additional flavour is imparted through combination of *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhiṭāribhāvas* is relished by spectators, initiated into the hieroglyphics of drama, who derive elevated pleasure at the time of appreciating the specimen of dramatic art : hence, he

concludes, a *Rasa* is commonly known as *Nāṭyarasa*.² This observation makes it clear that, according to Bharata, *Rasa* is relished by a spectator only at the time of witnessing of a theatrical performance, a corollary to which is this that, *Rasa* is not relished by a refined reader, as he peruses a specimen of Poetic Art, or in other words, *Rasa* is incapable of being presented in forms of Poetry, other than drama. Though Bharata describes *Rasa* in connection with drama only, the writers, affiliated to the *Dhvani* school give it a much more wide scope and explain *Rasa* not only in relation to drama, but in relation to Poetry in general. Thus Abhinavagupta relying on the observation of his venerable teachers remarks, *Rasa* is experienced by a refined reader, even when a drama is read out to him, but as it is relished in the same way in which it is enjoyed at the time of witnessing a theatrical performance, it is often referred to as *Nāṭyarasa*. At the time of listening to the recital of a dramatic composition, a man of poetic sensibility sees, as if, the very characters present before him : as his mind by its own nature gets concentrated on the events described in the play, the necessity of presenting different characters on the stage or catering music does not arise in order to make his mind steady and free from distractions. This necessity is felt to keep the mind of an ordinary man concentrated on the incidents of a Play : as he lacks in trained intellectual powers, he is unable to imagine the presence of different personages before him and consequently stands in need of being a spectator to the imitation of the characters, done by the actors.³ It is for this reason that while in a specimen of dramatic art *Rasa* is experienced by all, in a specimen of poetic art this is relished only by persons, endowed with poetic sensibility : the observation of Bharata that, the gates of dramatic art, which as he names, the fifth Veda are thrown open to all—to Brāhmaṇas and Śūdras alike—bear testimony to it.

The ambiguity and vagueness of Bharata's aphorism, coupled with his silence on the exact nature of the relation which the *Vibhāva* and other factors bear to *Rasa* give rise to a number of doctrines, which differ amongst themselves on the connotation

of the two most controversial terms—'Samyoga' and 'Niṣpatti', used in the Sūtra. Before entering into the intricacies of these doctrines, it is necessary to ascertain the meanings of the technical terms *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva*, *Vyabhicāribhāva* and *Sthāyibhāva*, as understood by the ancients.

Bharata defines *Bhāva*, the basis of *Rasa* as one, which brings into existence the sense of Poetry through four kinds of representation,—imitation by speech, costume, gesture and psychic changes : it is an element, which, as he says, makes one realise the main import of a Poem ; he, also, explains it on authority of his learned predecessors as a particular mental condition,—a definite state of consciousness,—a feeling which is shared along with others by a refined spectator at the time of enjoying a specimen of dramatic art. Bharata speaks of three categories of *Bhāvas*—*Sthāyibhāva*, *Vyabhicāribhāva* and *Sāttvikabhāva*, all of which go to make the import of Poetry sensed : yet, as he puts it, it is *Sthāyibhāva*, alone, which is brought to a relishable condition through *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva*. Following the old method of introducing parallelisms, he says that, just as though all human beings are possessed of same limbs, yet some of them only attain kingship, others only following them and carrying out their mandates, similarly though the *Sthāyibhāva* and the *Vyabhicāribhāva*, both are feelings, yet only the former is elevated to the status of *Rasa*, the latter, along with *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas* going only to help in its proper manifestation.

The *Ālankārikas* define a *Sthāyibhāva* as a feeling, which is incapable of being subdued by another *Bhāva* whether compatible or incompatible, and which subsists in the mind for a long time : a *Sāttvikabhāva* or *Vyabhicāribhāva*, on the other hand is fleeting in character and consequently is comparable to a flash of lightning ; it appears and disappears during the experience of a *Sthāyibhāva*.⁴ Bharata does not try to draw any distinction between these two types of feelings, nor does he assign any reason as to why a particular feeling is regarded as a permanent one (*Sthāyibhāva*) in contradistinction to another, which is described as fleeting in character ; he finishes his duty simply

by naming and defining eight *Sthāyibhāvas* and thirty-three *Vyabhicāribhāvas*. Abhinavagupta is the first critic to maintain that, this classification of feelings is psychologically sound, and is not the product of mere caprice of the rhetoricians. The nine *Sthāyibhāvas*, he points out, exists permanently in every human mind in the form of latent impressions : they are evoked and developed by adequate causes and in proper circumstances, and when these causes and circumstances are withdrawn, they get back to their dormant conditions : *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, on the contrary, exist only so long as the exciting causes are there and when these causes vanish, the *Bhāvas* also cease to exist without leaving any trace whatsoever behind. Abhinavagupta clarifies this difference by citing, an illustration : when, says he, the statement that 'one is fatigued' is made, the question that at once arises is 'why' ? : when, on the contrary, the statement that 'Ram is full of heroism' is made, the question that arises is 'in whose presence ?' The first question relates to the cause that gives rise to exhaustion and the second to the agency that brings out what already exists. This, Abhinavagupta asserts, is sufficient to show that, while a *Vyabhicāribhāva* does not exist in the form of a latent impression, but is generated by exciting causes, a *Sthāyibhāva* exists in the form of an impression and is called into play simply by exciting causes and circumstances. The *Sthāyibhāvas*, Abhinavagupta continues, are acquired by a human being since his very birth, inasmuch as, he naturally feels sexual love for his opposite sex, experiences sorrow when something cherished or adored is destroyed, becomes angry upon one who destroys the cherished, experiences a feeling of spiritedness and consequently is prompted to do such acts as he cannot perform in the ordinary state of his consciousness, feels the dawning of fear at the sight of terrible things, experiences disgust at the perception or idea of some unwholesome or dirty object, meets with astonishment at the preception of some extra-ordinary or super-natural phenomenon, feels mirth as he preceives an incongruity in the form of an erroneous action or mutilated dress or speech etc. and experiences a feeling of

self-abasement blended with complete indifference towards worldly objects as he ponders over the transitoriness of these things. As these feelings dawn upon all human beings without a single exception, they are regarded as *Sthāyibhāvas*, the only difference between the psychological condition of one man from another being this that, while the feeling of love is predominant in one, that of fear is prominent in another, that of anger is supreme in yet another and so on. The *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, on the other hand, Abhinavagupta maintains, are not acquired by a human being since his very birth: some of these feelings are not experienced by a man even for a single time during his whole life: thus, for instance a Yogin, addicted to an exciting drink may not experience the feeling of fatigue caused by some bodily exertion or that of inactivity from weariness and the like,—a saint, who has unearthed the mystery of the universe may not feel pride and so on. Then again the *Vyabhicāribhāvas* exist only so long, as the exciting causes are there, while the *Sthāyibhāvas* continue to exist in the form of latent impressions, even when the exciting causes cease to be present. In support of this observation, Abhinavagupta quotes a statement of Patañjali, which says that, the very fact that Caitra feels attachment for a particular girl does not mean that he has aversion for others.⁵ In conclusion, Abhinavagupta remarks, the *Sthāyibhāvas* are so many coloured strings to which remain sparsely tied the *Vyabhicāribhāvas* having their parallels in stones of different hue: just as the colour of the string is reflected on the stones, similarly the *Sthāyibhāvas* influence considerably the *Vyabhicāribhāvas*: then again as the stones of different shade tinge the intervening threads with their attractive hues, similarly the *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, in their turn, influence the *Sthāyibhāvas* and render them relishable. This analogy of a garland, introduced by the learned critic shows the mutual dependence of *Sthāyī* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*; the *Sthāyī* forms the basis of the *Vyabhicārī*, which being completely dependent on the former bears no relation to the mind independently, but nevertheless it helps the former to attain a relishable state.⁶

Apart from *Sthāyī* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, Bharata speaks

of another category of *Bhāvas*, which he names *Sāttvikabhāvas*. Hemacandra justifies this classification and observes that, *Sāttvikabhāvas*, dawning in the mind, in which the quality of goodness (*Sattva*) is brought into prominence are purely mental in character and are to be scrupulously distinguished from tears and perspiration, with which they are usually erroneously identified. When the feelings are experienced by a mind, in which the grossly material portion is prominent, the consciousness itself becomes benumbed and this state, he remarks, is called *Stambha*:—when they are realised by a mind, in which watery portion is conspicuous, the mind melts and this state is called *Āśru*;—when they are experienced by a mind, in which the fiery portion gains uppermost, the soul is either converted into a liquid form or it loses its original colour: the first of these two states is known as *Sveda* and the second as *Vaivarnya*,—when the feelings, he continues, are enjoyed by a mind in which the ethereal portion gains prominence, consciousness loses its very self even and this condition is known as *Pralaya* and when the feelings are experienced by a mind, in which the airy portion is the most conspicuous, the mind either thrills or shutters terribly or completely loses its normal tone and these states are referred to respectively by the terms *Romāñca*, *Vepathu* and *Svarabhanga*. Paralysis, perspiration, tears etc. which are purely physical changes point out to the existence of these psychic conditions and thereby to that of such permanent feelings as love, grief and the like and therefore are nothing but *Anubhāvas*. Hemacandra asserts that, the view expressed by him represents the conviction of the *Ālankārikas* affiliated to the school of Bharata.⁷ Though Bharata and Hemacandra draw a line of demarcation between *Sāttvikabhāvas* and their corresponding physical changes, through which they are usually brought into expression by actors and consequently which constitute *Anubhāvas*, other *Ālankārikas* do not distinguish between *Sāttvikabhāvas* and *Anubhāvas*. Thus Mammaṭa does not grant separate recognition to *Sāttvikabhāvas*, implying thereby that they are capable of being comprehended under *Anubhāvas*, and Viśvanātha, though expressing this view in clear

and unambiguous language at the beginning tries to reconcile the view of Mammaṭa with that of Hemacandra by introducing the parallelism of the relation existing between a cow and a bull. A bull though identical with a male cow is different from a female cow : in a similar manner a *Sāttvikabhāva* though identical with an *Anubhāva* is distinct from it, inasmuch as, it represents a state of mind, in which the quality of goodness is brought into prominence, while an *Anubhāva* represents only a physical change. This attempt to justify the stand-point of both Mammaṭa and Hemacandra on the part of Viśvanātha by introducing the analogy of the relation existing between a cow and a bull shows that Viśvanātha regards *Sāttvikabhāva* as a species of the genus *Anubhāva*.⁸

While *Sthāyibhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva* constitute the internal factors leading to aesthetic realisation, *Vibhāva* and *Anubhāva*, coming not from the ordinary world, but from the poetic one represent the external factors of such experience. Bharata says, the terms *Vibhāva*, *Kāraṇa*, *Nimitta* and *Hetu* are synonymous units ; a *Vibhāva*, he asserts, is called so, because it presents a permanent feeling, brought into expression through different methods of representation in such a way, as it becomes a fit object of relish, or in other words, it makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed. The causes of such permanent feelings as love and the like when described in Poetry or presented on stage are termed *Vibhāvas*. The feelings experienced in ordinary world are purely mundane in character and the causes which give rise to such feelings are also purely earthly in nature : the feelings experienced at the time of perception of Poetry, however, are transcendental, inasmuch as, they always generate supreme unmixed bliss in the mind of the appreciator, and the causes which give rise to such feelings are correspondingly supernormal in construction : these extra-normal factors leading to aesthetic experience, the *Ālaṃkārikas* refer to by the term *Vibhāva*. The *Ālaṃkārikas* classify *Vibhāva* into two types : *Ālambana* and *Uddīpana*. *Ālambanavibhāva* refers to the person or the object in respect of whom an emotion is experienced and whose appearance is directly responsible for evocation

of the particular emotion ; *Uddīpanavibhāva* refers to the movement of that person or object, as also to the situation or the environment in which he is placed and which are helpful in intensifying the emotional experience.⁹ Thus Śakuntalā represents the *Ālambanavibhāva* of the erotic emotion experienced from perception of the drama Śakuntalā and the loveliness of her youth, as also the calm surroundings of the hermitage situated on the bank of the river Mālinī constitute the *Uddīpanavibhāva* of that emotion : in a similar manner, the wife of the Yakṣa, pining in separation from her beloved represents the *Ālambanavibhāva* of the emotion of love-in-separation, experienced from perception of the Meghadūta and the advent of the rainy-season stands for its *Uddīpanavibhāva*. An *Ālambana*, as the critics say, causes an emotion, while an *Uddīpana* enriches it. Before concluding his discussion on the *Vibhāvas*, Viśvanātha introduces an interesting topic concerning the classification of the Hero and the Heroine : he divides and subdivides men and women, as *Ālambanavibhāvas* of the erotic emotion into numerous classes and sub-classes on the basis of their age, behaviour, situation and mutual relationship. The exuberant details and elaborateness with which Viśvanātha and his learned predecessors treat this subject capture possibly the imagination of the dramatists, whose strict adherence to these canons of dramaturgy is responsible for delineation of types rather than individuals in their plays.

Bharata defines an *Anubhāva* as a factor which indicates a permanent mood, imitated through words, gestures and organic changes, implying thereby that, the term is to be taken not only to mean what occurs after a *Bhāva*, but to mean what suggests or indicates a *Bhāva*. It is a matter of our ordinary experience that, when such feelings as love, hatred or anger appear in the mind they manifest themselves through certain bodily or organic changes or actions. The *Ālaṃkārikas* maintain that, these actions or changes, which are nothing but ensuents of these moods and are consequently regarded as ordinary effects in commonplace world, when presented in Poetry or on stage are regarded as extra-normal *Anubhāvas*, and hence the parti-

cular term is used to signify them to the exception of others : a *Kārya*, they continue, is ordinary, while an *Anubhāva* is extraordinary and the secret of this transformation of a commonplace effect into an extra-normal ensuent is a touch of the poet's imaginative faculty or the actor's art of imitation.¹⁰ Thus in the drama *Śakuntalā* such factors as Duśyanta's aversion to hunting or sleeplessness or paleness etc. represent *Anubhāvas* and in a similar manner, in the *Meghadūta* such factors as attempt to draw a portrait of his lady-love on the part of Yakṣa or his emaciation stand for these. Devoid of technicalities a *Vibhāva* may be described as one which makes a permanent mood capable of being sensed and an *Anubhāva* as one which makes it sensed. Though external manifestations of an emotion are innumerable, yet the writers on poetics make an honest attempt to fix their number and to name at least some of them. Thus Dhanañjaya speaks of twenty *Sāttvika Alamkāras* or the natural graces of a Heroine, who is an *Ālambanavibhāva* of the erotic emotion : he names these as *Bhāva*, *Hāva*, *Helā*, *Śobhā*, *Kānti*, *Dīpti*, *Mādhurya*, *Pragalbhāta*, *Āudārya*, *Dhairya*, *Līlā*, *Vilāsa*, *Vicchitti*, *Vibhrama*, *Kilakiñcita* (Hysterical mood), *Mottāyita* (manifestation of affection), *Kuṭṭamita* (Pretended anger), *Vivroka* (affected indifference), *Lalita* and *Vikṛta*. He says that, of these twenty graces, the first three are physical, the next seven come of their own accord and the rest arise from one's disposition. To this last category of graces, which arise from one's own disposition, or in other words, are *Svabhāvaja Alamkāras*, Viśvanātha adds eight more, naming them as *Mada*, *Tapana*, *Mauḍhya*, *Vikṣepa*, *Kuṭūhala*, *Hasita*, *Cakita*, *Keli*, and thus bringing the total number of graces of a Heroine to twenty-eight. These speculations reveal the excessive fondness of the *Ālamkārikas* for types,—a liking, which prompts them to lay down fixed laws and means as applicable to all types of individual and consequently, which, as Dr. S. K. Dey puts it, is like prescribing one measurement for all feet,—one garment for all bodies.'

II

Theories on Aesthetic Experience :

Bharata's cryptic dictum taxes greatly the ingenuity of commentators, who offer different explanations of the central terms : *Samyoga* and *Niṣpatti* appearing therein ; while some say that *Samyoga* conveys the idea of mere combination and *Niṣpatti* that of production, others maintain that the two terms signify respectively the concept of the relation existing between the Probans and the Probandum and that of inference and so on, and upon the explanation of these two much-discussed terms depends the solution of the important problem as to what actually the process of aesthetic realisation consists in and what relation do *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva* bear to *Rasa* in this process.

Bhaṭṭalollaṭa is the earliest commentator to offer a solution to this puzzling problem. He is of opinion that, *Rasa* is a developed form of a permanent mood, which attains maturity as it comes in contact with the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva* ; the *Vibhāvā*, he says, generates this mood, while *Anubhāva* manifests it and *Vyabhicāribhāva* offers nourishment and thereby helps it to develop into *Rasa*. Thus according to Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, the relation of producer and the produced exists between the *Vibhāva* and the *Rasa* and that of indicator and indicated between the *Anubhāva* and the *Rasa*, which is related to the *Vyabhicāribhāva* in the same way as is a nourished to its nourishment. Though an *Uddīpanavibhāva* is related to the *Rasa* in the same way as an excitor is to the excited, inasmuch as, it stimulates the produced mood, and as such the relation of producer and produced is incapable of being asserted of *Uddīpanavibhāva* on the one hand and *Rasa* on the other, yet as an unstimulated feeling is not experienced at all, so a stimulant is as much regarded as a producing agent as is the actual producer cause, which is only the *Ālambanavibhāva*, and consequently, Bhaṭṭalollaṭa makes the general statement that, the *Vibhāva* generates the mood. The doctrine that *Rasa* is a mature mood seems to receive the approval of Daṇḍin, inasmuch as, in his dissertation

on the poetic figure *Rasavat*, he makes it clear that, the feeling of love is developed into *Sṛṅgāra-Rasa* as it comes in contact with its excitants and accessories.¹¹ Bhaṭṭalollaṭa maintains that, *Rasa*, which is nothing but a mature feeling belongs actually to the original personage, whose character is imitated by the actor on the stage. This *Rasa*, he continues, is then superimposed on the actor by the absorbed spectator, who is deluded into the belief that the skilful actor himself is the original personage and as such possesses the emotion possessed by him. Subsequently the spectator perceives this emotion, belonging actually to the original personage but not now superimposed on the actor and the consequence is that, he enjoys pleasure. Thus, according to Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, at the time of appreciation of the drama *Śakuntalā*, the absorbed spectator gathers such perceptive knowledge as this *Duṣyanta* is possessed of love with reference to *Śakuntalā* and through this cognition he realises pleasure. Jagannātha raises an interesting point here. At the time of appreciation of *Śakuntalā*, he points out, the actor, who is taken as identical with the original personage remains present before the spectator and as such it is quite possible to have visual perception of the said actor, now mistaken for the original character : but how can the feeling of love be perceived through visual organ, which is competent to cognise only a tangible thing, with which it establishes direct contact ? In reply to this, Jagannātha states, the emotion of love, which is an adjunct to *Duṣyanta* in the present case is comprehended not through ordinary perception, but through an extraordinary one in the same way as the fragrance of a piece of sandal-wood is cognised by the visual organ. The Naiyāyika holds that, in an ordinary perception the sense-organ perceives that object only which is fit to be cognised by it and which is present before it at that particular time ; in case of an extra-ordinary perception, however, the sense-organ perceives even such an object which is not competent to be cognised by it and which is not even present before it and that is why the form of perception is called an extra-normal one. When one sees a piece of fragrant sandal-wood exhibited in the show-case of a selling centre and remarks,

'I see a piece of fragrant sandal-wood', direct contact of the piece of wood is certainly established with his visual organ, which comprehends the wood through the process of ordinary perception, but fragrance not being a proper object of cognition of the said organ is cognised through a process of extraordinary perception, as is effected by *Jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*.¹² In *Jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa* memory itself serves to effect the relation between the organ and the thing perceived, and consequently, as the Naiyāyika says, a man who has perceived the fragrance of a piece of sandal-wood in past occasions, alone, is able to cognise the sweet scent of the wood, even though its contact is not established with his organ of smell : in such a case, a remote connection of the visual organ is established with fragrance, the form of connection being this : the organ is conjoined with mental apparatus, which in its turn has conjunction with soul, in which inheres the knowledge concerning fragrance : it is this remote relation of the object with the organ which effects perception in this case. In a similar manner, Jagannātha points out, in the doctrine propounded by Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, the realisation of feeling, which appears as an attribute of the actor now taken as the original personage occurs through a process of extra-ordinary perception, the means of this process being *Jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa* and that of the actor, whose identity is established with the hero through a process of ordinary perception.¹³ This exposition of the doctrine adumbrated by Bhaṭṭalollaṭa makes it clear that, he takes the term *Samyoga*, occurring in the dictum of Bharata to convey the idea of connection and the term *Niṣpatti* to signify the sense of superimposition, the meaning of the whole dictum being this that, *Rasa*, which is nothing but a mood attaining maturity as it comes in close contact with the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva* is perceived after it is superimposed on the actor, taken as the hero himself.¹⁴

The doctrine of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa does not find favour with the *Alaṃkārikas*, because there are a number of weak points in it. It states that, *Rasa* is a developed mood, but this statement is open to serious objection. Bharata scrupulously maintains a

distinction between *Sthāyibhāva* and *Rasa*, showing thereby that the one is incapable of being equated with the other : had *Sthāyibhāva* and *Rasa* been identical, then the great exponent of dramaturgy would have formulated definition and classification of *Sthāyibhāvas* and not of *Rasas*. Moreover the assumption that, *Rasa* is a developed form of an emotion renders it necessary to postulate gradation in *Rasa*, since an emotion becomes intense gradually and reaching a certain point starts to wane. The assumption that, there are different degrees of *Rasa* in rank, however, seems absurd, since, as the authorities on the subject assert, *Rasa* is a blissful state of ego, which consists in relish only and in which knowledge of other knowables is completely obliterated. In reply to the question as to why does an invalid cognition of an emotion generate subjective pleasure in the spectator, Bhaṭṭalollaṭa simply cites the instance of an invalid cognition, which one has of a snake in respect of a rope and points out that invalid cognition often gives birth to real actions in men, inasmuch as, a man who mistakes a rope for a snake experiences fear and an impulse to run away : in a similar manner, he continues, the wrong notion that, the actor is possessed of an emotion, which belongs actually to the original character gives the spectator subjective pleasure. Unfortunately the parallelism introduced by Lollaṭa fails to serve the purpose for which it is drawn. An invalid cognition does not necessarily give rise to pleasure : it, on the other hand, generates such feeling as are experienced from valid cognition of the things concerned. The perception of a snake produces fear, trembling and an impulse to run away and consequently the false cognition of a snake in a rope also produces the same effects. Hence it is only natural for a spectator to experience such feeling, as is realised by him, in case the original personage with his original feelings appear before him—and this feeling is not necessarily pleasure. The assumption that invalid cognition produces pleasure without fail, even though its corresponding valid cognition produces pain or hatred is equally untenable, since it attributes greater power to false cognition. Moreover, it is not clear as to why perceptive knowledge of an emotion

belonging to one generates pleasure in the mind of another, particularly when it is experienced that, the tasting of delicious food by one does not bring satiety to another.

The next critic to formulate a theory on aesthetic experience is Śaṅkuka. While Bhaṭṭalollaṭa describes *Rasa* as a developed permanent feeling, Śaṅkuka regards it as an imitation or copy thereof and says, when an actor personates Rāma, the spectator has with regard to him the idea that 'this is Rāma himself'; but this idea is of a peculiar kind being of the same nature as the idea of a horse which one has in respect to the picture of a horse ; this idea, which he calls *Citraturaganyūyānusārīnī-Pratīti* is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions : (a) it is not of the nature of ordinary right notion that 'Rāma is the person', which is confirmed by a subsequent cognition that 'this is Rāma himself'; (b) nor it is of the nature of ordinary wrong notion such as 'this is Rāma', which appears in regard to one who is not really Rāma, and which is removed by subsequent cognition that, 'this is not Rāma'; (c) nor it is of the nature of ordinary doubtful cognition such as 'this person may or may not be Rāma'; (d) nor it is of the nature of commonplace cognition of similarity such as 'this person resembles Rāma'. The actor on the stage on account of his extraordinary simulating faculty, peculiar costume and other devices of stage-make-up is recognised by the spectator on the *Citraturaga* analogy as the original character. The actor by reason of his superior imitative faculty cleverly exhibits on the stage the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, which though artificial and unreal are not known to be so to the spectator, who by means of these experiences through the process of a peculiar inference the permanent feelings, such as love and the like as existing in the actor, now known as the original personage. The feeling, thus inferred to exist in the actor is not real, but only a semblance of that which existed in the original character and because it happens to be an imitation of the real mental condition, Śaṅkuka asserts, it is referred to by the term *Rasa*. Thus, at the time of appreciating the drama *Sākuntalā* in which love-in-union is predominantly depicted, the

spectator derives such an inferential knowledge as, 'This Duṣyanta is possessed of love with reference to Sākuntalā', and in a similar manner at the time of witnessing to the theatrical performance of the dramatised version of the Meghadūta his inference takes such a form as 'This Yakṣa is possessed of anguish, separated as he is from his consort'. This inference, Śaṅkuka maintains, is different from ordinary logical process of inference, because in it the thing inferred is of a peculiar type and consequently, it invariably causes delight. The above exposition of Śaṅkuka's doctrine makes it clear that, according to him the term *Samyoga* occurring in the dictum of Bharata signifies the sense of existence of the relation of universal concomitance (*Vyāpti*) and the term *Niṣpatti* present there conveys the idea of inference (*Anumiti*), and consequently, the complete dictum of Bharata means this: *Rasa* is inferred from the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva*, with which it bears the relation of universal co-existence.¹⁵

Though Śaṅkuka agrees with Bhaṭṭalollaṭa in declaring *Rasa* as belonging actually to the original personage, he differs from the latter on many vital points. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa thinks that, a permanent mood develops into *Rasa* as it comes in conjunction with the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva*, but Śaṅkuka asserts that, an imitation or a copy of such a mood attains the status of *Rasa*. Secondly, according to the former, the knowledge of the spectator that the actor is the original personage is an erroneous idea, while according to the latter, this notion is different from all the four kinds of ordinary notions and is of the nature of an idea, which one has of a horse in respect of a picture of a horse. Thirdly, while Bhaṭṭalollaṭa states that, the knowledge derived by the spectator that 'this Duṣyanta is possessed of love for Sākuntalā' is perceptual cognition, Śaṅkuka asserts that, this is inferential one. Jagannātha furnishes a clue to this difference of opinion between the two great commentators on this important issue. He refers to a principle which determines the respective strength of perception and inference in those cases where totality of conditions of these two valid instruments of cognition is equally present. The principle is

this that, in those cases where the content of these two instruments of knowledge is one and the same, perception prevails over inference and in those cases where the contents are different, inference prevails over perception. Thus when one sees a lion before him and hears its roar, he does not infer the presence of a lion from its loud deep sound, even though the conditions of inference are equally present: in such a case he perceives the lion by his visual organ, i.e. to say, the knowledge derived by him is perceptual in nature, and this is so, because the same lion constitutes the content of both these instruments of cognition. The assumption that when the same thing constitutes the content of both perception and inference, the former prevails over the latter is necessary in order to account for the perceptual nature of a right notion which occurs after a doubtful cognition. This cognition is exemplified by such knowledge as 'this may be a tree-trunk or a man',—a knowledge, which arises through comprehension of attributes, common to both tree and man and non-comprehension of features, special to either of them. As soon as the characteristic feature of man, namely possession of hands and feet is grasped, the dubious notion yields place to the certain knowledge, such as 'this is undoubtedly a man'. Relying on the experience of ordinary man, the Naiyāyika describes this certain knowledge as perceptual in nature, even though it is capable of being inferential in character, inasmuch as, the condition of inference, which is such a notion as 'this is possessed of hands and feet, which necessarily co-exist with manhood' is equally present in this case. The Naiyāyika contends that, here the same man constitutes the content of both perception and inference and consequently the condition of perception being more strong than that of inference, the certain knowledge, following the doubtful cognition is perceptual in nature. In a similar manner, the assumption that, when the contents of perception and inference are different, the latter prevails over the former is necessary in order to justify the very existence of inference as a separate instrument of valid cognition. The stock-illustration of inference, as furnished by the Naiyāyika is the cognition that, the hill is fiery,

because there is smoke on it : the condition of inference, which is technically known as *Parāmarśa* and which consists in the knowledge concerning the presence of the probans, which co-exists invariably with the probandum on the subject is in the stock illustration, the knowledge that the mountain possesses smoke which necessarily co-exists with fire. This knowledge, serving as the condition of *Anumāna*, the Naiyāyika argues, inheres in soul and consequently is capable of being perceived mentally, inasmuch as, the condition of such mental perception, which consists in contact of soul with mind is also present. The application of the principle under consideration, however, rules out the possibility of such mental perception of *Parāmarśa*, as a result of which such inferential knowledge as, 'the hill is fiery' occurs, instead of such perceptive notion as, 'the hill as possessed of smoke, which invariably co-exists with fire is cognised by me'. Here inference gains mastery over perception, because the contents of these two are different : while *Parāmarśa*, consisting in a form of knowledge, residing in soul through the relation of inherence constitutes the content of *Pratyakṣa*, an external object in the form of the hill as possessed of fire constitutes the content of *Anumāna*. Śaṅkuka is perfectly right, Jagannātha points out, in describing the knowledge derived by the spectator at the time of witnessing to a theatrical performance as inferential in nature, because while the actor, now known as the original personage is the content of *Pratyakṣa*, semblance of mental condition belonging to him is the content of *Anumāna*.¹⁶ It is interesting to note that, though Jagannātha speaks of two different contents of *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* in course of analysing the knowledge derived by a spectator at the time of witnessing to a theatrical performance, a proper examination of this cognition reveals that the same object constitutes the content of both these valid sources of knowledge. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa who describes the knowledge of the spectator as preceptive in character maintains that, cognition of the actor, now taken as identical with the original personage is effected through ordinary process of perception and that of his adjunct feeling through an extraordinary process, based on *Jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, showing,

thereby, that the actor, now identified with the original character and possessed of permanent moods such as love and the like forms the content of *Pratyakṣa* : this original personage as possessed of permanent feelings constitutes the content of *Anumāna*, as well. Thus the content of both *Pratyakṣa* and *Anumāna* is one and the same thing and consequently, the principle referred to by Jagannātha to justify the inferential nature of the knowledge derived by the spectator fails to serve the purpose for which it is introduced : instead of substantiating its inferential character it goes to establish its perceptive nature. This difficulty can somehow be avoided by assuming that the condition of inference gains mastery over that of extraordinary perception even in those cases where the same thing makes up the content of these two instruments of cognition. It is for this reason that the clever logicians declare that the conditions of *Anumāna* prevail over those of *Pratyakṣa* under all circumstances. The acceptance of this view renders a certain notion appearing in the wake of a dubious one a specimen of inferential knowledge and thus goes against our ordinary experience, but, nevertheless, as this principle is in conformity to the law of simplicity, it seems more sound and acceptable.

Abhinavagupta cites a lengthy criticism against the theory of Śaṅkuka, which, as he says, is offered by Bhaṭṭatauta. Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭatauta argues, is wrong in describing *Rasa* as an imitation or copy of a permanent mood, in as much as, it does not appear as such either from the stand-point of the spectator or from that of the actor or from that of the critic and even the great exponent of dramaturgy Bharata does not refer to *Rasa* as a semblance of a mental condition. The description that *Rasa* is a copy of a mood presupposes the existence of a thing other than the mood present before the spectator. When someone tastes a delicious drink before us, then and then alone we say that, in this manner another person drinks wine : this makes it clear that a notion relating to similarity develops only when a thing other than the thing imitated remains present before us. This thing, however, is conspicuous by its absence in the case of *Rasāsvāda* : the object which appears as a copy of a permanent

mood is unfortunately, not traced here. Such psychic changes as horripilation or perspiration and such effects as tossing of arms or sleeplessness are incapable of being regarded as this object, because while these changes and effects are perceptible entities, the feelings of others lie beyond the scope of perception and the difference between these two categories of objects being so wide, the one cannot be regarded as an imitation of the other. Secondly only one who knows the original is in a position to observe that a particular object is a mere imitation of the said original. As the spectator does not know the mental conditions of the original character, it is not possible for him to cognise the inferred mental conditions as semblance of those, existing in the original character. The argument that as the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, exhibited by the actor are unreal, being copies of those belonging to the original personage, the *Sihāyibhāva* inferred from them also is artificial and a mere copy of the actual *Bhāva* belonging to the Hero,—introduced in order to save the situation does not improve the position much. If the spectator realises the *Vibhāvas* and the like as unreal entities he cannot infer mental conditions at all from them and if he accepts these as real ones, which, according to Śaṅkuka himself he does, he cannot cognise the inferred mental conditions as semblance of those, belonging to the original character. Fog, cognised as smoke leads to inferential knowledge of real fire and not to that of such objects, which resemble fire, as glow of light and so on : in a similar manner, it is natural for the *Vibhāvas* and the like, comprehended as real entities by the spectator to generate in his mind an inferential knowledge of real mental conditions and not of copies thereto. Then again, according to Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭatauta points out, the knowledge of the spectator that, the actor is the original character is a peculiar cognition, being different from all the four recognised categories of cognition : this assertion, Bhaṭṭatauta continues, is unsound, inasmuch as, this notion is capable of being comprehended under either right or false cognition,—right when it is not replaced by a subsequent cognition and false when it is removed by a right notion coming in its wake. The

conception of the *Citraturaga* cognition, he proceeds, is not different from that of the cognition of similitude and as such is not something peculiar. Each time a spectator witnesses a theatrical performance of the same play, he regards every actor, who imitates the character of the original personage as the Hero himself, and this he does, because he notices the presence of the common characteristic Rāmahood in all of them. This analysis shows that, at times the spectator recognises the actor as bearing similitude to the original character,—at times, he regards him as identical with the Hero himself,—and at other times he becomes aware of the difference of the actor with the original character, and consequently, his idea is not distinct from four recognised notions. Just as the spectator does not regard *Rasa* as a copy of a mood, similarly the actor also does not recognise it as a semblance of a mental condition. Through his learning and practice he presents on the stage merely external manifestations of the mental conditions, pertaining to the Hero, who remains unseen and thus as he does not see the original, it is not possible for him to imitate it : rather he remains fully conscious of the fact that he is not imitating anybody. Nor is *Rasa* a semblance of a mental condition from the stand-point of the connoisseur of Poetic Art ; the concept of a copy presupposes the existence of an original, which unfortunately remains unnoticed by the connoisseur and consequently he is unable to recognise *Rasa* as a copy or imitation of a mood. Then again, Bhaṭṭatauta continues, nowhere in his work does Bharata describe *Rasa* as a semblance of a mental condition and this silence of the great exponent of dramaturgy on this issue is sufficient enough to refute the contention of Śaṅkuka that *Rasa* is an imitation of a mood, belonging actually to the original personage.

In his eagerness to escape the blame of momentariness of the *Rasa*-realisation, Śaṅkuka assumes that, a series of inference, prompted by a desire for further inference takes place in the mind of the spectator, as a result of which he derives uninterrupted pleasure for a number of hours. This presumption is unsound, because, firstly, the desire for further

and further inferences, generated in the mind of the spectator is very likely to distract it and thereby obstruct the realisation of *Rasa*, and secondly, eagerness to know the probandum ceasing after its comprehension, the desire for further and further inferences is not likely to continue for a considerable period of time. A critical analysis of the theory, propounded by Śaṅkuka thus, reveals that, it has very slender legs to stand upon.

Bhaṭṭanāyaka shifts the emphasis from the objective to the subjective side and attempts, for the first time, to explain *Rasa* by analysing the inward experience of refined appreciators: he refutes the view-points of the earlier theorists and sets up a theory of aesthetic enjoyment (*Bhoga*). *Rasa*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka argues, is neither known nor produced nor is it revealed. The doctrines of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, which assume that knowledge concerning *Rasa*, which belongs actually to the original character develops in the mind of the spectator as a result of which he derives supreme bliss—fails to explain properly the enjoyment of disinterested pleasure by him. It is not clear, he continues, as to how and why cognition of feeling, pertaining to one produces pleasure in the mind of another. The realisation of *Rasa* is competent to generate supreme bliss in the mind of the spectator, if cognised as belonging to his own self only: unfortunately, however, the absence of *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, related to the spectator does not allow us to describe *Rasa* as capable of being perceived mentally by him, as belonging to his own self. Śakuntalā, with reference to whom love is generated in the mind of Duṣyanta is an *Ālambanavibhāva* of the Hero only and it is not possible for the spectator to accept her as his own *Vibhāva*. The argument that, as it is natural for the spectator to feel attracted towards a lady, the universal attribute determining whom is present in Śakuntalā even, so it is possible for him to consider her as his *Vibhāva* does not lead us anywhere, because the spectator remains fully conscious of his difference with the Hero to whom Śakuntalā is related as a *Vibhāva*. Moreover a thing is regarded as a true *Vibhāva* only when it forms the content of certain spontaneous negative knowledge, or in other words only when such knowledge im-

plying denial of positive attribute or attributes develops concerning the object,—knowledge as is spontaneous, and not a make-believe one. Thus the spectator is in a position to recognise, at the time of witnessing presentation of a drama, depicting the erotic emotion only that character as his *Vibhāva* with reference to whom he possesses such negative knowledge as she is not unfit to be enjoyed by him: in a similar manner only that character concerning whom there is such definite knowledge as he or she is not unfit to be wept for is competent to constitute a *Vibhāva* in a drama, delineating the tragic emotion, and so on. The enunciation of this principle becomes an imperative necessity in order to preclude extension of recognition as a *Vibhāva* to a sister of the spectator, as he sees dramatic representation of a play, depicting love-plays of his own sister: though this sister is endowed with the universal attributes of a lady, yet the spectator is not able to consider her as his own *Vibhāva*, because with reference to her he has this positive knowledge that, she is unfit to be enjoyed by him.¹⁷ What happens in the case of a sister occurs in the case of Śakuntalā or Sītā also: as with reference to her as well, such a knowledge as, she is unfit to be enjoyed by him grows in the mind of the spectator, he finds it impossible to reckon Śakuntalā or Sītā as his *Vibhāva*. The argument that, the spectator thinks himself identical with the hero for the time being and this idea of identity impedes dawning of such knowledge in his mind, as a result of which he recognises Śakuntalā or Sītā as his own *Vibhāva* is without any force, because generation of this sense of identity itself is open to serious objection, inasmuch as, it is very difficult for a small spectator of modern age to think himself identical with such great emperors of ancient times as Duṣyanta or Rāma, whose difference with his own self is so marked. Thus due to lack of proper *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, *Rasa* does not develop in the mind of the spectator and consequently, the question of its realisation through a process of mental perception does not arise. Nor is *Rasa* capable of being explained away as a product of verbal testimony, because such an explanation is likely to render its realisation

an unattractive one, in the same way as conceptual cognition of ordinary expressions, describing love-plays leads more to hatred or bashfulness than to supreme bliss. Nor realisation of *Rasa*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka continues, is a case of recollection, because recollection occurs of those things alone, which are cognised before and *Rasa*, not being a comprehended entity, the question of its remembrance does not arise. Nor is *Rasa* manifested because manifestation or revelation occurs of an existent entity alone and *Rasa* being a non-existent entity, revelation is incapable of being asserted of it. The argument that, as the permanent feelings, such as love and the like lie in the form of latent disposition, their manifestation or revelation is not impossible, introduced in order to justify revelation of *Rasa* is dangerous, because it puts into prominence the inclination of the spectator to acquire more and more *Vibhāvas* and the like, which are helpful to clear and clearer revelation of these impressions, and so long as this eagerness is there in the mind of the spectator, it is not possible for him to derive distinterested pleasure and relish *Rasa*, in which knowledge of all other knowables is completely lost. Thus, Bhaṭṭanāyaka concludes, neither perception nor production nor revelation is capable of being asserted of *Rasa*, which is enjoyed in connection with the *Vibhāvas* through the relation of the enjoyer and the enjoyed (*Bhojya-Bhojaka*).

The words incorporated in a Poetic expression, Bhaṭṭanāyaka asserts, are different from those used in an ordinary linguistic expression: such words, as are polished by use of literary excellences and poetic figures in *Kāvya* and by the four types of acting in *Nāṭya*, he continues, are possessed of three functions—*Abhidhā*, *Bhāvakatva* and *Bhojakatva* or *Bhogikṛti*. This *Abhidhā*, however, is not merely denotation: an extended meaning is given to it, so that it may include *Lakṣaṇā* or Indication in its scope and thus embrace the two functions already admitted by previous speculation. The primary denotative power of terms and propositions, first of all, Bhaṭṭanāyaka says, explains to us their respective meanings and thereby makes us acquainted with the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*.

After this *Bhāvakatva* comes to operate: with reference to *Sītā* or *Śakuntalā* it obstructs generation in the mind of the appreciator of such knowledge as is detrimental to aesthetic realisation and presents those characters in their generalised forms. To state more clearly, it produces the desired negative knowledge, which is so essential for the recognition of a particular character as his *Vibhāva* in the mind of the appreciator and thereafter causes that particular character to appear in its universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and individual. Thus *Śakuntalā* does not appear as a particular lady, belonging to a particular place and particular era and standing in a particular relationship with a particular person and having a particular social status; she appears as a woman in general,—as a lovely maiden at the threshold of youth, and the love of Duṣyanta for her also assumes a detached nature, i.e. it appears without any reference to the person who loves or the object loved. The power of *Bhāvakatva*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka continues, serves to purge the mind of the perceiver of his mundane prepossessions, so that during the perception of the literary phenomenon he does not think of anything else. Hence *Bhāvakatva* is capable of being described as the power of generalisation, which makes the *Vibhāvas* as well as the *Sthāyibhāvas* sensed in their general characters, without any reference to their specific properties, and at the same time clears the mind of the perceiver of his earthly prejudices. Then by a third function called *Bhojakatva* or *Bhogakṛti* the attribute of *Sattvaguna*, residing in the mind of the spectator is brought into prominence by subordinating the elements of *Rajas*, that goes to distract the mind and *Tamas*, that makes it hard and devoid of responsiveness, as a result of which the mind of the perceiver becomes steady and his own self, consisting in the nature of bliss shines in its undimmed glory. Enjoyment of pleasure after this is inevitable to the perceiver as the eternal bliss of his consciousness, latent in him is relished in natural course: for this reason, he realises nothing but pleasure, whatever be the emotional quality of his object of perception. According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, *Rasa* consists in the permanent mood, experienced

in its generalised form, and enjoyed subsequently by one's own consciousness, partaking of the nature of bliss, as also in this process of enjoyment itself.¹⁸ This enjoyment, Bhaṭṭanāyaka asserts, differs from enjoyment of pleasure in the ordinary world in that it is impersonal, while pleasure in the ordinary world is the result of personal possessions and advantages. It is different also from Yogin's supreme bliss, in that the Yogin sees only the Brahman, i.e. bliss itself, while the spectator at the theatre or the absorbed reader at the closest sees and derives enjoyment from objects like the parties to love and other emotions on the stage. In supreme bliss (*Brahmānanda*), there is complete detachment from the world: in the enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure (*Rasānanda*), on the other hand, there is dissociation, no doubt, but attention on plurality of objects, like the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* makes for the incompleteness of concentration. So the spectator's pleasure, Bhaṭṭanāyaka maintains, is not *Brahmānanda* itself: it makes only a nearest approach to this. Thus, it is clear that, this critic takes the terms '*Samyoga*' and '*Niṣpatti*', occurring in the dictum of Bharata to convey respectively the ideas of presentation in generalised forms and enjoyment, the whole dictum meaning this: Enjoyment occurs of *Rasa*, which is nothing other than the bliss-portion of self, having for its adjunct a permanent latent disposition, as is experienced due to the prominence of *Sattvaguna* in the mind of the perceiver after the generalisation of the *Vibhāvas* and others through the function known as *Bhāvakatva*. In the view of this critic, the different stages in the appreciation of Poetry are acquaintance with the *Vibhāvas* and others,—their realisation in universal character and freedom from mundane prepossessions of the appreciator, consequential upon it,—and gaining of prominence by *Sattvaguna* in his mind,—effected respectively by the functions of *Abhidhā*, *Bhāvakatva* and *Bhōjakatva*, of which the first operates in the outside world, the second in the external world as also in the realm of the appreciator's mind and the third only in the mind of the perceiver.¹⁹

The answer of Abhinavagupta, an ardent advocate of the doctrine of Dhvani to the problem of aesthetic experience is a

bit different from the solution, offered by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. The observation of Bhaṭṭanāyaka that *Rasa* is not realised, he points out, is perfectly right, if it is meant for refuting the contention of Bhaṭṭalollaṭa or Śaṅkuka that, the spectator derives perceptive or inferential knowledge of *Rasa*, which belongs actually to the original personage: if, however, it is intended to preclude completely the realisation of *Rasa*, then it sounds absolutely absurd, in as much as, the existence of a thing, not realised or known is incapable of being predicated. Beyond *Pratīti* or perception of *Rasa*, he asserts, there is no such process as *Bhoga* or enjoyment, and nothing is gained by giving it a new name: just as perception, inference, conceptual cognition, analogy,—all these are but different forms of knowledge, similarly experience of *Rasa*, also, is a different type of cognition, the causes leading to it being extra-ordinary ones, but that does not mean that this is not realised at all. In a drama, the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* lead initially to inference of mental conditions, belonging to the original personage, which are comprehended through the process of conceptual cognition in a poem and thus the experience of *Rasa* takes at the outset the help of two well-known instruments of cognition, but nevertheless, the experience itself is completely different from the recognised forms of knowledge, effected as it is by the function of suggestion. *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta observes, is suggested by the union of the permanent mood with the *Vibhāvas* etc. through the relation of the suggested and the suggestor (*vyāñgya-vyāñjaka-bhāva*), or in other words, the *Pratīti* of *Rasa* is nothing other than *Abhivyakti* or manifestation through the power of suggestion, resulting in an extra-ordinary state of relish, known as *Rasanā*, *Āsvāda* or *Carvaṇā*. The objection of Bhaṭṭanāyaka that, revelation or suggestion, which is capable of being predicated of an established existent entity only is incapable of being asserted of *Rasa*, which is brought into being at the time of its comprehension—is untenable, because what is revealed is the bliss-portion of our own consciousness, which is an eternal entity. This bliss-portion of our soul, Abhinavagupta points out, manifests itself in its undimmed glory as the

curtain of ignorance, which shrouds it usually in ordinary life is removed by the extra-ordinary power of the function of suggestion. The argument that, *Vyāñjanā* is competent to bring a sense alone into light proves of no avail, because, the champions of this function ascribe to it an extra-normal and unlimited power, which, they say, is capable of creating wonders like the magician's wand. Hence *Bhoga*, proposed by Bhaṭṭanāyaka is nothing other than *Abhivyakti*. The function of *Bhojakatva*, postulated by Bhaṭṭanāyaka brings into prominence the quality of *Sattva* in the mind of the perceiver and thereby making it steady and free from all distractions allows the bliss-portion of his soul to flash forth automatically. What is accomplished by *Bhojakatva* in the doctrine of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta points out, is actually carried into effect by *Vyāñjanā*, in as much as, this function, also, leads to revelation of the same bliss-portion by removing for the time being the curtain of nescience: and the results produced by both the functions being the same, *Bhojakatva* is capable of being equated with *Vyāñjanā*.²⁰

Thus disposing of the power of *Bhojakatva*, Abhinavagupta turns to the other power assumed as *Bhāvakatva* by Bhaṭṭanāyaka. The function of *Bhāvakatva*, being stimulated by the use of literary excellences in a Poem and the four recognised types of acting in a Drama, Bhaṭṭanāyaka thinks, presents the *Vibhāvas* in their universal and impersonal aspect and at the same time sets the mind of the spectator free from mundane prepossessions. Commenting on this belief of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta remarks that, there is no necessity, as well as no authority for assuming this separate function, because the *Vibhāvas* and others appear automatically in their general character to a man of trained intellectual powers, for whom really a specimen of poetic art is intended. The observation of Bharata—'*Kāvyaṛthān bhāvayanti iti bhāvāḥ*' implies *Bhāvakatva* to be an inherent capacity of of all *Bhāvas*,²¹ a capacity to cause comprehension of the sense of Poetry, the sense indicating the principal sense consisting in *Rasa*: the *Bhāvas*, Abhinavagupta points out, are named so. because they lead to

aesthetic experience; as generalisation is the first step necessary for attainment of this experience, the power, inherent in them carries it into effect. The function of *Bhāvakatva*, Bhaṭṭanāyaka thinks, is assisted in Poetry by the absence of blemishes and introduction of figures and literary excellences and in drama by the four types of acting: this literary device of the artist or imitative faculty of the actor, however, Abhinavagupta observes, puts the appreciator in an appropriate frame of mind, so that it becomes possible for him to find out a general relation with the *Vibhāvas* and others, appearing in their universal and impersonal aspect or abstract form and thereby to realise the principal sense of Poetry, consisting in the relish of *Rasa*. Hence, the so-called *Bhāvakatva* of Bhaṭṭanāyaka, Abhinavagupta points out, consists in nothing more than a suitable use of *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra* in a poem and a proper employment of the four types of acting in a drama for the ultimate purpose of awakening *Rasa* through the function of suggestion, pertaining to both sound and sense. An analysis of the view-points of Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta reveal that both these scholars accept the principle of generalisation of characters and their mental conditions, but whereas according to the former, this generalisation is effected by a separate function known as *Bhāvakatva*, according to the latter, this is effected naturally in the mind of a man of trained intellectual powers, whose intellect is helped by the employment of *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras* in a Poem and the four types of acting in a Drama. Abhinavagupta is of opinion that, the much-talked of generalisation is produced incidentally in the process of effecting revelation of the bliss-portion of one's own consciousness, which happens as the curtain of nescience is removed by the supernormal function of suggestion. In our daily life, ignorance keeps our real nature shrouded, as a result of which the idea of difference haunts us: as soon as this nescience, causing the depressing sense of distinction goes, that idea also vanishes and the generalisation of the characters and mental conditions is accomplished automatically. Generalisation, as Govinda remarks, does not consist in understanding the characters and their mental conditions as related to all persons, but rather in

their realisation in universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and the individual : in fact to enjoy *Rasa* is to transcend all limitations.²² Thus, according to Abhinavagupta, generalisation is but a by-product of *Abhivyakti*. The argument that *Vyañjanā* being competent only to manifest an accomplished entity in the same way as light is competent to reveal only an existent jar, it is not possible for it to produce generalisation does not disprove the contention of Abhinavagupta, because all indicators incidentally produce effects, inasmuch as, light also goes to bring removal of darkness into effect. For this reason, while drawing the distinction between the theories, adumbrated by Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha rightly observes that, the former differs from the latter only at the postulation of a new function, which he calls *Bhāvakatva*.²³

Taking cue from Śaṅkuka's *Citraturaga-pratīti*, Abhinavagupta asserts that, the spectator experiences a peculiar sensation at the time of witnessing a theatrical performance : because of his uncommon costume, he does not regard an actor as an imitator, nor does he consider him to be the imitated hero himself, and thus the person appearing before him is neither taken as an ordinary man of present times nor as an extraordinary personality of ancient age. In a similar manner, the moods inferred from the *Vibhāvas* and the like are cognised by him in their idealised or abstract forms without existing in any concrete person and divested of all particularities : he regards them as being related strictly neither to the actor nor to the original character nor to his own self. This explains the interest taken by him in realisation of *Rasa*, which he would not have shown in case of its comprehension as a mood pertaining strictly to another person : this also accounts for the fact that ordinary feelings of pain and hatred, hope and disgust, horror and despair are not experienced by him at the time of appreciation of a Play.²⁴

Though Jagannātha observes that, Bhaṭṭanāyaka differs from Abhinavagupta simply at this presumption that, postulation of a separate function known as *Bhāvakatva* is necessary in order to explain generalisation of the *Vibhāvas* and others, there

is another important point of difference between the two. Abhinavagupta introduces a novelty by maintaining that, the *Sthāyin* or the permanent mood, inferred from its *laukika* causes and effects remains in the hearts of appreciative spectators and readers in the subtle form of latent impression, which is evoked at his perception of the generalised *Vibhāvas* etc., implying thereby that, aesthetic experience is absolutely dependent on existence of corresponding impression in the heart of the man who experiences *Rasa*. Expanding this dictum, Viśvanātha states, men who are not endowed with subtle impressions (of love and the like), acquired either in this or in previous birth are not competent to enjoy aesthetic delight : this explains, he continues, non-realisation of *Rasa* by dry and insipid Grammarians and Mimāṃsakas, who, according to Dharmadatta, are as good as seats in the auditorium.²⁵ On reading a poem or witnessing a drama, this permanent mood, remaining in the form of a latent impression in the mind of a perceiver, Abhinavagupta asserts, is awakened by the depicted *Vibhāvas*, which cease to be called *laukika* causes, but go by the name of *Vibhāvas* in poetry and drama, and which are taken in their general form without specific connections. The generalisation spoken of here is to be understood as excluding the individuality, not only of the characters in the piece, but of the *Sahṛdaya* himself,—of his friends and foes. Why this is so is quite clear. If it does not exclude his personality, his own interest in guarding himself from observation, say in love-making—is sure to interfere with his enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure : if his enemies are not excluded, his passion of hatred or anger or revenge is likely to interpose itself between his mind and enjoyment of pleasure : if his friends are not excluded, his passions like joy at their success and sorrow at their failure are likely to interpose themselves similarly ; if, on the other hand, the personality of friends or foes of the *Sahṛdaya* is totally excluded, then he is not likely to consider *Rasa* as a veridity and consequently, to feel attracted towards its realisation. To quote Abhinavagupta, aesthetic realisation is '*Vīṭaviḡmā Pratītiḡ*'.²⁶ The generalised *Vibhāvas* and the rest,

he maintains, call into play the latent *Sthāyibhāva* in the reader and the spectator, and this also is understood only in a general way, without any reference to himself as an individual. The latent impression which is aroused strictly belongs to the spectator, but by the process of generalisation it also appears in its abstract form. The process referred to above tends the spectator to loose the sense of his narrow individuality, and the common flow of thoughts, concerning his own joy and sorrow, gain and loss, hope and despair,—in short, multifarious problems of life stops, at least, for the time being : as his personality is rendered docile, the reader or the spectator loses his special form and is raised to a wider and higher plane of consciousness, being conducted to which he feels that, the mood is not relished by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. Abhinavagupta describes this celestial mental state as '*Sarvasāmājikānām Ekaghanatā*'.²⁷ In his doctrine, generalisation presents itself in two aspects : on the one hand, it presents the *Vibhāvas* and the rest in their universal and impersonal forms, and, on the other, raises the spectator or the closest reader to a wider and higher plane by lulling his sense of individuality into sleep. When the personality of the perceiver is sent to sleep, pleasure is derived by him in natural course, because the function of suggestion by removing the veil of nescience manifests to him the bliss-portion of his own being. Abhinavagupta interprets the dictum of Bharata to mean this that, revelation in its undimmed splendour occurs of *Rasa*, which is nothing but a permanent mood relished by the bliss-portion of one's own consciousness or this consciousness itself having a permanent mood for its adjunct through the function of suggestion, pertaining to the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, the meanings of the two much-discussed terms *Samyoga* and *Nispatti* being respectively the function of suggestion and revelation itself.²⁸ The greatness of this realisation, which consists in supreme bliss is not to be lowered, Abhinavagupta cautions, by attempting to equate it with inference or recollection. As a refined reader or spectator perceives poetry, he does not simply infer a mental condition belonging to another person, himself remaining neutral, nor does he re-

collect his past mental condition : what he actually does is that he experiences his own mood and being. For this reason, Abhinavagupta points out, Bharata leaves the term '*Sthāyī*' unmentioned in his dictum, inasmuch as, use of the term is likely to cause this wrong notion that, *Rasa* consists in inference of a mood, belonging to a person, other than the appreciator himself. With all emphasis at his command, he asserts that, *Rasa* is something different from permanent mood : it is not that, the mood itself is converted into *Rasa*. The statement that, the *Sthāyī* becomes transformed into *Rasa*, however, is made loosely through courtesy, because the causes and effects of *Sthāyī*, which is a *laukika* one are converted into *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas* of *Alaukika-Rasa*, which is brought by them alone to a relishable state. Hence, he observes, the remark is to be taken with a grain of salt and not too literally.²⁹

The realisation of *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta maintains, being dependent on comprehension of *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* lasts so long as cognition of these factors lasts and ceases to exist when the latter vanishes. And this happens, because the *Vibhāvas* evoke the latent impression in the appreciator and thereafter by removing the curtain of nescience causes the bliss-portion of his own being to manifest itself : consequently, when the *Vibhāvas* and the rest cease to be comprehended, the said curtain of nescience covers his own being again, as a result of which he fails to experience elevated pleasure. This realisation, he further asserts, takes the form of a *Samuhālabana* type of knowledge, inasmuch as, it embraces for its content multiple objects, as the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva*, *Vyabhicāribhāva* and *Sthāyibhāva* ; but it is different from the usual type of such cognition, in which the objects forming the content are realised as distinct from one another, since in it, the excitant, ensuent, accessory and the mood itself lose their individual traits and merge into one greater whole. For this reason, the Dhvani theorists explain the phenomenon of *Rasa* under the analogy of a beverage, in which the taste of the ingredients—sugar, camphor and others is not relished separately and thus, which gives, taste different from that of its constituents. This

indissoluble unity of taste, they observe, constitutes the essence of aesthetic experience.⁸⁰

In his eagerness to establish the *Alaukika* nature of *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta describes it as forming the content of cognitions, opposed to each other.⁸¹ The comprehension of *Vibhāvas* and the rest, he says, does not produce *Rasa*, which does not admit of production at all, since it ceases to exist as soon this comprehension, put forward as its efficient cause vanishes,—a feature, which is not noticed in the ordinary world, inasmuch as, the death of the potter, who is an efficient cause of the jar does not lead to destruction of the jar itself. The argument that, the principle involving the continuance of an effect in the event of destruction of its efficient cause is falsified by cessation of the feeling of pleasure, produced through a touch of sandal paste as soon as this touch ceases to exist—proves of no help, because in the instance cited above, destruction of touch does not lead to annihilation of the said pleasure, but rather, as Govinda points out, the cause being absent, the effect is not produced at all, and the pleasure already derived is obliterated by a quality opposed to it appearing next, in accordance to the principle that, of special perceptible attributes, pertaining to pervasive entities, one is effaced by the other, closely following it. Nor is *Rasa* capable of being described as an indicated entity, similar to a jar, which is revealed by a lamp, because the said parallelism is not applicable here: the jar forms the content of a cognition, produced by the lamp, which is absolutely distinct from it; the realisation of *Rasa*, on the other hand, is effected by comprehension of *Vibhāvas* and the rest, which are not distinct from *Rasa* itself, inasmuch as, experience of this phenomenon, characterised by indissoluble unity of taste is not separate from that of its constituents. Thus, the excitants, ensuents and accessories, Abhinavagupta asserts, neither produce *Rasa* nor do indicate it: but, nevertheless, this implicit idea of paramount importance is not a figment of imagination, since it is experienced by all persons of poetic sensibility; ascribing production of this experience to the thing experienced, *Rasa* is capable of being described as a produced entity and in a similar manner, revela-

tion, as well, is capable of being predicated of it, simply because it constitute the content of a cognition, embracing the *Vibhāvas* and the rest. This cognition, Abhinavagupta continues, is distinct from ordinary knowledge derived through common instruments of cognition, because whereas in an ordinary knowledge, the instrument of cognition itself is not known, in comprehension of *Rasa*, the process itself does not remain uncomprehended; this is distinct, also, from the knowledge relating to self derived by an immature *Yogin*,—knowledge, which is characterised by an idea of difference between the external world, on the one hand, and self, on the other, as also from that derived by a mature *Yogin*, in which concentration on the self is complete: and this is so, because the experience of *Rasa* is marked by effacement of knowledge relating to other knowables and concentration on plurality of objects like the excitants and the ensuents. Carrying this description further, Abhinavagupta maintains that, the cognition of *Rasa* does not take the form of an indeterminate knowledge, because the totality of the excitant, ensuent, accessory and the mood itself constitutes its content and supreme bliss its determinant: nor does it assume the form of a determinate cognition, because when *Rasa* is experienced, knowledge of other knowable vanishes completely, and consequently the idea of naming such realisation or giving a graphic description of it does not haunt the mind of the perceiver.

In course of epitomizing the theory on aesthetic experience, as adumbrated by Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha, gifted with a true Vedāntic insight points out the cases, where the tenets of the Vedānta system are applied in this doctrine. Just as on removal of its cover, the lamp reveals the objects present near it along with its own self, in a similar manner, he observes, on dismissal of nescience enveloping it, pure consciousness manifests the moods, attended with *Vibhāvas* and the rest, as also shines forth in its undimmed splendour. The simultaneous manifestation of pure consciousness, partaking of the nature of bliss and the moods occurs, because, love, grief and the like being attributes of mind are capable of being comprehended by soul itself without the help of instruments of cognition.⁸² This represents the

Vedāntic stand-point, which differs from the Naiyāyika doctrine, according to which, such attributes of soul as knowledge, desire, jealousy, bashfulness, fear and the like remain unknown at the first moment,—the moment they are produced and form at the subsequent moment the content of mental perception, effected through contact of the soul with the mind. The Vedāntic doctrine, however, does not recognise mental perception, because, as it says, such assumption entails a violation to the law of simplicity: the attributes of knowledge, love and the like, pertaining to the mind, it asserts, does not stand in need of any instrument of cognition for their comprehension, because they being associated with the soul are revealed by it as soon as they are brought into being. Hence, Jagannātha argues, simultaneous revelation of mood and own being of the appreciator occurs, as he experiences a piece of poetic creation. He raises a plausible objection that, though the mood being an attribute of the mind is capable of being cognised by pure consciousness, the excitants and ensuents being external objects are incapable of being so comprehended and to this objection he himself offers a solution relying on the principle enunciated by the learned Vivaraṇācārya,—the principle, which states that, all such thing with reference to which knowledge or ignorance springs is revealed by luminous and conscious self. The Naiyāyika, who extends recognition to the process of mental perception or *Anuvyavasāya* is of opinion that, the cognition concerning knowledge itself is effected through a process of ordinary perception and the content of this knowledge, without which knowledge becomes an unreality like the flower of a sky or the horn of a rabbit is comprehended through an extra-ordinary process, in which recollection connects the mind with the said content. The Vedāntin does not recognise the process of *Anuvyavasāya* and asserts that knowledge being an attribute of mind is cognised by luminous self independent of any instrument of cognition: in order to establish the reality of this knowledge it is indispensable for him to maintain that, necessarily it concerns something, because knowledge with reference to its content alone is comprehended: consequently, this

content concerning which knowledge develops and becomes comprehended, he points out, is also cognised by luminous and conscious self. What is true of knowledge is true of love, grief and such other moods, all of which are attributes pertaining to the soul, according to the Naiyāyika and belonging to the mind, according to the Vedāntin. Just as knowledge free from its content is not cognised, similarly abstract love free from the parties between which this is generated is not comprehended and such is the case of other moods, as well; and just as the content of knowledge is revealed by self-luminous self, though it is an external object, in a similar manner, Jagannātha asserts, the excitants and ensuents, though belonging to the external world are cognised along with the moods,—the attributes of the mind by soul without the help of any instrument of cognition. In support of his thesis that, external objects, as well, are comprehended by conscious and luminous self itself, Jagannātha cites the analogy of a piece of silver perceived erroneously and a horse, seen in a dream. The Vedāntin contends that, nescience or ignorance, being a material cause of mind is associated permanently with the self and the transformations of this nescience being so associated are cognised by pure consciousness independent of any instrument of cognition. A piece of silver produced on a mother-o'-pearl, as one derives an erroneous knowledge when awake or a horse experienced by him in dream when asleep is a transformation of nescience, and consequently, the Vedāntin holds, though these are objects of external world, conscious self cognises them. What happens in case of this piece of silver or horse, Jagannātha points out, occurs in case of the excitants and the ensuents: though they are external objects and thus do not constitute attributes of mind, yet conscious and luminous self manifests them independently. The parallelism introduced by Jagannātha is not to be drawn too far: by bringing forward this analogy he wants to establish his position that, it is possible for the conscious self to comprehend an external object, as well, without taking the help of a *Pramāṇa*, or in other words, a thing, other than an attribute pertaining

to the mind may, as well, be *Sākṣibhāṣya*. It is not his intention to show that, like a piece of silver, produced on nacre or a steed cognised in a dream, the *Vibhāvas* and the rest are conjured up by ignorance, and as such are unreal entities. He thinks that the *Vibhāvas* and the rest are as much real as the moods themselves, in as much as, the theory established by him on aesthetic experience following the lines of his great master Abhinavagupta is not in the least based on *Vijñānavāda* of the Buddhist. Thus explaining the doctrine of Abhinavagupta, Jagannātha points out that, though *Rasa* partakes of the nature of luminous and conscious self which is an eternal entity and thus does not admit of production and annihilation, yet these attributes, pertaining to its experience are ascribed to it, and accordingly production and annihilation are predicated of it: the use of the expression: '*Rasa* is generated' or '*Rasa* is destroyed', therefore, he holds, is a figurative one, capable of being justified with the help of *Lakṣaṇā*.³³

It is possible, Jagannātha continues, to dispense with the aid received from *Lakṣaṇā*, which is usually taken recourse to only in an emergency by furnishing another interpretation of Abhinavagupta's doctrine. According to this interpretation like a consciousness of bliss growing in the mind of a *Yogin* absorbed in deep meditation, a man of poetic sensibility also experiences a peculiar feeling at the time of perception of Poetry: this feeling is caused by the magical powers of comprehension of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest to which a helping hand is extended by the trained intellectual powers of the perceiver himself, and is of supreme bliss, which constitutes the very essence of his own being, as qualified by certain permanent moods; as he appreciates Poetry, his mind assumes, so to say, the form of bliss, which constitutes part and parcel of his own being. As this bliss is unqualified and complete, he derives refined and wholesome pleasure from perception of Poetry,—pleasure which is not, in any way, comparable to that, experienced in ordinary world. This explanation describes *Rasa* as a feeling of bliss or a state of mind assuming the form of bliss itself, and this feeling or state admitting of production and annihilation, literal use of

the expression: '*Rasa* is produced' or '*Rasa* is destroyed', Jagannātha points out, is capable of being justified. Thus in the doctrine of Abhinavagupta, he concludes, *Rasa* consists in a permanent mood revealed by bliss, which forms part and parcel of one's own being and as such shines forth in its undimmed splendour, as the curtain of nescience covering it is dismissed.

Abhinavagupta speaks of seven factors, which, according to him stand in the way of aesthetic experience. These are: (a) absence of plausibility in the events described, resulting in an idea that the incidents and characters painted are unreal, (b) the realisation of the excitants, ensuents and accessories, as belonging to a particular place and time and related strictly to the appreciator's own self, (c) the comprehension of the above-mentioned factors as belonging solely to other, (d) awareness of one's personal joy and sorrow, possession and dis-possession, which goes to distract his mind from the incidents depicted, (e) lack of clear cognition, springing from improper presentation of means, (f) relegation of *Rasa* to a subordinate position and (g) presence of doubt as to the exact nature of the mood delineated.³⁴ If the events described in a Poem or a Drama do not have a show, at least, of truth or reason, then the mind of a connoisseur of Poetic Art becomes overpowered by a feeling of their unreality and consequently does not remain concentrated on the incidents presented. For this reason, the Ālapkārikas utter a note of caution asking the writers of Epics and Dramas never to handle imaginary plot in their works, because, as they think, such a plot carries with it the risk of being an unreal one. At the time of relishing *Rasa*, the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, along with the *Sikhāyibhāvas* evoked by them present themselves in their universal and impersonal aspect, as transcending the limits imposed by time and space. The realisation of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest by the perceiver as being precisely related to his own self is likely to lead to wrangles of his personal feelings, and so long as these sensations are there, *Rasa* is not experienced, because, as Abhinavagupta says, it is a blissful state of ego in which knowledge of other knowables is completely obliterated. Like

comprehension of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest, as related precisely to the perceiver's own self, their realisation, as related strictly to another person, Abhinavagupta continues, stands in the way of aesthetic experience, because, as he says, the appreciator, who cognises these factors in this fashion does not feel attracted towards perception of Poetry, inasmuch as, he is not in a position to regard characters, confined strictly within the limits imposed by time and space as *Vibhāvas* of the mental condition produced in him. It is for this reason, he points out, as one enjoys aesthetic satisfaction, his mind does not search for the particular relation which a particular character bears to another nor does it probe into absence of this relation, inasmuch as, he understands the characters together with their mental conditions in their universal and impersonal aspect as opposed to the particular and individual. The stage and tiring-room equipment, including mask and dress, prescribed by Bharata conceal the identity of the actor and ascribe to him the personality of the hero and thereby, remove the limitations imposed upon him by time and space. Other devices, such as lighting arrangements, scenic effects and musical tones,—in short, the four types of acting render docile the sense of individuality of the appreciator and consequently, conduct him to a higher plane of consciousness. What four types of acting do in a drama is done by the use of literary excellences, poetic figures and chiselled expressions in a Poem : they also lull the sense of personality of the reader into sleep. A man, overwhelmed with thoughts of personal gain or loss, possession or dispossession finds it impossible for him to contemplate on the mood, presented in a poem or a drama : hence, the perceiver's personal feeling of pleasure and pain is regarded as a factor, that seriously interrupts enjoyment of *Rasa*. The equipments of the stage along with musical notes prove effective in diverting the mind of the spectator from his personal feelings and thus in allowing him to forget his narrow self for the time being. Abhinavagupta regards indistinct presentation of the excitants, ensuents and accessories as another obstacle in the way of aesthetic enjoyment. According to Bharata, he points out, *Rasa* is a process of enjoyment, of which

the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* constitute the means and as such, unless these factors are presented clearly, the comprehension of *Rasa* does not arise. For this reason, the *Ālankārikas* lay great emphasis on proper representation of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest by flawless acting and scenic arrangements in a Drama and by introducing *Prasāda-guṇa*, consisting in perspicuity, resulting from use of words in their familiar meanings in a Poem. Dismissal of *Rasa* to an inferior position is regarded as another obstacle, since in those cases, where it is so relegated, the mind of the perceiver being engaged in search for the superior one fails to remain contented with its experience and when this happens, what is realised is anything other than *Rasa*, which, as Abhinavagupta says, is the cynosure of all minds. What the mind enjoys at the time of appreciation of Poetry is the permanent mood or feeling depicted therein, and not the subordinate factors, like the excitants, ensuents and accessories to it. The argument advanced by the *Ālankārikas* to establish superiority of permanent moods over other factors is this that, they alone lead to the four ends of life : thus, love, they point out, leads to enjoyment, indignation to riches, heroism to religious merits, quietism to salvation, and so on. Strongest testimony to this however is borne by inward experience of men of cultivated taste : it reveals that, neither characters nor narratives form the centre of gravity of *Kāvya* or *Nāṭya*, which is furnished by *Rasa* and *Rasa* alone. In order to bring into light the paramount importance of an emotional mood in Poetry, the Dhvani Theorists maintain that, in a best specimen of poetic art, the expressed idea comprised of the *Vibhāva* and the rest renders itself subservient to the implicit mood of superior charm : suggestion of a fact or an imaginative mood, also, they point out, terminate ultimately in the suggestion of this emotional mood of supreme attraction. Abhinavagupta refers to presence of doubt as to the exact nature of the mood depicted as the seventh and last obstacle standing in the way of aesthetic enjoyment. The same thing constitutes the *Vibhāva* of a number of moods and the same effect follows, in a similar manner, from a number of emotions and consequently, represent their

Anubhāvas : thus a tiger excites both anger and fear ; tears ensue from both pleasure and pain,—and langour and anxious thoughts are common accessories to love and sorrow,—heroism and fear. To obviate this difficulty, the *Ālankārikas* advise presentation of all the factors—the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva* as clearly as possible, so that the delineated emotion is brought into consciousness straightway, leaving no room for occurrence of doubt in the mental plane of the perceiver. Abhinavagupta utters a note of caution to the poets, dramatists, actors and stage-directors of posterity to see that these obstacles do not hamper *Rasāsvāda*, which consists in unimpeded enjoyment of unmixed bliss,—to quote him '*Vitavighnā-Pratītiḥ*'.

In the preamble to the doctrine, adumbrated by him, Abhinavagupta acknowledges his indebtedness to earlier theorists, whose view-points, as he says, he uses as cross-bars in a ladder to arrive at the real truth. An analysis of his doctrine reveals the accuracy of this statement, inasmuch as, following Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, he maintains that, the ensuents go to indicate the permanent moods, which are nourished and thus benefitted by accessories to it,—conforming to the *Citraturaganyāya* of Śaṅkuka. he observes that, the spectator realises the actor neither as an imitator nor as an imitated, and concurring with Bhaṭṭanāyaka accepts the principle of *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*,—the realisation of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest in their universal aspect, as also that of revelation of supreme bliss, associated with the perceiver's own being. In the matter of aesthetic realisation, the processes of *Abhivyakti* and *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, Abhinavagupta observes, are absolutely necessary as stages. Of these two, the first refers to the dismissal of the curtain of nescience and the manifestation of pure consciousness, consequential upon it, and the second to the realisation of the excitant, ensuent and accessory, as also of the mental disposition in their generalised forms, on the one hand, and the liberation of the mind of the perceiver from the shackles of narrow individuality, on the other, so that at the time of relishing *Rasa*, he feels that, it is relished not by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. And because of this, the reader or the spectator derives supreme bliss even from

perception of Poetry, depicting such unpleasant emotions as the tragic, the loathsome and the like : the relish of *Rasa*, Abhinavagupta points out, is an extra-ordinary bliss and is not to be likened to ordinary pain or pleasure, and the mind is so entirely lost in it that even when the sentiment of grief or horror is relished, it is done in such a state that pain is never felt. The bliss that is derived at the time of perception of Poetry does not come from the nature of the emotional mood or feeling, depicted therein : it comes from within one's soul : it is pleasure, associated with one's own being that is experienced at the time of appreciation of Poetry. Secondly, because of *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*, the *laukika* causes are transformed into *alaukika Vibhāvas* in Poetry and Drama, as a result of which the taste or relish of *Rasa*, though a nature of cognition—differs from the ordinary forms of the process. The main point which differentiates the experience derived by the original character from the aesthetic relish of the refined appreciator is this that, whereas the characters, presented in their particular forms appear as directly related to the former, to the latter they appear in their generalised aspect, not having any connection with his own personality even, and this slumber of one's individuality is the secret of metamorphosis of unpleasant feelings into pleasant ones,—of particular and personal causes into universal and impersonal *Vibhāvas*. It is a matter of common experience that, when grief is realised by one alone, it gives him acute pain : when, however, it is shared by many, it loses much of its sting. At the time of perception of Poetry, Abhinavagupta points out, the *Sahṛdaya* does not remain conscious of his own personality : on the other hand, he becomes completely divested of all egotistic and egotistic feelings, and it is due to this transcendence that he derives aesthetic pleasure : as Poetry purges from his inward sight the film of familiarity, that obscures from him the wonder of his own being, it always generates refined and wholesome pleasure, whether it presents pleasant feelings or not. Abhinavagupta thinks that, as generalisation of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest is produced incidentally in course of revelation of one's own being, partaking of the nature of bliss, brought into effect

through dismissal of the curtain of nescience, done by *Vyañjanā*,—the operation of which differentiates a Poetic expression from an ordinary one, the postulation of two separate functions—*Bhāvakatva* and *Bhojakatva*, as introduced by Bhaṭṭanāyaka is unnecessary and unjustified, because as he points out, it entails a violation to the law of parsimony.

Jagannātha along with his learned predecessors Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha accept in toto the doctrine of Abhinavagupta on aesthetic experience. In his *Rasagaṅgādhara* he makes mention of eleven theories, which approach the problem from different angles, including the four explained before. Of the remaining seven, five are not backed by the authority of Bharata and as such are unreal and unscientific. Thus, while one of these theories states that, *Rasa* consists simply in the sum-total of the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva*, the other asserts that, it consists in the most attractive one of these three factors, the third lays down that, *Rasa* is comprised of the excitant, which is experienced by the connoisseur, the fourth maintains that, it is comprised of the ensuent alone, so experienced and the fifth points out that, a transient feeling alone is raised to the status of *Rasa*. The other two, however, which have been presented by Jagannātha in the name of the *Navya* and the *Para* deserve treatment, as bearing same substance at least.

The *Navya* is of opinion, that the original character constitutes the locus of *Rasa*, or in other words, emotion actually belongs to the original personage,—the character whose life is either presented is a Poem or represented by an actor on the stage. The *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, first of all, he points out, bring into light the mood pertaining to the hero through the function of suggestion; that is to say, while reading the drama *Śakuntalā* or witnessing to its performance at the stage, the reader or the spectator, as the case may be, understands the fact that, love with reference to *Śakuntalā* has been generated in the mind of Duṣyanta, and this love, the *Navya* says, is revealed to him by *Vyañjanā*. Subsequently, through a defect, arising from his concentration on the subject-matter, depicted in the work, aided by his trained intellectual

powers, he identifies his own self with the original personage and as this idea of identity dawns in the mind of the appreciator, he regards himself as possessed of the mood resting really on the original personage. This *Anirvacanīya* mood, the *Navya* thinks is designated *Rasa*, as it is experienced by the soul of the appreciator independent of the sense-organs and the instruments of cognition. The term *Anirvacanīya* is a technical term of the Vedānta system of Philosophy, and as such requires explanation. The adherents of this system maintain that, a thing, which is neither real nor unreal,—neither existent nor non-existent is *Anirvacanīya*, possibly because it eludes all descriptions. The Brahman, they say, is a real entity, because its existence is not falsified by any subsequent cognition: the horn of a rabbit, on the other hand, is an unreal entity, because its cognition never occurs; the empirical world, however, is neither rightly real nor truly unreal, because being conjured up by *Māyā*, it is experienced till the knowledge of the self dawns, on the appearance of which it vanishes. This analysis of the *Anirvacanīya* reveals that, it is spurious having merely a show of reality. An illustration to this is afforded by a piece of silver produced on a nacre, which lacks both in real and working existence—*Pāramārthika* and *Vyavahārikasattā*,—inasmuch as, the former is capable of being predicated of the supreme self alone and the latter of such a thing, which though conjured up by nescience lasts till the dawning of the knowledge concerning the supreme self, and possesses simply an appearance or *Prātibhāsika sattā*, since it appears as a piece of silver as long as the error persists and is not removed by subsequent right notion. This piece of silver is neither wholly unreal like a sky-flower, because, at least for a given length of time it presents a semblance of reality, nor is it real, in the strictest sense of the term, because it disappears as the knowledge of real nacre dawns, and consequently, is capable of being characterised as *Anirvacanīya*. The adherents of the Vedānta system of Philosophy maintain that, nescience or ignorance itself is *Anirvacanīya* and is experienced by conscious soul itself without the help of sense-organs

or instruments of cognition, or in other words, it is *sākṣibhāṣya*. What is true of nescience or *ajñāna*, is true of such moods as love and the like, because like nescience, a mood also is an attribute pertaining to the mind, and accordingly is capable of being experienced by pure consciousness itself independent of organs and instruments. The *Navya* points out that, just as due to a defect in the shape of dimness of light, resulting in absence of clear vision, a mother-o'-pearl is mistaken for a piece of silver, similarly from concentration on the subject-matter presented in *Kāvya* or *Nāṭya*, a reader or spectator is taken by himself as identical with the original personage, and consequently, as possessed of mood, belonging to him; this identity of the original personage and the mood produced—both, the *Navya* continues, are *Anirvacanīya*. This mood, he asserts, is experienced subsequently by the self of the appreciator independent of sense-organs and instruments of cognition, and when it is so experienced it is raised to the status of *Rasa*: by ascribing to it the identity of the mood, belonging to the original character, which is brought into light through the function of suggestion, it is called a suggested unit and by considering its oneness with supreme pleasure, derived immediately after its experience it is called pure bliss. The *Navya* thinks that, generalisation of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest, which is regarded as an element essential for aesthetic realisation and in which the different factors appear in their universal aspect, even though particular names are given to them—is nothing but the product of a short-coming and thus as the conception of a defect is an imperative necessity, the simpler process is to assert that, due to this defect an idea of identity with the original personage and the mood itself, consequential upon the growth of this idea dwains in the mind of the appreciator and is experienced subsequently by his own self. This analysis itself, he contends, is sufficient enough to reject the contention of the opponents that, the mood belonging to the original character is not likely to be relished and that pertaining to the appreciator's own self is not likely to be revealed owing to absence of proper excitants and

ensuents. Thus, according to the *Navya*, the terms *Samyoga* and *Niṣpatti* occurring in the dictum of Bharata convey respectively the idea of a short-coming resulting from realisation of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest and that of generation, the whole *Sūtra* signifying the sense that, *Rasa*, which is of the nature of a mood belonging actually to the original personage but now experienced by the self of the appreciator is brought into being through operation of a defect, resulting from realisation of the excitants, ensuents and accessories.³⁵

The *Navya*, who contends that the perceiver thinks himself as identical with the original character and consequently shares the emotions, experienced by him defends with meticulous care the blissful nature of *Rasāsvāda*. He anticipates a possible objection that, in the event of the reader or the spectator sharing the feelings of the Hero, it is not possible for him to derive from perception of Poetry, presenting an unpleasant mood, such as grief, horror, abhorrence and the like supreme pleasure, which is likely to ensue from appreciation of such Poetry alone as depict such pleasant moods as love, mirth and the like. In reply to this objection, he points out that, if realisation of a connoisseur of poetic art reveals that pure joy is experienced from perception of Poetry, delineating the pathetic, the furious and the disgustful even, then the assumption that, the super-normal function of Poetry impedes generation of pain in course of transfusing pleasure in his mind becomes necessary: the shedding of tears and the like do not constitute any proof of the feeling of pain, inasmuch as, on listening to the description of a deity, tears arise in a devotee, though he does not experience the slightest feeling of pain. If, on the other hand, he continues, the realisation of such a connoisseur shows that from perception of Poetry, depicting unpleasant emotions both joy and pain are experienced, then the necessity of ascribing the power of obstructing generation of pain to this super-normal function of Poetry does not arise, since such Poetry leads to both pleasure and pain: as, however, the feeling of pleasure is greater in volume, compared to that of pain, he is attracted towards this type of poem or drama.

In this respect, he maintains, a parallel is to be found in application of sandal-paste, which generates both pleasure and pain, but nevertheless, to perform which a man is prompted, the feeling of pain springing from rubbing being insignificant in comparison to joy derived from touch of sandal-paste. The argument that, the sense of identity, which one feels with such a character as Daśaratha, a victim to sorrow in dream or typhoid and other ailments does not lead to pleasure, but rather to unalloyed sorrow, and consequently a similar sense of identity cognised at the time of appreciation of Poetry is likely to lead to unmixed pain is unsound, because the two cases are of completely different types. Aesthetic realisation which is effected by the function of Poetry, in the sense that, this function leads to concentration on the events and characters described in Poetry, which brings the short-coming into being, which in its turn, brings the relish into consciousness is distinct from a realisation, effected by other instruments of cognition. Such is the greatness of the supreme function of Poetry, the *Navya* asserts that, even unpleasant feelings presented by it generate nothing but elevated pleasure.³⁶ Poetry turns all things into loveliness: it exalts the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and adds beauty to that which is most deformed.

The theory referred to as *Paramata* by Jagannātha does not extend recognition to the function of suggestion and to the fact that the mood produced in the appreciator is *Anirvacanīya* and in this respect it differs from the doctrine propounded by the *Navya*: while that doctrine follows the tenets of the Vedānta system of Philosophy; this theory, propounded by 'others' displays affiliation to the Nyāya system. It states that, the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva*, first of all, bring the mood belonging to the original personage into comprehension through the process of *Anumāna*. Then through the short-coming referred to in the doctrine of the *Navya* the appreciator thinks himself identical with the original personage, and as such, possessed of the mood belonging to him: this knowledge of the appreciator, which ensues from constant application of his mind to the incidents described in Poetry and arises through a process

of mental perception, this theory asserts, is *Rasa*. The idea of such identity derived in a dream is not the product of concentration on Poem or Drama and hence neither produces pleasure nor attains the status of *Rasa*. The perception referred to as *Rasa*, these theorists state, is different from the ordinary or *laukika* process of perception, inasmuch as, in it a mood that does not exist actually is experienced and as such, is rather of the nature of misapprehension. The wrong notion conceived as *Rasa* relates actually to the mood such as love, grief and the like and consequently, what is relished in this fashion is the mood itself: by attributing this capability of being relished, however, to the so-called *Rasa*, it is described as forming the content of an erroneous knowledge leading to pleasure. This theory states that the cognition constituting *Rasa* takes any one of the following forms: (a) the idea that I am the hero, possessed of the permanent mood, (b) the idea that the hero as possessed of the permanent mood is my humble self and (c) the idea that, my humble self is the Hero as also endowed with the permanent mood, pertaining to him.³⁷ In the first of these three forms of cognition, the appreciator remains oblivious of his narrow individuality from the very beginning,—in the second he superimposes the identity of the hero on his own self, as characterised by his individuality and regards the mood of the hero as a simple attribute of the hero himself,—in the third he cognises the identity of the Hero and his mood, both as separate attributes qualifying his own self, characterised by his peculiar personality. Thus the advocates of this theory interpret the dictum of Bharata to convey this idea that, *Rasa*, which is comprised of a knowledge is derived from comprehension of the *Vibhāvas* and the rest.³⁸

In the Theories of *Rasa*, propounded by the *Navyas* and others, a sense of identity with the original character, appearing in the mind of a true connoisseur of poetic art is put forward as the main factor that leads to aesthetic enjoyment, and it is further said that his sense of identity is not real, but mistaken. As the reader or the spectator thinks himself identical with the original character, nothing stands in the way of his establishing relation with the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas*

and the *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, belonging to the actual personage or to state more clearly, in taking these *Vibhāvas* as his own. For this reason, these theorists declare the process of *Sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* to be absolutely unnecessary: according to them, as the erroneous knowledge, mentioned above presents all the requisites of *Rasa*, its unimpeded enjoyment comes as a natural corollary.

It is difficult to accept this solution to the problem of aesthetic enjoyment, offered by the *Navyas* and others. First of all, there is no evidence to show that aesthetic enjoyment is a kind of misapprehension (*Bhrama*). Secondly, the fact that the reader or the spectator thinks himself to be the original personage is opposed to our common experience: at the time of witnessing a theatrical performance, nobody thinks himself as one with Rāma or Duṣyanta,—men removed from us by several hundreds of years. Thirdly, these theories are not much different in essence from the theories, propounded by Bhaṭṭa-lollaṭa and Śaṅkuka, inasmuch as they accept *Rasa* as primarily belonging to the original character: it is said that, the reader or the spectator is mistaken to take his own self for the original character, possessed of *Rasa*. But if the man of trained intellectual powers,—the *Sahṛdaya*—who is identical with the original personage shares with him the same feeling or feelings, then the pleasure, derived by him is bound to be ordinary, because no extra-ordinary bliss is generated in the mind of the actual character: and naturally, the transcendental character of *Rasa* is bound to fall through. Fourthly, it is not clear as to why unpleasant feelings are not excited at the time of perception of Poetry, depicting distasteful sentiments, such as grief, indignation and abhorrence. The argument that it is the magic power of the function of suggestion (*Lokottarakāvyavyāpāra*), that turns all unpleasant sensations into pleasant ones does not lead us anywhere, as the extra-ordinary character of this poetic function is a matter of hot controversy. Lastly, the realisation of emotions, such as love and the like is, in our ordinary life, restricted: it is earthly and full of impediments. The emotions, experienced

by actual characters are of this type, and if it is a fact that, a sense of mistaken identity with him excites similar emotions in the minds of the perceivers, then these emotions can, in no case, be sources of refined pleasure to him, being earthly and full of obstacles. For these reasons, these two theories have been rejected by eminent critics, including Jagannātha, who makes only a passing reference to them, but accepts as the correct one the theory, propounded by Abhinavagupta.

It is to note that the defects, mentioned above do not go to vitiate the theories of *Rasa*, adumbrated by Bhaṭṭanāyaka or Abhinavagupta. Firstly, in these two theories *Rasa* is described as a transcendental entity, and the question of its being an exclusively earthly thing does not arise at all, because aesthetic enjoyment is not produced by a false sense of identity with the original personage, but it is the realisation of the *Vibhāvas* in their generalised forms that lead to this enjoyment: it is transcendence over all limitations,—the putting into sleep of one's individuality that generates poetic pleasure or bliss. According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, this process of *Sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* is caused by a new function known as *Bhāvakatva*: according to Abhinavagupta, it is caused by the function of suggestion, aided by the trained intellectual powers of the *Sahṛdaya*. *Rasa* is transcendental, because at the time of its realisation, the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* etc. are neither accepted as one's own, nor as not being one's own by a man of cultivated taste, who perceives poetry. The main point that differentiates the realisation of emotion of the original character from that of a man of trained intellectual power is that, whereas, the excitants, ensuents and accessories of *Rasa* appear as directly related to the former, to the latter they appear in their generalised forms,—not having any connection with anybody,—not even with his own personality. At the time of perception of Poetry, the sense of personality of the perceiver is completely put into sleep, and it is due to this transcendence that he derives aesthetic pleasure. Secondly, according to Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, the bliss that is enjoyed at the time of appreciation of Poetry does not come from outside: it is not that the subject-matter of Poetry or the feeling, depicted

in it generates it : it is bliss that is associated with one's own being and as such comes from within. At the time of perception of Poetry, the bliss, associated with one's pure consciousness flashes forth, as the veil of ignorance is removed and as a natural corollary to it, he derives supreme pleasure irrespective of the nature of the feeling depicted. Thus it is evident that the theories, propounded by Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, the Navya and others have no legs to stand upon, and the problem of aesthetic enjoyment is to be explained either according to the view of Bhaṭṭanāyaka or according to that of Abhinavagupta.

This analysis of the theories of *Rasa* propounded by different theorists reveals that, while according to some, *Rasa* is a state of pure joy or unmixed bliss, according to others it is not so. Bhaṭṭalollaṭa, the earliest commentator says that, *Rasa* actually belonging to the original personage is superimposed on the actor and perceived by the spectator, who derives supreme bliss from its perception. It is not clear as to how the perceptive knowledge of a feeling, belonging to one produces pleasure in another,—the reader and the spectator. Then again, the perceptive knowledge of a feeling may generate unmixed pleasure, in some cases, but this proposition does not hold good in all cases. Knowledge of a pleasant feeling, experienced by an enemy is likely to produce pain, instead of pleasure in the mind of the perceiver, and similarly, cognition of an unpleasant feeling, experienced by him is likely to produce joy : in the same way, knowledge of an unpleasant feeling, experienced by his friend is likely to produce in him a sense of deep sorrow, and not of joy. Thus it is evident that the theory, propounded by Bhaṭṭalollaṭa fails to explain *Rasāsvāda* as a state of pure joy. And the same is the case with the theory, adumbrated by Śaṅkuka, because according to him, also, the inferential knowledge of *Rasa*, actually belonging to the original personage, but superimposed on the actor by the spectator arises.

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta, however, the state of aesthetic realisation is one of unmixed bliss. And this is so, because the pleasure, that is experienced at the time of perception of Poetry does not come from the subject-matter,

but from within one's own being. What is manifested is not the mood or feeling, belonging to the original personage, but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the mind of the reader or the spectator, as the case may be. This state, they say, partakes, no doubt, the nature of cognition : it is nevertheless, different from the ordinary or *laukika* forms of the process, because, its means,—the *Vibhāvas* are not to be taken as ordinary causes. Actual Śakuntalā, the lady of exquisite charm is an excitant cause of the feeling of love, generated in the mind of Duṣyanta, but when Śakuntalā is presented in Poetry or Drama, she becomes *Alaukika Vibhāva* in respect of the subjective condition of the ego, produced in the mind of the spectator, and such is the case with the *Anubhāvas* and the *Vyabhicāribhāvas*. The *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* are not to be taken as ordinary or *laukika* causes, but as extra-ordinary or *alaukika* ones, and this is so, because the *Vibhāvas* are presented in their generalised forms either through the function of *Bhāvakatva* or through the function of suggestion. In the view of Abhinavagupta, the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* are cognised in their universal and impersonal aspect by an appreciator of Poetry, and in the same way, the permanent mood, also, which is the source of *Rasa* is experienced as belonging not to any particular appreciator, but to appreciators in general ; so that, at the time of relishing it, he thinks that it is relished not by him alone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. The process of *Sādhārāṇīkaraṇa*, accepted by Abhinavagupta as an essential factor in the matter of aesthetic realisation presents itself in two aspects : (1) on the one hand, the *Vibhāvas* etc. are sensed in their general forms, and (2) on the other hand, it tends an appreciator to lose his narrow sense of personality, and conducts him to a higher plane of consciousness. As the means of *Rasāsvāda* are *Vibhāvas* etc., different from the *Laukika* causes, and as at the time of enjoyment of *Rasa*, a particular condition of the ego in which the sense of individuality is put into sleep is created, so the cognition of *Rasa* differs from ordinary or *Laukika* forms of the process. For this reason, emotions like *Karuṇa*,

Vibhatsa or *Bhayānaka*, which cause pity, disgust or horror are converted into *Rasa*, in which enjoyment of unmixed bliss is essential. The relish of *Rasa* is an extra-ordinary bliss,—not to be likened to ordinary pain or pleasure, and the mind is so entirely lost in it that, even when grief or horror is relished in such a state, pain is never felt. The fact is borne out by the common experience that, when grief is represented, the reader or the spectator says: 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence, Viśvanātha remarks that, those very things, which are called causes of pain in the ordinary world, like the banishment of *Sitā* and the like, when consigned to Poetry or dramatic representation possess the right to be called, in consequence of their being converted into generalised entities, *Alaukika Vibhāvas* etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance.

The Navya leaves the answer to the problem completely to the inward experience of the refined reader or the spectator. He says that if our experience reveals that only pleasure is felt at the time of appreciation of Poetry, depicting distasteful moods, like grief, horror or abhorrence, then it is better to attribute to the extra-ordinary function of Poetry, a capacity to prevent infiltration of sorrow in the mental plane of the appreciator. If, on the other hand, our experience reveals that a painful pleasure or a pleasurable pain is felt at the time of enjoyment of Poetry, then there arises no necessity of presuming this capacity belonging to the transcendental function of Poetry. In that case it is better to point out that, both pleasure and pain are produced by poetry, but as the volume of pleasure is much greater than that of pain, which is insignificant, in comparison to the former, a connoisseur of poetic art is attracted towards poetry, depicting distasteful mood even.

III

The Number of Rasas

In his *Nāṭyaśāstra* Bharata mentions eight *Rasas*, capable of being presented in a dramatic representation: these are—the erotic (*Śṛṅgāra*), the comic (*Hāsyā*), the tragic (*Karūṇā*), the furious (*Raudra*), the heroic (*Vīra*), the frightful (*Bhayānaka*), the disgustful (*Vibhatsa*) and the marvellous (*Atbhūta*). Of these eight, the erotic, heroic, disgustful and furious emotions are regarded as basic ones (*Prakṛti-Rasas*): the other four follow from these. Though *Rasa*, consisting in enjoyment of the bliss-portion of one's own being is always one and the same, yet it appears as different due to difference in attributes,—attributes which are nothing but particular states of the mind. These attributes are, according to Dhanañjaya, blooming (*Vikāśa*), expansion (*Viśtāra*), agitation (*Kṣova*) and perplexity (*Vikṣepa*). These qualities, as Vidyādhara says, bear resemblance respectively to the blossoming of a flower, growth of a tree, roughness of an ocean and turbulence of a hurricane.³⁹

Bharata, and following him, Dhanañjaya maintain that, the comic springs from the erotic, the tragic from the furious, the marvellous from the heroic and the frightful from the disgustful.⁴⁰ This observation is not to be carried too far, because the excitants and ensuents of erotic emotion being different from those of the comic, the relation of cause and effect cannot exist between them: and the same is the case of *Rasas*, grouped in other three pairs. The statement, referred to above only shows that *Rasas*, mentioned in each of the four pairs have attributes common to them: to state clearly, the enjoyment of both Erotic and Comic causes blooming of the mind,—the realisation of Furious and Tragic produces its expansion,—the relish of Heroic and Marvellous leads to agitation, and the appreciation of Frightful and Disgustful creates perplexity. While Bharata discovers the innate similarity of *Rasas* on the basis of mental states, produced from their appreciation, Abhinavagupta explains their affinity on the basis of the four

ends of human existence they lead to. Thus the Erotic and the Comic, he says, lead to enjoyment,—the Tragic and the Furious to riches, and the Marvellous and the Heroic to religious merits: the same thing excites both the Frightful and Disgustful and both of them lead to different ends of life.

The question whether *Śānta* is to be admitted as a separate *Rasa*, capable of being presented in a Poem and a Drama forms one of the most controversial issues in the field of *Alaṃkāra-śāstra*. Dhananjaya, the author of *Daśarūpaka* and his commentator Dhanika deny an independent status to *Śānta*. The grounds for their denial are detailed below: (1) Bharata has made no mention of *Śānta*—its exotants, ensuents and presiding deities; (2) the manifestation of *Śānta* is a myth, because total annihilation of attachment, jealousy and such other feelings is an absurd proposition; (3) Indifference to worldly objects, which is regarded as the basic feeling of *Śānta* is not a permanent mood, because neither it resides in the minds of appreciators of Poetry in the form of a latent impression, nor is it incapable of being wiped away by other feelings; (4) Connoisseurs of Poetic Art are unable to derive enjoyment of this *Rasa*: (5) As the state of the ego in which this *Rasa* is relished is a peculiar one, having no pleasure, no pain, no anxiety, no love, no hatred and no desire, it is possible only in the state of liberation and this being so, *Śānta* is incapable of being delineated in a Poem or a drama: (6) Some critics like to comprehend it under the Heroic and the Disgustful. The proposition of Abhinavagupta that the Drama *Nāgānanda* represents the Quietistic emotion is unacceptable: what actually is represented in it is the Heroic sentiment, having munificence for its basic feeling (*Dayā-Vīra*).

The advocates of *Śānta Rasa*, however, consider these grounds too weak to establish the proposition of the antagonists. Though Bharata makes no mention of *Śānta* or its basic feeling, yet he begins his enumeration of *Vyabhicāribhāvas* with a reference to indifference to worldly objects, which is

inauspicious by nature: and this goes to show that it is to be regarded both as a *Sthāyī* and a *Vyabhicārī*. The aphorisms do not express all points clearly: they hint at many, and in this capacity to hint lies their excellence. But the fact that, *Śānta* is a *Rasa* and *Nirveda* is a *Sthāyibhāva* is not only known from hints, offered by the *Sūtras* of Bharata; it is evident, as well, from its express mention in the *Dhvanyāloka* by the learned Dhvanikāra. According to Ānandavardhana the existence of *Śānta Rasa*, having for its basic feeling happiness, springing from annihilation of desire is undeniable: it is established by *Śāstra*, as also by the inward experience of refined readers.⁴¹ The feeling of supreme happiness produced by annihilation of desires that constitutes the basic feeling of this *Rasa*—is comparable to supreme satisfaction, which one finds on eating to satiety and in which state of mind one feels a complete aversion to the most dainty dishes offered to him. The argument that, the Quietistic emotion is incapable of being delineated in a Poem or represented on the stage has no legs to stand upon. When *Śānta* is relished fully and reaches its acme, then certainly it transcends the bounds of verbal and histrionic expression; but the same is the case with other *Rasas* also: when other *Rasas* like *Śṛṅgāra* and *Karuṇa* reach their climax, then they also become unexpressable and inimitable. But antecedently to that point, *Śānta* like other *Sthāyibhāvas* can form the object of our expressions and imitations. The argument that, Sahṛdayas do not feel attracted towards this *Rasa* is a travesty of truth, because a good number of men find pleasure in listening to narration of the transience of mundane existence from the *Bhāgavata* and the *Gītā*. The point that it has not the capacity to attract all persons of poetic sensibility towards it does not lead us anywhere, because even *Śṛṅgāra* has not got the capacity to draw the minds of all human beings, inasmuch as, a recluse, has no taste for it. The proposal to comprehend *Śānta* under *Dayā-Vīra* does not hold good, because whereas the former consists in total negation of pride, the latter is characterised by existence of an element of pride. Nor can it be comprehended under the Disgustful,

because abhorrence, that constitutes its basic feeling is completely wiped away when the Quietistic reaches its climax.

In view of the great claims of *Śānta* to be regarded as an independent *Rasa*, Mammāṭa, however grudgingly it may be, regards *Śānta* as the ninth *Rasa* : according to him detachment from worldly affairs forms its basic mood. Abhinavagupta says that, this basic feeling is happiness, springing from annihilation of desires, leading to rejection of all worldly objects : in the view of some, this is negation of all activities, but as a *Sthāyībhāva* is a positive entity, this view is unacceptable. The proposition of Abhinavagupta on this issue seems to be more plausible. The basic mood of Quietistic emotion is tranquillity, consisting of supreme happiness, springing from total annihilation of desires and worldly objects : detachment is only an accessory to it. Viśvanātha, the author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa* mentions in details the excitants, ensuents and accessories to this *Rasa* : according to him, tranquillity forms its *Sthāyībhāva*,—the transitoriness of the world and the nature of the supreme soul its *Ālambana-vibhāvas*,—seeing of holy hermitages and places of pilgrimage and association with great men its *Uddīpanavibhāvas*,—horripilation and tears its *Anubhāvas* and detachment, joy, remembrance and compassion its *Vyabhicāribhāvas*.⁴² In his *Rasagaṅgādhara*, Jagannātha analyses fully the arguments, advanced against the admission of *Śānta* as an independent *Rasa*, and finally asserts that, the status of an independent *Rasa* has got to be granted to *Śānta*, which is capable of being represented in a poem, as well as on a stage.⁴³ The argument that, as a state of tranquillity is not produced in the mind of an actor, so *Śānta* is incapable of being represented on the stage does not hold good, because *Rasa* is relished by spectators, and not by actors, and nothing stands in the way of development of a tranquil state in the mind of a perceiver. The objection that, an actor being devoid of tranquillity is unable to exhibit the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* clearly is misleading, because it is equally applicable to demonstration of excitants, ensuents and accessories to other moods, such as fear and indignation, which also do not belong actually to the actor. The

solution that, by constant training and practice the reactions to fear and indignation are capable of being simulated effectively supplies an answer to the problem raised, because the same can be done in case of *Śama* also. The adverse statement that, such accessories like orchestra and music hamper the manifestation of *Śānta*, consisting in detachment from the objects of enjoyment in the minds of refined spectators is untenable, because instead of proving an impediment, they become helpful in production of that state of mind in which relish of the *Rasa* becomes possible. In support of this contention it is possible to cite the case of sound, emanating from the tabor in accompaniment of which Sri Caitanya used to sing praises of the Lord : that music, instead of proving an hindrance became helpful in production of tranquillity in the minds of all devotees.

The emotion of parental affection (*Vatsala*) receives recognition as an independent *Rasa* in the hands of Viśvanātha, for the first time : affection towards children, he says, constitutes its *Sthāyībhāva*, sons and daughters its *Ālambanavibhāvas*, their scholarship, valour and conduct its *Uddīpanavibhāvas*, embrace, touch, kisses and tears its *Anubhāvas* and anxiety, joy and pride its *Vyabhicāribhāvas*.⁴⁴ The advocates of *Vatsala Rasa* argue that, as its basic mood affection is not directed towards a lover of the opposite sex, it is not *Śṛṅgāra* : nor is it capable of being equated with other *Rasas*, such as *Hāsyā*, *Karuṇā* and the like, because their basic feelings are entirely different in nature. Bharata and Ānandavardhana, as also other Dhvani Theorists, however, deny the status of a *Rasa* to it : they say that, it is not relished in the same manner as a true *Rasa* is relished, because it does not reach the point of perfection : it is only a *Bhāva*. Jagannātha opens this question, but depending entirely on the mandates of Bharata he solves it by declaring *Vatsala* to be a *Bhāva*, and not *Rasa*. Whether the emotion of parental affection reaches the desired acme and earns for it the enviable appellation '*Rasa*' or not, is a matter to be decided solely by the connoisseurs of Poetic Art. If their experience reveals that, it does not reach the climax, then it is better to call it *Bhāva* : if, on the other hand, their experience

points out the opposite, then it is proper to call it *Rasa*. But even then its status of an independent *Rasa* is open to controversy. When *Vatsala* has for its permanent mood affection, it is possible to comprehend it under *Śṛṅgāra*. If tradition prevents us to regard *Vatsala* as a variety of *Śṛṅgāra*, then the question of admission of number of new *Rasas*,—like *Bhakti*, having love for the Lord for its basic feeling and *Sauhārda*, having friendly affection for its permanent mood, which also cannot be regarded, for the same reasons, as types of *Śṛṅgāra*—arises, vitiating the entire proposition by the fallacy of violation to the law of parsimony (*Gaurava*).

Depending similarly on the authority of Bharata, Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha consider love directed towards a deity as reaching the state of a *Bhāva*, being manifested by *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*: this, they say, is incapable of attaining the perfection of *Rasa*. But the Ālankārikas, affiliated to Vaiṣṇava school regard *Bhakti* not only as a *Rasa*, but as the most perfect *Rasa*,—the only *Rasa*. They say that, undivided love for God constitutes its basic feeling; God is its *Ālambana-Vibhāva*; horripilation and tears its *Anubhāvas* and joy, sorrow and disappointment its *Vyabhicāribhāvas*: as an incontrovertible evidence in favour of the existence of this *Rasa*, they refer to the actual experience of transcendental bliss, which one deduces at the time of listening to the achievements of the Lord, as narrated in the Bhāgavata. It is not possible to equate it with *Śānta Rasa*, because while this is characterised by an attachment for the supreme Lord, in *Śānta* there is complete detachment.

Kavikarṇapūra, the author of Ālankāra-kaustubha, a contemporary of Sri Caitanya is the first to regard *Bhakti* as a separate *Rasa* in addition to the ten *Rasas* enumerated above. The other *Rasa* that receives his approval is *Prema Rasa*, concerning the divine love of Lord Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā. This *Rasa*, he says, is the most important of all the *Rasas*, which are included in it, and its importance is established in this way.⁴⁵ God is the source of all *Rasas* of which love is the most predominant. In order to have the experience of aesthetic pleasure of love,

God incarnated Himself as Lord Kṛṣṇa and relished the love of Rādhā, the dynamic source of delight, known as '*Hlādinī Śakti*' in the language of Vaiṣṇava Philosophy. As the parties to this emotion are Kṛṣṇa, the source of all *Rasas* and Rādhā, the eternal source of delight, so it affords exquisite pleasure to the devotees.

The wide scope and predominance of *Bhakti Rasa* is recognised for the first time in the work '*Muktāphala*', compiled and annotated by Vopadeva. According to him concentration of mind on Lord Kṛṣṇa by any means constitutes its *Sthāyibhāva*; a devotee is its *Ālambana Vibhāva*; hearing of the achievements of the Lord or conduct of his devotees is the *Uddīpanavibhāva*; horripilation, perspiration and benumbness are *Ānubhāvas*, and aversion, sorrow etc. form its *Vyabhicāribhāvas*. *Bhaktirasa*, he states, is a charming state of the mind produced on listening to the tales of the Lord or his devotees or on witnessing to theatrical performances concerning them: this *Rasa* manifests itself in other *Rasas*, that are nothing but its transformations.⁴⁶ This proposition finds expression in a better form in the speculations of Rūpagoswami the author of *Bhaktirasāmṛtasindhu* and *Ujjalanīlamanī*. Rūpagoswami takes *Bhakti Rasa* as the only *Rasa*, and says that, it presents itself in twelve different forms, which are *Śānta*, *Prīti*, *Preyān*, *Vatsala*, *Madhura*, *Hāsyā*, *Adbhuta*, *Vīra*, *Karūṇa*, *Raudra*, *Bhayānaka* and *Bībhatsa*. Other writers on the subject prefer to call *Prītibhaktirasa* as *Dāsyabhaktirasa* and *Preyobhaktirasa* as *Sakhyabhaktirasa*.⁴⁷ Of these twelve, the first five are regarded as primary, and the last seven as secondary, the criterion of classification in this case being the permanence or otherwise of the basic feelings of these different aspects. The basic feelings of *Śānta*, *Dāsyā*, *Sakhyā*, *Vatsala* and *Madhura* are experienced by all devotees for all time to come, inasmuch as, they are incapable of being eradicated by other moods. The basic moods of the last seven types of *Bhaktirasa*, however, are not experienced by all devotees for all time to come, and are replaced by other aspects of *Bhaktirasa*, even when they reach the highest point.

The claim of *Bhakti* to be recognised as a *Rasa*, and *Rasa* par excellence finds a staunch supporter in Jīvagovāmin, who establishes with strong arguments its superiority to other *Rasas*. The factors, necessary for elevation of a permanent mood to the state of *Rasa* is, he points out, (a) ability of the mood to reach the highest point, (b) power of the excitants, ensuents and accessories to develop it, so that it may reach climax, and (c) capacity of the appreciators to appreciate it. Undivided love for God is a permanent feeling; it resides in the form of a latent impression and is incapable of being eradicated by other feelings; on the other hand, it moulds into its own shape other transient moods. It raises a devotee above the bodily passions and releasing him from the bondage of worldly existence affords him supreme bliss, leading him to a state in which his mind becomes pure, calm and steady. The *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* of *Bhaktirasa* are competent enough to develop the mood, because they are *alaukika* in their very nature. The causes, effects and accessories to other moods, such as love and the like are earthly in their nature: it is only due to the art of presentation and poetic faculty of the poet that they become *alaukika*, and produce transcendental pleasure. This being so, there is greater likelihood of the *Vibhāvas* of *Bhakti Rasa* being converted into *alaukika* ones and producing supreme bliss, because themselves unearthly in their nature, they are rendered all the more unearthly by the touch of poetic genius and art of presentation. The devotees, thirdly, have the necessary capacity to relish this *Rasa*, because unflinching love for the God is always present in them in the form of a latent impression. The argument that, all persons are not able to appreciate it has no weight whatsoever, as it is equally applicable to all other established emotions as the erotic, quietistic and the like.⁴⁸ In trying to establish the superiority of *Bhakti* to other *rasas*, Jīvagovāmin argues that, love between two human beings, though developed fully is unable to produce unmixed pleasure, because union is bound to be followed by separation, resulting in grief: this is the case with other feelings, belonging to men, who due to their bodily

existence are destined to suffer untold miseries. Moreover, the thought of abhorrent and ghastly nature of bodies is likely to interpose itself at the time of relish of these *Rasas*, and thus the experience in all cases is bound to be one of Disgustful emotion.⁴⁹

Another ardent advocate of *Bhaktirasa* is Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who in his 'Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana' justifies with great care the superiority of *Bhaktirasa* to other emotions. According to him, mind that resembles lac in many respects melts when it comes in touch with such heating factors as love, anger, grief, fear, compassion and the like, and in such a fluid mind the shape of the thing experienced becomes firmly implanted. This form of the thing experienced reflected in mental apparatus, or in other words, the moulding of the mind into the form of the thing experienced is regarded as *Sthāyibhāva*: when it manifests itself as supreme bliss coming in contact with *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, it is transformed into *Rasa*. Following this line of argument, Madhusūdana regards *Bhakti* as the conversion of the molten mind into the form of the Divine Lord and says that, when the Divine Lord himself reflected in a fluid mind constitutes the basic feeling of *Bhaktirasa*, it is but natural that this is blissful in nature. Other emotions, such as the erotic and the tragic, the disgustful and the comic, that have for their excitants lady and child, dead body and incongruity generate supreme pleasure only because the absolute reality (Brahman) that is blissful in nature is present in all those excitants, being omniform in character. Thus, while in case of *Bhaktirasa* unqualified consciousness flashes forth in its undimmed glory, in case of other emotions, consciousness, qualified or determined by objects experienced manifests itself, and accordingly, greater amount of pleasure is derived from the realisation of *Bhaktirasa*. In drawing the distinction between *Bhakti* and other emotions, Madhusūdana compares the first to the splendour of the Sun and the second to the feeble light of glow-warm.⁵⁰

The search for unity in multiplicity, that constitutes a peculiar trait of Indian outlook manifests itself for the first time

in this field in the observations of Bhavabhūti, who regards all emotions as formal transformations of the tragic one (*Karuṇa Rasa*). His commentators try to establish the reality and supremacy of *Karuṇa-Rasa* by pointing out to the fact that, it is relished equally by persons of different dispositions : moreover, they say, the conversion of mind into a liquid form, as is, effected by enjoyment of *Karuṇa* is an essential condition necessary for relishing of other *Rasas*, and as such, the tragic emotion can rightly be described as the basic one. This observation of Bhavabhūti bears testimony to the firm Indian conviction that a Poetry is an emotional approach to an ideal that eludes tight grasp,—a belief that finds a beautiful expression in the *Meghadūtā* of Kalidāsa. This inability to realise the exact nature of his ideal casts a gloom in the mind of the poet, which he attempts to transmit to the appreciator, also, through his Poetry. For this reason, a sting of pain is experienced even in moments of exalted ecstasy, and what we actually relish at the time of appreciation of Poetry is painful pleasure, because pleasure, without pain is a contradiction in terms. The statement : 'Eko Rasaḥ Karuṇa Eva Nimittabhedāt Bhinnah Prthak Prthagivāśrayate Vivarttān/Āvartabudbudataraṅgamayān Vikārān Ambho Yathā Salilameva hi Tatsamastam (Uttarāramacarita 3.47) speaks of a deep psychological knowledge and high poetic sense of the speaker and reminds one of the observation of Shelley that, 'Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thoughts'.

The next critic to establish the unity of *Rasas* is Bhojarāja. In his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* he describes *Śṛṅgāra* as the only absolute reality and asserts that the speculations of earlier thinkers on the number of *Rasas* are wrong and misleading. But it is curious to note that, Bhojarāja's '*Śṛṅgāra*' has an altogether different connotation : it refers to a particular quality of the Ego, that forms the very basis of desire. As *Rasa* consists of a particular state of Ego, so one devoid of it has no capacity for aesthetic experience, because this inherent quality alone urges one to enjoy *Rasa*. According to Bhojarāja a man tempted to appreciate poetry by *Śṛṅgāra* is a real enjoyer (*Rasika*).⁵¹ This argument,

advanced by Bhojarāja, in addition to the old one that the erotic emotion is relished equally by all due to its own inherent quality throws a new light on the subject and points out to the futility of probing into the question of number of *Rasas*.

In arriving at the conclusion of unity of *Rasas*, Bhojarāja is influenced possibly by Ānandavardhana who remarks that, the enjoyment of quietistic emotion makes itself felt in experience of all other *Rasas* (Sarveṣāṃ Rasānāṃ Sāntaprāya Eva Āsvādah). As at the time of perception of Poetry, depicting all sorts of emotions, the mind of the perceiver becomes free from all distractions and consequently, clear and calm, so it is but natural to regard *Sānta*, having for its permanent mood aversion to worldly objects as the basic emotion.

Viśvanātha in his *Sāhityadarpaṇa* quotes a remark of Dharmadatta, which states that, according to Nārāyaṇa the Marvellous (*Adbhuta*) is the only emotion. Nārāyaṇa takes *Adbhuta* as identical with charm and states that, whenever an emotion is experienced, the mind of the enjoyer becomes charmed so to say, and relishes supreme impersonal pleasure ; this charm he says, constitutes the essence of *Rasa* and accordingly, the enjoyment of *Adbhuta* occurs in all cases. The observation of Nārāyaṇa, which runs as : 'Rase Sāraścamatkāraḥ Sarvatrāpya-nubhūyate/Taccamatkārasāratve Sarvatrāpyatbhuto Rasaḥ//Tasmādadbhutamevāha kṛtī Nārāyaṇo Rasam// (Sāhityadarpaṇa III) testifies to the deep penetrating insight of this great critic and exerts considerable influence on the speculations of Jagannātha, who straightway declares charm (*Camatkṛti*) as forming the secret of a poetic expression.

It is refreshing to note that while most of the Ālaṃkārikas are busy in advancing arguments and counter-arguments to determine the exact number of *Rasas*, there are at least some who are eager to establish the unity of emotions ; the under-current to find out unity in multiplicity makes itself evident not only in the speculations of Bhavabhūti, Bhoja, Nārāyaṇa and Rūpagosvāmin, but also in the casual remarks of Ānandavardhana, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha, who defend with great care the multiplicity of *Rasas*. Critics, in this connection,

observe that, multiplicity here is not incompatible with unity. *Rasa* is nothing but manifestation of bliss-portion of one's consciousness, and enjoyment of impersonal pleasure consequential upon it. This is true in respect of all *Rasas* and so it is reasonable to regard their unity. Their multiplicity also can be defended in this way. Consciousness when reflected in intellect that attains diverse states as a result of experience of different *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhiṅgāribhāvas* appears as different; and in this respect it has a close parallel in the face that appears as round when reflected in mirror, but as long when reproduced in sword. Thus the difference of *Rasas* arises through difference in attributes (*Upādhi*), which are in this case *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas*, *Vyabhiṅgāribhāvas* and *Sthāyibhāvas*. Kavikarṇapūra recognises this aspect fully and he is the only rhetorician to draw a distinction between permanent moods belonging to the appreciator and those belonging to the original personage, of which the former, he asserts, is only one. The permanent mood belonging to the appreciator is an attribute of the mind in which the quality of goodness (*Sattva*) attains prominence by rendering the other two qualities of hardness (*Tamas*) and fickleness (*Rajas*), subservient—attribute that prompts him to relish *Rasa*. When the qualities of *Tamas* and *Rajas* are subordinated, the mind becomes free from distractions and in this serene mind bliss-portion of one's own being automatically manifests itself. This attribute Kavikarṇapūra says, is blissful in nature, as otherwise its transformation *Rasa* could never have partaken the nature of supreme bliss. According to Kavikarṇapūra, this single permanent mood appears as dissimilar in different emotions owing to the diversity of substratum and excitant: thus in the Erotic emotion it takes the form of love, in the Tragic one it appears as grief, in the Heroic as heroism, in the Marvellous as wonder and so on. The unity of *Rasas* is a corollary to oneness of *Sthāyibhāvas*. Just as the same space is described differently owing to diverseness of attributes,—as *Ghaṭākāśa* when delimited by a jar and *Paṭākāśa* when delimited by a picture, similarly *Rasa* that consists of transcendental bliss appears as different and

assumes a number of names owing to diverseness of attributes, which are in this case *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhiṅgāribhāvas*.⁵²

The proposition of Karṇapūra that, mood belonging to an appreciator is different from that of the original character is acceptable from the psychological point of view: it gives a clue further to the futility and absurdity of classifying *Rasa* into eight or nine fixed forms, as has been done by Sanskrit Ālankārikas, who instead of recognising this truth have expended their energies in determining the exact number of *Rasas* with subtlest arguments.

A psychological analysis of *Rasa* reveals that, as a mental state produced from perception of Poetry, it is composed of a number of feelings that are aroused in the mind of an appreciator on hearing a poem or on witnessing a theatrical performance. It is not a fact that in all cases the mood aroused in the mind of the connoisseur of poetic art corresponds exactly to that of the original personage: a poetry depicting erotic emotion does not necessarily excite love,—a drama, presenting tragic does not necessarily stimulate sorrow: and such is the case with other specimens of poetry and drama. Moreover, there are a number of poetic creations that portray objects of nature and customs of society without presenting any feeling whatsoever: the appreciation of these creations also stirs up a number of feelings in the mind of the man who experiences them. So the proposition of the ancients that a permanent mood that lies in the form of a latent disposition and which corresponds exactly to the mood of the actual character is aroused in the mind of an appreciator at the time of perception of Poetry does not hold good.

The first and foremost of the feelings constituting *Rasa* is amazement. Some specimens of poetry surprise a reader or a spectator, as the case may be, by expression of poetic individuality, others astonish him by description of form, taste, smell and touch of the external world, yet others fill his mind with wonder simply through handling of the plot or treatment of character or presentation of ideal. All these specimens of poetry

stir up amazement in the mind of an enjoyer first and thereafter, making his mind completely free from thoughts of other knowables make it clear and calm and stimulate to activity the sense of beauty, lying dormant in it. At the time of experiencing specimens of objective poetry, such as the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the court-epics sympathetic and antipathetic feelings are produced in the mind of an enjoyer, and so these also constitute the component feelings of *Rasa*. Witnessing of the drama *Śakuntalā* on board excites sympathetic feelings, and this is done as soon as the idea of unreality of characters present before is shifted from the centre of consciousness to its outer fringe, i.e. to quote Coleridge 'temporary suspension of disbelief' is effected. This stimulation of sympathetic feelings possibly leads the ancient *Ālaṃkārikas* to describe the mood of the perceiver as corresponding exactly to that of the actual hero, but they confuse the entire position by regarding as identical the moods of the enjoyer and the hero. Appreciation of *Śakuntalā* certainly excites joy and that of *Uttararāmaçarita* stirs up compassion, but joy and love and compassion and sorrow are never indetical. Just as joy is derived from knowledge of success of such characters as *Śakuntalā*, *Sītā* and the like and sorrow is derived from their failures, similarly grief is experienced from knowledge of success of such villainous characters as *Rāvaṇa* and *Śakāra* and joy is derived from their failures. While sympathetic feelings are called forth by the characters who are noble or viciously oppressed, antipathetic feelings are generally evoked by ignoble and villainous characters. The third type of feelings constituting *Rasa* is the class of Recollectional feelings. As literature is nothing but a reflection of life, in it one is likely to come across such incidents that have been experienced by him previously and perception of these incidents is bound to revive in him memories of the past. When this happens, the appreciator no longer remains neutral and his feelings do not take the shape of sympathetic and antipathetic feelings only, but he feels a genuine emotion as the excitants become available to him with the help of his memory. The fourth one constituting *Rasa* is the class of Reflectional feelings.

As life is growing more and more complex in modern times, greater amount of complexity of human phenomenon is being reflected in literature, which appeals more to the head than to the heart. When one experiences this type of literature, he becomes conscious of the problems of human life and society and goes on thinking about remedies to them. This group of feelings includes the class known as critical ones, and are evoked relating not only to complex human problems delineated in literature, but also to such things as the diction of a poet, the successful characterisation of a dramatist, the simulating faculty of an actor and so on. Every composition or representation having a plot excites some curiosity in the mind of its perceiver, but this is experienced in abundance when one reads a detective novel, the relish of which consists solely in one's curiosity to know how a mysterious murder or a cautious theft is traced to its original perpetrators.

As the determinants of aesthetic relish Sanskrit *Ālaṃkarikas* describe only *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas*, *Vyabhicāribhāvas* and *Sihāyibhāvas*, of which the first two are external factors being presented in poetry and the last two are internal feelings pertaining to the appreciator. The mention of *Vibhāva* and *Anubhāva* which constitute the subject-matter of poetry as essential for aesthetic experience speaks of high critical insight of these theorists, but at the same time non-mention of other determinants in clear terms by them is likely to evoke much criticism. The experience of *Rasa* depends apart from the subject-matter on the form and style of composition. The description of some letters and compounds as proving conducive to suggestion of some emotions and detrimental to the manifestation of others, as drawn by *Ālaṃkārikas* gives an idea of partial realisation of this truth by them. Then again, aesthetic experience differs according to the method of perception: the witnessing of a theatrical performance produces highest relish in the mind of the spectator,—relish that is not comparable with that derived from listening to a poetry by its listener or reading of a poem by its reader. Possibly for this reason, a drama is regarded as the most charming of all the forms of

poetic creation (*Kāvyeṣu nāṭakam ramyam—Nāṭyaśāstra*). Secondly the relish of a poetry is affected by environment and atmosphere in which the poetry is experienced. The same specimen of poetry produces different degrees of pleasure, being enjoyed differently in different circumstances. Thirdly aesthetic experience is influenced, not to a mean extent, by nature and taste, mood and fancy, and understanding of the appreciator. This truth is recognised partially by Abhinavagupta who regards aesthetic relish as completely dependent on the mental inclination of the perceiver, and it receives approval of Viśvanātha also.

As *Rasa* is constituted of a number of feelings, having for its determining elements a number of factors including the mood of the appreciator and the method of perception, it is incapable of being grouped under a few definite heads; and naturally it is wise to call it as one marked by unity. The speculations of Kavikarṇapūra, Jīvagoṣvāmin and Bhojarāja deserve commendation in this respect, because they conform fully to the analysis of *Rasa* from psychological stand-point.

Sanskrit Ālaṃkārikas scrupulously distinguish *Bhāva* from *Rasa*: while the latter is a developed form of a permanent mood, that reaches its acme coming in contact with its excitants, ensuents and accessories, the former, they say, is either a developed form of a transient mood, reaching a relishable state, being in touch with the *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas*, or the highest shape of love directed towards a God or a king.⁵³ Neither the love of a man for a woman is comparable to the devotion of a devotee for his deity, nor is a transient mood of equal status with a permanent one, which is common to all men of all ages and resides in their mind in the form of a latest impression. The distinction between *Bhāva* and *Rasa* is important from the stand-point of theory, but in practical field it is of no use, because both *Rasa* and *Bhāva* being blissful conditions of the ego, in which knowledge of other knowables vanishes, no line of demarcation is drawn between their basic moods at the time of enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure. According to the rhetoricians, a *Bhāva* manifests itself in many aspects as being endowed

with a number of attributes, and according to the difference in these attributes gets different designations. Thus a piece of poetic creation, in which the dawning of a particular feeling is predominantly depicted is regarded as an illustration of *Bhāvo-daya* and a specimen of poetry in which the allayment of a particular feeling is prominently suggested is reckoned as an example of *Bhāvaśānti*. Similarly an admixture of two antagonistic feelings in the same substratum, they say, creates the field of *Bhāvasandhi* and likewise the generation of a number of antagonistic or indifferent feelings in the same substratum or different substrata at different times forms the scope of *Bhāvaśabalatā*.⁵⁴ In all these types *Bhāva* is of supreme importance, because its expression through the function of denotation renders a poetry one of inferior type, even though the generation or allayment of such *Bhāva* is conveyed through the function of suggestion.

Rasābhāsa or the semblance of *Rasa* is emotion improperly manifested. Improper excitants and indecent basic moods, both render an emotion improper, but as impropriety of excitants do not lead to all types of *Rasābhāsa*, as enumerated by the Ālaṃkārikas, it seems that in their opinion what renders an emotion improper is the indecency of its basic mood. A feeling with respect to which the sense of impropriety arises in the mind of men of trained intellectual powers is to be regarded as an improper basic mood. The postulation of *Rasābhāsa* as a separate category is prompted possibly by the strong belief of the Ālaṃkārikas that, impropriety is the only defect that manifests itself in different forms and a touch of which is sufficient to render a thing defective,—a belief, that, finds expression later in the form of a definite theory in the writings of Kṣemendra. Mahimabhaṭṭa, though opposed to the theory of *Dhvani* recognises the ability of impropriety to vitiate a thing and his observation relating to this is praised, by Śrīharṣa in his '*Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*'.⁵⁵ Indecency of basic moods cannot render *Rasa* one of inferior type, because, when *Rasa*, consisting of a blissful state of ego is enjoyed, the knowledge of other knowables vanishes and naturally there does

not arise the question of its inferiority or wrongness. What impropriety of basic moods do is that they hamper the manifestation of *Rasa*, or in other words impede the generation of this blissful state. Indecency of basic moods obsesses the mind of the appreciator, who being unable to identify himself with the events and characters described in poetry fail to sense the *Vibhāvas* in their generalised forms, and cosequently *Rasa* is not manifested for lack of ingredients. Depiction of love with a paramour or with a number of men or with the wife of a perceptor or with an enemy, as well as, that of attachment in which one of the parties is indifferent or both the parties are animals other than men affords examples of the semblance of *Śṛṅjāra-Rasa*. Similarly, delineation of grief for the death of a villain creates semblance of *Karuṇa-Rasa*, that of anger towards elders makes semblance of *Raudra-Rasa*, that of amazement springing from witnessing of magical feats forms semblance of *Vismaya-Rasa*, and so on.⁵⁶ The proposition that depiction of love between lower animals forms *Śṛṅjārarasābhāsa* is open to controversy. Vidyādhara, the author of *Ekāvalī* thinks that, this is a case of *Rasa* proper and not of its improper manifestation. The reason is not far to seek. In verses depicting amours of lower animals, the excitants and ensuents to *Rasa* of the appreciator are there. The argument that lower animals have no knowledge of *Vibhāvas* and the like has no legs to stand upon, because, what is necessary for the manifestation of *Rasa* is the existence of determining elements and not their knowledge on the part of parties to love or anger.⁵⁷ Moreover, according to the doctrine of Abhinavagupta on aesthetic realisation, that has been accepted as the correct one by later theorists, the *Vibhāvas* etc. are taken by an appreciator not in their particularised forms, as presented by the poet and dramatist, but in their generalised forms as incarnations of certain permanent ideals, and this being the case, the lower animals who are parties to love or anger do not present themselves as insentient beings to the refined reader, who realises them as representations of permanent ideals. And as this argument applies to depiction of love with the wife of a preceptor or a paramour, whose claim to

be regarded as a *Rasa* proper necessarily becomes great, so the actual existences of such a separate category as semblance of emotion (*Rasābhāsa*) is thrown open to great challenge. *Bhāvābhāsa* is semblance of manifestation of a *Bhāva*. Shyness in a prostitute and anxious thoughts in a paramour furnish its illustrations. To an appreciator of poetry *Bhāva* and *Bhāvābhāsa* make no difference, as do *Rasa* and *Rasābhāsa*, both resulting in an experience of supreme bliss in the same process. Similarly *Rasa* and *Bhāva* also have no distinctive features of their own. It is argued that while *Rasa* is a developed form of a *Sthāyibhāva*, *Bhāva* is a developed form of a *Vyabhicāribhāva*. But the classification of *Bhāvas* into two groups : *Sthāyī* and *Vyabhicārī* seems to be rather arbitrary. The proposition that, through an inherent miraculous power a *Sthāyī* irremovably exists in our minds sounds ridiculous, because feelings are always replaced by posterior ones. If the test of a *Sthāyibhāva* lies in its capacity to exist throughout the poetical narrative, then a number of feelings, classed permanent by ancient theorists such as resentment, disgust and wonder have got to be regarded as *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, because none of them has the capacity to become a predominant feeling of a whole work. The observation that, a *Sāñcāribhāva* has its parallel in a flash of lightning so far as transitoriness is concerned is inadmissible, because anxiety (*cinā*), sleep (*nidrā*) and intoxication (*mada*) last for hours, sickness (*vyādhi*) and insanity (*unmāda*) for months and death (*maraṇa*) for ever. Thus there being practically no distinction between *Sthāyī* and *Sāñcāribhāvas*, the experience of both these types of feelings is likely to produce the same state of mind in the refined appreciator. The description of such separate categories as *Rasa*, *Bhāva*, *Rasābhāsa* etc. as done by the ancient *Ālankārikas* points out to the great influence exercised on them by the Codes of Conduct, set by the learned *Śāstrakāras*, as well as by the views fixed by tradition. Nevertheless, their awareness of the whole situation and depth of psychological knowledge are evinced by their considered opinion that, *Asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type of Dhvani is marked by unity.

IV.

Antinomy of Emotions (*Rasa-Virodha*) and other defects

The expression 'Antinomy of Emotions' is a contradiction in terms, because *Rasa*, being a blissful state of the Ego, in which nothing but its own self is relished, there does not arise any question of realisation of conflict or contradiction between *Rasas*;—a realisation, that rules out, in its turn, the possibility of experience of real *Rasa*; thus, so long as there remains an apprehension of conflict, *Rasa* is not experienced and once it is enjoyed, all idea of contradiction is obliterated. So what the *Ālaṃkārikas* actually mean by 'Antinomy of Emotions' (*Rasa-virodha*) is 'conflict of basic moods' (*Sthāyibhāva-virodha*).⁵⁸ Some basic moods of the *Rasas* discussed above bear the relation of benefactor and beneficiary between each other, while others have between them the relation of destroyer and the thing destroyed. The emotions that have no conflict between each other are heroic and erotic, erotic and comic, heroic and marvellous, heroic and furious, and erotic and marvellous, while those that are mutually opposed to each other are erotic and disgusting, erotic and tragic, heroic and frightful, quietistic and furious, and quietistic and erotic. A poet, desirous of depicting a particular emotion is advised to eschew insertion of excitants and ensuents belonging to another emotion, opposed to the former one, because, as the Sanskrit rhetoricians say, such elaboration hampers the manifestation either of the intended emotion or of both. If at all such elaboration is found necessary, then he is advised to do so after adopting such means as are recommended to avoid the conflict which appears in two aspects : (a) in the form of absurdity of the basic mood of one to remain in the same substratum with the basic mood of the other, and (b) in the form of antagonism between the cognitions of two *Rasas*, in the case of which experience relating to one is obstructed by that relating to other.⁵⁹ The first form of conflict in which opposite basic moods remain in the same substratum is avoided by effecting a change of substratum, that is to say, by depiction of one of the moods in a different base.⁶⁰ Thus a poet can

safely portray heroism in a king who happens to be his patron and fear in his antagonist, without any loss of charm whatsoever. Ancient *Ālaṃkārikas* suggest a number of remedies to the second form of conflict in which experience of one is obliterated by that of the other. Firstly this conflict is avoided by presentation of a neutral emotion between the two mutually opposed ones,—an emotion that serves to bridge the gulf between the two.⁶¹ Thus for a poet, desirous of delineating both erotic and quietistic moods, what is necessary is portrayal of marvellous emotion in between them. In such case, the experience of the neutral marvellous emotion serves as a buffer, and thereby removes the chances of clash between appreciation of two opposed moods. Similarly, a poet desirous of delineating the erotic and the disgusting is advised to arrange for enjoyment of the heroic between the appreciations of two emotions mentioned first. The reason for adoption of such a step is quite clear : in such case, the experience of the neutral heroic removes the cognition of erotic, presented first and thereby makes the enjoyment of the disgusting unimpeded. Secondly, this is also avoided by effecting a relation of predominance and subservience between the mutually opposed sentiments or by rendering both of them subservient to another predominant emotion.⁶² Though erotic and tragic are mutually opposed to each other, yet when the former is rendered subservient to the latter, depiction of both becomes all the more charming, because the poignancy of grief experienced by one of the parties to love at the demise of the other is put into fuller relief when placed in the setting of their mutual love. This practice is usually followed by Sanskrit poets, who in their eagerness to delineate both these emotions in a charming manner occasionally follow also the procedure of rendering both of them subservient to another predominant mood,—the love of the poet for his royal patron. Thirdly, as a means to avoid conflict Sanskrit *Ālaṃkārikas* speak of presentation of both the mutually opposed emotions with the help of common sets of adjectives.⁶³ As an illustration to this principle, Jagannātha quotes a verse meaning : O warrior ! your enemies, with their bodies besmeared with blood (having snatched attach-

ment), puffed up with the pride of their youthfulness are lying embracing snugly earth (their lady-loves),—in which, he says the tragic and the erotic being presented through the same adjectives leave aside their enmity and manifest themselves in full glory (Nitāntam jauvanonmattāḥ gāḍaraktāḥ sadāhave/Vasundharām samāliṅgya śerate vīra terayaḥ//). A poet endowed with a strong imaginative faculty is advised not to get afraid of handling the excitants and ensuents of an opposite *Rasa*: it is rather imperative on his part to delineate an emotion, opposed to the one intended to be depicted after avoiding the conflict by taking recourse to the means suggested above, because the victory of the intended emotion over its rival naturally brings it out in flying colours. Anāndavardhana advises poets to avoid carefully conflict of emotions in their creations, particularly in those depicting the erotic predominantly. This is a must, because the erotic being the most tender of all emotions is likely to suffer greatly even from slightest incongruity.⁶⁴ At the same time, he thinks insertion of excitants and ensuents of erotic emotion in a poem, depicting another prominent emotion advisable, as the former being highly attractive induces the appreciators to experience other distasteful feelings and to devour the pill of advice, administered by poetry in good grace: it also enhances in general the beauty of a poetic creation. Thus the depiction of erotic and quietistic in the verse: 'Satyam manoramā rāmāḥ satyam ramyāḥ vibhūtayaḥ / Kintu mattāṅganāpaṅgabhaṅga-lolaṃ hi jīvitam', meaning: 'Truly ladies are attractive: verily riches are charming, but life is as fickle as the side-glances of a passionate lady—renders the piece of poetic creation more beautiful, instead of making it defective.'⁶⁵

A specimen of poetic art is rendered unattractive and defective mainly due to the defects of emotion of which this antinomy is one: these have been elaborately discussed by the ancient Ālaṃkārikas. According to the Ālaṃkārikas an emotion is never to be expressed through the function of denotation from the use of general word '*Rasa*' or from the use of such words as '*Śṛṅgāra*' and the like, that are significant of particular types

of *Rasa*. As *Rasa* is brought into comprehension only through the function of suggestion, the attempt of denotation to express it becomes equivalent to ejection of food already taken and thus is vitiated by the defect technically known as *Vamana*. Moreover, *Rasa*, signified through the function of denotation only is incapable of being relished, and naturally, the operation of this function to convey it proves futile.⁶⁶ In a similar manner, mention of words, denotative of permanent (*Sthāyī*) and transient (*Vyabhicārī*) feelings is regarded as a blemish, pertaining to *Rasa*. Absence of clear knowledge of *Vibhāvas* and *Anubhāvas*, or the late dawning of such knowledge is regarded as another *Rasa-doṣa*, because it proves a hindrance to aesthetic realisation. The next defect consists in insertion of the *Vibhāvas* and the like of an emotion, that is more powerful than or is of equal strength with or is opposed to the intended one: it hampers the manifestation of *Prākṛta-Rasa*.⁶⁷ An emotion that has been brought into light fully through clear portrayal of excitants and ensuents should not be attempted to be brought into consciousness again, after its experience has been halted by description of other things. Such attempt renders a piece of poetic creation vitiated by the defect known as *Vicchinnadīpana*, and as such is to be avoided. This prohibition is to be taken with an amount of reservation: it applies only to subsidiary emotions and not to the prevailing one in a particular piece. As blemishes pertaining to *Rasa*, the Ālaṃkārikas speak of both depiction of a *Rasa* at a time in which it should not have been presented and its non-presentation at a time in which its experience should not have been put to a halt. A violation to this principle is illustrated by delineation of love in union at a time when others are engaged in performance of evening rites or in offering worships to Gods, as also by description of such performances and offerings made by the hero at a time when an enemy has committed aggression on his own territory. Poets are advised by learned critics to describe achievements and riches of an enemy of his hero in such a way, that they do not seem to excel those of the latter, because non-conformity to this rule fails to bring into light the superi-

ority of the hero and aesthetic relish, consequential upon it. Ancient critics, including Daṇḍin prefer description of high lineage, superhuman strength and massive scholarship of a rival to the hero and says that defect of such a great rival at the hands of the hero amply shows his greatness in all respects.⁶⁸ But Jagannātha warns against application of this principle to its extreme: he says that only that much of excellence of the rival, as remains subservient to that of the hero, bringing as it does in bold relief his royal dignity and valour is to be described, because sheer victory of the hero over his rival is unable to signify the glory of the former. An illustration to this is to be found in the case of a forest-ranger killing a great King by a single poisonous arrow,—a fact, that does not convey any idea of superiority of the fowler.⁶⁹ A poet whose mind is concentrated on contemplation of an emotion is further advised to describe the party, with respect to whom a particular feeling is excited, as also the party in whose mind the feeling is generated at regular intervals, as constant application of an appreciator to them leads to aesthetic realisation. A violation to this principle forms a serious defect. As all the elements in Poetry, including the plot itself is nothing but a means to an end, which is aesthetic realisation (*Rasāsvāda*), so insertion, also, of incidents, that have nothing to do with manifestation of *Rasa* is to be carefully avoided.⁷⁰

The principal blemish, pertaining to *Rasa*, however, is inappropriateness which is to be avoided scrupulously by a poet, because it distracts the mind from enjoyment of poetry, and thereby hampers realisation of *Rasa*; the hindrance caused by it to pleasant appreciation of Poetry is often compared to that caused by a grain of sand to enjoyable drink of a beverage.⁷¹ This defect consists in description in objects and characters of qualities and actions, other than proper and appropriate ones. An example of this is afforded by delineation of valour in a cow,—piousness in a tiger,—decrepitude in heaven,—immortality in earth,—water-sports in winter,—use of hearth in summer, urge for dalliance in old age,—aversion in youth and so on. Ānandavardhana states that, characters are of different

types being either good (*uttama*) or bad (*adhama*) or mediocre (*madhyama*), and again either a divinity (*divya*) or a human being (*mānuṣa*); he warns against depiction of feelings common to a man in a divine character and of those, associated with a God in ordinary men. Thus description of such incidents as crossing of Oceans, done easily by characters, who are ordinary human beings or of their indignation as consuming the entire universe and putting a change to the order of day and night being inappropriate produces a suspension of belief in the minds of appreciators and consequentially hampers aesthetic realisation. For this reason, a dramatist is advised by Bharata to select plot of his *Nāṭaka*, that is regarded as the best type of a dramatic composition from such great works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* and to have for his hero such famous and distinguished characters as Rāma, Yudīṣṭhira and Bhīma. Invention of plot in a work of this type is strictly prohibited because it is apprehended that there is every likelihood of an inventor describing inappropriate feelings and actions in his new characters.⁷² Ānandavardhana says that though Indian tradition approves depiction of love between human and divine beings, yet the principle of propriety is to be followed strictly: the method of portraying love-in-union between noble parties, one of whom is a King and the other a princess,—a method, in which bites, nail-marks, kisses and similar other repugnant actions are avoided—is to be followed in case of depiction of love between a God and Goddess. The way in which Kālidāsa has delineated love between Lord Śiva and Pārvatī by describing their dalliance in a common manner is a serious defect, according to Ānandavardhana: but at the same time he asserts that, the strength of poetic intuition of this great poet covers up the defect which does not stand in the way of enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure.⁷³ Jagannātha uses more strong language and while accusing Jayadeva for violation of the principle of propriety warns poets of posterity against imitating him. The argument that, in such cases the process of *Sādharaṇīkaraṇa* presents Śiva and Pārvatī, Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā in their generalised forms as representations of certain ideals and divested of divinity

proves abortive, because this process operates only in those cases in which poetic relish is experienced by refined appreciators. The only standard of judging a Poetic creation, along with its elements and functions is the pleasure derived from its perception by connoisseurs of poetic art and nothing else. As poems, depicting amorous dalliance of Śiva and Pārvatī, Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā prove distasteful to a refined appreciator like that describing enjoyment of his own parents, the question of operation of the process of *Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* does not arise.⁷⁴ Describing inappropriateness as the greatest factor that subdues aesthetic experience, the secret of which lies in strict adherence to the principle of propriety, Ānandavardhana advises poets to select such incidents as their plots, as contain *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* appropriate to the manifestation of intended emotion. Special care is to be taken in case of selection of a subject-matter, that is purely imaginary, because slightest negligence on the part of a poet in this respect is likely to cause disaster and hamper the manifestation of *Rasa*. A poet who selects plots of his creations from such works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*, the emotions presented in which are non-controversial and accomplished entities (*Siddha-rasa*) is further advised not to effect such a change in the plot, that is likely to prove detrimental to the principal emotion.⁷⁵ A caution, however, is necessary here. If it is found that some of the episodes described in the source are harmful to depiction of the intended emotion, then it becomes imperative on the part of a poet to replace those incidents by new invented ones, that are more conducive to presentation of *Rasa*, because sheer narration of incidents does not constitute the duty of a poet, who is not a historian : what forms his actual aim is delineation of emotion. A poet is to be guided solely by this consideration in matters of insertion of five junctures (*Sandhi*) and improvisation of figures. Junctures are to be arranged not merely out of reverence for the mandates of scholars in dramaturgy, but with an eye to realisation of aesthetic relish. Similarly figures are not to be heaped up to make a display of one's craftsmanship, even though a poet is expert in their insertion, because

this tendency carried too far is likely to lead to such descriptions, that have absolutely no bearing on the depiction of the principal emotion. The purport of the whole discussion is this that, *Rasa* is the end of all poetry and all poetic elements are to be so arranged as they prove helpful to its manifestation.⁷⁶

CHAPTER V

THE DHVANI THEORY OF
SANSKRIT POETICS

I

The views of Anti-Dhvani schools

From early times the function of suggestion and the suggested sense of the Dhvanivādin have been hotly challenged by rival theorists, who oppose the claim of *Dhvani* to be regarded as a distinct category, forming the essence of poetic creation. The question whether it is necessary to postulate the separate function of *Vyañjanā* or whether it may not be comprehended in other recognised functions like *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā*, and in other intellectual processes like Inference and Logical Postulation forms the subject-matter of many animated discussions. For this reason a scholar of the stature of Ānandavardhana feels the necessity of refuting the contentions of the schools opposed to the theory of Dhvani, before enunciating it in clear cut terms, and this act, in fact, earns for him the enviable title *Dhvanikāra*.

Jayaratha, the learned commentator on *Alaṃkārasarvasva* of Ruyyaka cites a verse, according to which the problem of suggestion is capable of being explained away in twelve different ways, which are detailed below :

(1) *Vyañjanā* is identical with the function known as *Tātparyā*.

(2) The function of suggestion is no function at all ; it is a myth,—a brain-wave of the Dhvani Theorists.

(3) The function of suggestion is nothing different from that of denotation.

(4) The function of suggestion is capable of being equated with the function of Indication of Inclusive type (*Upādāna-Lakṣaṇā*). This point is illustrated by such figures as *Samāśokti*, *Aprastutapraśaṃsā* and the like, in which the expressed meaning

brings in the non-contextual (*Aprastuta*) and contextual (*Prastuta*) elements respectively in order to establish its logical connection with the rest of the sentence.

(5) The function of suggestion is capable of being equated with the function of Indication of Exclusive type (*Lakṣaṇa-Lakṣaṇā*). This point is illustrated by such figures as *Ākṣepa*, *Vyājastuti* and the like, in which the expressed meaning completely surrenders itself in favour of a new meaning,—injunction or prohibition in case of the first, and censure or praise in case of the second.

(6) The function of suggestion is capable of being comprehended under the process of Inference of informal type (*Svārthānumāna*). Inference, the Naiyāyikas say, is a knowledge that springs from *Parāmarśa* or consideration, which in its turn again, is the knowledge of the reason, as distinguished by invariable concomitance ; as for instance, the knowledge that this mountain has smoke which is invariably accompanied by fire is consideration, while the knowledge born of it that the mountain is fiery is inference. According to the Naiyāyikas, Inference is of two types : *Svārtha* and *Parārtha*. Of these two, the first one is the source of one's own knowledge ; in it as the premises are immediately known to a man and are derived from his own experience, he does not require them to be stated with exact formality. An example of this type of Inference is afforded by the knowledge that the mountain is fiery, derived by a man, who having himself ascertained by frequent observation the generalisation that wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen approaches a mountain and sees smoke on it. In *Parārthānumāna*, on the other hand, the premises that are discovered by one man are imparted to another through the medium of language, and as such, they stand in need of being stated with precision. An example of this type of Inference is afforded by the knowledge that the mountain is fiery, derived by a man on hearing from an enlightened person the following five-membered syllogism : Mountain is fiery, because it smokes ; whatever smokes is fiery ; as is a kitchen ; this is so ; hence this is fiery. The point, pressed forward by this section of opponents

is capable of being illustrated by the verse of Abhijñānaśakuntalam, that runs as :

Stananyastośīraṃ prasithilamṛṇālaikavalayam
Priyāyāḥ sādham kimapi kamanīyaṃ vapuridam/
Samastāpaḥ kāmam manasijanidāghaprasarayoh
Na tu grīṣmasyaivaṃ subhagamaparāddham yuvatiṣu//

and means : 'This body of my beloved with the ungent of Uśīra applied to the breasts, and with a single loose bracelet of lotus-stalks round the arm, though full of torment is exceedingly lovely. Granted that the affliction caused by the operation of love and heat is equal ; yet the injury caused to young maidens by heat is not so charming', and in which the so-called suggested sense, namely the dawning of love in the mind of Śakuntalā is known by Duṣyanta through inference.

(7) The function of suggestion is capable of being comprehended under the process of Inference of formal type (*Parārthānumāna*). This point is illustrated by the well-known verse :

Bhrama dhārmika viśrabdhaḥ sa śunako'dya mārītastena/
Godānadītīrakūñjavāsinaḥ dr̥ptasimhena//, that means :

'O religious-minded person ! roam about freely, that wretched dog has been slain to-day by the mighty lion, residing in the groves situated on the banks of the river Godavari.' The *Parārthānumānavādin* argues that the syllogism, presented by the speaker produces a knowledge that the bank of the river Godavari is not a proper place for free movement of a man afraid of a dog in the mind of the religious-minded person.

(8) The function of suggestion is capable of being comprehended under the process of Logical Postulation (*Arthāpatti*). Logical Postulation or *Arthāpatti*, recognised by some section of philosophers as a valid source of knowledge consists in presumption of a cause from a known effect. The stock-example given of *Arthāpatti* is the expression : 'Pīno Devadatto divā na bhunkte', in which from the known fatness of Devadatta, the taking of meal by him during night is arrived at. The view-point of this section of opponents is demonstrated by the

presumption of a cause in the shape of dalliance in the oft-quoted verse :

Nihśeṣacyutacandanam stanataṭam nirmṛṣṭarāgo' dharah
Netre dūramanañjane pulakitā tanvī taveyam tanu/
Mithyāvādinī Dūti vāndhavañjanasyājñātapīḍāgame
Vāpīm snātumito gatāsi na punastasyādhamasyāntikam//

Here the given effects, namely the complete wiping away of sandal paste from the slopes of breasts, the total disappearance of redness from the lower lip and such other changes lead us to have a knowledge of the unknown effect, namely dalliance.

(9) The figures of speech comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*. There are certain figures, that are characterised by emergence of an unexpressed meaning, and these *Alaṃkāras* can safely include *Vyañjanā* and *Vyaṅgyārtha* under their purview.

(10) *Rasa*, a type of suggested meaning of the *Dhvanivādin* is not really indicated by the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* : what the *Vibhāvas* and others actually do is that, they combine to produce the non-existent unit of *Rasa*.

(11) The so-called suggested meaning *Rasa* is not brought into light through suggestion, but its enjoyment is produced through a function known as *Bhojakatva*, or in other words, *Rasa* is not suggested, but is enjoyed.

(12) The function of suggestion is unable to bring *Rasa* into comprehension : this exquisitely charming element is raised into our consciousness by another function. Though Jayaratha does not mention this function by name, Viśvanātha, while quoting the view-point of one school calls it *Rasanā*.

Of these twelve views, the last three relate to one type of suggested sense only, namely the suggested emotion, but the other nine have in their view suggested meaning in general, that presents itself in the form of a fact or a figure or an emotion. The Introductory stanza of the *Dhvanyāloka* summarises these antagonistic views into three groups. One sceptical school entirely denies the existence of the suggested sense in poetry, a second school tries to trace it back to the recognised function of *Lakṣaṇā* and the third school holds that it is beyond the province of words and can only be perceived

by a man of refined discernment. The third chapter of the work, however, while attempting to establish the separate existence of the function of suggestion introduces the point of view of that school that wants to equate *Vyañjanā* with *Tātparya*, as also of that, that tries to comprehend it under the process of Inference.

The school that declares *Dhvani* to be entirely non-existent takes up three different positions, and approaches the problem from three different angles. One sub-section of the school argues that, Poetry consists of a combination of sound and sense and the elements known as *Guṇa* as *Alaṃkāra* only go to augment the beauty of such a combination. The *Rīti* of Vāmana, it asserts, is formed through combination of *Guṇas* and the *Vṛtti* of Udbhata, in a similar manner, is capable of being dissolved into an *Alaṃkāra*, inasmuch as, alliteration formed through repetition of different types of letters constitutes different varieties of this element. This sub-section firmly denies the existence of *Dhvani* and asserts that, there is no decorating element in Poetry other than the *Guṇa* and the *Alaṃkāra*. A second sub-section of this school denies the existence of *Dhvani* on the ground that, its admission tantamounts to total rejection of the existing principles of literary criticism. Ancient scholars define Poetry as a combination of word and meaning, competent to generate supreme pleasure in the minds of connoisseurs of Poetic Art through literary excellences and figures of speech, inserted in it : as acceptance of *Dhvani* goes against this belief, and consequently, throws to winds the established norms of literary criticism, so, it points out, this element cannot be accepted as an existent entity. A third sub-section maintains that, *Dhvani* lends such a charm to a Poetic creation as is imparted to it by the much-talked of *Guṇa* and *Alaṃkāra*, and as such, these factors comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*. It is a fact that the list of poetic figures is being continually swelled by the speculations of critics and it is just possible that a new turn of expression is named *Dhvani* by the Dhvani Theorists, but still it is not proper on their part to wax eloquent in self-appraisal and to raise such a hue and cry over this self-styled

achievement. In summing up the view-points of these three sub-sections, Abhinavagupta remarks that, while the first says that there is no such beautifying element in Poetry, which is not recognised by it, the second states that an element which is not recognised by it is not an instrument of decoration at all, and the third asserts that if such an element imparts beauty to a poetic creation, it is capable of being grouped under the *Guṇa* or the *Alaṃkāra*.¹ In conclusion the Abhāvavādin observes that, *Dhvani* is a figment of imagination and consequently, does not stand critical test. In support of his observation, the Abhāvavādin cites a verse, said to be composed by one Manoratha a poet and contemporary of Ānandavardhana,—which records a sarcastic fling at the Dhvanivādin for his departure from the traditional views on Poetry : it states that, though a Dhvanivādin showers profuse praise on a specimen of Poetic Art, in which neither a charming figure nor a chiselled expression is there, simply because of the fact that it remains marked by revelation of *Dhvani*, he is not in a position to expound the nature of *Dhvani*, when challenged.² This sad state of affairs, the Abhāvavādin asserts, testifies to the fact that, *Dhvani* is a mere brain-wave of the Dhvanivādin, having no objective and real existence.

The second school of rival theorists prefers to equate *Dhvani* with *Bhākta-artha*. This peculiar term *Bhākta*, Abhinavagupta comments, is comprehensive enough to denote the ideas as are conveyed by both the functions of *Lakṣaṇā* and *Gauṇī*, recognised separately by the Mīmāṃsaka. Thus *Bhakti*, he points out, refers to a well-known relation, which constitutes one of the conditions necessary for manifestation of the secondary sense, which itself, consequently is described as *Bhākta* : then again, he continues, it refers to an attribute, which constitutes a part and parcel of the connotation of a particular term and the new sense to signify which this term is used simply because this attribute is traced in it is necessarily regarded as *Bhākta*. The term *Bhākta* is capable of being derived in other ways also : *Bhakti* is the devotion which an idea other than the primary one bears to the relation or the attribute, which constitutes a part and

parcel of the connotation of the word concerned and naturally, *Bhākta-ārtha* is the meaning brought into light through the functions of both *Lakṣaṇā* and *Gauṇī*,—functions, which depend on the relation or attribute referred to above for their operation. The term *Bhakti*, Abhinavagupta continues, conveys the idea of inapplicability of the primary meaning, as well, and these different types of derivation bring out, he asserts, the conditions necessary for operation of *Lakṣaṇā* and *Gauṇī*.⁸ It is admitted by rhetoricians and philosophers alike that, *Abhidhā* conveys the conventional idea and when this idea becomes inapplicable in the context, *Lakṣaṇā* or *Gauṇī* approaches to bring the *Lakṣaṇika* or the *Gauṇa artha* into light, relying either on usage or on some purpose. According to this school of rival theorists, *Dhvani* in all its aspects is identical with *Bhakti*, or in other words, a suggestive word is identical with an indicative word,—a suggested content is the same with the indicated content and the function of suggestion itself is nothing other than the function of Indication. The argument that the view-point that *Vyañjanā* in all its aspects is identical with *Lakṣaṇā*, as attributed to a section of the ancients is a misrepresentation, since in no works of earlier theorists do we come across the term *Dhvani*—is misleading, because, as Āṇandavardhana points out, by accepting *Lakṣaṇā* as an additional function, these theorists touch the fringe of *Dhvani*, inasmuch as, in a *Prayojanamūlā-Lakṣaṇā*, the *Prayojana* or motive for the signification of which *Lakṣaṇā* is resorted to is signified solely through *Vyañjanā*: these theorists, however, do not give a separate status to the function of suggestion and their silence on the issue is sufficient enough to bring out their belief that *Vyañjanā* is identical with *Lakṣaṇā*. To state clearly, these theorists recognise only two functions—*Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā*, of which the first conveys only the primary sense: consequently, it is an a priori conclusion that all other ideas are brought into comprehension through *Lakṣaṇā*, and as the suggested content is one different from the primary one, is to be subsumed under the indicated idea (*lakṣyārtha*).

It is very difficult to describe definitely as to who of the earlier theorists equates or equate *Bhakti* with *Dhvani*. While

Abhinavagupta quotes the names of Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and Vāmana as the upholders of the Bhaktivāda, Ruyyaka maintains that, these earlier theorists like to comprehend *Dhvani* under the *Alaṃkāras*: these critics, he asserts, recognise the essentiality and importance of the poetic figures—the instruments of decoration in a specimen of poetic art.⁵ This difference between the view-points of Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka, though appearing as highly puzzling at the first sight resolves itself on a closer analysis, which reveals that an indicated content goes to augment the beauty of an expressed idea in the same way as a poetic figure does it; this is further corroborated by the fact that the western critics grant the status of a figure of speech to Indication, which they name Metonymy or Synecdoche. The first of these figures, they point out, consists in substituting the name of one thing for that of another to which it bears a certain relation and the second in the use of a more comprehensive term for a less comprehensive or vice versa: this, it is clear, is nothing other than *Upacāra* of Sanskrit rhetoricians.

Another school of rival theorists declares *Dhvani* as lying beyond the scope of words. Shy as they are in formulating an accurate definition of *Dhvani*, these critics maintain that, the suggested content is something inexplicable and is to be relished only by men initiated into the heiroglyphics of Poetry. In summing up the relative position of these three anti-dhvani schools, Abhinavagupta points out that, each of the views recorded in succession marks a definite improvement on the preceding one: thus, while the first group, which denies completely the existence of *Dhvani* recognises only the function of *Abhidhā*, the second, which wants to equate *Vyañjanā* with *Lakṣaṇā* extends recognition to the second function of Indication, as well, though it is not sure as to the existence of *Vyañjana* and the idea signified by it, and the third section, which describes *Dhvani* as lying beyond the comprehension of words hesitates only, though sure of its existence to formulate its definition in clear-cut terms.⁶

II

Dhvani—a profound verity

Against the attacks of the anti-dhvani schools, which deny the existence of *Dhvani* or try to comprehend it under different processes, Ānandavardhana replies that, being a profound verity it is capable of being established positively by an examination of aesthetic facts, as well as facts of experience and that this unexpressed content is incapable of being satisfactorily explained as revealed by *Abhidhā*, *Lakṣaṇā* or similar other means. The inward experience of connoisseurs of poetic art, he asserts, reveals the fact that, *Dhvani* constitutes the essence of all poetic creations of master artists : it is different, he continues, from the expressive word and the expressed meaning and is incapable of being equated with such elements as *Guṇas* and *Alaṃkāras* even. In his eagerness to establish the distinction of *Dhvani* from other elements of Poetry, Ānandavardhana introduces the parallelism of grace of a lady ; just as the loveliness of a lady is something different from her limbs or ornaments or absence of defects, similarly, the suggested sense-unit, also, he points out, is something distinct from the primary meaning, the instruments of decoration and the absence of blemishes in Poetry. An examination of historical facts also, he observes, points out to *Rasadhvani* as forming the essence of a poetic creation : thus, the first specimen of Poetry—the *Rāmāyaṇa* is an external manifestation only of the tragic emotion aroused in the mind of Vālmīki on hearing the pitiful cries of the poor bird, separated from its consort. In explaining this observation, Abhinavagupta remarks, the ordinary sorrow, experienced by the bird generated extra-ordinary tragic emotion (*Karuṇa-Rasa*) in the mind of the seer, and in the manner of water gushing forth from its container, overflowed by it, this emotion extending beyond the limits of his mind appeared outside and as it came, it assumed the shape of the verses of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. This remark of Abhinavagupta is quite in keeping with his theory on aesthetic experience, inasmuch as, it maintains the distinction between a *laukika* feeling and an *alaukika-Rasa*,

showing, thereby, that the ordinary cause-and-effect theory is not applicable in case of extra-ordinary *Rasa*.

Before adumbrating the doctrine of *Dhvani*, Ānandavardhana proceeds to establish the absolute distinction of the suggested content from expressed one.⁷ The suggested sense-unit or the *Pratīyamānārtha*, which is raised into comprehension by the suggestive power of a word and its corresponding primary concept, he asserts, presents itself in three different aspects. It may either be a suggested fact or matter (*Vastu*) or an unexpressed imaginative mood which may be put into the shape of a poetic figure (*Alaṃkāra*) or an implicit emotional mood (*Rasa*) or feeling (*Bhāva*). The first occurs when a distinct subject or thought—a matter-of-fact is suggested : the second when the suggested sense constitutes something imaginative,—being something distinct from a matter-of-fact,—which, if expressed in so many words, would assume the form of a poetic figure : and the last where a feeling or a mood, which is directly unexpressable, but which can be suggested is brought into comprehension as the principal element. *Rasa* or *Bhāva* is directly unexpressable : it is only suggested by the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and the *Vyabhicāribhāva*, that constitute the expressed sense. The fact that *Rasa* is incapable of being conveyed through the function of denotation, Ānandavardhana points out, is testified to by non-generation of any feeling, whatsoever, on hearing the simple word *Rasa* or words denotative of its particular types, such as *Śṛṅgāra*, *Karuṇa* and the like : naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. Nor do such words as *Vibhāva* *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhicāribhāva* present *Rasa* directly. On the other hand, *Rasa* is experienced from perception of Poetry, depicting the *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and the *Vyabhicāribhāva* : at the time of enjoyment of Poetry these factors are not conceived as ordinary causes and effects by the refined reader or the spectator, as the case may be, whose sense of narrow individuality is put into sleep through the process of generalisation, but are taken consequently, as certain abstract general ideas, as a result of which impersonal pleasure is derived by him : and this happens in all cases, irrespective of the nature of mood,

depicted in Poetry. Bightly does Dr. S. K. De remark, "We can give a name to them, such as love, grief, horror, but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best, therefore, it can be suggested. What the poet can directly express or describe are the *Vibhāvas* etc. but with the help of these expressed elements, which must be generalised and conceived, not as they appear in the natural *laukika* world, but as they may be imagined in the world of Poetry, the poet can awaken in us through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular dissociated *Alaukika* condition of the soul in which the relish of feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling, as for instance, Duṣyanta whom he describes felt, but he can call up a reflection of it, which is similar in some respects; and the condition of the reader's soul in the enjoyment of such feeling in Poetry and Drama is the relish of *Rasa*, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas". Thus it is clear that, the suggested mood or feeling is absolutely distinct from the expressed content.

The second type of suggested sense, viz. the suggested imaginative mood, also, is distinct from an expressed poetic figure. It is recognised by such ancient scholars as Bhāmaha and Udbhaṭa that certain expressed figures remain characterised by apprehension of a few imaginative moods in the background. Thus, for example, in the expressed figure *Vyatireka*, there exists an apprehension of suggested *Upamā* in the background, and such is the case with *Dīpaka* also. This observation of the ancients, Ānandavardhana points out, testifies to the ability of the function of suggestion to bring an *Alaukika* into comprehension. In fact, when the figures of speech are conveyed through the function of suggestion, they become endowed with unexpressable charm and attain the status of the soul of Poetry. Commenting on this observation of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta remarks, an expressed figure, when improvised skilfully by a poet endowed with strong creative genius can utmost be brought into an intimate relation with the body of Poetry

in the manner of saffron-paste, but it can never be transformed into the soul of a poetic creation: a suggested poetic figure, on the other hand, does not remain a mere instrument of decoration, but rather is elevated to the status of soul of Poetry, which, in its turn, is ornamented by other instruments.⁸ The imaginative mood, Ānandavardhana maintains, may be conveyed through suggestion in both *Śabdaśaktimūla* and *Arthaśaktimūla* types of *Dhvani*. Thus the stanza:

Unnataḥ prolāsaddhāraḥ kālāgurumalīmasaḥ/
Payodharabharastanyāḥ kaṁ nā cakre' bhilāṣinam//

in which similarity between the rows of clouds and the breasts of the lady is brought into consciousness through *Vyañjanā* furnishes an illustration of *Alaukikādhvani* of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type. The Dhvani theorist thinks that this is a case of *Upamā-dhvani*: as the relation of similarity, referred to above is not clearly stated in words, so, he continues, the *Upamā*, contained in the stanza is incapable of being regarded as an expressed figure. In a similar manner, the verse:

Lāvanyakāntiparipūritadīnmukhe'smin.
Smere' dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi/
Kṣobham yadeti na manāgapi tena manye

Suvyaktameva jalarāśirayaṁ payodhiḥ//, in which identity between the face and the moon is brought into comprehension through *Vyañjanā* affords an example of *Alaukikādhvani* of *Arthaśaktimūla* type. Explaining this illustration, Abhinavagupta observes, the expressed figure here is *Śleṣa*, based on the use of the word *Jalarāśi* and the suggested figure is *Rūpaka*, causing a superimposition of moon on the face of the heroine: as the suggested *Rūpaka* is more charming than the expressed *Śleṣa*, so, he continues, in accordance with the dictum: '*Prādhānyena vyapadeśā bhavanti*', the verse is designated *Rūpaka-dhvani*.

The suggested fact, also, in its turn, Ānandavardhana continues, is absolutely different from the expressed fact. The suggested differs from the expressed (1) in point of form, (2) in point of substratum of cognition and (3) in point of cause of comprehension, as well. This difference, he asserts, is a

definite pointer to the absolute distinction of the unexpressed from the expressed.

Hemacandra in his *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* quotes a number of *Prākṛta* Gāthās to establish the difference between the expressed and suggested meanings in point of form. In the verse :

‘Bhama Dhammia visattho so suṇao ajja mārio teṇa/
Golāṇaikatthakudaṅgavāsiṇā Dariasīheṇa//

meaning : ‘O religious-minded person ! roam about freely now, because that dog has been slain to-day by the powerful lion, residing in the groves situated on the banks of the river Godavari’, the expressed meaning is injunction, but the suggested meaning is prohibition, because the intention of the speaker is to tender covertly an advice not to move about freely on the banks of the river, infested with a mighty lion. The verse ;

‘Attā ittha nu majjai ettha aham diasayam paloei/
Ma pahiya rattiandhaya sījāe maham nu majjihisi//

meaning : ‘Herein lies my mother-in-law ; herein do I ; mark O traveller, during day-time : blind as you are at night, do not steal into my bed’ apparently presents negation, because the traveller is prohibited to steal into the bed of the speaker, but in reality, however, it gives an indication to him to approach the sleeping-place of the lady secretly at night ; thus the expressed meaning is negation, but the suggested sense is affirmation. These verses go to show that, the expressed and suggested meanings are mutually opposed to each other. There are certain specimens of poetic creation in which two different injunctions or prohibitions are brought into light through the functions of denotation and suggestion. In the verse :

‘Bahalatamā haarāi ajja pauttho paī gharam sunṇam/
Taha jaggisajju sajjiya na jahā amhe musijjāmo//

meaning : ‘The wretched night is terribly dark, my husband has gone abroad this very day : there is nobody in the house ; O dweller next door, keep vigil so that thieves may not rob us’ the expressed meaning is affirmation because a request to keep wakeful is being tendered through *Abhiḍhā*, and the suggested meaning also is another affirmation, in as much as, a request

to approach the speaker fearlessly during night is being conveyed to the neighbour. The verse :

‘Āsāyam aṇāena jettīyam tattīeṇa baṃdhadihiṃ/
Uramasuvasahainhiṃ rakkhijjai gabavichittam//

meaning : ‘The land of the householder is being protected from wicked bulls, moving to and fro according to their sweet wills’ apparently prohibits one from allowing free access to wicked bulls in the field of the householder, but really it gives a hint to the paramour not to approach the house. There are certain specimens of poetic creation in which the expressed meaning is neither affirmation nor negation, but the suggested is either a positive injunction or a definite prohibition. The two verses :

‘Mahuehiṃ kiṃ ca panthiya jai harasi niyaṃsaṇam niyambāo/
Sahemi kassa ratne (?) gāmo dūre aham ekkā//

meaning : ‘You are a fool, O traveller ; if you take away the garment of my waist, how shall I..... ; the village is far of and I am alone’ and

‘Jīvitāsū balavatī dhanāsā durbalā mama/
Gaccha vā tiṣṭha vā pāntha svāvasthā tu niveditā//

meaning : ‘With me the urge to live long is strong and the desire to acquire riches is feeble ; O traveller ! you are at liberty to go or stay : my condition has been made known to you’ are illustrations to the point. In these verses the expressed meaning is neither affirmation nor negation, as it consists only in statement of sheer fact, but in the first one the implicit meaning is an injunction, as a subtle hint is given to the person addressed to remove even the waist-garment of the speaker, and in the second one, this is prohibitive in character, because the words of the lady, perturbed by thought of impending separation go only to prevent the departure of her husband. In some cases denotation presents affirmation relating to one and negation relating to another, while suggestion conveys injunction or prohibition as the case may be, concerning a different thing. The two verses :

‘Niadaiadamsanukhitta pahiya annēṇa vaccasu pāheṇa/
Gavaidhūyā dullaṅghavāgurā iha hayaggāme//

meaning : ‘O traveller, proud of the beauty of your wife as

you are, proceed by another route ; in this village there is the daughter of our householder,—an uncrossable noose' and

'Uccīṇasu paḍiyam kusumam mā dhūṇa sebhāliyam
hāliyasunhe/

Esa avasānavirasō sasureṇa suo valayasaddo//

meaning : O daughter-in-law of the farmer, collect flowers dropped on the ground : do not shake the Śephālikā tree ; the sound of your bangles, harsh at its end is irritating your father-in-law' are illustrations to the point. In both these verses the expressed meaning is comprised of one affirmation and one negation, inasmuch as, in the former the traveller is asked not to proceed by old route, but to go by another, and in the second the lady is asked to collect dropped flowers and not to shake the tree, but whereas in the former a covert hint is given to the traveller to enjoy the company of the beautiful maid, in the latter a similar hint is given to the girl not to make sound with the bangles at the time of wanton enjoyment. The fact that a suggested meaning does not bear any definite relation to the expressed one is testified to by the verses :

'Siṇiam vacca kisoyari paṇa yatteṇa ṭhavisu mahivaṭṭhe/

Bhajjihi siviṇchayacchaṇi vihiṇā dukkheṇa ṇimmaciyā//

meaning : 'O slim-figured lady, go slowly : with great care live in this world ; enjoy at your sweet will your desired objects ; providence has set you free from sufferings,'

'De ā pasiya niyattasu muhasasijonhāviluttatamanivahe/

Ahisāriyāṇam viggham karesi aṇṇāṇam vi hayāse//

meaning : 'Be pleased O Lady ! the dispeller of darkness with the light of your moon-face : go back ; O disappointed one ! you are hampering the cause of other girls also set out for their lover's places',

'Vacca maham viya ekkāe huṃtu nissāsaroiyavvāim/

Mā tujjha vi ttiṇ viṇā dakkhinnahayassa jāyamtu//

meaning : 'Proceed, let sighs and lamentations remain with me alone ; may not these overpower thee also, separated from your new love and tired of showing impartiality towards all', and

'Nahamuhapasāhiyaṃgo niddāghummaṃtaloyano na tahā/

Jaha nibbaṇāharosā malamga dūṇesi maha hiyayam//

meaning : 'Your limbs bearing nail-marks and sleepy eyes do not pain me so much as do these lips of mine, devoid of scar-marks'. In the first of this group of four verses, the expressed meaning is affirmative in character, because the lady is advised to proceed slowly, but the suggested sense is only the desire of the speaker to do good to her. In the second the expressed meaning is prohibitive in nature, because the girl is requested to refrain from further journey, but the implicit meaning is the intention of the speaker to please her. In the third the expressed meaning is comprised of both affirmation and negation, because while movement of the lover is affirmed, appearance of sigh and lamentations in him is prohibited, but the suggested sense is the indignation of the irritated lady. In the fourth verse the expressed meaning, comprised as it is of a mere statement of fact is neither injunctive nor prohibitive in character, and the suggested meaning is the feeling of the speaker that as the hero is over head and ears in love with a new love, there is no chance of her attaining his favour and attachment now.⁹

In order to demonstrate the distinction of the implicit idea from an explicit one in point of substratum of cognition, Ānandavardhana, and following him Hemacandra quote the Prākṛta Gāthā, that runs as :

'Kassa vā na hoi roso daṇṭṭhūṇa piāe savvaṇam aharam/

Sabhamarapaumagghāini vāriavāme sahasu ehnim//

and means : 'Who indeed is not enraged to see the lips of her beloved, bearing scar-marks thereon ; O lady ! you attempted to take the fragrance of a lotus with bees hovering about it without paying heed to our prohibition : now you have got to stand the admonition of your husband'. Abhinavagupta says that, this verse is addressed by a lady to her friend in whose limbs signs of dalliance with paramour are fully manifested in presence of her husband. Here the expressed meaning is meant for the friend—the person addressed to, but different suggested meanings are comprehended by different persons. The husband understands that the girl is not at fault, the dweller next door knows

that she has done no wrong, the co-wife realises that she basks in the sunshine of her husband's favour, the paramour cognises that clear signs of dalliance should not be affixed to the limbs of his fiancée again and the refined reader is charmed as he grasps the keenness of intellect of the speaker, as is evinced by the act of managing the situation in this way.

According to the Dhvanivādin, the difference in the causes of comprehension of these two meanings, also, go to differentiate them from each other. Whereas the expressed meaning is cognised by one conversant with the rules of grammar and lexicons, the suggested sense is comprehended only by him who has got a special type of intellectual training. This exquisitely charming suggested sense remains undiscovered to one not initiated into poetic hieroglyphics, just as the real nature of musical notes remain unknown to one, who though well-versed in the theory of music does not sing at all.¹⁰

III

Dhvani versus Abhidhā and Lakṣaṇā

The Mīmāṃsakas regard the function of suggestion as one identical with that of denotation. In support of their proposition they quote the dictum 'Yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdarthaḥ', which is interpreted to mean this that, a meaning to signify which a sentence is used forms the primary meaning of that sentence. The application of this dictum renders an unexpressed meaning, for the signification of which all poetic elements are used in such a way that they become subservient to it—an expressed one, capable of being conveyed through the function of denotation. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, *Abhidhā* produces cognition of both the expressed and the so-called unexpressed meanings of the Ālankārikas,—the cognition of the first leading to that of the second in the same way, in which understanding of the import of a term leads to the knowledge of the import of a whole proposition. As against this view, the Ālankārikas hold that, not only is the suggested sense different from the

expressed one, but the function of suggestion, also, is absolutely distinct from the function of expression. And this is so, because the meanings conveyed by them, as well as their nature are essentially different. *Abhidhā* signifies a meaning that is directly and eternally related to a word, and as such is known as the primary meaning, while *Vyañjanā* brings into light a meaning that is related to a word in an indirect way,—being suggested by the primary meaning of the word. The very fact that musical notes and gestures that are never endowed with the function of denotation, not being word-entities bring into comprehension certain *Rasas* through suggestion proves beyond doubt the absolute distinction of *Vyañjanā* from *Abhidhā*. As regards the dictum 'Yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdarthaḥ' the Ālankārikas observe that, it relates only to Vedic injunctions and is to be interpreted to mean this: Of the meanings of terms, flashing forth on the understanding of an import of a proposition, those that are already accomplished are never laid down: what a sentence enjoins is a meaning, that is yet to be accomplished; to state clearly, the drift of a sentence lies in what is actually laid down in it and this constitutes the actual meaning of the sentence, because to signify this, which is not known from any other source, a sentence is used. The Vedic injunction 'Dadhnā juhōti', meaning 'he makes an oblation of curds' opens before us two alternatives as regards the actual action enjoined in it, of which one is performance of sacrifice and the other is oblation of curd. Now as another Vedic sentence: 'Agnihotraṃ juhōti' enjoins performance of sacrifice, that becomes an accomplished fact; thus, what the injunction 'Dadhnā juhōti' lays down is not performance of sacrifice, but instrumentality of curd in oblation: it gives information about the material to be used, and that indeed is the drift of the sentence. Similarly the moving about of priests being known from other sources, in the sentence 'Lohitoṣṇāśā Rṭvijāḥ Pracaranti' the assertion is meant simply to lay down that the priests should wear red head-dresses, and not to lay down that they should move about. This interpretation of the dictum makes it clear that, the spirit of a sentence lies only in

meanings, expressed through words actually used, because actions, presented directly through words alone are enjoined. If anything that may be implied be included in the import of a proposition, then the sentence 'the former man is running (*Pūro Dhāvati*)' may also mean 'the latter man is running (*Aparo dhāvati*)', because the sense of latter is implied by the term 'former', both being relative terms. The suggested sense is neither conveyed through words, denotative of them nor does it form in all cases an enjoined meaning : so it is incapable of being regarded as the primary sense of a proposition, conveyed through the function of denotation. The explanation of the dictum '*Yatparaḥ śabdaḥ sa śabdārthaḥ*', as furnished by the *Ālankārikas* is challenged by some critics who refers as an illustration to violation to the maxim two sentences : 'Eat poison, and do not eat in this man's house (*Viṣaṃ bhukṣa mā cāsyā gṛhe bhukṣta*)', the real import of which lies in the meaning : 'meal should not be taken in this house',—a sense, that is not expressed through words, actually used in the first sentence. In reply to this Mammāṭa says that, in reality, these two sentences, as is indicated by the particle 'ca' constitute a single sentence. Two independent propositions, containing two different finite verbs, however, cannot normally form a single sentence, nor can the first proposition be taken in its face value, because it is not possible for a man to advise swallowing of poison to his friend. The primary meaning of the proposition, thus, being incompatible, indication is taken recourse to, and it signifies the sense that, eating in the house of the man concerned is more harmful than swallowing of poison. The first sentence, expressing this meaning through *Lakṣaṇā* provides a reason for establishment of the sense of the second sentence, and is thus, for all practical purposes, a clause subordinate to the second one. Thus as the two sentences form a single sentence, whose import lies in a meaning, conveyed by words, actually used, the question of violation to the dictum, as pointed out by opponents does not arise.

With irrefutable logic Ānandavardhana points out that, the speculations of the Mīmāṃsakas themselves go to establish the separate existence of the function of suggestion. A sound,

according to the Mīmāṃsakas, is neither produced by vocal organs nor is liable to disappearance as soon as the act of utterance is over. But what actually takes place is that the operation of the vocal apparatus serves to manifest, instead of producing, the sound, that is ever existent. To the Mīmāṃsakas, relation between words and their meanings is natural or eternal and not something brought about by convention of human origin. The author of the *Bhāṣya* interprets this relation as inseparable, that is to say, words and their corresponding things are not first of all produced and then get themselves connected with one another : but their reciprocal association is fixed by nature. The Mīmāṃsakas are compelled to ascribe eternality to both words and their relation to meanings for the sole purpose of maintaining the unquestionable trustworthiness of the Vedas. Now as an ordinary expression, composed by a human being presents the same eternal meaning as is done by a Vedic expression, that has for its author a mystic agency,—relation between sound and sense being eternal, what differentiates the former from the latter is the intention of the speaker brought into light through the function of suggestion. This intention that forms a suggested meaning is an accidental attribute (*Upādhika-Dharma*) that is transmitted to word and expressed meaning by such factors (*Upādhi*) as the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, time, place, context and the like. A parallel is to be found in redness, communicated to a pearl by its sheer proximity to a red flower. An ordinary expression, though conveying its eternal meaning through the function of denotation signifies, at the same time, the intention of the speaker, who being a human being is very likely to err, and accordingly it presents incorrect meanings : a Vedic expression, on the other hand, does not convey through suggestion any intention of a human agency and so it always conveys correct and trustworthy facts. The argument that the same ordinary expression can never convey eternal and as such correct meanings and false facts simultaneously does not hold good, because things that do not give up their real nature are found to produce contrary results, when borrowed attributes are communicated to them.

An illustration is found in the case of the moon, which, though pleasing the entire world by its cool rays consume a passionate lover.¹¹ With these arguments Ānandavardhana establishes that the Mīmāṃsakas, who want to place beyond dispute the trustworthiness of Vedic expressions and incorrectness of ordinary expressions are compelled to accept the existence of an unnatural function belonging to a word and this function is nothing other than *Vyañjanā*.

Taking cue from Ānandavardhana, Mammaṭa launches another attack on the Mīmāṃsakas and shows that neither the doctrine of *Abhihitānvayavāda*, as propounded by Kumārila nor that of *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*, as adumbrated by Prabhākara is competent enough to equate *Vyañjanā* with *Abhihā*. These two views refer to the construction of a sentence as also to the meaning expressed by it. In accordance with the former view, a sentence is to be explained either as a combination of words (*saṃghāta*) or as an order (*Krama*), and according to the latter, inflected words, possessing mutual expectancy (*sarvapaḍam sākāṅkṣam*) go to constitute a sentence. The doctrine of *Abhihitānvayavāda*, as interpreted by Mammaṭa states that, words convey meanings in general, having no connection with others, and in a sentence as the function of denotation ceases after bringing into light the imports of individual terms, a function known as Purport (*Tātparyā*) begins to operate and brings into comprehension connection among the meanings of different words, that forms the import of the whole proposition. An *Abhihitānvayavādī* is inclined to make association (*saṃsarga*) the import of a proposition and says that a sentence acquires some special feature in course of its denoting the intended sense. To make it more clear, when the meanings of different words in a sentence are correlated with one another, there arises invariably some additional signification, distinct from those of the constituents, that is to say, the sense that is evolved from such association or correlation of meanings is something more than a mere totality of them. To signify this new sense these thinkers postulate the existence of a separate function,

known as Purport (*Tātparyā*). Apart from conveying special signification this new function according to some, presents particular meanings in the form of individuals of component words,—*Abhihā* ceasing to function after bringing into light the sense of class-element only. The postulation of a separate function in order to bring into light the import of a proposition itself, Mammaṭa points out, proves the absurdity of establishing identity between *Abhihā* and *Vyañjanā*: the stages recognised in *Arthaśaktimūla* type of Dhvani are understanding of imports of individual terms, cognition of import of the whole proposition and comprehension of the suggested sense; as *Abhihā* is incapable of going up to the second step and signifying the sense of a sentence, the question of its moving upto the third step and bringing into comprehension the implicit idea does not arise. Contrary to the view of the *Abhihitānvayavādī*, the *Anvitābhīdhānavādī* holds that, the meaning of a sentence is for all practical purpose the same as signified by its component parts. What is special signification or import to the adherents of the former view is considered by them to be nothing more than those that are denoted by individual words themselves. These thinkers say that, of all the factors, leading to knowledge of meanings, the usage of elderly people is the most important, because it is the first to bring home to children the imports of terms. In ordinary life a child understands meanings from a sentence alone, because this has the capacity to enage a man in a particular work, as also to dissuade him from that. When a child hears a man say to his servant 'Bring the cow (*Gāmānaya*)', he sees the employee moving an animal having dewlap and horns from one place to another and infers that the latter has grasped the import of the proposition, as otherwise he would not have cared to move an animal like that: subsequently, the relation of signifier and signified (*vācyavācakabhāva*), existing between the indivisible proposition and the total import is comprehended by him through the process of logical postulation (*Arthāpatti*), that consists in arriving at an unknown cause from a given effect. According to an *Anvitābhīdhānavādī*, the relation existing between words and meanings is thus grasped through

three processes—Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), Inference (*Anumāna*), and Logical postulation (*Arthāpatti*). At a late stage the child hears such expressions as : 'Take away the cow (*Gām naya*)', 'Bring the horse (*Aśvamānaya*)' and by applying the methods of Agreement and Difference ascertains the imports of individual terms, that appear to him not as unconnected entities, but as connected ones. Thus the term 'Bring (*Ānaya*)' conveys through denotation the sense of the act of bringing related to an object and the term 'Cow (*Gām*)' signifies the sense of an animal, having connection with others. As the connection existing between different meanings is conveyed through the function of denotation, these writers do not think it necessary to postulate the separate existence of a function known as Purport. It is to note in this connection that, *Abhidhā* expresses things as connected with others in general and not having any connection with a particular thing : for example, the word 'Bring' denotes the act of bringing as being connected with an object in general, and not with any particular object. In a proposition, however, particular meanings and their mutual correlations are realised, for the comprehension of which an *Anvitābhidhānavādī* is forced to depend on the efficacy of expectancy (*Ākāṅkṣā*), competency (*Yogyatā*) and proximity (*Āsatti*). These factors, they say, help the function of denotation to bring into light the import of a proposition,—the extremely particular nature of a meaning. Now as *Abhidhā*, unaided by expectancy, compatibility and proximity does not signify even an import of a proposition it is wrong to attribute to it the signification of an implicit idea, that flashes forth only after the cognition of the explicit meaning of a sentence,—the *Vākyārtha*.¹² The argument that, causes are inferred from effects, and cognition of all meanings, appearing in chain on hearing of a particular word, being caused by that word itself, a single function is competent enough to bring into light the different types of meanings has slender legs to stand upon. Words are not generators (*Kāraṇahetu*) of meanings, because the latter, being eternal do not admit of production : what they actually do is that, they make the already existing meanings known, and are thus regarded as their indicators (*Jñāpaka-hetu*).

But until the relation of a particular word with a particular meaning is known, that word does not signify that special sense, which is brought into light solely through a function. This proposition holds good in case of a suggested meaning also, that is pointed out through the function of suggestion by its indicator word-unit,—a unit that can never be regarded as a cause unless the power of suggestion is taken into account. The counter-proposition that, it is possible for a word to signify a sense even without the help of a function is dangerous, because it cuts *Abhidhā* also at its roots. In a similar manner, the analogy of the same arrow destroying the armour, piercing the heart and ultimately killing the enemy by a single velocity quoted to illustrate the magnitude of power of *Abhidhā* is of no help. This parallelism drawn to its logical extreme renders the feelings of joy and sorrow, arising in individuals on hearing pieces of good and bad news,—that are known through inference—as specimens of primary meanings, being conveyed through the function of denotation. This extended power granted to denotation not only comes in clash with the scope of inference (*Anumāna*), but expressing the indicated sense lands Indication (*Iakṣṇā*) also in jeopardy. The omnipotence of *Abhidhā* is further falsified by an axiom of Jaimini according to which, in case of conflict between *Śruti*, *Liṅga*, *Vākya*, *Prakaraṇa*, *Sthāna* and *Samākhyā*, the former prevails over the latter, because apprehension of meaning is gradually more and more delayed in each of these successive pointers. A word independent of other evidence is *Śruti* : the potential power of a word is *Liṅga* : words signifying one unified sense through mutual expectancy constitute *Vākya* : mutual expectancy itself is *Prakaraṇa* : *Sthāna* is mention in same place, and a word, whose derivative meaning is taken into account constitutes *Samākhyā*. The assumption of delayed cognition, as found in the aphorism of Jaimini renders the proposition of *Abhidhā* bringing into comprehension all meanings—untenable, because the very idea of the function of denotation conveying all meanings simultaneously is opposed to the concept of gradual and delayed cognition.¹³

There are other evidences that go to prove the absolute

distinction of *Vyañjanā* from *Abhidhā*. Of these the prohibition, enunciated by the *Ālaṃkārikas* to use such expressions as '*Ruciṃkuru*' (meaning: Be thou attached) in a specimen of Poetic Art is one. The reason behind this prohibition is this that, in the expression quoted above, the term '*Ciṅku*', formed through an euphonic combination of the two words '*Ruciṃ*' and '*Kuru*' is sufficient enough to bring into light an indecorous sense, as the term '*Ciṅku*' itself denotes private part of a female species. The indecorous sense, referred to above is incapable of being comprehended through *Abhidhā*, because its expressive word is conspicuous by its absence in the sentence. It is the function of suggestion alone that conveys the indecorous idea, and so, a Dhvanivādī argues, it is wrong to deny its existence. The classification of defects, relating to Poetry into two groups: defects that are universally regarded as blemishes (*Nityadoṣa*) and defects that are not always considered as faults (*Anityadoṣa*) also bears testimony to its existence. The first group is represented by such defects as *Cyutasamskāra* and *Kliṣṭatva* and the second by such as *Śrutiduṣṭatva* and *Punaruktatva*. If Poetry is considered to consist of expressive word and expressed meaning only, that constitute its body, then the proposition that defects do not always mar its charm becomes an absurd one, because, in all cases, a defect is sure to render a body ugly. This proposition, however, seems acceptable, if the separate existence of a soul of Poetry, which according to the Dhvani Theorists, is nothing other than a suggested emotion is posited: *Śrutiduṣṭatva* is an *anityadoṣa*, because it mars the beauty of erotic (*Śṛṅgāra*), but not of heroic (*Vīra*). Thirdly, the observation of the *Ālaṃkārikas*, that in a good poetry words actually used by a Poet do not admit of replacement by the synonyms,—such substitution failing to bring out all that is intended to be conveyed by the word itself and making the poet say something new—goes to establish the contention that *Vyañjanā* is a profound verity. The well-known verse of Kumārasambhavam, that runs as follows:

Dvayaṃ gatam samprati śocanīyatām
Samāgamaprārthanayā kapālinah/

Kalā ca sā kāntimatī kalāvata-

Stvamasya lokasya ca netrakaumudī//

and means: Two things have now become pitiable by their desire for union with the holder of skulls—the sweet digit of the moon and the good self of Pārvatī, both of whom enchant the eyes—illustrates the point pressed forward by the *Ālaṃkārikas*. The pitiableness of the situation implied by the term '*Kapālinah*' here is incapable of being conveyed by its synonym '*Piṇākinah*' though there is absolutely no difference between the primary meanings of the two terms, both being names of Lord Śiva. And the reason is clearly traceable. The term '*Kapālinah*' presents through suggestion the disgusting picture of Lord Śiva, and thereby brings into full relief the pitiableness of the situation,—the terribly deplorable lot of Pārvatī, eager for union with him. A completely different picture, however, is presented by the term '*Piṇākinah*', that refers to the holder of a Bow: it brings into light the heroism of the Lord and thus is not an appropriate substitute. Fourthly, the primary meaning differs from the suggested one in point of number also; the first one is always one and the same, but the second one differs according to the speciality of the context, speaker and person spoken to. Thus the sentence 'The Sun has set (*Gato'stamarakaḥ*)' conveys through denotation only one sense which is constant, but signifies through suggestion different ideas under different circumstances; it means (1) This is just the time to attack the enemy, when spoken by a General to his soldiers, (2) The time to approach the lover secretly has come, when spoken by a friend to a lady of easy virtues, (3) In no time will your darling be back, when addressed by a friend to a lady whose husband has gone out, (4) we should stop now, when uttered by labourers among themselves, (5) Let the vespertine rites be started, when uttered by hermits among themselves, (6) Don't go far, when addressed by a man to a person going out on an errand, (7) Bring back the cows home, when spoken by a man to the tenderer of the cows, (8) Now the temperature will come down, when spoken by a friend to one afflicted with heat in summer, (9) Let the things displayed for sale be collected,

when said by a shopkeeper to his employee, (10) Even now your husband has not come back, when addressed by a friend to a lady, waiting for her consort, and so on. Fifthly, the primary meaning differs from the suggested one in point of time of cognition; the expressed is grasped first, the unexpressed is comprehended next. Sixthly, the conveying agents of these two differ; the first one is conveyed by a word-unit, but the second one is brought into light by a word, as also a portion of it, the primary meaning, letter, style etc. Seventhly, the expressed and the unexpressed meanings differ in point of their respective effects. One who grasps the expressed sense is known as intelligent, but one who catches the subtle sense is regarded as really of cultivated taste; further, the former brings about only a comprehension, while the latter produces exquisite charm. Eighthly, the two meanings, as is evident from the expression: '*Gato* *stamarkaḥ*' quoted above differ in point of number also. Thus it is clear that the suggested meaning can in no case be equated with the expressed one.

The Dhvani Theorists proceed, as well, to establish the distinction of a suggestive unit from a denotative unit. A word that brings into light the conventional primary meaning is regarded as a denotative word, and naturally, it depends for its existence on a primary meaning. A suggestive word, however, is independent of it: it is capable of conveying any idea not having any connection whatsoever with the primary one. Secondly, a denotative unit in all cases is a word, but suggestive unit is not necessarily a word; even ideas are endowed with the power to suggest subtler meanings. The distinction of the suggested sense from the expressed one, as also that of the suggestive unit from the expressive one goes only to establish the absolute distinction of the function of suggestion from that of denotation.

It is said that a suggested meaning is multiple in number, is a cause of special appellation, inasmuch as, a person who apprehends it is called a man of cultivated taste, and is dependent on word, primary meaning and context for its comprehension. It

is pointed out that all these features are present in the secondary sense, conveyed through the function of Indication. An indicated meaning, also, is characterised by multiplicity; in the expression *Rāma* as I am, I shall endure everything (*Rāmo'smi sarvaṃ sahe*), the term *Rāma* means 'One who has suffered much', but the same term refers to 'a hard-hearted person' and 'famous as being the hero of many battles' in the expressions: 'Very fond of life, *Rāma* as I am, I have not done what befits love (*Rāmeṇa priyajīvitena tu kṛtaṃ preṇnaḥ priye nocitam*)' and 'This *Rāma* has attained fame by the excellence of his valour (*Rāmosau bhuvaneṣu vikramaḡuṇaiḥ prāptaḥ prasiddhiṃ parām*)' respectively. Secondly an indicated meaning, in its turn, entitles a piece of poetic creation to achieve such new appellations as *Arthāntara-saṃkrāntavācya* and *Atyantatiraskṛtavācya*. Thirdly the comprehension of this meaning depends on the knowledge of word, primary meaning and context, and this is so, because incompatibility of the primary meaning, presented by expressive word with the rest of the sentence, along with its inability to convey the intention of the speaker is a necessary condition for operation of Indication. In the light of these similarities existing between the indicated and the suggested sense-units, it is argued that, there is no necessity of admitting the function of suggestion as distinct from that of Indication.

To refute this contention, the Dhvanivādin argues in the following way: Firstly, though the indicated meaning appears differently in different expressions, in a single expression it is always one and the same. A number of suggested meanings, however, as is evident in the sentence 'The Sun has set (*Gato* *stamarkaḥ*)' are apprehended from the same expression, according to the difference in the characters of the speaker and the person spoken to. Secondly, an indicated meaning always bears some definite relation to the expressed one, but the suggested one has only an accidental or remote or even no connection with it. Thirdly, the incompatibility of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence is an essential condition of the operation of Indication, but this factor though present in *Avivakṣitarācya* type of Dhvani is totally absent in *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type.

Fourthly, in Indication based on purpose, the motive for the signification of which Indication is taken recourse to is, as has been established before, incapable of being conveyed through the functions of Denotation and Indication. Fifthly, Indication depends for its operation on a set of conditions, which are— inapplicability of the expressed meaning in the given context, existence of some connection between the primary and secondary sense-units and the presence of usage or purpose. And such is the case with denotation also : it too depends for its operation on a condition in the shape of convention, because it brings into light only the conventional meaning that forms the object of divine volition. Neither Denotation nor Indication conveys any and every sense, their powers being restricted by two factors,— by Divine Will in the case of the first and by a set of conditions in the case of the second. For this reason, Indication is regarded as an extension of Denotation : to quote the Ālankārikas 'a tail of *Abhidhā*'. As *Lakṣaṇā* is merely a tail of *Abhidhā* and as *Vyañjanā* is incapable of being identified with *Abhidhā*, it is perfectly clear that it is incapable of being equated with *Lakṣaṇā* also. The powers of *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā* are restricted, but the same cannot be said of *Vyañjanā* ; its powers are unlimited : it goes to any length and brings into light any idea.

In order to establish the absolute distinction of *Vyañjanā* from *Guṇavṛtti*, Ānandavardhana introduces the question of difference between these two in points of form and content. *Guṇavṛtti*, as is evident from its nomenclature, refers to a function of word, that operates depending on such qualities as proximity and the like or on such attributes as sharpness and others. Pure Indication or *Śuddhā Lakṣaṇā*, that is illustrated usually by the expression : '*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*' depends for its operation on such relation as that of proximity and others, and Qualitative Indication or *Guṇī Lakṣaṇā*, that is usually illustrated by the expressions : '*Gouravāhikāḥ*' and '*Agnirmānavakāḥ*' operates because the cow and the carrier bear similitude to each other in respect of stupidity, and so on. As the Mīmāṃsakas hesitate to regard *Guṇī Lakṣaṇā* as a type of *Lakṣaṇā* proper, and treat it as a separate function,

named *Guṇī*, Ānandavardhana cleverly uses the term, '*Guṇavṛtti*', which though referring to *Lakṣaṇā* of the Ālankārikas is comprehensive enough to include *Lakṣaṇā* and *Guṇī* of the Mīmāṃsakas. The form of *Guṇavṛtti*, Ānandavardhana says, is different from that of *Vyañjanā* ; the former is regarded as a secondary function, because its operation is obstructed by such impediment as inapplicability of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence,—a factor, that accounts for its inability to signify the secondary sense straightway ; the latter, on the other hand, is a primary function in this sense that, in no stage is its operation put to a halt by obstructing factors, whether the meaning revealed is a fact or a figure or a mood, each of which is brought into light by it straightway. Secondly, *Guṇavṛtti*, as has been established, is an extended *Abhidhā*, while *Vyañjanā* is completely different from it. Thirdly, when a fact indicates another fact by *Lakṣaṇā*, it surrenders its own self and is transformed totally into the new indicated fact. In the expression : '*Gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*', the sense of flowing mass of water completely gives it up in order that the sense of bank may establish its logical connection with the establishment of dairy-colony. In case of *Vyañjanā*, however, the position is otherwise ; when a fact suggests another fact, it retains its self in toto and at the same time manifests another idea. A close parallel of a suggestive idea is to be found in a lamp, that retains its distinct self and at the same time brings into light a jar. In the verse : '*Evam vāḍini devarṣau pārśve pituradhomukhī / Līlākamalapatrāṇi gaṇayāmāsa Pārvatī*', meaning : 'as the divine sage introduced the topic of her marriage, Pārvatī with her face bent down began to count the petals of her play-lotus, standing by the side of her father' the expressed sense namely the counting of the petals of play-lotus by Pārvatī brings into comprehension through suggestion the idea of her bashfulness, and ultimately presents the erotic emotion : here the expressed meaning is not transformed into a new shape ; it is cognised as such and its cognition is followed by apprehension of the implicit idea.

The content of *Guṇavṛtti* again differs from that of *Vyañjanā*. The meaning that is conveyed through *Vyañjanā* presents itself in the form of a fact or a figure or an emotion, while the sense signified through *Guṇavṛtti* always presents itself in the shape of a dry fact. Neither cognition of *Rasa* nor that of *Alaṃkāra* can be said to be effected by *Lakṣaṇā*, because the conditions, necessary for its operation are absent in the case of both. Comprehension of a fact is effected by *Lakṣaṇā*, no doubt, but the fact conveyed through *Vyañjanā* excels much the one conveyed through *Guṇavṛtti* in charm. Such is the greatness of the transcendental function of suggestion that, its slightest touch even is sufficient to invest an idea with exquisite charm; *Lakṣaṇā*, however, lacks this greatness and the meaning conveyed by it is not necessarily charming. Ānandavardhana adds that, the circumstances under which *Guṇavṛtti* functions are, in their turn, different from those under which *Vyañjanā* operates. While *Guṇavṛtti* is regarded as a function belonging to a 'skhaladgati śabda',—a word, whose ability to signify idea is impeded by obstructing factors, the case is otherwise with *Vyañjanā*. Secondly, as absurdity of establishment of logical connection of the conventional meaning with the rest of the sentence is a condition, necessary for operation of *Guṇavṛtti*, this function is to depend, though not directly, but indirectly on Divine Volition; *Vyañjanā*, however, is independent of it, because even non-significant letters and gestures are endowed with it. Thirdly, *Guṇavṛtti* takes the help of *mukhyārthavādha* and others for its action, whereas *Vyañjanā* takes the help of speciality of speaker, person spoken to, time, place, context and such other factors, for its operation. Fourthly, in case of *Guṇavṛtti*, only the secondary sense is cognised; in case of *Vyañjanā*, however, both the explicit and implicit ideas are distinctly comprehended. Thus as *Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyañjanā* differ from each other in points of form, content and conditions of operation, Ānandavardhana asserts, the one cannot be equated with the other.¹⁴

Vyañjanā, is based sometimes, on *Abhidhā*, and sometimes on *Lakṣaṇā*. The action of the first is traced in Dhvani of

Vivakṣitānyaparavācya type and the operation of the second in Dhvani of *Avivakṣitavācya* type. *Vyañjanā* is not identical with either of its foundations *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā*, because its operation follows the action of those two. In *Avivakṣitavācya* type of Dhvani, suggestion appears when the function of indication, losing its power by signifying the secondary sense ceases to operate; in *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type of Dhvani, also, suggestion starts functioning, only when denotation stops, losing its potency by conveying the conventional meaning. Nor is *Vyañjanā* an appendage to *Abhidhā* or *Lakṣaṇā* only, because it is found to exist in letters and syllables, also, that are absolutely meaningless. This supreme power belongs not merely to words and their fragments, but also to side-glances and wistful looks, that are suggestive of inner feelings, as also to musical notes, that generate impersonal pleasure in the minds of real connoisseurs. From these considerations, the Dhvanivādin argues, it is evident that the existence of *Vyañjanā* as separate from *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣaṇā* cannot but be admitted.¹⁵

The proposition of the *Bhāktavādin* that Dhvani is identical with *Bhakti* or *Lakṣaṇā* is discussed threadbare by Ānandavardhana, who asks them at the outset, to clarify their position precisely. What is actually meant by identity of *Dhvani* and *Bhakti*? Do these theorists mean that the nature of *Dhvani* is identical with the nature of *Lakṣaṇā*? Or do they mean that *Bhakti* is an essential differentiating mark of *Dhvani*? Or do they take *Bhakti* to be an occasional differentiating mark of *Dhvani*? The opponents who endeavour to deny *Dhvani* an independent status may take up these three different positions and may hold that *Dhvani* is identical in nature with *Bhakti* or the second one is the definition of the first one, or it is merely an accidental mark of *Dhvani* of the Dhvani theorists. Of these three possible contentions, the first one is unacceptable, because the nature of *Dhvani* and *Bhakti* are entirely different. The term *Dhvani* signifies the sense of a charming suggested meaning; this appellation is also applied to a piece of poetic creation, in which the

expressed meaning subordinates itself to the inexplicably charming suggested sense. But *Bhakti* or *Lakṣaṇā* is not the appellation of a piece of poetic creation. It consists merely in attribution to an object of an attribute, that does not originally belong to it,—in giving to a thing a name, that does not pertain to it. This is exactly transference of epithet of Western Rhetoricians. Thus while the beauty of the suggested meaning is the first condition of *Dhvani*, in *Bhakti* this charm of the suggested meaning is not at all a necessary factor. For this reason, Ānandavardhana observes, the form or nature of *Bhakti* and *Dhvani* cannot be regarded as identical in all respects.¹⁶

The second proposition that, *Bhakti* or indication is an essential differentiating mark or definition of *Dhvani* is also unacceptable, because this proposed essential differentiating mark, Ānandavardhana points out, is vitiated by the fallacies of too narrow and too wide definition. The absence of *Dhvani* does not agree with the absence of *Bhakti* and the absence of *Bhakti* also does not agree with the absence of *Dhvani*. *Bhakti* is a function belonging to the primary meaning; when the logical connection of the primary meaning of a term cannot be established with the rest of the sentence, then this *Bhakti* brings into light a secondary sense, connected in some form or other with the primary one, depending either on usage or on some motive. Taking the basis of *Bhakti* or *Lakṣaṇā* into consideration it admits of classification into two types: one based on usage—*Rūḍhimūlā* and the other on purpose—*Prayojanamūlā*. Of these two types, the first one is characterised by the absence of a suggested sense, while in the second variety, the purpose to signify which indication is resorted to is conveyed solely through the function of suggestion. As in *Bhakti* based on usage, the implicit idea is conspicuous by its absence, so the absence of *Dhvani* does not agree with the absence of *Bhakti*. In illustrating this type of Indication, Ānandavardhana quotes the term '*Lāvanya*'. This term (as well as such words like '*Kuśala*' etc.) is used figuratively to convey a meaning that is entirely different from its strictly derivative meaning, yet it is not proper, he maintains, to regard a piece of poetic creation,

in which this word is used as a specimen of *Dhvani Kāvya*, only because of the presence of this term.¹⁷ In the *Prayojanamūlā* variety of *Lakṣaṇā*, also, *Dhvani* is not always present, because in order to form *Dhvani*, the suggested meaning has got to be extremely charming. Even in cases where the purpose is insignificant and devoid of charm, the poets employ figurative words merely in obedience to past tradition; but these cases can never be regarded as cases of *Dhvani*. In the verse:

Parimlānam pīnastana-jaghanasaṅgādubhayataḥ
Tanormadhyasyāntaḥ parimilanamaprāpya haritam/
Idam vyastanyāsam ślathabhujalatākṣepavalanaiḥ
Kṛśāṅgyāḥ santāpam vadati bisinīpatraśayanam//

meaning: 'This bed of lotus-leaves, extremely faded at the two ends, that came in contact with heavy breasts and thighs, and retaining its greenness in the middle, that did not come in touch with thin waist and disarranged by tossing of drooping creeper-like arms speaks of the agony of the slim-figured lady', the word *Vadati* cannot be taken in its literal sense, as it is not possible to establish logical connection of the agency of a bed made of lotus-leaves with the act of speaking. So the word '*Vadati*' through indication conveys the secondary sense of 'pointing out'. The 'clarity in understanding' is the purpose for the signification of which indication is resorted to, but this purpose has no charm whatsoever; it is not in the least attractive, and for this reason this verse cannot be regarded as a specimen of *Dhvani Kāvya*. In this connection, the learned Dhvanikāra enunciates the essential characteristic of a truly suggestive word, that entitles a piece of poetic creation to receive the covetable appellation *Dhvani*. He thinks that, a word that brings into light a beauty, that is incapable of being conveyed through any other expression entitles a specimen of poetry to be regarded as *Dhvani-Kāvya*.¹⁸ In the verse: '*Parimlānam*' etc, quoted above, however, the implicit idea is not inexplicably charming; it can as well be expressed through the function of denotation, without any applicable loss of charm. This fact also points out to the

proposition that the absence of *Dhvani* does not agree with the absence of *Bhakti*.

The Dhvanikāra classifies Dhvani into two types: (a) that based on *Abhidhā* and (b) that based on *Lakṣaṇā*. Of these two types, *Dhvani* that is based on the function of denotation or in other words Dhvani of *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* variety, of which *Rasadhvani* is a subtype is characterised by the absence of *Lakṣaṇā*. So the absence of *Bhakti* also does not agree with the absence of *Dhvani*.

There are other reasons also that go to point out to the fact that *Bhakti* cannot be regarded as an essential differentiating mark of *Dhvani*. The contents of *Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyañjanā* are entirely different; the first one signifies the secondary sense and the second one brings into comprehension the purpose for the signification of which *Lakṣaṇā* is taken recourse to. The relation of qualification and the thing qualified cannot exist between two things whose contents are entirely different. It is also wrong to suppose that *Bhakti* or *Lakṣaṇā* brings into comprehension both the secondary meaning and the purpose, because the supposition leads to a number of irreconcilable incongruities; first of all, the conditions of *Lakṣaṇā* are absent and secondly, the proposition of *Viśiṣṭa-Lakṣaṇā* is untenable.¹⁹

The third point that goes to establish the truth that *Bhakti* is not a definition of *Dhvani* is this: *Bhakti* or *Lakṣaṇā* is based on the function of denotation, because one of the three conditions of its operation is inapplicability of the primary meaning. For this reason, *Lakṣaṇā* is regarded as merely an extension of *Abhidhā* (*Abhidhāpucchabhūtā*). *Dhvani* on the other hand, is based entirely on the function of suggestion,—a function that belongs to words, meanings and even to unmeaning sounds and movements. This being the case, it is absurd to maintain that *Dhvani* and *Bhakti* are identical or the one is defined by the other.

The third proposition of the rival theorists that wants to make *Bhakti* an occasional differentiating mark of *Dhvani* is acceptable, because the *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani* is based on the function of indication. It is a fact that *Bhakti* is an

occasional mark of *Dhvani* as is attested to by the existence of *Bhakti* in the varieties of *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani*, but the rival theorists, thereby, Ānandavardhana asserts, gain nothing, nor is the position of the *Dhvani* theorists compromised, in any way, by such admission.

IV

The relation between the expressed and the unexpressed

In maintaining that the unexpressed or the suggested manifests itself in the form of a fact or a figure or an emotional mood, the Dhvani Theorists recognise the truth that the essence of Poetry may consist of fact or imaginative mood or emotional mood, but at the same time it is maintained that the emotional mood is of highest importance in it. In fact, Abhinavagupta asserts in unambiguous language that *Rasadhvani* constitutes the quintessence of Poetry and the other types, namely *Vastudhvani* and *Alamkāradhvani* terminate ultimately in it.²⁰ The end of all Poetry, the Dhvani Theorists say, is *Rasa*: and the different poetic elements such as the expression and the expressed, the metre and the figure are but means to manifestation of this *Rasa* of paramount importance. *Rasa* constitutes the soul of a poetic creation, the body of which is comprised of its plot. The fact that the relation existing between a plot and a *Rasa* has its close parallel in that existing between a body and a spirit is challenged by some theorists, who point out that, though after death a body is cognised separately from spirit, a plot of a poetic creation is never comprehended separately from *Rasa*, and this is sufficient to prove the untenability of the proposition. These theorists say that, the relation existing between an emotional mood and a plot,—*Rasa* and *Itivṛtta* is exactly like that existing between an attribute and a thing endowed with it; just as a thing possessed of an attribute is not known as something absolutely separate from that attribute, similarly an *Itivṛtta*, also, is not comprehended as something distinct from *Rasa*. Of this new relation, proposed by the

opponents, the Dhvanivādins point out several flaws. The admission of this new relation, they say, renders *Rasa* capable of being comprehended by all, having knowledge of the plot, irrespective of the fact whether the appreciator is a man of poetic sensibility or not, and this happens because an attribute such as fairness of complexion is known by any man, who sees the body endowed with such fairness. In reality, however, aesthetic experience is not derived by all conversant with the rules of grammar and imports of terms, as embodied in lexicons : only those initiated into poetic hieroglyphics can enjoy it. The analogy of a discernor alone knowing the excellence of a precious gem does not prove to be of much help, because it lands us into another difficulty. When a precious gem is known to be of excellent type by a connoisseur, its excellence is not noticed as something distinct from its own self ; the case is, however, completely otherwise with *Rasa* and *Itivṛtta* : the former is comprehended as something definitely distinct from the latter by a connoisseur of poetic art. Thus as the new relation, said to exist between an emotion and a plot is not acceptable, the Dhvani Theorists say the exact relation between the two is that current between a spirit and a body.²¹

It is said that the comprehension of a suggested meaning is always preceded by the understanding of an expressed meaning. An expressed meaning of a poetic creation is comprised of the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvos*, and as such is capable of being grouped under any of these three heads, and this is so, because the aim of a poet, who is not a historian is not mere narration of bare incidents, but depiction of sentiments.²² The dictum of Bharata : '*Vibhābhānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogāt Rasaniṣpattiḥ*' by stating that the excitants, ensuents and accessories raise *Rasa* into consciousness renders the cognition of *Vibhāvas* and the like the causal factor of comprehension of *Rasa*. Thus as the relation of cause and effect exists between cognition of *Vibhāvas* qua the expressed meaning and experience of *Rasa*, it is clear that a sequence certainly exists between them ; this sequence, however, is imperceptible, and accordingly *Rasadhvani* is said to be one of *Asamlakṣya*kr-

amavyaṅgya type. The objections that the word, being aided by speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context presents both the expressed and the unexpressed simultaneously and as such no sequence exists between the cognitions of two meanings and that, the understanding of the expressed meaning is not a condition necessary for comprehension of the unexpressed, inasmuch as, aesthetic experience is derived from mere hearing of musical notes, having no meaning whatsoever do not go to vitiate the proposition of the Dhvanivādin. According to these theorists, suggestion is twofold in nature : the one emanates, as in the case of musical notes and tunes from words comprehended by our auditory organ, and the other follows, as in the case of poetic creations from the understanding of expressed meanings. The first has for its cause auditory perception of sound and the second has for its generator cognition of the expressed meaning. Thus as the apprehension of the explicit generates comprehension of the implicit, the latter is always preceded by the former. The bid to trace the existence of first type of suggestion, operating simply from auditory perception of sound in specimens of poetic art is ludicrous, because it renders enjoyment of aesthetic experience possible from mere hearing of poetic expressions by men, blissfully ignorant of conventional meanings.

Rasadhvani is said to be one of imperceptible process : but in other types of *Dhvani* the sequence existing between the understanding of the expressed meaning and the comprehension of the unexpressed one is clearly perceptible. In *Arthaśaktyudbhava* type of *Dhvani*, the expressed meaning, being aided by the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to, context and such other factors brings into light through the function of suggestion the unexpressed idea ; the relation of cause and effect existing between the apprehension of the explicit and the comprehension of the implicit is incapable of being denied in it. And as existence of a sequence is quite natural between a cause and its effect, it is absolutely in the fitness of things that a sequence is traceable between the understandings of two types of ideas. The *Prākṛta* Gāthas : '*Bhāmo Dhammī*' etc.

and the like amply illustrate the difference between the two types of ideas in point of form, and completely rules out the possibility of simultaneous cognition of the two meanings. This sequence is perceptible in case of *Śabdaśaktimūla* Dhvani, also, in which the denotation of multi-meaning words is restricted to the contextual sense, and the non-contextual meaning, as well as the relation linking the two is brought into light through the function of suggestion. The expression : 'Atrāntare kusumasamayayugamupasamharannajrmbhatagrīsmābhīdhāṇaḥ phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso mahākalah', meaning : 'In the meantime, the unbearable summer season, rendering the palaces white by jessamine flowers in blossom approached putting an end to spring time (like Lord Śiva, having laughter as white as full-blown jasmine flower)' furnishes an example of this type of Dhvani : in it, first of all, denotation presents the idea of summer season ; after that suggestion brings into light the idea of Lord Śiva ; and subsequently the same function conveys the relation of similarity existing between the explicit and implicit ideas. As the cognition of *Upamā*, as in the present case, is dependent on knowledge of *Upameya*, appearing in the form of expressed meaning and *Upamāna*, taking the shape of suggested sense, it is clear that a relation of cause and effect, and consequently, a sequence exists between the apprehension of the expressed and unexpressed facts, on the one hand, and the comprehension of the suggested figure on the other. The postulation of a different category of Dhvani, known as Dhvani of *Avivakṣitavācya* type, as separate from *Asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* and *Samlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* types does not go to show the absence of sequence between the understanding of the expressed and the comprehension of the unexpressed in this category. In fact, in it the primary meaning is cognised first and after that, as its logical connection is not established with the rest of the sentence, it is either transformed into a shape, characterised by certain new attributes or is totally replaced by an altogether new sense through the function of Indication, and at a subsequent stage only the suggested meaning is presented through suggestion : thus it is

perfectly clear that, this is also characterised by perceptibility of sequence existing between the comprehension of the expressed and that of the unexpressed. As in this type of *Dhvani*, the primary meaning is not accepted in its original form, or in other words, the apprehension of the expressed (in its original form) does not occur, the Dhvanivādin does not think it necessary to examine closely the question of perceptibility or otherwise of the sequence existing between the cognitions of two ideas in it. This non-mention is not to be taken as an indication of non-existence of sequence. Thus with irrefutable logic the Dhvanivādin establishes that, a sequence certainly exists between the apprehension of an explicit idea and the comprehension of an implicit meaning,—the two cognitions, that bear the relation of cause and effect to each other.²³

In order to explain the exact relation existing between the two cognitions, the learned Dhvanikāra puts forward the analogy of *Padārtha-vākyārtha-nyāya*, and asserts that just as understanding of the import of the whole proposition is caused and as such is preceded by knowledge of the imports of individual terms, occurring in it, similarly the comprehension of the unexpressed is caused and, accordingly preceded by apprehension of the expressed. It is said that, at the time of understanding of an import of a proposition, the meanings of individual terms, as presented by the function of *Abhidhā* are known first, and after that through the function known as *Tātparya*, that is called into play by expectancy, proximity and compatibility the import of the whole proposition in the form of correlation of meanings of individual terms is grasped and in a similar manner the explicit sense is apprehended first and after that the implicit idea is comprehended. This parallelism, however, is to be taken with some caution. And this is so, because the reality of terms and their imports is open, firstly, to great controversy. The *Vaiyākaraṇas* describe a sentence as a real unit, and assert that, just as a letter is incapable of being split up into component parts, similarly, a term and a sentence, in their turns, also are incapable of being analysed into letters and terms respectively : from this it follows that a *Vākyārtha* is the

real entity and a *padārtha*, though unreal is necessary because it leads to knowledge of *vākyārtha*. Secondly though the Mīmāṃsakas ascribe reality to *Padas* and *Padārthas*, they point out that, *padārthas* constitute intimate causes of *Vākyārthas*. An intimate cause is not known separately from the effect when the latter is produced and accordingly, a *Padārtha* is not traced separately when the *Vākyārtha* is known. When the import of a proposition is understood, then the imports of individual terms lose their separate existence and merge themselves completely in the judgemental cognition. As the *Padārthas* constitute parts of the whole *Vākyārtha*, knowledge of them as distinct from the latter,—that is equivalent to division of the whole into parts is likely to endanger the cognition of the *Vākyārtha*. With *Vākyārtha* and *Vyavahāryārtha*, however, the case is completely otherwise. When the suggested sense is comprehended, the expressed meaning is not obliterated absolutely : at the time of comprehension of the implicit, the knowledge of the explicit also lingers in the mind of a refined reader. This leads one to suppose that the cognition of the explicit constitutes an efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of the comprehension of the implicit ; even after the production of an effect like a jar, its efficient causes, such as the rod and the like are realised as entities separate from the effect. So the learned Dhvanikāra concludes by saying that, the exact relation existing between the comprehensions of the explicit and the implicit bears similitude to that remaining between a lamp and a jar and not to one existing between the understanding of the imports of individual terms and the knowledge of the import of the whole proposition. A lamp manifests an already existent jar, and when the jar is manifested, then the lamp does not lose its existence ; similarly an expressed meaning brings into light the unexpressed content of Poetry, and when this unexpressed sense-unit is brought into comprehension, the cognition of the expressed meaning does not cease to exist. The analogy of *Padārtha-Vākyārtha-Nyāya*, Ānandavardhana himself observes, is not to be taken too seriously : it brings out only the idea that the comprehension of the implicit is caused by the apprehension of the explicit.²⁴

V

The Doctrine of Dhvani

The Doctrine of Dhvani derives its inspiration from the works of grammarians, the chief among whom is Bhartṛhari and their semi-philosophical speculations on speech : in its eagerness to show that it is an old theory, it seeks the protection of the grammarian's authority by asserting that it is based on the analogy of the theory of *Sphoṭa*. The Vaiyākaraṇa says that, as the momentary sounds, pronounced by operation of our vocal organs cannot combine to form a term or a proposition, they cannot signify imports of terms or propositions : what they do is this that they bring into light the eternal sound-unit called *Sphoṭa*, which alone is capable of conveying ideas. The function of the *Sphoṭa*, thus, is two-fold in nature : on the one hand, it is manifested by letters and on the other, it is an entity from which, alone, the sense emanates. Taking the second function of the *Sphoṭa* into consideration, the Vaiyākaraṇa enumerates eight varieties of *Sphoṭa*—*Varnasphoṭa*, *Padasphoṭa*, *Vākyasphoṭa*, *Varnajātisphoṭa*, *Pada-jātisphoṭa*, *Vākyajātisphoṭa*, *Akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*. When the Vaiyākaraṇa speaks of *Varnasphoṭa*, he does not mean that each and every letter is expressive of a sense : what he means is this that, individually and separately stems and suffixes express ideas. A word, however, is not regarded as a combination of a stem and a suffix at the time of comprehension of its sense : rather it expresses the required sense in its entirety, and for this reason the Vaiyākaraṇa is compelled to posit the existence of *Padasphoṭa*, as something distinct from *Varnasphoṭa*. In a similar manner, he finds a strong justification for admitting *Vākyasphoṭa*, because, as he says, a child, who is yet ignorant of the technicalities and principles of grammar and consequently of the analysis of a sentence into component terms understands the import of a sentence, when between two persons, in its presence, it observes one to do a certain act, after he has been told by the other to do it. The Vaiyākaraṇa who extends recognition to *Jātisphoṭa*, as well, argues that, when the import

that is denoted is the universal, it is perfectly reasonable to admit that what expresses the sense, also, is of the nature of the universal. Thus, he points out, the individual word *Ghaṭa* uttered by a certain person does not express the desired idea : what actually conveys the sense is the universal, which finds its expression through different use of the said word. Though the Vaiyākaraṇa emphasises his point that, the *Sphoṭa* is completely devoid of all ideas of sequence and the question of priority and posteriority does not arise in relation to it, yet he speaks of an entity as *Akhaṇḍasphoṭa*, implying thereby that, there is another entity known as *Sakhaṇḍasphoṭa*, which admits of classification into component parts. This, however, does not represent his true stand, since it goes to annul the transcendental character of *Sphoṭa*. By *Akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*, the Vaiyākaraṇa means this that one indivisible word, which is but an aspect of the Eternal Verbum or *Śabdabrahman* manifests itself through different words in the line of word, as the cosmic process starts : the conception of *Sakhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*, as opposed to it refers to numerous indivisible words, each of which is expressive of an idea. Thus, while an advocate of *Akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* believes in the unitary character of *Sphoṭa*, an advocate of *Sakhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* thinks that it is multiple in number. And the same is the case with *Vākyasphoṭa*. With all emphasis at his command, Nāgeśa asserts that the *Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* or the *Akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* alone are real entities, since they alone are significant of complete ideas. This assertion shows that by *Padasphoṭa* Nāgeśa does not refer to the fact that the words used in a sentence are expressive of ideas themselves, since a sentence does not admit of division into component parts : he refers rather to a word which is competent to bring a complete thought-unit into expression independent of others.

Taking his cue from this somewhat mystical conception, the Ālankārika develops the idea of *Dhvani* by analogy. The Vaiyākaraṇa, who subscribes to the wave-theory of sound asserts that, one sound gives rise to another, which produces another, which in its turn gives rise to a fourth, and thus, the last

of a series of sounds, produced like a series of waves is comprehended by our auditory organ. A sound that is produced by another sound is parallel to a vibration, that arises after the original sound, when a bell is rung. A suggested meaning, also, bears similitude to this vibration, inasmuch as, like a vibration appearing after the original sound, its comprehension occurs after apprehension of the expressed sense.²⁵ As the Vaiyākaraṇa uses the term *Dhvani* to signify this type of sound, produced by another sound, the Ālankārika also uses the term to denote the implicit idea, whose cognition is caused by understanding of the explicit. Secondly the Vaiyākaraṇa applies the term *Dhvani* to the momentary sounds pronounced by our speech-organs,—the sounds that manifest the sound-essence or the eternal *Sphoṭa* ;²⁶ accordingly, the Ālankārika also uses the term *Dhvani* to signify suggestive word and meaning, which bring the unexpressed content into light. Thirdly, the Vaiyākaraṇa speaks of two types of *Dhvani*—the one *Prākṛta* (natural) and the other *Vaiṣṛta* (unnatural) : *Prākṛta Dhvani*, he contends, is necessary to manifest the eternal *Sphoṭa* and *Vaiṣṛta Dhvani*, which has no contribution towards revelation of *Sphoṭa* makes only the sounds felt as long and short,—sweet and harsh,—quick and slow, and so on. Thus, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa, an effort, that is required in excess to that which is absolutely necessary for revelation of the eternal sound-unit in order to pronounce harsh or sweet sounds,—quick or slow notes is *Dhvani*,²⁷ and similarly, in the view of the Ālankārika, also, a function, that is required in addition to the three well-known functions of Denotation, Indication and Purport to bring into comprehension the unexpressed content of Poetry is *Dhvani*. The above discussion goes to show that a suggested sense, a suggestive word, a suggestive idea and the function of suggestion,—all these are reckoned as *Dhvani* by the Ālankārika : he uses the term to signify a piece of poetic creation, also, that is comprised of all these elements. While commenting on the observation of Ānandavardhana that, the Doctrine of *Dhvani* is backed by the authority of the Vaiyākaraṇa, Abhinavagupta brings out this four-fold connotation of the term *Dhvani* and

thereby, furnishes a strong point, competent enough to show the indebtedness of the Ālaṃkārika to the Vaiyākaraṇa. Though the theories of *Dhvani* and *Sphoṭa* have scarcely any mutual connection, the Dhvanivādin harps on this point, because, what he actually wants is an authority and the theory of *Sphoṭa*, adumbrated by the Vaiyākaraṇa by accepting the proposition of revelation of an eternal entity affords him an opportunity to boast of the authority of the Vaiyākaraṇa,—the '*Prathamā Vidvāṃsah*'.

In formulating the Doctrine of *Dhvani* Ānandavardhana states that, a piece of poetic creation in which an expressive word making its primary concept subservient and the expressed meaning rendering its own self subordinate go to manifest an implicit idea, which alone attains prominence is regarded as the *Dhvani-Kāvya* : in this type of Poetry, he asserts, the suggested is of paramount importance, being the most attractive element, and the expressive word and the explicit idea remaining subordinate and thereby, playing only a second fiddle to it.²⁸ The greatness of a Poetry, he continues, does not depend on insertion of an expressive word or presentation of an expressed sense, but rather on the capacity of its creator to incorporate a suggestive word and bring an implicit idea into light. Though Ānandavardhana connects the Doctrine of *Dhvani* with somewhat mystical theory of *Sphoṭa*, he takes care to show that *Dhvani* is not something mystical, but is an entity, which is capable of being properly defined and grasped. In fact, this element is the most striking element in Poetry and no Poetic Art worth the name can afford to go without this essential element. Any literary composition that is not touched by this element can never be regarded as a specimen of Poetic Art at all. *Dhvani* is not an airy nothing : it is not a figment of imagination : on the other hand, Ānandavardhana asserts, it is grasped and relished by men initiated into the hieroglyphics of Poetry.

In a Poetic creation both the word and the expressed meaning conjointly bring the implicit into light and to bring home the part played by both these elements in the matter of sugges-

tion Ānandavardhana uses the verb '*Vyañtāḥ*' in dual number in the definition of *Dhvani*, propounded by him. The objection that, it is not possible for the word and the expressed sense-elements to combine with each other, since the cognition of the sense follows that of the word and the two are not comprehended simultaneously, his commentators point out, is not tenable : and this is so, because, according to the Vaiyākaraṇa, whose authority the Dhvanivādin boasts of, the word itself constitutes along with its primary concept its own connotation, in the same way as the knowledge itself constitutes along with the knowable the content of the said knowledge. Thus, as the word and the thing symbolised by it both form the connotation of the same word and consequently, the content of same cognition, the combination of word and explicit idea, they assert, is not an absurdity. But it is a fact that these two elements are not equally important in all cases : in some cases, the word-element is of more importance than the sense-element, and in others, the latter is of more importance than the former, which goes only to help it in revealing the implicit. In order to bring home this idea that, the choice is between importance of sound and sense, and not between sound and sense themselves, Abhinavagupta makes it clear, the particle '*vā*' is used in the said definition. But of all the terms used therein, the most important is '*upasarjanīkṛtasvārthan*', because it precludes the possibility of inclusion of *Dhvani* within the domain of Poetic figures. It is said that in a *Dhvani-Kāvya*, the words and meanings are of secondary importance ; but this is not the case with the figures of speech. The figures merely adorn the sound and sense and consequently, are subordinate to them : they themselves cannot augment the beauty of a Poetic creation unless incorporated in it, and it is only when they are applied to sound and sense that they go to embellish them. Thus the Ālaṃkāras depend absolutely on words and meanings for their very existence, and as such, are subordinate to them : in a *Dhvani-Kāvya*, however, the words and meanings are subordinate to the implicit idea of paramount importance and have no independent status of their own. For this reason, Ānandavar-

dhana points out, the definition of Dhvani itself is competent enough to draw the line of demarcation between the scope of *Dhvani* and that of the Poetic figures.²⁹

In reply to the proposition of the rival theorists that *Dhvani* can be subsumed under the figures of speech, Ānandavardhana contends that, as *Dhvani* has nothing to do with denotation,—it being conveyed solely through the function of suggestion and as the figures are based on the function of denotation, so the former cannot be subsumed under the latter. Moreover, *Dhvani* is the name given to a whole piece of poetic creation of which the figures of speech form merely a section of decorative elements. Thus as the relation of part and whole exists between *Alaṃkāra* and *Dhvani*, the one cannot be equated with the other.

There are certain figures that are characterised by the emergence of the unexpressed sense; these figures are *Samāśokti*, *Ākṣepa*, *Paryāyokta*, *Apahnuti*, *Dīpaka* and the like. The question of inclusion of *Dhvani* within the domain of these figures, that are characterised by apprehension of suggested meaning naturally arises. But Ānandavardhana firmly asserts that these figures, also, cannot comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*. In *Dhvani-Kāvya* the suggested meaning is inexplicably charming, but in the illustrations of such figures as *Samāśokti* and the like, it is the particular way of expression that is more attractive than the unexpressed hidden sense.³⁰

In the verse :

Upoḍharāgena vilatārakam
Tathā gṛhītam śaśinā niśāmukham/
Yathā samastam timirāṃśukam tayā
Puro'pi rāgāḍgalitam na lakṣitam//

the behaviour of two lovers are superimposed on the moon and the night; both are presented with the behaviours of two lovers ascribed to them. Yet in the verse under consideration the unexpressed meaning in the form of lovers is incapable of being accepted as forming the final import of the proposition and as such of paramount importance; it is the description of the moon in the evening that is the final import of the verse. The lovers only render the moon and the night suitable *Vibhāvas*

for the manifestation of erotic emotion. Thus in the illustration of *Samāśokti* the expressed sense, whose beauty is heightened by superimposition of the behaviour of the unexpressed idea is of more importance than the subtle meaning itself. In the figure of speech *Ākṣepa* also predominance belongs to the expressed meaning and not to the suggested one. This figure consists in a semblance of negation,—the negation being apparent only, and it is expressed in order to bring into light another hidden sense. In this figure the mode of expression, i.e. the apparent negation is more striking than the hidden intention of the speaker, and as prominence belongs to the expressed meaning, so *Dhvani* cannot be subsumed under it. In determining which of the two meanings,—the expressed and the unexpressed one—is principal and which of them is subordinate, the sole criterion, according to the Dhvani theorists is *Cārutva* or beauty.³¹

In the figure of speech *Dīpaka* the contextual and the non-contextual meanings are connected by the same action or attribute, and this connection ultimately leads to the apprehension of a suggested similitude existing between them. But nevertheless, the form of expression,—the mode of connecting two things with the same attribute or action—is more attractive than the suggested *Upamā* lying in the background, and as such *Dīpaka* cannot comprehend *Dhvani*. In *Apahnuti*, the object of description is rejected and in its place a standard of comparison is established. Here also, there lies in the background an apprehension of suggested *Upamā*, but the mode of rejection of the one and establishment of the other being more attractive, this figure also cannot include *Dhvani*. In the figure of speech *Viśeṣokti*, the effect is described as absent, even though all the causal factors are apparently present. This apparent violation to the law of causality creates charm and entitles this form of expression to receive the status of an *Alaṃkāra*. This mode of expression, however, leads to the apprehension of some factors, that are responsible for the non-production of effect. Though this factor is signified through the function of suggestion, yet it is not charming; in it the mode of expression is more

attractive than the suggested special factor. So illustrations of this figure also cannot be regarded as proper fields of *Dhvani*.

In the figure of speech *Paryāyokta*, the same meaning is conveyed through the functions of denotation and suggestion, the only difference being in the respective process of conveying it: the manner in which the suggested sense is conveyed is different from that in which it is expressed in words. Ānandavardhana states that, if in an illustration of *Paryāyokta* the suggested sense appears as more striking than the expressed one, then these cases can safely be regarded as cases of *Dhvani Kāvya*; or in other words, these examples of *Paryāyokta* can be subsumed under *Dhvani*. But it is not possible for the figure *Paryāyokta* to comprehend *Dhvani*, for the scope of *Dhvani* is much more extensive than that of *Paryāyokta*. Moreover, *Dhvani* constitutes the soul of a poetic creation and the figures of speech are analogous to such instruments of decoration, as bangles and the like. Just as a bangle cannot be identified with soul, similarly a figure also cannot be identified with *Dhvani*.

Mixture of a number of figures creates two different species of figures known as *Samr̥ṣṭi* and *San̥kara*. In *Samr̥ṣṭi* the connection between the figures is separable: in *San̥kara* this is inseparable. The Ālaṃkārikas speak of three different cases of *San̥kara*: (1) when a number of figures are located in the same substratum, (2) when a doubt as to the nature of the exact figure lingers in the mind of appreciator and (3) when one figure paves the path for the emergence of another figure. Of these three cases, the first can never be regarded as a case of *Dhvani* because the suggested meaning is conspicuous by its absence in it. In the second case both the *Alaṃkāras*—suggested as well as expressed—are equally predominant. For as there is no definite clue as to which *Alaṃkāra* should be expressed and which suggested, both may be suggested as well as expressed alternatively and it would be illogical to arbitrarily mark out one as predominant in preference to the other. Thus the second case of *San̥kara* also cannot be regarded as a case of *Dhvani*, because in order to form *Dhvani* the suggested meaning must be predominant, being the most attractive element in the whole

piece. Normally *Dhvani* cannot be subsumed under the third type of *San̥kara* also, because in that, too, the expressed sense appears as more attractive. In the verse:

Pravātanīlotpalanirviśeṣamadhīraviprekṣitamāyataḥkṣyā/
Tayā gr̥hītam nu mṛgāṅganābhyastato gr̥hītam nu

mṛgāṅganābhīh//

the expressed figure is *Sandeha* and the path for the emergence of this figure is created by the suggested *Upamā* that lies in the background. Of these two figures the suggested *Upamā* bringing into light the affinity of Parvati's unsteady glances with those of the deer is less attractive, and as such subordinate to the expressed *Sandeha*, which is more charming: so this verse cannot be taken as an illustration of true *Dhvani*. If however such illustrations of *San̥kara* are found, in which the suggested figure excels the expressed one in charm, then those illustrations are capable of being regarded as proper fields of *Dhvani*; but for that reason it is wrong to contend that, *San̥kara* comprehends the concept of *Dhvani*. Moreover, in *San̥kara* a complete merger of individual traits of the component figures is effected and the very designation 'San̥kara' rules out all speculations concerning the existence of *Dhvani* in it. Because in *San̥kara* the different figures lose their separate independent traits, and naturally it is futile to contemplate the relation of principal and subordinate between them.⁸²

The figure of speech *Aprastutapraśamsā* is based on the cognition of the suggested meaning in the background. In it from the expressed non contextual meaning, the contextual one is apprehended through the function of suggestion, and this happens because a definite relation exists between the expressed and the suggested meanings. These relations are (1) the relation existing between a universal and a particular, (2) the relation of causality and (3) the relation of similarity. Those poetic creations, in which the expressed and the unexpressed meanings stand in the relation of universal and particular or in that of cause and effect can never be reckoned as true cases of *Dhvani*, because in such pieces the suggested and the expressed meanings are equally prominent. It has been

made clear by the Dhvanikāra that in order to form *Dhvani* the suggested meaning should excel the expressed one in charm ; and as such should be more prominent than it. In cases where the expressed and the suggested meanings stand in the relation of universal and particular, the predominance of either of these cannot be argued, because a universal cannot reside without its substrata—the particular and the particulars also cannot be conceived without knowing the universal ; thus as the universal and the particular are of equal importance, so both the expressed and the unexpressed meanings are equally prominent in such cases. This proposition holds good in case of the second type of *Aprastutaprasaṃsā* also, that is based on the relation of causality ; and this is so because at the time of understanding the effect, the cognition of the cause lingers and at the time of the comprehension of the cause, the effect also continues to exist in the mind. In the third variety of *Aprastutaprasaṃsā*, in which the expressed non-contextual suggests a similar contextual, there might be *Dhvani*, provided the latter is intended primarily to be conveyed by the poet and the expressed sense is subordinated to it. But for that reason it cannot be argued that the figure *Aprastutaprasaṃsā* comprehends *Dhvani*, because the scope of *Dhvani*, as has been pointed out, is much more wide than that of a variety of figure of speech. Thus by showing with strongest arguments that the figures of speech cannot comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*, Ānandavardhana in the *Samkṣepa* verses clearly draws the line of demarcation between the scope of true *Dhvani* and that of the figures of speech, characterised by the apprehension of an unexpressed sense. Thus run the *Samkṣepa* verses :

Vyaṅgyasya yatrāprādhānyam vācyamātrānuyāyinaḥ /
Samāsoktyādayastatra vācyālamkṛtayāḥ sphuṭāḥ //
Vyaṅgyasya pratibhāmātre vācyārthānugame' pi vā /
Na Dhvaniryatra vā tasya prādhānyam na pratiyate //
Tatparāveva śabdārthau yatra vyaṅgyam prati sthitau /
Dhvanēḥ sa eva viśayo mantavyaḥ saṅkarojjhitaḥ //

—DL. I. pp. 130-31,

These verses mean this : a piece of poetic creation, in which the

suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed and serves only to embellish it forms the field of such figures as *Samāsokti* and the like. This can in no way be taken as an illustration of *Dhvani*. A piece of poetic creation, in which the unexpressed meaning is not clearly cognised or it stands on an equal footing with the expressed sense, so far as charm is concerned, or its predominance is not clearly apprehended does not form similarly a field of *Dhvani* ; this is a case of such expressed figures as *Aprastutaprasaṃsā*, *Dīpaka* and the like. That only is a genuine case of *Dhvani* where the expressive words and the expressed meanings subordinate themselves to the suggested sense, that excels in charm all other poetic elements, and this *Dhvani* is immune from the possibility of being comprehended under the figures of speech.

Just as cases of *Vastudhvani* cannot be comprehended in such figures as *Samāsokti*, *Dīpaka* and the like, similarly *Rasādhvani* is incapable of being comprehended in the much-discussed figure *Rasavat*, which is recognised by old poetics and which helps to smuggle as it were, the idea of *Rasa* into their systems. Really in the figure of speech *Rasavat*, the moods and feelings are supposed to have been roused not for their own sake, but only to embellish the expressed thought or another unexpressed idea. Just as such things as the moon and the like can augment the beauty of the face in such expressions as 'Mukhacandra' and the like, similarly emotional moods or feelings also can embellish other expressed or unexpressed ideas. Thus while in *Rasādhvani*, *Rasa* is primarily developed and as such, attains the status of the soul of poetry, in the figure *Rasavat*, *Rasa* is not primarily relished, but is made subservient to the expressed thought or some other suggested idea.⁷⁸ Illustrations of these figures are instances of *Guṇibhūtavyaṅgya* type of poetry and just as *Samāsokti* and such other figures cannot comprehend *Vastudhvani*, similarly *Rasavat* cannot comprehend *Rasādhvani*. The verse :

Kim hāsyena na me prayāsyasi punaḥ prāptaścīrāddarśanam
Keyam niṣkaruṇā pravāsarucitā kenāsi dūrikṛtāḥ /

Svapnānteṣviti te vadan priyatamavyāsaktakanṭhagraho

Buddhvā roditi riktabahuvalayastāram ripuṣṭrījanah //

—is an illustration of this figure. Here the poet eulogizes his royal patron and depicts the sad plight of the ladies of rival kings only to bring into bolder relief the glory and valour of his patron. As the greatness of the king is manifested clearly by tragic emotion, it can be said that the latter beautifies the former and as such is subservient to it. Similarly in the verse :

Kṣipto hastāvalagnaḥ prasabhamabhihato' pyādādāno' mśukāntam

Gṛhnan keśeṣvapāstascarananipatito nekṣitaḥ sambhramaṇa/

Ālīnganyo' vadhūtaṣṭripurayuvatibhiḥ sāsruneṭrotpalābhiḥ

Kāmīvārdrāparādhaḥ sa dahatu duritaṁ śāmbhavo vaḥ śarāgnih//

—the erotic emotion suggested by the expression 'Kāmīvārdrā-parādhaḥ' brings into full relief the prowess of the Lord Śiva, and as such serves only as an instrument of decoration. These cases can never be regarded as cases of true *Rasadhvani*, because emotional moods are not primarily developed in these.

In this connection Ānandavardhana quotes the view-points of the writers belonging to the pre-dhvani school on the nature of the poetic figure *Rasavat*. In the view of Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin this figure consists in the presentation of such permanent feelings as love, grief, heroism and the like. Though these scholars are cognisant of the existence of *Rasa*, yet they are unable to draw the line of demarcation between *Rasadhvani* and *Rasavat* as the concept of *Dhvani* is unknown to them.

In criticising the view-point of these theorists Ānandavardhana states that, if their proposition is accepted then the scope of pure simile and such other figures become completely wiped away. Now it may be contended that, as the permanent feelings belong only to animate beings, so description of them are cases of the figure *Rasavat* and descriptions of inanimate beings form the scopes of other pure figures such as *Upamā*, *Rūpaka* and the like. In reply to this contention Ānandavardhana argues that, the inanimate objects like hills and rivers are states and as such apparently there can be no possibility of certainly devoid of conscious activities and permanent mental

the poetic figure *Rasavat* in their description, but it is a fact that in poetry these inanimate things are presented with some touch of human and conscious elements in them. Thus as in the descriptions of inanimate things there exists a touch of human elements, so in these we shall find illustrations of *Samśṛṣṭi* or *Samkara* between *Rasavat* and other figures. If, on the other hand, it is contended that descriptions of inanimate beings, even though characterised by touches of human elements form illustrations of such pure figures as *Upamā* and the like, and do not come under the purview of the figure of speech *Rasavat*, then we have got to regard many specimens of really good and great poetry as dry compositions, because in the view of the ancients, absence of the poetic figure *Rasavat* agrees with the absence of emotional mood. And a poetic creation that is not characterised by the presentation of an emotional mood can never be regarded as a specimen of true poetry. Such poetic creations as :

Taraṅgabhrūbhaṅgā kṣubhitavihagaśreṇīrasanā

Vikarṣantī phenam vasanamiva samprambhaśīthilam /

Yathāviddham yāti skhalitamabhisandhāya bahuśo

Nadīrūpeṇeyam dhruvamasahanā sā pariṇatā //

and

Teṣāṁ gopavadhūvilāsasuhṛdāṁ rādhūrahaśśakṣināṁ

Kṣemaṁ bhadra kalindaśailatanayātīre latāveśmanāṁ /

Vicchine smaratalpakalpanamṛduchedopayoge'dhunā

Te jāne jaraṭhībhavanti vigalannīlatviṣaḥ pallavāḥ //

in which a river has been imagined as an irritable lady and the groves are described as excitant causes of love contain descriptions of inanimate objects no doubt, but nevertheless they can not be regarded as totally devoid of *Rasa*. Thus it is clear that, if the view-point of the ancient theorists on the nature of the poetic figure *Rasavat* is accepted, then it becomes difficult to distinguish between the fields of pure *Upamā* and pure *Rasavat*. If, on the other hand, the view of Dhvani theorists on this point is accepted, then it becomes possible to properly demarcate the spheres of *Dhvani*, *Upamā* and *Rasavat*. Those poetic creations in which an emotional mood is ornamented by

other things or superimpositions or introsusceptions, and where other secondary emotional moods are absent from the scopes of such pure figures as *Upamā*, *Rūpaka*, *Atiśayokti* and the like; those compositions in which an emotional mood is predominantly depicted form cases of *Rasadhvani* and those poetic creations in which *Rasa*, *Bhāva* etc. are rendered subservient to other contents of poetry are regarded as illustrations of the poetic figure *Rasavat*.³³

The above discussion goes to show how the theory of *Dhvani* is utilised by the learned *Dhvanikāra* himself to refute the contentions of those, who want to deny the existence of *Dhvani* by comprehending it under different figures of speech, as also of those who want to identify *Dhvani* with *Lakṣaṇā*. The formulation of this definition itself is sufficient enough to show the absurdity of the proposition of the *Anirvacanīyavādin*, who declares *Dhvani* as lying beyond the province of words. In conclusion, the learned *Dhvanikāra* remarks that, if the proposition of the *Anirvacanīyavādin* is a mere hyperbole intended to convey the immense charm of *Dhvani* that surpasses all other elements of poetry in point of strikingness, then he concedes the reasonableness of such a view and agrees with him wholeheartedly. In a poetry, the unexpressed content really surpasses all such elements as *Guṇa*, *Rīti* and *Alaṃkāra* in point of beauty and strikingness.

CHAPTER VI

DHVANI VERSUS ANUMĀNA

I

Anandavardhana's stand

After refuting the contentions of the critics, who like to equate *Vyañjanā* with the figures of speech or with *Lakṣaṇā* and who declare it as something undefinable, the learned *Dhvanikāra* takes up the proposition of those, who want to comprehend *Dhvani* under the process of inference. The advocates of this theory maintain that a suggestive unit is only an indicative one, and the relation existing between a suggestive unit and a suggested idea is exactly that, which connects an indicator and an indicated. The relation of indicator and indicated, as is evident in the stock illustration of *Anumāna*—'*Parvato vahnimān dhūmāt*' exists between a probans and a probandum, also, inasmuch as, smoke indicates the existence of fire on the hill. For this reason, these critics argue that the relation, linking a suggestor and a suggested is that, which connects a probans and a probandum, or in other words, *Vyañjanā* is identical with *Anumāna*. In support of their contention these critics quote the remarks of the *Dhvanikāra* himself, who in course of rejecting the view-point of the *Mīmāṃsakas* says that, the intention of the speaker is brought into light solely through the function of suggestion; these opponents point out that, as the intentions of others are capable of being comprehended through the process of inference alone, so the proposition established by the *Dhvanikāra* itself goes to equate *Vyañjana* with *Anumāna*.

In replying to these charges the *Dhvanikāra* first of all congratulates the *Anumānavādin* for the latter is at least convinced of the fact that *Vyañjanā* is not identical with *Abhidhā* or *Lakṣaṇā*; because otherwise he would not have

attempted to regard a suggestive unit as a probans. Secondly, he argues, cognition of a word produces knowledge concerning four entities, of which two are capable of being known through inference and two through denotation or indication and suggestion. The knowledge of a word reveals, first of all, the desire of the speaker to make a sound : secondly, it manifests the intention of the speaker to signify a sense : thirdly, it brings into light the conventional meaning, and fourthly it brings home the purpose for the signification of which that particular word is used. Of these four entities that form the content of one knowledge, produced on hearing of a word, the first thing, namely, the desire of the speaker to make a sound has no bearing on verbal testimony : it only points out to the consciousness of the speaker, because an animal, having consciousness alone can make significant or unmeaning sounds. The second thing namely the intention of the speaker to signify a sense is connected in a remote way with verbal knowledge, because in between the apprehension of this intention and cognition of the conventional meaning, there exists knowledge of the particular word or words used. These two factors, the *Dhvanikāra* says,—the desire of the speaker to make a sound and his intention to convey an idea—are capable of being known through inference. But the other two factors,—the ideas, that form the object of his desire, being the meanings intended to be conveyed by him are incapable of being known through the process of inference. In some cases, these objects are signified by words, directly expressive of them, and in others, where the speaker wants to bring home some charming motive, through another mode. The object that is conveyed by an expressive word is regarded as an expressed meaning and that which is conveyed by a word, not denotative of it in another mode is regarded as a suggested sense. According to the *Dhvanikāra* these two types of objects, intended to be brought into light are signified through the functions of denotation and suggestion respectively, and never through the process of inference.¹ The fact that doubts arise as to the rightness or wrongness of meanings, or in other words, meanings

constitute the objects of doubts goes to show the absurdity of their comprehension, being caused by *Anumāna* : because the knowledge produced through *Anumāna* assumes the form of a right notion, and not of a doubtful cognition ; when the existence of fire is inferred from presence of smoke, no such doubt as to whether the fire actually exists or not arises in the mind of the knower. The argument that it is not possible for a word to bring into light a suggested sense with which it bears no relation whatsoever does not hold good. The suggested meaning being brought into comprehension per force of expressed sense, conveyed by a word, certainly bears relation to the word-unit, though of course, the relation in this case is an indirect one. An indirect relation existing between a word and a meaning is as much competent to reveal a sense as is a direct relation, linking the two. The verse :

Harastu kipeit parivṛtta-dhairyaścandrodāyārambha

ivāmvurāṣiḥ/

Umāmukhe Bimbaphalādharaṣṭhe vyāpārayāmāsa vilocanāni//
meaning : 'Like the Ocean perturbed at moon-rise, Lord Śiva, with his fortitude shaken slightly placed his eyes on the face of Pārvatī, bearing lips resembling Bimba fruits' furnishes a nice illustration to the point. Here the desire of Lord Śiva to kiss, as also his love for Pārvatī that constitutes the inner content of this poetry is incapable of being described as an inferred entity. What inference presents here is the skill of the poet, as well as his intention to bring out an idea. The desire of Lord Śiva referred to above can not be conveyed through the function of denotation, because that does not constitute the conventional meaning. So for the signification of this inner content, the *Dhvanivādin* argues, one has got to admit the separate existence of the function of suggestion.

In order to explain the exact relation existing between an expressed and an unexpressed, the *Dhvanivādin* generally quotes the analogy of the relation existing between a lamp and a jar, and says that, like a lamp manifesting an already existing jar, an explicit idea brings an implicit one into light. This parallelism itself goes to refute the contention that a *Vyañjaka*

is nothing other than a *Hetu*, and *Vyañjanā* is nothing different from *Anumāna*. In *Anumāna*, a relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) exists between the probans and the probandum; no such co-existence however exists between a lamp and a jar: neither the presence of the lamp agrees with the presence of the jar, nor does its absence agree with that of the jar. Thus it is clear that in the case of the lamp manifesting the jar, the latter cannot be described as being known through *Anumāna*; and it is quite in the fitness of things that *Vyañgya-vyañjaka-bhāva*, which is based on *Ghaṭa-pradīpa-nyāya* is incapable of being equated with *Anumāna*.² Moreover, in *Anumāna* the knowledge of the Probans produces a series of actions in order to make the inference a valid one: it sets the mind of the knower thinking about the relation of co-existence, linking the probans and the probandum, as also about the presence of the probans on the subject (*Pakṣa*); no such action, however, is produced by a suggestive unit in course of its signification of the implicit idea. This, also, goes to establish the proposition of the *Dhvanivādin* that, a *vyañjaka* is not identical with a *hetu*. The argument that, inference that makes known the correctness or otherwise of the suggested idea brings into light the self of the idea, also does not lead us anywhere, because by applying the same argument, the case of the explicit idea being conveyed through the process of inference, that establishes its validity or otherwise arises. No body, however, regards an expressed meaning as a product of inferential knowledge. The *Dhvanivādin* does not object to the proposition that the correctness or otherwise of an implicit idea is determined through inference: what he objects to is this that, the idea itself is known through inference. The firm conviction of the *Dhvanivādin* is this that, the unexpressed content of Poetry is brought into comprehension through suggestion and suggestion only. Moreover, the determination of correctness or otherwise of an idea, however, necessary it might be in case of expressions found in the Vedas, as also those used in our daily life, is absolutely unnecessary in case of poetic expression. And this is so, because a presented fact is of secondary importance in poetry,

the prime purpose of which is generation of impersonal pleasure in the minds of real appreciators: accordingly, an attempt to find out the rightness or wrongness of a fact, presented in poetry, points out, as it does to lack of appreciative genius on the part of the discernor, sounds ridiculous. Thus, it is clear that *Anumāna* does not comprehend the concept of *Dhvani*. The intention of the speaker to signify a sense, no doubt, is comprehended through *Anumāna*, but this inferred idea, the *Dhvanivādin* says, is unable to acquire the covetable appellation *Dhvani* for a piece of poetic creation; an implicit idea alone other than this intention, that is common to both ordinary linguistic expression and poetic expression is able to bestow the status of a *Dhvanikāvya* on a poetry. If the intention of the speaker is regarded as the factor, due to which a piece of poetic creation is considered as the best specimen of poetry, then the question of admission of ordinary linguistic expressions, too, that are characterised by manifestation of this intention of the speaker as best specimens of poetry arises. The proposition of accepting ordinary linguistic expressions as best specimens of Poetry, however, is an absurd one. Thus with convincing arguments, the *Dhvanivādin* establishes that a *Vyañjaka* is something different from a *Hetu*,—the function of *Vyañjanā* is something different from the process of *Anumāna*.³

II

Mahimabhaṭṭa's criticism of the Doctrine of Dhvani

The movement of the *Anumānavādin* receives a fresh impetus in *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa who claims to have established in his work the inclusion of all types of *Dhvani* within the domain of *Anumāna*.⁴ To start with, Mahimabhaṭṭa takes up the theory of *Dhvani*, as adumbrated by the learned *Dhvanikāra*, and points out ten defects, that are said to vitiate, and as such, render the theory unacceptable. The epithet '*Upasarjanākr̥tasva*', as applicable to '*artha*' in the definition of *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, is unnecessary. According to

the *Dhvanivādin*, in a *Dhvanikāvya*, the expressed meaning, making itself subservient suggests the implicit sense. Now, as in this type of poetic creation, the expressed is presented as a means leading to manifestation of the unexpressed, it goes without saying that the former is subordinate to the latter. A column of smoke, that leads to inferential knowledge of fire certainly renders itself subordinate to the comprehended fire. Thus as in a *Dhvanikāvya*, in which an expressed is presented not for its own sake, but solely for the sake of bringing the unexpressed into comprehension, the former does not transgress its subservience to the latter, and accordingly, the mention of that characteristic with the help of an adjective, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks, is redundant. A real adjective, it is said, presents an attribute, which though competent to reside in the thing qualified is yet found to dissociate itself occasionally from the latter. The use of the adjective 'hot' in the expression 'hot fire' is defective, because the attribute presented by it, namely heat is incapable of being transgressed by fire; similarly defective is the use of the adjective 'cold' in the expression 'cold fire', because it is not possible for the attribute coldness, presented by it to reside in fire.⁵ The relation of qualification and a thing qualified, however, as existing between blueness and 'lotus' in the expression 'a blue lotus' is appropriate, because it is possible for the quality of blueness to reside in a lotus, and at the same time, this quality is found occasionally to dissociate itself from a lotus. inasmuch as, a red lotus is not marked by blueness. In a *Dhvanikāvya*, under consideration, the attribute of subservience to the implicit, belonging to the explicit is never found to dissociate itself from the thing qualified: the expressed never transgresses its character of subordination to the unexpressed which is of greater importance, because it is presented for the sole purpose of bringing in a manifestation of the suggested. So, Mahimabhaṭṭa says, the use of the adjective '*Upasurjanīkṛtasva*' as qualifying '*artha*' is inappropriate and unnecessary.

The *Dhvanivādin* explains that this adjective precludes the possibility of comprehension of *Dhvani* under the domain

of such figures as *Samāsokti* and the like, that are characterised by manifestation of a suggested fact. In the verse:

Upoḍharāgena vilatārakam tathā grhītam śaśinā nīśāmukham /
Yathā samastam timirāṃśukam tayā puro'pi rāgāḍgalitam na

lakṣitam //

the expressed meaning comprised of moon and night, he says, is of more importance than the implicit idea, consisting of the hero and the heroine, that serves only as an embellishment to the former. He says that, as in this case, the expressed meaning violates its character of subservience to the unexpressed, so the proposition of the *Anumānavādin* that an expressed meaning introduced in order to bring an unexpressed into light never transgresses its character of subordination to the implicit, and the conclusion drawn by him on the basis of that proposition are wrong. In reply to this contention, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that, prominence of the explicit idea, as laid out in the verse quoted above is only due to the fact, that it constitutes the contextual sense. A contextual sense, irrespective of the fact whether it is primary or secondary or suggested, is of importance, because it forms the subject-matter of poetry; this importance derived from the sheer fact of its constituting the subject-matter of Poetry, however, merits no consideration in a *Dhvanikāvya*, based solely on the function of suggestion. However important an explicit meaning may be, being the subject-matter of the Poetry concerned, it is always subordinate to the implicit idea, for the comprehension of which it is introduced. In the verse quoted above, the expressed meaning, comprised of the description of moon-rise in evening is important no doubt, as it forms the final import of the sentence; but it is undoubtedly subservient to the suggested idea, consisting of the behaviour of the hero and the heroine: and this is so, because the expressed meaning is presented for the sole purpose of manifesting the suggested one. Of the two,—the means and the end,—the way and the goal—the former is definitely of less importance than the latter. The argument that, prominence and subservience, in the present case, refer respectively to charm and absence of charm, and

as in some specimens of poetic creation, the expressed meaning is capable of attaining prominence, being excellent in charm, so the proposition that, the expressed never transgresses its character of subordinating itself to the unexpressed is incorrect, —is misleading because the unexpressed is found to excel the expressed in charm, even in the *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* type of Poetry, reckoned by the *Dhvanivādin* as Poetry of second class. Thus the *Anumānavādin* concludes that, the expressed sense being a way leading to comprehension of the unexpressed content of Poetry remains always subservient to that, and accordingly, qualification of the expressed sense by the adjective 'upasarjanīkṛtasva', as is done in the definition of *Dhvani*, propounded by the *Dhvanivādin* is inappropriate and unnecessary.⁶

Secondly, Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, the use of the epithet 'Upasarjanīkṛtārtha' as an adjective to 'Śabda' in the definition of *Dhvani* is improper. According to the learned *Dhvanikāra* in a best specimen of poetry, either the expressed meaning making itself subservient or the expressive word making its primary meaning subordinate brings into light through suggestion an implicit idea of paramount importance. Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges the very belief of the *Dhvanivādin* that, an expressive word is endowed with the ability to render its primary meaning subordinate; he says, that a word, which makes known the unknown is endowed with no function other than that of signifying its meaning. A parallel is to be found in the case of the lamp, that only manifests others, and does nothing else. The assertion that apart from its ability to bring into light a meaning, a word has competence to render its import subservient to others is ridiculous. The capacity to render its import subservient to others, as belonging to a word-unit is, however, found in case of imitation-words, commonly known as 'anukarṇa-śabda' in the language of Indian poetics, but it is to note that such words are unable to bring into light their meanings that are cognised in some cases, from the words imitated (*anukārya-śabda*). The verse :

'Tam karṇamūlamāgatya palitacchadmanā jarā /
Kaikeyīśaṅkayāevāha Rāme śrīrnasyatāmīti //

meaning : 'In the guise of grey hair decrepitude came near his ears, as if, through fear of Kaikeyi and said : To Rama thou hand over the goddess of fortune', furnishes an illustration to the point. The indeclinable 'iti' inserted after the imitation-word, quoting the message of decrepitude delivered to king Daśaratha secretly indicates that the expression brings out its form only, and no content whatsoever : the content is brought into light by the actual message, and not by its quotation by the poet,—by the *Anukārya-śabda*, and not by the *Anukarṇa* one. An *Anukārya-śabda*, the *Śābdikas* say is two-fold in nature : one is significant (*Sārthaka*) and the other is insignificant (*Nirarthaka*). When a significant word is imitated by another word, the imitator *Anukarṇa-śabda* brings out only the form of the imitated and this *Anukārya-śabda* subsequently conveys the actual import, if, of course, it remains one of *Sārthaka* type. In those cases, in which the *Anukārya-śabda* is one of *Nirarthaka* type, the question of cognition of sense does not arise. Moreover, expressions are used with the sole object of signifying imports, and so it is never possible for them to render their primary meanings subservient. A thing introduced for the sake of another never makes that another object subordinate : on the other hand, it renders its own self subservient to the object. An illustration is to be found in the case of a jar, requisitioned in order to fetch water ; the jar never attains more prominence than water : on the other hand, it keeps its ownself completely subordinate to that. In a similar manner, an expression used to convey a meaning never subordinates that meaning : on the other hand it makes its own self subservient to that.⁷ Thus, Mahimabhaṭṭa asserts, the notion of the learned *Dhvanikāra* that it is possible for an expression to render its expressed meaning subservient is erroneous, and the introduction of an epithet that brings out this competence on the part of an expression vitiates the definition by the fallacy of absurdity. The argument that, in a *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* type of Poetry the expressed meaning excels the suggested one in charm and as such attains more prominence than the latter, and naturally it is possible for an expressed meaning to violate its character

of subservience to the unexpressed—is misleading and fallacious. Equally fallacious is the argument that expressions are capable of making their expressed meanings subservient to the unexpressed. Both these, intended to remove the defect of absurdity, by which the definition is vitiated lead to another defect, known as tautology. As expressions and expressed meanings are introduced for the sole purpose of bringing into light the unexpressed content of Poetry, it is obvious that they are subservient to the latter; their subordination to the implicit idea does not stand in need of further assertion.

Not only is the definition of *Dhvani* faulty by the defects of absurdity and repetition: it is vitiated also by the fallacy of too narrow definition. Non-mention of the function of denotation, along with expressive words and expressed meanings, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks, leaves many good specimens of Poetry out of the purview of Dhvanikāvya. An illustration is to be found in case of expressed *Dīpaka* or *Samśaya*,—figures that lead to comprehension of suggested *Upamā*. Examples of such figures as *Dīpaka* and *Samśaya* are correct illustrations of Dhvanikāvya, but the definition, propounded by the *Dhvanivādin* is unable to bring them under its scope. In case of *Dīpaka* and *Samśaya* neither an expressed meaning, rendering its own self subservient suggests an implicit idea nor does an expression making its primary meaning subordinate brings out an implied meaning: what actually happens is that, an expressed figure brings into light a suggested figure, that excels the former in charm and as such attains more prominence than that. The words ‘*ārtha*’ and ‘*śabda*’, incorporated in the definition are unable to include figures within their connotation. Figures of speech are nothing but peculiar turns of expression and consequently they are identical with *Abhidhā*. *Abhidhā* is the name given to a relation, existing between a sound and a sense, that has for its another nomenclature ‘the connection between an expressor and an expressed’,—‘*vācyavācakabāva*’. This relation, as goes without saying is a quality belonging to both sound and sense. When this quality, being imparted by the creative genius of the poet becomes charming, it is

converted into an *Alaṃkāra*. So, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that, in order to include that specimen of poetry, in which an expressed figure brings a suggested figure into comprehension, as is done by the figure *Dīpaka*, within the province of Dhvanikāvya, mention of *Abhidhā* in the definition, under consideration is imperative. The objection that examples of *Dīpaka* and *Samśaya* do not form fields of true *Dhvani* does not help us in any way, because the argument on which a *Dhvanivādin* bases this objection is erroneous. According to the learned *Dhvanikāra*, in order to form a Dhvanikāvya, an expressed figure has got to manifest a prominent suggested figure; he thinks that in illustrations of *Dīpaka*, prominence does not belong to the suggested *Upamā*, which is excelled in charm by the expressed *Dīpaka*, and naturally these are not regarded as specimens of Dhvanikāvya. Challenging this chain of argument, Mahimabhaṭṭa says, the figure *Dīpaka* attains the status of an *Alaṃkāra* being a charming mode of expression, only when, it points out to the implicit idea of similarity, existing between the *Prakṛta* and the *Aprakṛta*. A *Dīpaka* that does not lead to comprehension of this implied sense is unable to claim the designation ‘*Alaṃkāra*’. And such is the case with *Samśaya*, also. Thus as the suggested *Upamā* is the most beautiful element, bestowing charm, necessary for its very existence on the expressed *Dīpaka*, so there is no reason to deny an example of *Dīpaka* the status of Dhvanikāvya. And non-mention of *Abhidhā*, resulting as it does in denial of this status is a serious defect.⁸ The explanation that *Abhidhā* is obtained through implication from ‘*ārtha*’ with which it bears a relation of inseparable association, inasmuch as, without this function of denotation apprehension of meaning does not occur and that subservience of *Abhidhā* is obtained through implication from the epithet ‘*upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau*’ that presents the idea of subservience of expressive word and expressed meaning, inasmuch as, the prominence of the function of *Abhidhā* is bound to result in prominence of word and meaning connected by it lands a *Dhvanivādin* into fresh troubles, because by applying the same argument, the question of deletion of ‘*śabda*’ arises;

like subservience of *Abhidhā*, being known through implication, subservience of *śabda* and the meaning presented by it also is capable of being known through implication from 'artha', with which a *śabda* is inseparably associated. The counter-argument that a *śabda* is not comprehended through implication from *artha* and as such requires separate mention in the definition makes, as stated before, the distinct statement of *Abhidhā* imperative, because in point of signifying meaning an *Abhidhā* meets on a common platform with a *Śabda*. The justification for the use of the word *śabda*, as advanced by the *Dhvanivādin*, according to which, though a word is incapable of making its expressed meaning subservient to its own self is competent enough to make the primary meaning subordinate to the suggested idea does not cut much ice, because the existence of a function of suggestion, in addition to that of denotation as belonging to a word is itself open to great controversy. Thus it becomes clear that the learned *Dhvanikāra* has committed a blunder by inserting the term 'śabda' in his Theory of Dhvani, which should, in the fitness of things, have been avoided.

Mahimabhaṭṭa approaches the problem of language and meaning in a novel way, and asserts that all verbal knowledge, based as it is on the relation of premise and conclusion is identical with inferential cognition. An expression is used to engage a man in performance of a particular action or in order to dissuade him from that. Now the man who hears the expression performs an action, only when he is fully convinced of the propriety and strength of the arguments, advanced by the speaker. This fact goes to show that all verbal knowledge, competent to excite a man to discharge a particular action or to dissuade him from performance of that is based on inference, and as such is one and the same with inferential knowledge.

Following Bhartṛhari, Mahimabhaṭṭa classifies expressions into two types : word (*Pada*) and sentence (*Vākya*). Corresponding to this two-fold classification of expression the expressed, also, admits of division into two categories : import of a term (*Padārtha*) and import of a proposition (*Vākyaārtha*). The import of a term is always conveyed through *Abhidhā*, and as such is

regarded as *Vācya* only. According to Mahimabhaṭṭa a word is endowed with only one function, which is *Abhidhā*. It is not possible for the process of inference to bring into light the idea of a word, because it being unitary in character does not admit of being split up into two parts—premises and conclusion—factors, that are essential for operation of inference. The import of a proposition on the other hand, is conveyed through the function of *Abhidhā*, as well as through the process of *Anumāna*. Whereas a *Dhvanivādin* regards facts and imaginative moods, as capable of being signified through both *Abhidhā* and *Vyañjanā*, Mahimabhaṭṭa considers them as both *Vācya* and *Anumeya*, and while a *Dhvanivādin* declares an emotional mood (*Rasa*) as being brought into comprehension solely through *Vyañjanā*, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks it as a unit, brought into light through the process of *Anumāna*, alone. In sharp contrast to the import of a term, that does not admit of division into fragments, the meaning of a sentence admits of division into two parts,—the subject-portion and the predicate-portion. In cases of some sentences, the predicate being an established entity does not stand in need of being proved beyond dispute with the help of justifying reasons : in cases of others in which the predicate is not an established entity, it has got to be proved with convincing arguments. In the first type of these two categories of propositions, a bare statement of fact is made, while in the second type, the subject and the predicate stand in the relation of premises and conclusion, the knowledge of the former leading to comprehension of the latter, with which it is associated inseparably. The poetic expression : 'astyuttarasyāṃ diśi devatātmā himālayo nāma nagādhirājaḥ' meaning : 'to our north exists the Himalayas, the foremost of the mountains, ensouled by diety' furnishes an illustration of the first type of proposition, consists as it does of a statement of fact. The verse :

'Kayāsi kāmīnī sarasāparādhāḥ
Pādānataḥ kopanayāvadhūtaḥ /
Yasyāḥ kariṣyāmi dr̥ḍhānutāpaṃ
Pravālaśayyāśaraṇaṃ śarīram //

meaning : 'O passionate one, by which lady, you, fallen at her

feet after perpetration of a fresh offence have been despised ; tell me, which remorseful lady will have to be confined to bed of tender leaves ?' affords an example of the second type of proposition, because the relation of cause and effect is traceable between perpetration of an offence and propitiation, as also between irritable temper and repudiation, and this relation is nothing other than that, existing between a probans and a probandum. This connexion existing between the premises and the conclusion of a syllogism, as is noticed between the different portions of a meaning conveyed by a sentence, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, is capable of being clearly stated through words as also of being known through implication : in the first case it is called *Śabda*, in the second it is named *Ārtha*. The poetry :

'Sara-yāmetasyāmudaravalivīcīvilulitam

yathā lāvanyāmbho jaghanapulinollaṅghanaparam /

Yathā lakṣyaścāyam calanayanamīnavyatikara-

stathā manye magnaḥ prakṛṭakucakumbhasmaragajaḥ //

meaning : 'As the waters of grace, tossed by waves in the shape of folds, appearing in the belly of this lake are about to overflow the banks of thighs, and as fishes in the shape of moving eyes are noticed, it seems, the elephant in the form of cupid, with its temples of breasts visible has entered it (the lake)' constitutes an example of *śabda-sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*, because the relation of reason and conclusion, as exists between the imports of the two clauses, presented in the first three feet on the one hand and the idea of the last foot on the other is clearly stated by use of such words as 'yathā.....tathā.' The poetry :

'Divam yadi prārthayase vṛthā śramaḥ pituḥ pradēśāstava

devabhūmayāḥ /

athopayantāramalam samādhinā na ratnamanviṣv. ti

mṛgyate hi tat //

meaning : 'If you hanker after heaven, fruitless is this toil : your father's regions are the abodes of Gods ; if you are eager for union with a groom, useless in this practice of penance : a gem does not search after suitors ; it, on the other hand, is found out' furnishes an example of *ārtha-sādhya-sādhana-bhāva*, because the relation of middle and minor terms, as existing

between the imports of the second and the first propositions, and the meanings of the fourth and the third propositions though not clearly expressed through words is gathered through implication. The relation existing between the middle and minor terms of a syllogism, that is traced between different portions of an expressed meaning of a sentence is also found to reside between the primary import of a proposition and the meaning inferred from it ; in such cases the knowledge of the primary meaning leads to comprehension of the inferred, as does smoke to existence of fire. In the verse :

'Suvarṇapuṣpām prthivīm cinvanti puruṣāstrayaḥ /

Śūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jānāti sevītum //

meaning : 'A brave, a learned and one who knows how to serve,—these three persons only pluck the golden flowers of this earth', the knowledge of the expressed meaning leads to cognition of the fact that prosperity is under the grip of brave, learned and servant, because the connection, linking the two ideas is the relation existing between a probans and a probandum. Not only is an unexpressed idea inferred from an expressed ; it is inferred also from an idea, inferred from a primary meaning. The verse :

'Evaṃ vādinī devarṣau pārśve pituradhomukhī /

Līlākamalapatrāṇi ganayāmāsa pārvatī //

meaning : 'As the divine sage said this, Pārvatī, standing by the side of her father, with her face bent down began to count the petals of her pleasure-lotus' furnishes an illustration of emergence of an unexpressed content, inferred from an idea, deduced through inference from the expressed sense. Here at the first instance, bending down of the face of Pārvatī and counting of lotus-petals by her point out respectively to bashfulness and attempts on her part to conceal her real feelings, with which they stand in the relation of middle and minor terms of a syllogism : subsequently, these ideas deduced through inference point out to the dawning of love for Śiva in the mind of Pārvatī, with which they are connected in the same way as a Probans is with a Probandum.

It is clear that in the process of inference, the cognition

of the premises leads to a knowledge of the conclusion, and as such the sequence existing between apprehension of Probans and comprehension of Probandum is easily perceptible. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, this sequence is clearly traceable in case of inference of facts and imaginative moods, but is imperceptible in case of inference of emotional moods, and this imperceptibility of succession is responsible for production of a false notion that the apprehension of the conclusion occurs simultaneously with that of the premises. This false notion, Mahimabhaṭṭa considers, leads the Dhvanivādin to posit the relation of suggestor and suggested (*vyāṅgya-vyāñjaka-bhāva*) between the expressed excitants, ensuents and accessories, on the one hand and the unexpressed emotional mood on the other, on the basis of *Ghaṭa-pradīpa-nyāya*. Thus *vyāṅgya-vyāñjaka-bhāva* itself, being the product of an erroneous knowledge, *vyāñjyārtha* is a myth, and so is the designation *dhvani* added to *Vastu*, *Alaṃkāra* and *Rasa*. The expression '*Rasadhvani*' used to denote an inferred emotional mood is not to be taken literally, inasmuch as, no mood can be brought into light through suggestion,—a function that does not exist at all. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, the above-quoted expression, found in the work of the learned Dhvanikāra is used figuratively only in order to bring home the ability of the emotional mood to produce refined pleasure in the hearts of connoisseurs of Poetic Art, and the charm, consequential upon it. Direct presentation of facts is not so much appealing as their presentation in a veiled and round-about way: a portrait, a portion of which is covered in fun, when shown subsequently pleases the mind more, and so does gradual presentation of a hidden character or incident of a play on stage, which by arousing curiosity of the spectator attracts him more and more. In a similar fashion, a meaning, when expressed directly through the function of denotation does not produce so much pleasure in the minds of appreciators, as it does when presented by modulation of voice or comprehended through the process of inference. This characteristic feature of meanings is ingrained in them, and so does not

require any proof. Even the Dhvanivādin prefers indirect mode of presentation of meanings to direct way of presentation. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, an emotional mood, when comprehended through the process of inference produces exquisite charm, and in order to give an idea of charm of this mood, the expression '*Rasadhvani*' is used figuratively to signify it.⁹

A Dhvanivādin regards a *Rasadhvani* as one of imperceptible process and a *Vastuadhvani* and an *Alaṃkāradhvani* as *Dhvani* of perceptible process: as in the case of manifestation of unexpressed fact and imaginative mood, the sequence existing between apprehension of the expressed and comprehension of the unexpressed is clearly traced, there is no reason to deny the relation of probans and probandum between the two,—the expressed being the *Sādhana*, and the unexpressed *Sādhya*. Thus as an unexpressed fact and an imaginative mood are capable of being known through inference, there is absolutely no reason to regard them as suggested entities. And this procedure is followed in case of understanding of the primary meaning of a proposition, the different portions of which stand in the relation of premises and conclusion: the unestablished predicate-portion of a proposition, the different parts of which remain connected through the connexion of *Ārtha-sādhya-sādhana-bhāva* is regarded as an inferred unit, and not a suggested one. The objection that the theory of Dhvani, as adumbrated by the learned Dhvanikāra is based on the theory of *Sphoṭa* of the Vaiyākaraṇa, according to which the momentary sounds, that are pronounced by our speech-organs and are called *Dhvanis* bring into light through suggestion the eternal sound-essence called *Sphoṭa*, and that, as the function of suggestion is incapable of being denied in the field of Vyākaraṇa, it is proper to recognise it in the field of Alaṃkāra, also,—has no force whatsoever, because the manifestation of *Sphoṭa* itself through the function of suggestion is open to controversy. Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges the proposition that the relation of suggestor and suggested exists between *Dhvani* and *Sphoṭa*, and that the former brings into light the

eternal *Sphoṭa* through suggestion; he thinks that, because a knowledge of *Dhvani* produces a knowledge of *Sphoṭa*, which, in its turn generates a cognition of meaning, the existence of the relation of cause and effect necessitating presence of sequence between the two is to be postulated between them, and consequently the designation '*Dhvani*' applied to a specimen of Poetry on the model of the Vaiyākaraṇa's Theory of *Sphoṭa*, based on the relation of suggestor and suggested as existing between the expressed and the unexpressed is too weak to stand upon its legs. It is improper to regard *Dhvani* as *Vyañjaka* of *Sphoṭa*, because as the relation of cause and effect exists between knowledge of *Dhvani* and that of *Sphoṭa*, the simultaneous appearance of two comprehensions is incapable of being asserted.¹⁰

To the proposition that a sequence exists between apprehension of the expressed meaning, comprised of the excitants, ensuants and accessories of a permanent mood and comprehension of *Rasa*, a Dhvanivādin replies by pointing out that, realisation of *Rasa* arises simultaneously with the cognition of excitants, ensuants and accessories and in between the two cognitions no such process as recollection of the relation of universal concomitance interposes itself, and as such, *Rasa* is correctly regarded as a *vyāṅgya* unit. The concept of *vyāṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva*, developed on the parallelism of *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya* recognises simultaneous manifestation of the indicator and the indicated; when a lamp is lighted, it is seen simultaneously with other objects, such as jar and the like, there being no sequence between cognition of the lamp and realisation of other objects: and in a similar manner a suggested *Rasa* is comprehended simultaneously with the cognition of the *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*. The analogy of *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya*, a Dhvanivādin contends, brings into light, further, another characteristic feature of *vyāṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāva*; when the jar is known, the knowledge of the lamp persists; and similarly when the *vyāṅgyārtha* is comprehended, the cognition of *vyañjaka* lingers. In his attempt to refute this contention of a Dhvanivādin, Mahima-

bhaṭṭa refers only to the observations of the learned Dhvanikāra and asserts that those remarks are competent enough to establish his own proposition that, as the comprehension of *Rasa* arises simultaneously with the apprehension of the *Vibhāvas* and the like, the postulation of the relation of suggestor and suggested, as effecting connexion between the two is incorrect, and consequently, *Rasa* is incapable of being regarded as a *vyāṅgya* unit; the term '*vyāṅgya*' or '*dhvani*' however is used to denote it figuratively. The learned Dhvanikāra, himself, recognises the apprehension of *vācārtha* as a cause leading to comprehension of *vyāṅgyārtha*, the effect, and maintains that as a sequence definitely exists between cognition of a cause and that of its effect, in the present case, also, it exists between understanding of the expressed and knowledge of the unexpressed.¹¹ Thus as the relation of cause and effect qua that of middle and minor terms of a syllogism exists between knowledge of the expressed and comprehension of the unexpressed, it is possible to comprehend *Dhvani* under the process of inference; the question of comprehending *Anumāna* under the domain of *Dhvani* does not arise, because the scope of the former is much more wide than that of the latter: the operation of the process of *Anumāna* is traced even in those specimens of poetic creations that are regarded as *Kāvya* of *Guṇibhūta-vyāṅgya* variety or illustrations of such figures as *Paryāyokta*, *Samāsokti* and the like,—specimens that are not considered as illustrations of *Dhvani* in any way.¹² And because in poetic creations expressions are used by poets or speakers in order that others may grasp the intended idea through inference, this *Dhvani* is *Anumāna* of *Parārthina* type. The argument that *Parārthānumāna* being formal in type, the statement of illustration, that leads the knower to accept beyond dispute co-existence between *Sādhya* and *Sādhana*, a factor, that is essential for validity of a syllogism is absolutely necessary in it, and as in a *Dhvani Kāvya* no mention of illustration is found, it is not a case of *Parārthānumāna*—does not hold good, because statement of such an illustration is not an imperative necessity in a syllogism in which the

Sādhana is strong enough to point out undisputedly to the *Sādhya*; the logicians, themselves, hold that mention of an illustration, that forms a component member of a five-membered syllogistic reasoning proves only helpful to the immature intellect of a man.¹³

Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that, the *Rasa* is really an inferred entity, and when a Dhvanivādin uses the term '*dhvani*' to signify it, he does it figuratively, only in order to bring home the charm of the inferred emotional mood,—the capacity of the feeling to generate impersonal pleasure in the mind of appreciators. To this an objection is raised that, the inference of feelings, belonging to one by other does not produce pleasure in his mind in all cases in the outside world, and so this inference is not likely to generate supreme bliss in the minds of appreciators, irrespective of the nature of feeling depicted in the realm of poetry, also, because the causes that lead to such inference in poetry and drama are not substantially different from those that lead to it in outside world; and this being the case, the figurative use of the expression '*Rasadhvani*' is unjustified. As against this objection Mahimabhaṭṭa uses his own polemics, and asserts that, neither the excitants, ensuents and accessories are exactly identical with causes, effects and attendant causes of ordinary world, nor is the mood that is raised to the status of *Rasa* equivalent to feeling of ordinary world. The causes, effects and attendant transient feelings, when described in poetry are converted into *alaukika Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*. Inference of feelings caused by knowledge of *laukika kāraṇa* and *kārya* produces earthly pleasure or pain or hatred, as the case may be, but inference of moods, caused by knowledge of *alaukika Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* unfailingly generates transcendental pleasure; this happens due to inherent nature of these factors, as found in the realm of Poetry, and as such it is neither proper nor judicious to question it. Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that *laukika* causes and *alaukika Vibhāvas* differ in point of both form and field: a *hetu* of a feeling of the external world is real, a *Vibhāva* of the realm of poetry is artificial;

a *hetu* operates in the external world, a *Vibhāva* moves in the world of Poetry alone: and as such, the two are incapable of being regarded as identical in nature. The inferred mood, in its turn, too, is distinct from similar inferred feeling of ordinary world, because while the latter is real, the former is artificial, inasmuch as, the mood inferred by the spectator at the time of witnessing of a theatrical performance, as belonging to the actor, seen on the stage is unreal. Poetry affords, as it does, an opportunity to know through the process of inference unreal emotional moods from presentation of artificial *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas* causes supreme bliss in the minds of appreciators. In replying to the objection as to how is it possible for knowledge of non-existent unreal moods, which is erroneous in character to generate transcendental pleasure in the minds of appreciators, Mahimabhaṭṭa refers merely to the observation of the ancients, according to which even wrong notion turns to serve fruitful purpose under some circumstances, being a means of knowing the real. A man taking lustre of a gem to be the gem itself and accordingly striving to attain it meets on a common platform with a man taking the glow of light as a gem and thereafter running to have it, so far as wrong notion is concerned; but whereas the efforts of the first man are crowned with success, those of the second end in vain.¹³

The unreality of the inferred emotional mood does not in any case stand in its way of generating supreme bliss in the minds of appreciators: what pleases the connoisseurs of Poetic Art is comprehension of emotional mood,—the question of determination of reality or unreality of the mood itself having no place in appreciation of Poetical works. In external world real and existent feelings are inferred from real causes and effects, and consequently, inference of feelings in ordinary world differs from that of moods in the realm of Poetry: the former generates pleasure, pain or hatred, as the case may be,—the latter produces nothing but supreme bliss. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes, *Rasa* is capable of being regarded figuratively as a *vyāṅgya artha*.¹⁴

In the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa the unexpressed content of Poetry can never be rightly regarded as a suggested unit, because the relation of suggestor and suggested is not competent to effect a connection between the expressed and the unexpressed. And this is so, because it is not possible to treat manifestation of the unexpressed as suggestion (*Abhivyakti*) in the technical sense of the term. *Abhivyakti*, Mahimabhaṭṭa says, consists in manifestation of an existent or a non-existent entity by an indicator, which reveals its own self as well,—an indicator, that does not stand in need of recollecting its relations with the indicated. This *Abhivyakti* of an existent entity, he continues, is three-fold in nature. In some cases it refers to production of an object in the sense that an effect lying in a latent form within the cause is perceived first by a sense-organ; in other cases it signifies the sense of manifestation of a produced object, whose visibility is obstructed somehow, along with the manifestation of its illuminator, and in others it refers to awakening of an impression deposited by an object experienced previously by another thing with which the first object bears the relation of co-existence. *Abhivyakti* of the first type is explained in conformity to the view of the upholders of the Sāṃkhya system of Philosophy, according to which an effect, resides in a latent form in its cause and what is production in ordinary sense is nothing but its manifestation in a different form. *Abhivyakti* of the second type is illustrated by revelation of a jar by a lamp, which produces simultaneously with knowledge of its own self cognition of the jar: appearance of knowledge concerning both the indicator and the indicated at the same time constitutes the essence of this type of *Abhivyakti*. *Abhivyakti* of the third type is illustrated by awakening of an impression left by fire through a sight of smoke, which bears the relation of universal concomitance with the said fire. This is further exemplified by revelation of the original caused by a knowledge of its imitation, as also by manifestation of a concept, caused by cognition of its significant word-unit. Manifestation of a non-existent entity is of one type only: an illustration to this is to be found in the appear-

ance of a rain-bow in the rays of the Sun, passing through water-sprays. Now as the unexpressed content of Poetry is not a non-existent entity, having appearance only, its manifestation can not be explained as parallel to the manifestation of rain-bow. The revelation of the unexpressed content is also incapable of being explained as *Abhivyakti* of the first and second types, because neither the implicit idea residing in a latent form in the explicit one is perceived by a sense-organ, nor is it experienced simultaneously with the understanding of the expressed meaning, inasmuch as, the learned Dhvanikāra himself, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out, recognises the existence of a sequence between apprehension of the expressed and comprehension of the unexpressed. The third type of *Abhivyakti* is identical with *Anumāna* in all respects, and as such, the postulation of a separate process known as *Abhivyakti* is unnecessary and unwarranted. The much-talked of instrument of cognition *Upamāna*, in which knowledge of one object leads to that of another, bearing similarity to it is nothing different from *Anumāna*, because the operation of the process of analogy, also, demands the presence of such conditions as *Vyāpti* and *Parāmarśa*,—factors that constitute the essence of *Anumāna*. Thus it is evident that *Anumāna* having a wider scope comprehends *Abhivyakti* and *Upamāna* alike, and just as the separate existence of *Upamāna* cannot be posited, similarly, that of *Abhivyakti*, too, cannot be asserted. In this way it is possible to show that *Anumāna* comprehends *Smṛti* also. The third type of *Abhivyakti*, which is but a different name of *Anumāna*, demanding as it does the relation of universal concomitance between *Sādhya* and *Sādhana*, Mahimabhaṭṭa continues, is traced in the manifestation of the unexpressed content of Poetry, caused by a knowledge of the expressed content, which bears a relation of inseparable association with it. This is testified to by the fact that, while persons not initiated into the mysteries of this relation do not grasp it, men who are aware of this inseparable association do comprehend it. The proposition of the Dhvanivādin, based on the analogy of *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya*, which demands occurrence of comprehension of

the expressed and unexpressed in Poetry at the same time is untenable, because the apprehension of the expressed being the cause of comprehension of the unexpressed, the two understandings are bound to happen in succession. Thus as it is not possible for an expressed idea to bring into light through suggestion the implicit sense of Poetry, the definition of *Dhvani*, which takes for granted without question the above concept is vitiated by the defect of absurdity.¹⁵

After explaining the nature of *Abhivyakti* in details and showing that a suggested sense is nothing but an inferred idea, Mahimabhaṭṭa turns to the meaning which suggests and observes that, this also is nothing different from a *Probandum*. A thing that suggests, he remarks, assumes either the form of an *Upādhi* or the shape of a distinct object. An *Upādhi* that manifests others is often self-luminous in character, i.e. to say, it manifests others, and at the same time for its own manifestation no other illuminator is necessary. Knowledge, word and lamp reveal others in this way. Knowledge itself being an attribute of the knowable manifests that and in a similar manner word itself which constitutes a portion of its connotation becomes an attribute of the thing signified by it and subsequently manifests it : a lamp is called *Upādhi* in the sense that it tinges the jar and such other objects with its colour or in other words, ascribes to them the quality of manifestedness. Of these three entities that reveal others, the first and the third—the knowledge and the lamp—are not definitely regarded as *Vyañjaka* units in a *Dhvani Kāvya*, because this assertion renders things perceived by sense-organs specimens of Poetry : nor is the second entity—the word considered a *Vyañjaka*, because this assumption renders primary meanings illustrations of best specimens of Poetry. Thus as attributes or adjuncts are incapable of being treated as *Vyañjaka* units in a *Dhvani Kāvya*, what we are left with is that a distinct object reveals another, without changing or qualifying or colouring it in any way ; and this distinct object is nothing other than a *Probandum* : in a *Dhvani Kāvya* the explicit brings into light the implicit, without attributing a new quality to it. The above discussion

shows, Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes that, neither *Abhivyakti* occurs of the unexpressed content of Poetry, nor is the expressed meaning its *Vyañjaka* : what actually happens is *Anumāna* of the implicit idea and the explicit, which brings this into light is really a *liṅga* or *hetu*.¹⁶

The objection that comprehension of *Rasa* occurs simultaneously with apprehension of *Vibhāva*, *Anubhāva* and *Vyabhi-cāri-bhāva*, and as such, the second type of *Abhivyakti* is capable of being asserted in case of *Rasa* does not help a *Dhvanivādin* in any way, because, as Mahimabhaṭṭa points out, the learned Dhvanikāra himself accepts the existence of sequence between the cognition of the *Vibhāvas* and the comprehension of *Rasa*. The point that from the definition of *Abhivyakti*, the clause, stating simultaneous manifestation of the indicator and the indicated is to be deleted and what actually happens in a *Dhvani Kāvya* is that apprehension of the explicit produces subsequently comprehension of the implicit helps an *Anumānavādin* more, because in *Anumāna*, also, knowledge of *Probandum* leads subsequently to knowledge of *Probandum*. The solution that, *Abhivyakti* occurs of a non-existent entity as *Rasa*, alone, and *Anumāna*, consisting as it does in knowledge of an existent thing does not comprehend *Dhvani*—lands a *Dhvanivādin* into further troubles, because it makes the definition of *Abhivyakti* inapplicable to *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya*,—an analogy on which the whole Theory of *Dhvani* is based. The point that from the definition of *Abhivyakti*, the clause stating manifestation of a non-existent is to be deleted is unacceptable, because leaving the revelation of a non-existent rainbow out of the purview of *Abhivyakti* it renders the definition vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition. The solution that, in the said definition mention should be made neither of an existent nor of a non-existent entity, offered to obviate the above difficulty makes the case of an *Anumānavādin* stronger, because, as Mahimabhaṭṭa points out, the definition, thus enunciated becomes that of *Anumāna*.¹⁷

According to the *Dhvanivādin* in a *Dhvani Kāvya*, word rendering its primary meaning subservient and meaning, which he explains as expressed meaning rendering its own self sub-

servient bring into light through suggestion the implicit idea of Poetry. Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges this proposition that, in a *Dhvanikāvya* an expressed meaning alone manifests the unexpressed content, and asserts that express mention of expressed meaning in the definition of *Dhvani* vitiates it by the fallacy of too narrow definition, inasmuch as, it makes impossible attainment of the covetable status of *Dhvani* by the verse: 'Evaṃ vādinī Devarṣau pārśve pituradhomukhī/ Līlākamala-patrāṇi ganayāmāsa Pārvatī', in which the implicit idea of love for Lord Śiva of Pārvatī is brought into light not by the primary sense, but by the meaning of bashfulness, inferred from that explicit idea. The argument that by the term 'artha', used in the definition of *Dhvani*, a Dhvanivādin means both an explicit and implicit idea and specimens of Poetic creation in which the unexpressed content of paramount importance is brought into comprehension by expressed and inferred meanings constitute illustrations of *Dhvani* is untenable, because, firstly, in the *Vṛtti* on this definition, the learned Dhvanikāra himself explains the term 'artha' as referring to 'vā-ya artha' only, and secondly, mention of *vyāṅgyārtha* in the subsequent portion of the definition makes it clear that what actually is meant by 'artha' is the primary meaning only, and not primary and inferred both. Moreover, this argument renders many poetic creations of second rate, in which the cognition of an inferred fact follows apprehension of one or two implied facts, manifested by expressed meaning cases of *Dhvanikāvya*, and thereby vitiates the definition by the fallacy of too wide definition. The Verse:

'Sihipicchakannaūrā vahuā vāhassa gavvirī bhamai/
Muttāhaḍaraipāsāhaṇāṇā majjhe savattīṇam//

meaning: 'The wife of the fowler, holding peacock-plumage in her ears is moving with pride in the midst of her co-wives, decorated with pearls' forms an illustration of this type of Poetry. Here the expressed meaning leads to knowledge of this idea that, while the fowler, being not attached to his other wives go deep into the forest and kill elephants when he remains in their company, he, being eager to enjoy the company of this girl does not move much but bags such games,

as are available near at hand, and this inferred idea, in its turn, leads to cognition of good luck of the girl, along with misfortune of her co-wives. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that, the contention that in a *Dhvanikāvya* both expressed and inferred meanings are capable of giving rise to comprehension of implicit idea gives to this verse the status of *Dhvani*, which it does not actually deserve. The point that absence of recognition granted to the verse under consideration is likely to bring the verse: 'Evaṃ vādinī' etc. also out of the purview of *Dhvani* is untenable, because the cases of the two stanzas are entirely different from each other. It is a fact that in both these stanzas an apprehension of an inferred meaning interposes itself between the cognition of the expressed meaning and comprehension of the so-called implied idea, but while in the case of the verse: 'Sihipiccha' etc. the intervening factor is a *Vastu*, in the case of the verse: 'Evaṃ vādinī' this factor is a *Vyabhicārībhāva*. The nature of these two intervening factors are entirely different from each other: the first is absolutely distinct from the subsequent inferred idea, as is smoke from fire, but the second namely bashfulness is not entirely separate from the inferred idea of love, inasmuch as, the two move hand in hand, the one sharing the beauty of the other. The intervening agent, being absolutely distinct from the final inferred idea, the first verse is unattractive, while the second one in which this agent is not totally separate from the final unexpressed content is endowed with supreme charm. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, it is wrong to regard the two stanzas as similar cases, and to deny the status of *Dhvani* to the verse: 'Evaṃ vādinī' etc. A similar illustration is afforded by the verse:

Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadīnṁ mukhe'smin
Smere'dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi/
Kṣobhaṃ yadeti na manāgapi tena manye
Suvyaktameva jalarāśirayaṃ payodhiḥ//,

in which cognition of the sense of total identity of moon and the face is intervened by apprehension of the relation of substratum of superimposition and the thing superimposed (*Rūpya-rūpaka-bhāva*), existing between face and orb of the

moon. Here, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks, the understanding of the expressed content leads to cognition of the said *Rūpya-rūpaka-bhāva*, which, in its turn, leads to apprehension of the idea of total identity,—an idea, whose manifestation alone is competent to acquire for the verse the covetable appellation 'Dhvani'; the intervention caused by an *Alaṃkāra* does not stand in the way of this verse being regarded as a specimen of *Dhvani*, because an *Alaṃkāra*, unable as it is to reside without an *Alaṃkārya* is not totally distinct from that in the same way as a *Vyabhicāribhāva* is not absolutely separate from a *Sthāyibhāva*.

These considerations lead to the inevitable conclusion that, while the verses: 'Evaṃ vādinī' etc. and 'Lāvāṇyakānti-paripūrītādīn mukhe'smin' are capable of being regarded as specimens of *Dhvani*, the stanza 'Sihipicchakaṇṇaūrā' is incompetent to receive this recognition. Thus as the point that 'artha' in the definition refers to *vācya artha* only vitiates the definition by the fallacy of too narrow definition, similarly the explanation that the term refers to both expressed and inferred meanings, also, renders it vitiated by the fallacy of too wide definition.¹⁸ Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that in one place only the learned Dhvanikāra uses the term 'artha' to convey the idea of both expressed and unexpressed contents but there, too, he commits a blunder by describing both these meanings as forming the soul of Poetry. This observation is contradictory to his own assertion that, the suggested sense alone constitutes the essence of poetic creations.

After finding fault with all the possible explanations of the term 'artha', used in the theory of Dhvani, Mahimabhaṭṭa proceeds to criticise the use of the indeclinable 'vā' in the definition. This indeclinable is capable of signifying either the sense of option or that of aggregate. The acceptance of the first alternative leads to the conclusion that, in a *Dhvanikāvya* either the word-element or the sense-element brings into light the unexpressed content of Poetry. Now as words are endowed with no function other than that of denotation, it is not possible for them to suggest implicit ideas, and naturally, the indeclinable

is not significant of option. The question of choice arises only when more than one objects are present: as in a *Dhvanikāvya* only the sense-element, and not the word-element is competent to suggest, so the question of extending choice does not arise. Moreover the explanation that the indeclinable 'vā' signifies option renders justification of the use of the dual number in the verb 'vyañktaḥ' impossible: in all such expressions as: 'Śiraḥ śvā kāko vū drupadatanayā vā parimṛśet' in which option is granted between two or more things, the verb is always put in the singular number, and never in dual or plural. The acceptance of the second alternative brings out this characteristic, that in a *Dhvanikāvya* the sound and the sense-elements conjointly suggest an implicit idea. This explanation fails to bring under the scope of *Dhvanikāvya* those specimens of poetic creations, in which the implicit idea is brought into light severally by sound or sense, and thus vitiates the entire definition by the fallacy of too narrow definition. Moreover this explanation makes unnecessary the use of the epithet 'upasarjanīkṛtārtha' as an adjective to śabda, because the assertion that in a *Dhvanikāvya* the explicit idea renders itself subordinate to the implicit one, alone, is able to convey this intended sense. In fact for this reason, the learned Dhvanikāra does not mention *Abhidhā*, in the definition of *Dhvani*: he thinks that the clause, signifying the subordination of the expressed meaning to the suggested one is quite competent to bring out the idea of subservience of *Abhidhā*, also, in a *Dhvanikāvya*. Thus, with irrefutable logic Mahimabhaṭṭa proves that, the indeclinable 'vā', used in the Theory of Dhvani neither conveys the idea of option nor that of aggregate. Abhinavagupta attempts to justify the use of this indeclinable as also that of the dual number in 'vyañktaḥ' by saying that, in the matter of suggestion words and meanings both have their roles to play, though of course, in some cases the word-element is of more importance than the sense-element and in others the case is just the reverse: he points out that, the dual number in the verb conveys the idea that the sound and sense-elements conjointly suggest an implicit idea, and the indeclinable 'vā' refers to option

between prominence of one or other of these two elements. This statement, Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, is wrong; it is not possible for word and meaning to act conjointly and bring into comprehension the unexpressed content, because these elements are not apprehended simultaneously,—the knowledge of the word arising first and the cognition of the meaning following it. This argument, coupled with those advanced above goes to establish beyond doubt the futility of Abhinavagugta's attempt.

Another minor defect in the Theory of Dhvani, adumbrated by the learned Dhvanikāra is the use of the masculine gender in the term '*taṁ*', denotative of the unexpressed content of Poetry. The pronoun *tat* refers to a contextual thing: as in the preceding Kārikā the suggested element is described, this pronoun stands for that element; but because the suggested idea is referred to by a word in neuter gender in the Kārikās: 'Pratīyamānam punaranyadeva' etc. and 'Sarasvatī svādu tadarthavastu' etc., it is proper to refer it here also by a word in the neuter gender. To obviate this difficulty Mahimabhaṭṭa suggests modification either in the two preceding Kārikās, which should read as: 'Pratīyamānaḥ punaranya eva so'rtho'sti vāṇīṣu mahākavīnām yo 'sau..... etc.' and 'Sarasvatī svādutamam tamartham.....etc.' respectively or in the body of the definition itself, which should read as: 'Yatrārthaḥ śabda vā vastu tat' etc. Of these two courses he prefers the first one.

Continuing his criticism of the Theory of Dhvani, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out to the impropriety of the use of the word '*Viśeṣa*', which the Dhvanivādin, according to whom *Dhvani* is the name given to a species of poetic creation explains as conveying the sense of type. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, Poetry does not admit of classification into types and subtypes, inasmuch as, each and every poetic creation is marked by manifestation of *Rasa*. The learned Dhvanikāra himself recognises *Rāsa* as constituting the essence of all poetry, beginning from the *Rāmāyaṇa* to the latest productions, and emphatically asserts that, no specimen of poetic art can do without this charming element. Thus as all poetry constitutes case of *Rasadhvani*, the use of the word '*Viśeṣa*', signifying the sense

of type is redundant and misleading. Mahimabhaṭṭa agrees with the Dhvanivādin in accepting the essentiality of *Rasa* in Kāvya which is established in this way. Poetry is an extranormal description of *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, that bring *Rasa* unfailingly into comprehension, made by a Poet, expert in drawing such description. From the point of form and mode of appreciation, Poetry is grouped under two heads: *Abhineya* and *Anabhineya*. The first is fit to be enacted on the stage, while the second admits of reading and recital only: the first exhibits excitants, ensuents and accessories on the stage, when the second merely draws their descriptions. The aim of both these groups of Poetry is delivery of counsel, comprised of injunctions in some cases and prohibitions in others, and in this respect a Poetry meets on a common platform with a Śāstra: it asks man to imitate the conduct of some, and not to follow that of others. The difference, between Kāvya and Śāstra lies, however, in this that, while advice that is tendered by poetry is caught by men of tender intellect, that delivered by a Śāstra is grasped by men of mature intellect, averse to the study of the Vedas and dullards. *An-bhineyakāvya* is meant for princes of such tender intellect, and *Abhineyakāvya* is meant for dullards, averse to reading or hearing of *Śravya-kāvya*, but attached to music and dance. These persons, disinclined to the study of Vedas and Śāstras feel inclined to read poetry or witness a theatrical performance, because poetry attracts them by generating in their minds supreme bliss, springing from aesthetic realisation. Just as a patient is drawn to a pungent medicine by taste of sugar administered previously, similarly a man opposed to Vedic studies is attracted towards the pill of advice by a taste of bliss, springing from relish of *Rasa*. A specimen of poetic creation that does not afford relish of *Rasa* fails to draw readers or spectators towards it: they do not derive any lesson whatsoever from such poetry and naturally its very purpose is defeated. This discussion, Mahimabhaṭṭa asserts, goes to establish the essentiality of *Rasa* in Kāvya, and as all poetry presents *Rasa*, the question of a particular type of Poetry delineating it does not arise.

The argument that Poetry is capable of being classified into numerous types according to the principle of great merit or inferiority of the *Rasa* delineated and a species of Poetry in which excellence of *Rasa* manifests itself is Poetry of the best type does not hold good, because excellence or inferiority is not likely to be asserted of *Rasa*, which is a peculiar blissful condition of the ego, in which knowledge of other knowables is completely obliterated. Nor is it correct to say that, a Poetry, depicting a particular emotion is Poetry of the best type, because such proposal renders the definition of *Dhvani* vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition by bringing specimens of Poetry, delineating other emotions out of the purview of *Dhvanikāvya*. It is equally wrong to maintain that, a combination of sound and sense, ornamented by the elements known as *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras* forms Poetry of the best type, because a specimen of poetic creation, though beautified by *Guṇas* and *Alaṅkāras*, but bereft of *Rasa* is not regarded as *Kāvya* at all. The opponents might meet the objection of the Anumānavādin by pointing out that, though the concept of superiority or inferiority does not arise in case of *Rasa*, the superiority or inferiority of fact and imaginative mood, that terminate ultimately in the suggestion of *Rasa* is shifted to *Rasa* itself, and taking this transmuted merit or demerit into consideration, Poetry is regarded as one of superior or inferior type. As against this, Mahimabhaṭṭa replies that, the facts (*vastu*) and imaginative moods (*Alaṅkāra*), whose manifestation terminates ultimately in the suggestion of *Rasa* are regarded as causes leading to its comprehension: the excellence of cause does not produce a similar excellence in effect; and naturally the superiority or inferiority of *Vastu* and *Alaṅkāra* is not competent to infuse merit or demerit into *Rasa*. A similar instance is found in the case of physical structure of cows of different colour and size, the difference of which is unable to produce any change in the universal element of cowness, manifested by that structure. The argument that superiority of *Vastu* and *Alaṅkāra* produces superiority of *Rasa*, whose delineation entitles a piece of poetic creation to receive the appellation '*Dhvani*' lands a Dhvani-

vādin into further troubles, because on the one hand, it denies the status of *Dhvani* to poetry, not marked by manifestation of *Vastu* and *Alaṅkāra* but characterised by emergence of *Rasa* alone, and on the other hand, extends it to riddles even, presenting *Vastu* only through suggestion and thereby creating wonder. Equally untenable is the point that, the speciality of the *Rasa* in the shape of its subservience to *Vastu* and *Alaṅkāra* renders a poetry one of special type, because in the view of the learned Dhvanikāra himself, in a *Dhvanikāvya* the suggested emotion manifests itself prominently and absorbs all our consciousness. Moreover, when Poetry, depicting emotion predominantly is found, the designation '*Dhvani*' is to be added to this Poetry, only, in conformity to the dictum: '*Gaṇamukhyayormukhye kāryasampratyayah*', which states that, in the event of applicability of a rule to both primary and secondary cases, action enjoined by the rule operates in primary cases only and not in secondary ones. The epithet '*Kāvyavišeṣa*' applied to such poetic creations as the *Meghadūta* and the like is dependent neither on the excellence of *Rasa* nor on the delineation of a particular type of emotion nor on the superiority of *Vyañjana* *Vastu* nor on the subservience of *Rasa* to *Vastu* or *Alaṅkāra*: excellence of the expressed meaning is attributed here to *Kāvya* and naturally the use of the term '*Kāvyavišeṣa*' is *Aṣṭāṅrika*. In conformity to his view that, all poetry is *Dhvanikāvya* and the genus *dhvanitva* is but a different name of the universality Poetryness, Mahimabhaṭṭa regards examples of such figures as *Samāsokti* and the like, that are considered as Poetry of the mediocre type by the Dhvanikāra as specimens of *Dhvanikāvya*; as all Poetry depicts *Rasa* without which a composition is not counted as *Kāvya* at all, the unexpressed content of a Poetry, he says, presents itself either in the aspect of a fact or in the aspect of a figure. To a critic who wants to justify the use of the term '*Višeṣa*' in the definition of *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa puts the simple question: is the definition one of a special type of Poetry or is speciality of Poetry comprehended from its definition? If the first alternative is accepted and it is argued that, the definition, propounded by the Dhvanikāra is one of a

special type of Poetry, then the use of the term *Viśeṣa* becomes superfluous, because what is a special type of Poetry of the Dhvanivādin is nothing but Poetry in general. If the second alternative is accepted and it is said that, speciality of the Poetry is comprehended from its definition, then also mention of the term becomes redundant, because the peculiar nature of the Poetry defined is brought into light by the special traits, incorporated in the definition. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa shows that, the mention of the term '*Viśeṣa*' renders the definition vitiated by the defect known as *Avācyavacana*, that consists in express statement of one, that is not fit to be mentioned.

Similarly superfluous is the use of the word '*Sūribhiḥ*' denotative of the sense of agency of the act of describing, presented by the term '*Kathitaḥ*'. The express mention of the subject may bring out either the idea of agents in general or that of a particular type of agents : to put it more clearly it may either be said that, *Dhvani* is described by men or it may be posited that, *Dhvani* is described by a particular section of men. The contention that *Dhvani* is described by scholars in general makes the express mention of agents superfluous, because the idea of agency is capable of being known through implication from the statement of action, with which it is associated inseparably. In a similar manner the proposition that, *Dhvani* is described by one section of scholars makes the use of the term '*Sūribhiḥ*' redundant, because the fact that *Dhvani* is postulated by a certain section of critics is capable of being comprehended from the very attempt on their part to formulate a definition of *Dhvani* in clear cut terms.

Thus the defects that go to vitiate the definition of *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa sums up, are ten in number and are enumerated as follows :

- (a) The mention of *Artha*, as qualified by the adjective '*Upasarjanīkṛtasva*.'
- (b) The mention of *Śabda*, as qualified by the adjective '*Upasarjanīkṛtārtha*.'
- (c) The mention of the adjective '*Upasarjanīkṛtasvārthau*.'
- (d) The use of the pronoun *tat* in masculine gender.

- (e) The use of the dual number in the verb '*vyāñtāḥ*'.
- (f) The use of the indeclinable *vā*.
- (g) The assumption that *Abhivyakti* takes place of the unexpressed content of Poetry and that *śabda* and *artha* are *vyāñjaka* units.
- (h) The mention of the term '*Dhvani*', which being in no way different from *Kāvya* is needless.
- (i) The use of word '*Viśeṣa*', which is superfluous.
- (j) The mention of the agent '*Sūribhiḥ*', which is redundant¹⁹

The definition of *Dhvani*, free from the defects enumerated above Mahimabhaṭṭa says, comes to this : A piece of poetic creation in which an expressed or an inferred meaning manifests a sense with which it bears the relation of universal concomitance is regarded as a case of *Kāvyaānumiti*.²⁰ Mahimabhaṭṭa fully agrees with the learned Dhvanikāra in accepting the essentiality of *Rasa* in *Kāvya* and recognising it as the soul of poetic creation, but he differs from him in regarding *Rasa* as being comprehended through the process of *Anumāna*, and not through the function of *Vyāñjanā*.

Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges the proposition that, words are endowed with more than one function, and asserts that the function of conveying the secondary sense or bringing into light the suggested content really belongs to the explicit idea. In cases where a number of powers co-inhere in the same substratum, they are found to act simultaneously and independent of one another and produce their respective results. An illustration is found in case of fire, that forms the common substratum of the power to illuminate and that to consume : the two powers act simultaneously and none is dependent for its operation on that of the other. The functions, that are supposed to belong to a word-unit, however, do not act simultaneously and independent of one another. Inasmuch as, the functions of *Lakṣaṇā* and *Vyāñjanā* always depend on *Abhidhā*, whose operation precedes that of them without fail. This goes to show that, the secondary sense is not conveyed by a word-unit through the function of *Lakṣaṇā*. What actually

conveys it is the explicit idea and that too through the process of *Anumāna*.

The critics who recognise the separate existence of *Lakṣaṇā* put forward the expressions: 'Gourvāhikaḥ', meaning 'the carrier is a bull' and 'Gaṅgāyām Ghoṣaḥ', meaning 'A hamlet on the Ganges' as illustrations respectively of *Gauṇī* and *Śuddhā* types of *Lakṣaṇā*; they say that, in the first expression, the term 'Gauḥ' signifies through *Lakṣaṇā* the sense of a man resembling a cow and in the second one, the word 'Gaṅgā' conveys through the same function the idea of the bank of the Ganges. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, these two meanings are capable of being comprehended through the process of inference. He says that, in the first expression, the establishment of identity between a cow and a man, being opposed to our ordinary experience leads to a knowledge of similarity of the man concerned with a cow in some respects through *Anumāna*: as no sane man speaks of physical identity of a man with a bull, the hearer, who knows the speaker to be a sane man, at once, realises through *Anumāna* the similarity of the man with the bull in some respects, —similarity that leads the speaker to identify the two in that fashion. The purpose served by use of the term 'bull' to signify the man resembling the bull is to bring home the idea of bovine stupidity of the man concerned. Similarly in the second expression, the primary meanings of the two terms being incompatible with each other, the simple mention of the term 'Gaṅgā' shows that its identity is sought to be established with something, related to it, and this ultimately leads to knowledge of the bank of the Ganges through inference. The purpose served by use of the term 'Gaṅgā' to signify the sense of *Gaṅgāṭī* is to bring home the idea of excess of coolness and purity as belonging to the bank. In the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa, the assertion of identity between two things, that are actually different leads in such cases to inferential knowledge of a relation existing between the two; it is not that superimposition of identity of one on another is caused by the relation of similarity alone: this is caused, as well, by such relations as that of proximity, that

of association, that of contradiction, that existing between a cause and an effect and the like. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, the superimposition of identity of one on another leads unfailingly to the knowledge of existence of a relation between the two, because superimposition of identity is co-existent with such relations as that of similarity, proximity and the like. This co-existence is ascertained from expressions used in daily life even: it is seen that one having long neck is called a camel and one having a fat frame is named an elephant, and similarly children reclining on cradles are referred to as cradles themselves. In order that, *Lakṣaṇā* might not convey any and every sense, the Ālankārikas speak of three conditions necessary for its operation: these conditions, they say, are inapplicability of the primary meaning with the rest of the sentence, existence of some sort of connection between the primary and the secondary meanings and existence either of usage or of motive. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that, the factors necessary for operation of *Lakṣaṇā* are really the probans leading to inferential knowledge of the secondary sense,—the probandum. In case of *Gauṇī Lakṣaṇā*, the superimposition of identity between two distinct objects leads to comprehension of similarity existing between them and in cases of *Śuddhā Lakṣaṇā*, similar superimposition prompts one to apprehend the relation of proximity or of cause and effect, as existing between them. Thus, according to Mahimabhaṭṭa, both the types of *Lakṣaṇā*, postulated by the Ālankārikas are nothing but fields of inference.²¹

The Dhvanivādin regards indication as an extension of denotation, and points out that, as in certain expressions the primary meanings seem incompatible with the rest of the sentence, the word instead of conveying the primary sense signifies through an extended denotation the secondary meaning. Mahimabhaṭṭa challenges this proposition and asserts that neither does a word give up its primary function of denotation nor does it convey a secondary sense through a function other than that of *Abhidhā*: this secondary sense, he continues, is comprehended through the process of inference. To those critics who regard *Lakṣaṇā* as a case of transference of epithet,

consisting in use of a word to signify a sense other than the primary one Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that, this concept of *Śabdāropa* is wrong, and what actually is superimposed is the thing itself, and not the word denotative of it. The argument that, in case of *Lakṣaṇā* superimposition of both word and object occurs—is unacceptable, because the two types of superimposition are not of equal status,—the superimposition of one object on another that leads to superimposition of one word on another being the more important of the two : moreover, as the desired result is produced by mere superimposition of object, the presumption that, both objects and words are superimposed leads to complexity. Thus as words have no role to play in the matter of bringing into light the secondary sense, what brings this idea into comprehension is the meaning and that, too, through the process of inference.²²

Contrary to the view of the Dhvanivādin, who holds that neither *Bhakti* and *Dhvani* are identical, their forms being different, nor is the former a definition of the latter, the proposed definition being vitiated by the fallacies of too wide and too narrow definition, Mahimabhaṭṭa regards the two as identical in all respects, because, as he says, both *Bhakti* and *Dhvani* are nothing but forms of *Anumāna*. This observation is in accordance to the principle that things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. *Bhakti* is not, as the Dhvanivādin thinks, based on the function of denotation : similarly *Dhvani* also is not based on the function of suggestion, because *Abhivyakti* of the unexpressed content does not take place simultaneously with the manifestation of the expressed, and the parallelism of *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya*, on which the whole theory of suggestion rests itself has slender legs to stand ; both *Bhakti* and *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks, are based on the relation existing between a probans and a probandum, and as such the presence of the former agrees with that of the latter and the vice versa. He recognises the presence of *Dhvani* even in illustrations of *Lakṣaṇā*, based on *Rūḍhi*. Mahimabhaṭṭa holds further that *Bhakti* is capable of being regarded as the definition of *Dhvani*.

The contention that in the expression : 'Suvarnapuṣpāṃ prthivīm cinvanta puruṣāstrayaḥ / Śūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jānāti sevitur', *Dhvani* is present, but *Bhakti* is absent, and the absence of *Bhakti* not agreeing with the absence of *Dhvani*, the former cannot constitute a definition of the latter—is unsound, because *Bhakti*, that relates to both *Padārtha* and *Vākyārtha* is fully present there ; even a Dhvanivādin admits the existence of *Lakṣaṇā* as belonging to a proposition, and not merely to a term.²³

Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that the function of *Tātparyā*, also, is capable of being comprehended under the process of inference, and as such its postulation is unnecessary. Of the operation of *Tātparyā Śakti* the stock illustration that is quoted is the expression : 'Viṣaṃ bhakṣaya mā cāśya gṛhe bhukthāḥ', in which it is pointed out that, the idea that, taking of meal at this man's house is more dangerous than swallowing of poison is brought into light through this function. Mahimabhaṭṭa believes that in the expression, sudden request meted out to swallow poison coupled with a prohibition never to take meal at the house of a particular man leads one, cognisant of the speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context to comprehend through inference the idea that taking of meal at this man's house is more dangerous than swallowing of poison. The point that the whole proposition conveys the idea through the function of *Tātparyā* is without any value, because first of all words are endowed with no function other than that of *Abhidhā*, and secondly the idea referred to above is made known not by the word-element, but by the sense-element, namely the sudden request meted out to swallow poison, with which it is related in the same way as is a probandum to a probans. Thus as the sense conveyed by the *Tātparyā Śakti* is capable of being arrived at through the process of *Anumāna*, Mahimabhaṭṭa does not think it necessary to accept the existence of this function.²⁴ Some scholars are in favour of investing the function of *Abhidhā* with an extensive power : they argue that just as an arrow discharged by a strong person produces through the same velocity a number of actions, inasmuch as, it pierces

the armour of the enemy, cuts into his vital parts and kills him, similarly a word, used by a great poet brings into light all the ideas, beginning from the explicit to the implicit one, and all these through the same function of *Abhidhā*. In support of their view, they quote the dictum '*Yatparaḥ Śabdah sa śabdār-thah*', and maintain that, in the matter of bringing the intended sense or the implicit idea into light, meaning has no role to play. In reply to this contention, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that, a word is incapable of being regarded as the cause of apprehension of all meanings, appearing in succession on hearing of a particular term; a word produces the cognition of the primary meaning only, and this meaning, in its turn, leads to comprehension of another idea. The argument that, word, having remote connection with an idea, made known by its primary meaning is likely to be regarded as the cause of that idea is dangerous, because adoption of this logic renders a potter as much efficient cause of blossoming of flowers as the advent of spring itself, simply because of the fact that he happens to be a producer of the jar, with which the saplings in blossom are watered. Thus as words do not constitute the causes of comprehension of meanings, made known by their explicit ideas, these ideas, Mahimabhaṭṭa remarks, are to be regarded as causes leading to knowledge of new meanings, with which they stand in the relation of premises and conclusion. The action performed by an explicit idea cannot be described as that discharged by its denotative word, in the same way as an act done by a son cannot be taken as one performed by his father. The analogy of the arrow, put forward, Mahimabhaṭṭa continues, is not applicable in the present case; an arrow pierces the armour, cuts into the vital parts and performs other actions naturally and independent of others: a word, however, does not act independently, completely dependent on divine volition as it is: it signifies only that meaning that forms the object of divine volition. The proposition that words do act independently of divine volition and convey meanings other than those with respect to which convention is accepted is misleading, for it renders comprehension of the sense of horse from the term 'cow'

likely²⁵ The above discussion clearly shows that the comprehension of a meaning other than the primary one is neither caused *Abhidhā* by nor by *Tātparya*; in fact, word has nothing to do with signification of that sense, which is made known by the primary meaning alone through the process of inference.

In his eagerness to show that all poetic functions are nothing but forms of inference, Mahimabhaṭṭa turns to the concept of *Vakrokti* of Kuntaka and opines that, this also can be dispensed with, comprehended as it is under the process of *Anumāna*. *Vakrokti* of Kuntaka is a turn given to a poetic expression by the imaginative faculty of the poet,—a turn, that differentiates it from ordinary linguistic expression: he says that, it is this *Vakrokti* that constitutes the essence of poetic creation. To the scholars affiliated to the school of *Vakrokti*, Mahimabhaṭṭa puts this simple question; what do they actually mean by declaring *Vakrokti* as the soul of Poetry? Do they mean that appropriate combination of sound and sense invests a linguistic expression with the status of Poetry or do they mean that capacity to signify an implicit idea differentiates a poetic expression from an expression of daily life? Of these two alternatives, the acceptance of the first one renders separate assertion of *Vakrokti* as forming the very life of Poetry superfluous, because no poetic expression can afford to do without appropriate combination of sound and sense. The function of a poet is presentation of suitable *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, competent to bring *Rasa* into comprehension: the slightest touch of the defect of impropriety is sufficiently able to render the excitants, ensuents and accessories ineffective in the matter of conducting the mood to a relishable state and so it goes without saying that appropriateness constitutes the very essence of Poetry. The acceptance of the second alternative, that is to say, the assertion that, the capacity to signify an implicit idea differentiates a poetic expression from an ordinary linguistic expression makes the position of the *Vākroktivādin* exactly identical with that of the *Dhvanivādin*, according to whom an unexpressed content forms the essence of Poetry. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, by the term *Vakrokti*

the Vakroktivādin really means a round-about expression,—a mode to express meanings in a way other than the normal one; that this is nothing other than *Dhvani* is corroborated by the fact that like the classification of *Dhvani* into *Padaprakāśya*,—that brought into light by a word-unit, *Vākya-prakāśya*,—that brought into light by a whole proposition and so on, *Vakratā* also is classified into *Padavakratā*, *Vākya-vakratā*, *Pravandhavakratā* and so on. In conformity to his belief that a word is endowed with only one function named *Abhidhā*, that brings the primary meaning alone into light and that, meanings other than the primary one are made known by the expressed sense, Mahimabhaṭṭa holds that *Vakrokti*, which is but a different name of implicit idea, and which is distinct from the expressed sense, as is evident from its classification into numerous types is made known by the primary meaning through the process of inference.²⁶

The proposition that a word expresses meanings only and is not competent to suggest or manifest them seems untenable at the first instance, because in the science of language a distinction is scrupulously made between a *vācaka* and a *dyotaka*, and it is asserted that an *upasarga* is a *dyotaka* and not a *vācaka*: the terms 'manifestor', 'suggestor' and 'illuminator' are all synonymous units. In this connection, Mahimabhaṭṭa remarks that *dyotakatva* of an *upasarga* is asserted only in a figurative sense; really speaking the *upasargas* do not manifest ideas in the sense a lamp illuminates others; what they do is this that, they express meanings in the same way as is done by *vācaka* words. The point that, such roots as *spac* and the like signify the general act of cooking, that includes within its orb all particular types of cooking and accordingly, this sense of particular that is expressed by the root itself is manifested merely by such prefixes as 'Pra' and the like—indicates the ingenuity of the critic, but is, nevertheless, unacceptable. This is in accordance with the dictum '*Nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyam bhavedcchaśaviśānavat*' which states that a universality, having no individuals to inhere in is an unreality like a rabbit's horn, and conformity to this

doctrine gives it a show of probability. But such *upasargas* as 'Pra' and the like do not merely convey the idea of that particularity as is necessary for comprehension of the sense of generality: they convey in addition the sense of speciality, which differ according to difference in context and theme. As this idea of speciality is not expressed by the root itself, it is proper to regard *upasargas* as directly *vācakas* of that sense. Moreover the drawing of this logic to its extreme point is likely to render adjectives also *dyotakas*, because it is possible to argue that in the proposition 'a blue lotus', the term 'lotus' directly conveys the sense of water lily in general in which are included all particular types, such as blue, red and white, and what the adjective 'blue' does is this that, it merely indicates the sense already conveyed by the noun. Adopting this chain of argument, such terms as *Ghaṭa*, *Paṭa* also can be explained as *Dyotakas*, because eternal consciousness reflected in the form of a jar or a picture is manifested only by the terms. For this reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks it better and proper to regard an *upasarga* as a real *vācaka* unit, and not a *dyotaka* one.²⁷ It is called a *dyotaka* figuratively and the purpose for taking recourse to a figurative expression is to bring home the idea that the expressed meaning is cognised clearly; the reason lying behind this figurative use of words is a false notion that the meanings of the prefixes and roots are comprehended simultaneously.²⁸ Really however a sequence exists between the apprehension of the meaning of the prefix and comprehension of the sense of the root, but as this sequence is negligible, one regards the two comprehensions as appearing simultaneously, and this wrong notion prompts him to regard both the meanings as being conveyed by the root,—the prefix only indicating it. In this connection, Mahimabhaṭṭa introduces the topic of *Viśeṣaṇa* which, he says, is two-fold in nature, one being intimate and the other remote. An intimate *Viśeṣaṇa* imparts qualities or a thing or an action, only when it is placed by the side of the *Viśeṣya*, not intervened by any other thing: a remote *Viśeṣaṇa*, on the other hand, imparts qualities on the *Viśeṣya*, though remaining intervened by others. A lac-stick imparting redness

to a piece of crystal, lying by its side illustrates an *Antaraṅga Viśeṣaṇa*, while a piece of magnet imparting power to an iron-bar even from a great distance illustrates a *Bahiraṅga Viśeṣaṇa*. As an *upasarga* is an *Antaraṅga Viśeṣaṇa*, the meaning conveyed by it remains, as if, embedded in the connotation of the root and consequently, the comprehensions of the ideas conveyed by the *Viśeṣaṇa* and *Viśeṣya* occur in quick succession. The erroneous knowledge of simultaneity springing from imperceptibility of this sequence is responsible for attributing *dyotakatva* to *upasargas*. The indeclinables such as *Ca* and the like also illustrate intimate attributes: as they ascribe speciality to contiguous nouns only, special care is to be taken to insert them in proper place in proper order. Violation to this rule is likely to hamper cognition of the intended idea and the enjoyment of aesthetic relish, consequential upon it.

According to the Dhvanivādin Poetry admits of classification into three types: *Dhvani*, *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* and *Citra*; in a *Dhvanikāvya* the suggested content is of paramount importance, in a poetry of *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* type, this is rendered subservient to the explicit idea and in a *Citrakāvya* the implicit idea is unable to manifest itself clearly, being smothered beneath a huge mass of figures of sound and sense. Mahimabhaṭṭa finds fault with this system of classification, made according to the prominence or subservience of the suggested sense, and remarks that this classification does not conform to facts. What converts an ordinary expression into a poetic expression is the charm, springing from touch of inferred meaning and as this charm is equally present in *Kāvya* of *Dhvani* and *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* types, it is proper to group them under one head. The proposition that suggested meanings are capable of rendering themselves subordinate to the expressed idea is unacceptable in the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa, because the expressed being a means to comprehension of the unexpressed is bound to render itself subordinate to the suggested sense, which is always prominent. Mahimabhaṭṭa does not find any appreciable difference in charm between a specimen of poetry, presenting prominent implicit

idea and that, depicting a subservient suggested sense, and asserts, quoting illustrations, that this is true in cases of *Vastu*, *Alaṃkāra* and *Rasadhvani*. Thus the verse:

Vacca maha bbia ekkāe hontu nīsāsaroiabbāim /

Mā tujja vi tīe viṇa dakkhiṇṇahaassa jāandu //, quoted as an illustration of *Vastudhvani* meets on a common platform in point of charm with the verse:

Anurāgavatī sandhyā divasastatpurassaraḥ /

Aho daivagatiścitrā tathāpi na samāgamaḥ //, quoted as an illustration of *Samāsokti* of the Neo-alaṃkarikas and *Ākṣepa* of Bhāmaha in which the suggested idea of the behaviour of hero and heroine embellishes the expressed meaning, and consequently, becomes subservient to it. In a similar manner, the verse:

Candamañchi ṇisā ṇaliṇī kamalehi kusumagucchehi laā /

Haṃsehi saraasohā kavvakahā sajjanehi karaī gurūi //, which is an example of *Dīpaka* and as such, Poetry of *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya* type is as much charming as the verse:

Vīraṇa ramai ghusṇṇāruṇammi na tahā piṭhanuccheṇge /

Diṭṭhī riugaakumbhatthalammi jaha bahalasindūre //, quoted as an illustration of *Alaṃkāradhvani* by the learned Dhvanikāra. There is no difference in beauty between *Rasadhvani* and *Rasavalalaṃkāra*, also, which are so carefully distinguished by the Dhvanivādin. Thus the verse:

Kim hāsyena na me prayāsyasi punaḥ prāptaściraḍdarśanam

Keyaṃ niṣkaruṇa ! pravāsarucitā kenāsi dūrīkṛtaḥ /

Svapnānteṣviti te vadan priyatamavyāsaktakaṇṭhagraho

Buddhvā roditi riktabhūvalayastāraṃ ripustrijaṇaḥ //, in which the tragic emotion puts into bolder relief the glory of the king and as such renders itself subordinate to that—is as much attractive as any illustration of *Rasadhvani*. And the reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa observes, is quite clear; the manifestation of the implicit idea is there in both the verses. In support of his proposition, Mahimabhaṭṭa quotes the observation of the learned Dhvanikāra, according to which no poetry worth the name can afford to do without beauty, imparted by an implicit idea, the charm of which is as essential in it as is shyness in a girl.

Thus, Mahimabhaṭṭa concludes, as equal beauty is noticed in the *Guṇābhūtavyāñya* type of poetry, as described by the Dhvanivādin, it is improper to regard it as a separate category. The argument that whereas a Dhvanikāvya is marked by presence of *Dhvani*, this is characterised by its absence is misleading, because admission of a type of composition, marked by absence of *Dhvani* as a specimen of poetry results virtually in granting recognition to the proposition of the *Abhāvavādin*, who declares *Dhvani* as non-existent. Equally misleading is the attempt to support that argument by pointing out that what is actually meant by absence of *Dhvani* is non-presentation of emotion only, because an expression that does not present emotion is incapable of being regarded as poetic expression at all. What imparts beauty to an expressed meaning is the touch of the unexpressed content brought into comprehension through the process of *Anumāna*.²⁹

Mahimabhaṭṭa regards the classification of *Dhvani* into two types: *Avivakṣitavācya* and *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, improper and maintains, that the very designations applied to the two types go to show its untenability. The term *Avivakṣitavācya* does not certainly convey this sense that, in this type of *Dhvani* the expressed meaning is totally rejected, because such explanation is likely to jeopardize its capacity to suggest itself. The exposition that by *Avivakṣitatva* partial rejection is meant, and in this type of *Dhvanikāvya* the *Vācyārtha* is partially rejected in the sense that, though expressed, it is kept subservient to the implicit idea solves the difficulty, but makes the definition of this type of *Dhvani* exactly identical with that of *Dhvani* in general. The point that the term *Avivakṣita* conveys the sense of subservience to another equally renders the two definitions identical. The Dhvanivādin subdivides an *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani* into two sub-types, according to the difference in the nature of *Lakṣaṇā* that forms its basis. In the first sub-type, known as *Atyantatirūṣkṛtavācya Dhvani*, the primary meaning is completely rejected and in its place an altogether new meaning appears, while in the second sub-type known as *Arthāntarasamkramitavācya*, the primary meaning is trans-

formed into a new meaning, characterised by a number of attributes. Of these two sub-types, the second one is capable of being comprehended under inference, because its illustrations are the same as those of *Guṇavṛtti*, and the element of *Upacāra* is present in them. *Upacāra* consists in the superimposition of identity of one on another, made in order to bring home the idea of similarity existing between the two. The expression 'The boy is fire (Agnirmānavakah)' is marked by existence of *Upacāra*, inasmuch as, the identity of fire is superimposed on the boy; but whereas in this expression, the thing superimposed and the object of superimposition both are clearly stated by two different words, in illustrations of *Arthāntarasamkramitavācya Dhvani*, the same word presents both the thing superimposed and the substratum of superimposition,—the idea of generality conveyed by the term forming the substratum of superimposition of identity of the idea of particularity. A particular, marked by an excellence is often superimposed on a universal, as in the expression: 'Tadamṛtamanṛtaṃ sa indurinduḥ', meaning, 'that nectar is nectar indeed and that moon is real moon': here the first term '*amṛta*' conveys the sense of nectar in general, and the second '*amṛta*' brings out the idea of nectar, endowed with an ability to bring the dead back to life. The merit or demerit of this particular placed on the universal is comprehended with the help of knowledge, relating to purpose and such other factors as context and the like.³⁰ Mahimabhaṭṭa asserts that the purpose, context and such other factors bear the relation of universal concomitance to the quality of the particular and as such the quality is capable of being known through the process of *Anumāna*. An illustration is necessary to make the point clear. The Dhvanivādin says that in the expression: 'Kāmaṃ santu dṛḍhaṃ kaṭhorahṛdayo Rāmo'smi sarvaṃ sahe', the term 'Rāma' signifies through *Lakṣaṇā*, the sense of 'Daśaratha's son, as characterised by a number of attributes', and the charm of these attributes, brought into light through the function of suggestion renders the verse an example of *Dhvani*. Mahimabhaṭṭa says that in the expression quoted above, the identity of Rāma, as charac-

terised by a number of attributes is superimposed on general Rāma, and the cognition of the attributes is produced through *Anumāna*. The very fact that one having a knowledge of purpose, context, speciality of the speaker and such other factors comprehends the merits or demerits of the particular superimposed—goes to show that the factors—purpose, context etc. are definite pointers to these attributes, as is smoke to fire. The second sub-type, namely *Dhvani* of *Atyantatiraṣkṛtavācya* type, also is capable of being comprehended under the process of inference. And this is so, because the nature of this sub-type of *Dhvani* is exactly identical with *Padārthopacāra*, consisting in establishment of identity between two distinct objects, resulting in cognition of a relation existing between them. That this relation is capable of being known through *Anumāna* as in the expression: 'This carrier is a bull (Gourvahikaḥ)' and accordingly, *Anumāna* comprehends cases of *Bhakti* or *Lakṣaṇā* is an established fact.³¹

Like the designation '*Avivakṣitavācya*', applied to a species of *Dhvani* the name '*Vivakṣitānyaparavācya*' given to its another species is equally untenable and unable to stand the test of criticism. The explanation that the term *Vivakṣita* means prominence is likely to jumble up the entire thing, because '*anyapara*' conveys the sense of subservience and two contradictory attributes, such as prominence and subservience are incapable of inhering in the same substratum, namely *vācyaṛtha*. The qualities of prominence and subservience, mutually opposed to each other are found to reside in the same adjective sometimes, as in the expression: 'Rāmasya pāṇirasi nirbharagarbhakhinnasītāvivāsanapaṭoḥ karuṇa kutaste', meaning: 'Thou art the hand of Rāma, expert in sending Sītā in exile even when she was in her advanced stage of pregnancy: compassion is unknown to thee', in which the qualification of the hand, namely *Rāmasya* is prominent, as it imparts cruelty and harshness to the arm, but nevertheless, being a qualification, it is subservient. The argument that in a similar manner prominence and subservience are capable of inhering in the same *vācyaṛtha* does not hold good, because those two opposite

attributes co-inhere in an adjective only, and in no other substratum. Moreover, the subservience of *vācyaṛtha* to *vyāṅgyārtha* in this type of *Dhvanikāvya* is an established fact, because the prominence of the unexpressed content forms the essence of *Dhvani*. Consequently, the subservience of the explicit idea, being gathered from the very fact that it is a type of *Dhvani* does not stand in need of further assertion. The point that this characteristic precludes the possibility of including *Guṇābhūtavyaṅgya Kāvya*, in which the expressed meaning is more prominent than the suggested sense under the scope of *Dhvani* renders mention of the same characteristic in the designation of *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani*, also, an imperative necessity, because both being types of *Dhvani* meet on a common platform in respect of prominence of the suggested content. The *Dhvanivādin* classifies *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type of *Dhvani* into two sub-types: *Asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* and *Saṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgya*; this second sub-type is further classified into two branches: *Śabdaśaktimūla* and *Arthaśaktimūla*. Mahimabhaṭṭa asserts that in *Asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type of *Dhvani* the ensuents, excitants and accessories do not bring *Rasa* into comprehension through the function of suggestion: but they do so through the process of *Anumāna*. And in a similar manner in *Arthaśaktimūla* type of *Dhvani*, the *vācyaṛtha* leads to inferential knowledge of the *vyāṅgyārtha*. The existence of *Śabdaśaktimūla* type of *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, is an absurd proposition, because words are endowed with no function other than that of *Abhidhā*. Thus, he concludes, that not only the definition of *Dhvani*, adumbrated by the learned *Dhvanikāra* is defective, his scheme of classification, also, is faulty and untenable.³²

III

Mahimabhaṭṭa's explanation of the illustrations of Dhvani :

In conformity to his doctrine that *Anumāna* comprehends *Dhvani*, Mahimabhaṭṭa shows that the suggested meanings, pointed out in the illustrations of *Dhvanikāvya* by Ānandavar-dhana are capable of being known through inference. First of all he takes up the verse :

Bhama Dhammā Vīsaddho so supāo ajja mārio deṇa/
Golānaikacchakuḍaṅgavāsīṇā dāriāsīheṇa//, quoted as an example of *Vastudhvanī* by Dhvanikāra, and says that the so-called implicit idea of negation of free movement is made known through inference. The Dhvanivādin, in explaining this verse says that, the expressed meaning is affirmation, inas-much as, the religious-minded person is asked to move about freely, but the suggested sense is negation, because what the speaker really means is that he should not roam about. The expressed meaning in the form of affirmation, Mahimabhaṭṭa remarks, as established by the reason, namely death of the dog is comprehended first, and then is revealed the sense of negation to an appreciator, who knows fully well the antecedents of the speaker, as also understands the implication of the expression, presenting death of the dog at the hands of a more terrible animal; and this is so, because presence of mighty lion is a definite pointer to absence of free movement of a man, afraid of a dog even in a place, haunted by it. Thus in the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa, the form of syllogism in the present case is : *Idam Godāvarīnikuñjaṃ svabāhvarubhramāṇāyogyaṃ siṃ'arūpabhayaḥkāraṇaṃ sattvāt*, meaning : the grove situated on the bank of the river Godāvarī is not a place proper for free movement of a man, afraid of a dog, infested as it is with a cause of fear in the shape of a mighty lion. Though the expressed and inferred meanings are both contextual here, yet the mind of the knower rests only after apprehending the inferred sense. It is not possible to know the two meanings jointly, because affirmation and negation do not co-inhere in the same substratum. Nor are they apprehended optionally.

because such proposition renders futile the mention of both the alternatives in such cases. Nor are the two comprehended as standing in the relation of part and whole, because such relation does not exist between things, opposed to one another. The relation that actually exists between the expressed and inferred meanings in the verse, Mahimabhaṭṭa says, is that as exists between a suppressor and a suppressed,—the inferred meaning suppressing the expressed one, cognised first. The expressed meaning is put to an end, because no sane man, afraid of a dog moves about freely in a place, knowing fully well that a lion has made its permanent habitat there. The postulation of a relation linking the suppressor and the suppressed is an imperative necessity, as without this a case of a knowledge of silver, being obliterated by a knowledge of a real mother-of-pearl is incapable of being explained logically.³³ Thus in the verse under consideration, the expressed meaning in the form of a permission granted to the religious-minded person to move about freely, which is itself established by the announce-ment of the death of the dog terminates ultimately in the presentation of the sense of prohibition through inference, because no place, that is infested with a cause of fear in the shape of a mighty lion is a proper place for free movement of a coward, afraid of a dog even : and when the inferred negation is comprehended, the expressed sense of affirmation effaces itself completely. Though a Dhvanivādin regards the verse as the best type of poetic creation, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that it is vitiated by the defect of impropriety, inasmuch as, it is not proper for a lion, eager to cleave the temples of mighty tuskers to select a dog as its prey : accordingly, he suggests that in place of the lion mention is to be made of a bear in the verse.³⁴

The second verse quoted by the learned Dhvanikāra in order to establish the separate existence of a *vyāṅgyārtha* from a *vāc्यārtha* is :

Attā ettha nimajjai ettha aham diasāam paloehi/

Mā pahia ! rattiandhaa sejjāe mahāna majjahisi//, in which the expressed meaning is a prohibition, but the suggested meaning is an affirmation, because through it the lady, eager

for union with the traveller really gives him a covert hint to steal into her bed at night. Mahimabhaṭṭa denies the emergence of any such hint in the verse, as according to him, the reason that is competent to lead to knowledge of any such hint is conspicuous by its absence here. Scholars who believe that a disguised invitation is extended to the traveller to steal into the bed of the speaker at night in the verse hold that, the reasons that lead to this inevitable conclusion are sudden attribution of the quality of blindness at night to the visitor and the pointing out of the bed of the lady: the resting-place of the mother-in-law, also, is shown, they say in order to remove all possible apprehensions of the old beldame. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, these reasons are not conclusive pointers to the sense of disguised invitation extended to the visitor to enjoy the speaker at nightfall. In such a circumstance, a probans, that does not produce any doubt whatsoever in the mind of old woman, but at the same time urges the traveller to approach the visitor at night is to be inserted. The sudden attribution of the quality of blindness at night, that is known on through constant association is not such a probans, because instead of removing apprehensions, it is likely to redouble them in the mind of the old lady, and moreover, it has no bearing on the act of prompting the visitor to enjoy. The exhibition of the resting-place also is neither a definite pointer to this sense of invitation nor to the fact that the speaker is a lady of easy virtues, because even chaste ladies are seen to show respective chambers of the members of the family to visitors coming to the house for the first time. For the same reason, the pointing out of the distance between the bed of the speaker and that of the mother-in-law, leading in the first instalment to inferential knowledge of the fact that, no one of the two is in a position to see each other's bed is incapable of being regarded as a conclusive Probans. Nor are the gestures of the speaker capable of being regarded as reasons, because, according to a Dhvanivādin only a *vācyaṛtha* is recognised as a *vyañjaka*. To those scholars who regard the verse as being characterised

by emergence of a covert hint, Mahimabhaṭṭa puts a simple question: is the probans favourable to inference of expressed negation or to that of implicit affirmation or to that of both? The acceptance of the first alternative renders the probans a contradicted one, like '*Kṛtakatva*' in the syllogism *Śabdo nityaḥ kṛtakatvāt*, because, as *Kṛtakatva* instead of being a pointer to eternity becomes a conclusive pointer to transitoriness, similarly, blindness at night instead of establishing the fact that the visitor will not approach the bed of the speaker at night proves beyond doubt the opposite fact, because, a man blind-at-night is more likely to recline on other man's bed, unable as he is to see his own. The acceptance of the second alternative renders the probans an unestablished one, like '*cākṣuṣatva*' in the syllogism: *Śabdo guṇaḥ cākṣuṣatvāt*, and as the attribute of blindness, as superimposed on the traveller is not an established entity, it is likely to cause misgivings in the mind of the old mother-in-law. The acceptance of the third alternative renders the probans an inconclusive one, as is *Prameyatva* in the syllogism: '*Parvato vahnimān Prameyatvāt*,' where the attribute of *Prameyatva* is found to co-exist with fire, as also with its absence. A syllogism in which the probans is contradicted or unestablished or inconclusive is not regarded as a valid syllogism, and so, Mahimabhaṭṭa asserts, the sense of a disguised invitation extended to the traveller is incapable of being known through inference either from attribution of the quality of blindness to the visitor or from pointing out of the reclining-places of the respective persons. The case of this verse is not the same with that of the first one, because while in the first verse, the reason, introduced to establish the idea of affirmation (*Bhraman-vidhi*) subsequently goes to prove beyond dispute the sense of negation (*Bhramana-niṣedha*), in this stanza, the reason, introduced to establish the sense of negation (*Śayana-niṣedha*) does not, in the least, help the cognition of the implicit idea of affirmation (*Śayana-vidhi*).³⁵

In order to show that the suggested meaning differs from the expressed one in point of substratum of cognition, the learned Dhvanikara quotes the stanza:

Kassa vā na hoi roso datṭhūṇa piāe sabvaṇaṃ aharam/
Sabbhamarapaḍumāghāṇi vāriabāme sahasu ehnim//.

Mahimabhaṭṭa says that, the expressed meaning, namely the fact that, the heroine will have to stand the admonition of the infuriated husband is established by a strong reason in the shape of sight of her lips, bearing scar-marks thereon by the hero, the form of the syllogism being 'Nāyakaḥ prakopaḥ savraṇavallabhādharadarśanāt, and the suggested meaning, namely the fact that the girl has not been enjoyed by her paramour, in its turn, is established by the conclusive probans in the form of taking of smell of a lotus with bees hovering about it by the lady, the form of syllogism in the present case being : 'Iyaṃ parapribhogavatī na, Sabhramarapaḍmāghrāṇaśīla-tvāt.' The relation of universal concomitance, existing between the probans and the probandum in the present case is revealed, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains, to the minds of persons, given to enjoyment. Though both the expressed and inferred meanings are cognised here, yet the mind of the appreciator sets at rest only after comprehending the inferred meaning, to which the former, being a means to its apprehension, keeps its own self subservient.

The learned Dhvanikāra quotes the stanza :

Suvarṇapuṣpāṃ prithivīm cinvanti puruṣāstrayaḥ/
Sūraśca kṛtavidyaśca yaśca jñāti sevitum// in order to

illustrate *Dhvani* of *Avivakṣitavācya* type. With reference to this stanza, Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that the so-called implicit idea, namely the sense that riches are at the disposal of brave, learned and servant is capable of being known through *Anumāna*, the probans in the present case being the statement that those three are competent to pluck the golden flowers of the earth. As it is not possible to pluck golden flowers, the primary meaning is inapplicable, and what is really comprehended is a sense similar to that meaning, namely the fact that riches are enjoyed in profusion by those three types of persons. Mahimabhaṭṭa regards it as a case of *vākyaārthopacāra* and remarks that just as in the expression : *Gaṅgyāyaṃ Ghoṣaḥ—padārthopacāra* leads to knowledge of the bank through inference,

similarly in the present case also superimposition of identity between imports of two propositions, that are totally distinct leads to inferential knowledge of the implicit idea, referred to above, the form of the syllogism being : *Śūrakṛtavidyasevakāḥ sarvatra svādhīnasampadaḥ, suvarṇapuṣpaprithivīcayanakāritvāt*.

According to the learned Dhvanikāra the verse :

Śikhariṇi kva nu nāma kiyacciṇaṃ kimabhidhānamasāva-
karottapaḥ/

Taruṇi ! yena tavādharapāṭalaṃ dasati bimbaphalaṃ
śukaśāvakaḥ//

furnishes an illustration of *Dhvani* of *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type Mahimabhaṭṭa says that, the so-called suggested meaning in this verse, also, is nothing but an *anumeyārtha* ; here the probandum is the idea that it is not possible for a man, having little stock of religious merits to have a taste of the lips of the girl, and this is made known through the process of inference by the description that, in order to have a taste of Bimba fruit even, that resembles only these lips, a parrot has to practise penance for a long time and thereby acquire religious merit, and the form of syllogism is : 'Tvadadharacumbanāmṛtam nālpapuṣy-avatpuruṣapṛpyaṃ tvadadharasādṛśabimbaphaladaśanavidhau śukaśāvakasya asādhāraṇatapaḥsampaḥjanatvakaḥpanāt'.

As an illustration of *Dhvani* of *Arthāntarasamkramitarācya* type, the learned Dhvanikāra quotes the verse :

Snigdhaśyāmalakāntilīptavīyato velladvalākā ghanā

Vātāḥ śīkariṇaḥ payodasuhridāmānandakekālāḥ/

Kāmaṃ santu dṛḍraṃ kaṭhorahṛdayo Rāmo' smi sarvaṃ sahe

Vaiḍehi tu kathaṃ bhaviṣyati hahā hā Devi !

Dhirā bhava//

in which it is pointed out that, the term 'Rāma' refers not only to Daśaratha's son, but to his son, as characterised by a number of attributes, such as banishment from the Kingdom, ability to stand a number of misfortunes and so on, and these attributes are comprehended through the function of suggestion. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, these attributes are capable of being known through *Anumāna* as the probans, the state of Rāma itself bears the relation of universal concomitance to these

attributes, in the same way as the state of a particular tree bears to the generality 'treeness'; as soon as the state of a particular tree is asserted of a thing, it is known automatically that it is a tree: similarly as soon as *Rāmatva* is asserted of a man, it is at once comprehended that he is a victim to misfortunes and sorrows. The form of syllogism, in the present case, he contends, is: '*Ahaṃ kleśasahiṣṇuḥ Rāmatvāt*'. In a similar manner, the implicit idea in the expression: '*Raikirāṇ-ānuggahīāi honti kamalāi kamalāi*', quoted as another example of this type of *Dhvani* is capable of being arrived at through *Anumāna*. According to the Dhvanivādin, the first word '*Kamala*' used in the expression signifies the sense of lotus in general, and the same word repeated again conveys the idea of lotus, having real beauty and fragrance,—attributes that are presented through *vyañjanā*. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that the superimposition of identity of a particular lotus, favoured by the rays of the Sun, and as such endowed with beauty and fragrance on lotus in general points unfailingly to beauty and fragrance of the lotus on which such superimposition is made: he says that the form of syllogism in the present case is: '*Kamalaṃ niratīśayaśobhāsaurabhābhīrāmātāvīṣṭam Ravikiraṇāṇuṣṇhītakamalatvāt*'.

According to the learned Dhvanikāra, an illustration to *Dhvani* of *Atyantatiraṣkṛtavarācyā* sub-type is furnished by the sloka:

Ravisamkrāntasaubhāgyastuṣārāvṛtamaṇḍalaḥ/
Nihśvāsāndha ivādarśaścandramā na prakāśate//.

Here the term '*andha*' signifies through secondary function the sense of mirror unable to hold reflections, and the function of suggestion brings into light the extreme ugliness of the mirror. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, tho very attribution of the quality of blindness to the mirror, which is an inanimate being makes known through inference the unpleasing nature of the mirror, darkened by sighs,—mirror that resembles a blind in point of repulsiveness to the sight: the form of syllogism here is: '*Ādarśo vicchāyaḥ nihśvāsāndhatvakalpanāt*'. In a similar manner, the inferred meaning in the expression:

'*Gaganam ca mattamegham*' is the idea that clouds do not behave judiciously, inasmuch as, they put an end to the lives of men, separated from their consorts, and the probans that leads to knowledge of this idea is attribution of madness, a quality, belonging to a living being to the inanimate cloud, and the form of syllogism is: '*Meghaḥ virahimāraṇādyanarthakāritvā-samīkṣyakāritvadurnivāryatvādidharmavān tasya mattatvakalpanāt*'.

Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that *Rasa* is capable of being known through *Anumāna* because the excitants, ensuents and accessories are definite pointers to mental conditions of the characters, introduced in the piece. In this connection he quotes the proposition of the learned Dhvanikāra that a sequence exists between apprehension of *Vibhāvas* and the like, on one hand, and comprehension of *Rasa* on the other, and asserts that this statement relegates the position of *Sādhana* to *Vibhāvas* and the status of *Sādhya* to *Rasa*. The stanzas, beginning from the arrival of Pārvatī, ornamented with vernal flowers to the description of throwing of an arrow by cupid and the consequential loss of fortitude in Lord Śiva furnish illustration, he says, to *Rasānumāna*: the Dhvanivādin regards these verses as example of *Asaṃlakṣyakramavyaṅgya* type of *Dhvani*, in which the sequence between the cognition of *vācārtha* and that of *vyañyārtha* is not clearly traced.

In the view of the learned Dhvanikāra the word-unit mainly brings into light the *vyañyārtha* in *Śabdaśaktimūla* type of *Dhvani*, which is illustrated by the expression:

Atrāntare kusumasamayayugamupasaṃpharannajṃbhata

Grīṣmābhīdhānaḥ phullamallikādhavalāṭṭahāso mahākūlaḥ,
in which the function of denotation of such multi-meaninged words as *Mahākūla* and the like being restricted to the contextual sense of unbearable summer season, the non-contextual idea of Lord Śiva is brought into comprehension only through the function of suggestion. As Mahimabhaṭṭa holds that words are endowed only with the function of *Abhidhā*, he cannot regard the realisation of non-contextual meanings, presented through *Vyañjanā* in such cases a reality. As

regards the expression : 'Atrāntare' etc. he however, maintains that the idea of Lord Śiva, laughing violently and putting an end to cupid is cognised; but this cognition is effected through inference by the *Sādhana*—the mention of laughter and the act of putting an end to the cycles, the from of the syllogism being : *Mahākālah mahākālākhyadevatā-viśeṣaḥ aṭṭahāsayuktatvaḥ sati yugasamhārakartṛtvāt*. This process of comprehension of a non-contextual meaning through *Anumāna* is found in the figure of speech *Samāsokti*, which consists in superimposition of the behaviour of a non-contextual on a contextual due to sameness of action, sameness of gender or sameness of adjective. Mahimabhaṭṭa cautions against the possibility of production of a wrong notion that, in the expression referred to above, the multi-meaning term : *Mahākāla* presents two ideas,—one through *Abhidhā* and another through *Vyañjanā*. The learned Dhvanikāra quotes the verse :

Unnataḥ prolāsaddhāraḥ kālāgurumalīmasaḥ/
Payodharabharastanyāḥ kaṁ na cakre' bhiḷāṣiṇam// as

a second example of this type of *Dhvani* : he says that here *Abhidhā* conveys the idea of the breasts of the lady exciting persons given to enjoyment and *Vyañjanā* signifies the sense of the mass of clouds, augmenting longing as also the idea of similarity existing between the two meanings. Mahimabhaṭṭa completely denies the emergence of any non-contextual meaning in it, because, as he says, the figure of speech *Samāsokti* is absent here. Another illustration of this type of *Dhvani* that receives greater attention from Mahimabhaṭṭa is the stanza :

Dattānandāḥ prajānāṁ samucitasamayākṛṣṭasṛṣṭaiḥ payobhiḥ
Pūrvāṇhe viprakīrṇā diśi diśi viramatyaḥni samhārabhājāḥ /
Dīptāṁsordīrghaduḥkhaṇḍaprabhavabhvabhayodanavaduttā-
ranāvo

Gāvo vaḥ pāvanānāṁ paramaparimitāṁ prītimutpādayantu//, where the Dhvanivādin points out that, the sense of rays of the Sun is cognised through *Abhidhā*, and the idea of multitude of cows as also the relation of similarity existing between the two

are comprehended through *Vyañjanā*. Mahimabhaṭṭa is of opinion that the cognition of the non-contextual idea of multitude of cows does not arise at all ; and this is so, because there is no reason that can give rise to apprehension of such meaning. The point that the very term 'Go' which is a multi-meaning one gives rise to apprehension of this meaning is without any value, because it keeps open the question of cognition of other meanings also, such as thunderbolt, earth and the like, which, too, form the connotation of the term 'Go'. It is futile to argue that, the understanding of the sense of cows alone occurs, because the restrictive factors restrict the power of signification of the word to that sense only, since no such restrictive factor is traceable in the verse. The plethora of adjectives does not constitute this factor, because an adjective signifies only that sense, as is applicable to the thing qualified by it, and it is not possible for it to convey an idea, applicable to the sense of multitude of cows, without any reason, in the present verse. The argument that the use of the multi-meaning word 'Go' itself, which presents the noun supplies this reason vitiates the entire proposition by the fallacy of mutual dependence, as the position comes to this that, cognition of a particular meaning of the noun is dependent on comprehension of such meanings of adjectives, as are applicable to it, and the understanding of specific meanings of adjectives depends on apprehension of such a sense of the noun, as is compatible with those of the adjectives. The point that though individually the noun and the adjective are unable to bring the non-contextual idea of cows into light, jointly they are in a position to do so is unsound, as the sumtotal of two inefficient does not make an efficient entity : this is amply illustrated in the case of two blind persons, who are unable to see individually as well as jointly. The analogy of earth, air and water combining to generate a sprout,—each helping the other two to produce the desired effect—is inapplicable in the present case, because the application of that rule is restricted to things, related to each other, through the natural relation of cause and effect only. Though the noun and the adjective are said to combine to produce apprehension of the

implicit idea, and as such, a relation of cause and effect is said to exist between them, yet this relation is not natural, inasmuch as, the comprehension of the implicit is dependent on existence of appreciative genius in the minds of refined readers ; if this genius is not there, the noun and the adjective fail to produce apprehension of the intended idea.³⁶ Thus it is clear, Mahimabhaṭṭa argues, there is no such reason as can give rise to understanding of the non-contextual. It is not possible to regard the same word-unit as responsible for cognition of both the meanings, because, had it been so, the two meanings would have been cognised simultaneously. But a Dhvanivādin holds that the understanding of the non-contextual is preceded by apprehension of the contextual. Moreover, such an assumption entails a violation to the maxim : *Arthabhedena śabdabhedah*, which demands use of one word to denote one concept only. Thus as the realisation of the non-contextual is a myth, the question of apprehension of a relation existing between the contextual and the noncontextual, also, is false. In this connection, Mahimabhaṭṭa introduces the question of distinction amongst *Sādhuśabda*, *Asādhuśabda* and *Apasabda*, and asserts that words convey meanings only with the help of certain factors, and never independently of these : accordingly, that idea to which such factors are favourable is signified by a word, and a sense to which such factors are not favourable is not conveyed by a word, even though it is primarily denotative of that sense.³⁷ For this reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa is of opinion, even *Asādhuśabdas* are endowed with the capacity to signify meanings. This view, he says, is in conformity to the doctrine of Bhartṛhari, according to which, though ideas are capable of being conveyed by both *Sādhu* and *Asādhu śabdas*, yet the former group alone, is to be used, because it results in acquisition of religious merit. An *Asādhuśabda* is to be carefully distinguished from a *Sādhuśabda* on the one hand, and an *Apasabda*, on the other. A *Sādhuśabda* is formed according to the rules of Grammar, that are completely thrown into winds by an *Asādhuśabda*, and an *Apasabda* differs from both in this respect that, while these two are competent to express meanings, this, being

bereft of conveying agents is unable to do so. Thus, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks, a *Sādhuśabda*, also, is treated as an *Apasabda*, when it loses its power of signification, being unaided by conveying factors. In *Śabdaśaktimūla* type of Dhvani, the words are incapable of giving rise to apprehension of the non-contextual meaning, because the factors, favourable to its signification, as has been pointed out, are conspicuously absent. So there is no reason behind the assumption that comprehension of the non-contextual meaning occurs in *Śabdaśaktimūla* type of *Dhvani*, and the considered opinion of Mahimabhaṭṭa on this point is this that, the explanations, furnished and the illustrations put forward of this type of *Dhvani* by commentators are based more on respect for age-old tradition than on logic ; he says that, these explanations not only speak of total neglect of fact on the part of the commentators concerned, but also fail to bring out the real intention of the poet, and thereby, as if, put him to shame.³⁸

The Dhvanivādin is of opinion that, in *Arthśaktimūla* type of *Dhvani* the *vyāñjaka artha* is in some cases objectively possible, being a reality in the outside world even, and in others it owes its existence either to the imagination of the poet or to the imagination of a character created by the poet's muse. This classification of a suggestive meaning, Mahimabhaṭṭa says, has no bearing on the nature of an implicit idea, that is said to form the essence of Poetry. The learned Dhvanikāra quotes the verse : 'Evaṃ vādinī' etc. as an illustration of *vastu-dhvani* of *Arthśaktimūla* type, and points out that the counting of petals on the part of Pārvatī, with her face bent down brings into light the idea of her bashfulness through suggestion. Mahimabhaṭṭa, however, thinks that the counting of petals is a definite pointer to shyness, and as such the idea of bashfulness is not comprehended through suggestion but through the process of *Anumāna*. As an illustration of *Alaṃkāra-dhvani* of this type, in which the suggestive meaning owes its existence to the imagination of the poet, the learned Dhvanikāra quotes the verse :

Prāptaśrīreva kasmāt punarapi mayi tanmanthakhedam
vidadhyān

Nidrāmapyasya pūrvāmanalasamanaso naiva sambhāvayāmi/
Setum badhnāti bhūyaḥ kimiti ca sakaladvīpanāthānuyāta/
Stvayyāyāte vitarkāniti dadhata ivābhātīkampah payodheh//

in which the expressed figure, which is an admixture of *Sandeha* and *Utprekṣā* is said to suggest the figure of *Rūpaka*, consisting in superimposition of identity of Lord Vāsudeva on the poet's patron. Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that the concepts of transfusion of pain of churning to the Ocean out of a desire to attain riches on the part of the king, the enjoyment of rest, through love for pleasures and the construction of a bridge by him prompted by a desire to vanquish the rulers of other islands—all these combine to produce inferential knowledge of the idea that the king is identical with Lord Vāsudeva, with which they bear the relation of universal concomitance. the form of syllogism being : 'Rājā Vāsudevarūpaḥ, slokokaṭatādṛṣāpraśnasya āśrayatvāt, mukhyavāsudevavat'.

Another illustration of *Alaṅkāra-dhvani* of this type is furnished by the verse :

Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūritadinmukhe'smin
Smere'dhunā tava mukhe taralāyatākṣi /
Kṣobham yadeti na manāgapi tena manye
Suvyaktameva jalarāśirayam payodhih//

in which as the Dhvanivādin points out, the figure *Rūpaka*, consisting in superimposition of identity of moon on the face is brought into light through suggestion by the expressed meaning. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, the description that, agitation of Ocean is absent even though its causes are fully present points out unmistakably to the idea that, the face is not presented as such, but with the nature of moon superimposed on it. In the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa, this sense of superimposition of identity of moon on face is comprehended through the process of inference, the form of syllogism being : *Mukham pūrnacandrārūpam Samudrasamkṣobhāvīrhhāvasya karanatvakalpanāt*. In this connection, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out that the epithet 'jalarāśi', applied to the Ocean in the stanza is inappropriate ; if the term

is taken to refer to mass of water alone, then its use becomes insignificant, because an ocean remains a huge mass of water, even when its waters grow agitated : if, on the other hand, it is taken to convey the idea of stupendous stupidity, then the meaning that is likely to be brought into comprehension through the function of suggestion is the extreme beauty of the face, and not the superimposition of identity of moon on it. The sense of this superimposition is capable of being cognised only when possible agitation of waters is described as being obstructed by some factor ; as the ocean is imagined as a bundle of stupidity, and not as a mass of water, the possibility of agitation, appearing in the Sea is ruled out from the very beginning and so the expressed meaning in the verse under consideration cannot be a definite pointer to the idea that the face is identical with the moon. For this reason, Mahimabhaṭṭa suggests a different reading in the second half of the verse, which, according to him should read as :

Kṣobham yadeti na manāgapi tena manye
Rūpāntaram patirapām kimapi prapannah//.

This reading, he says, not only leads to inferential knowledge of the sense that, the face is identical with the moon, but also brings into comprehension the idea that, the Ocean is given to all sorts of enjoyments, and so is much more appealing than the original one. As an example of *Vastu-dhvani* of this type, in which the suggestive meaning owes its existence to the poetic faculty of the creator, the learned Dhvanikāra quotes the stanza :

Sajjei surahimāso na ā paṇāvei juvaijanalakkhhasahe/

Abhiṇayasahārmuhe ṇavapallavapattale aṇaṅgassa sare//, in which the expressed meaning, according to him, suggests the implicit idea that, with the appearance of spring in its full splendour love-sickness will grow violently in ladies. Mahimabhaṭṭa says that, the description of visibility of fresh twigs and buds that are excitants in different trees points out unfailingly to the idea that love-sickness is bound to grow in ladies : he thinks that the form of syllogism, in the present case, is : *Surābhīmāsataraṇo juvatijanamadānonmāthadāyinaḥ madanod-*

dīpanasamarthasvabhāvasampālakatvāt candravat. Thus, Mahimabhaṭṭa explains away all the illustrations of *Dhvani*, put forward by the learned Dhvanikāra and emphatically asserts that *Dhvani*, with all its types and sub-types is comprehended under *anumāna*. This is so because, *Abhivyakti* does not occur of the implied meaning to which neither the expressed meaning renders its own self subservient nor does the expressive word make its primary sense subordinate; the requisites that are necessary in order to effect revelation of the implicit idea constitute really the probans leading to inferential knowledge of the probandum.³⁹

IV

Dhvanivādin's reply to Mahimabhaṭṭa :

In Ruyyaka, the commentator on Vyaktiviveka, who has to his credit a number of original treatises also, the school of Dhvani finds a staunch defender: Ruyyaka not only replies to all the charges levelled against the Doctrine of Dhvani by Mahimabhaṭṭa, but at the same time, points out the flaws and discrepancies in the observations of the great *Anumānavādin* himself. In criticising the definition of Dhvani, adumbrated by the learned Dhvanikāra, Mahimabhaṭṭa first of all remarks that, as an expressed meaning, introduced to effect manifestation of a suggested sense is always bound to render its own self subordinate to the latter, the mention of the adjunct *Upasarjanīkṛtasva*, in relation to *artha* is redundant. Ruyyaka in reply to this says that, by subservience of the expressed meaning, any one of these three factors is meant: (a) subordination of the expressed to the unexpressed in the same way as a means is to the end, (b) its deficiency in charm in comparison to the implied meaning and (c) the fact that it is competent to rest on its own self and consequently does not stand in need of obtaining help from other ideas. Mahimabhaṭṭa's objection is sound in so far as it relates to the first two cases of subservience of the expressed meaning, but it does not hold good in case

of the third alternative, namely in those cases, in which the expressed meaning rests on its own self, and naturally, does not stand in need of being benefited by others. It is wrong to argue that in such cases, the expressed automatically renders its own self subservient to the unexpressed, because examples of such poetic creations are numerous, in which the suggested goes to embellish the expressed, that forms the chief import of the sentence. The figure of speech *Samāsokti* furnishes an illustration to the point: in it, the expressed, as ornamented by the behaviour of the suggested *Aprakṛta* forms the main import of the proposition and as such, it constitutes Poetry of *Guṇībhūta-vyañgya* type. In order to preclude the possibility of inclusion of this type of Poetry within *Dhvanikāvya*, Ruyyaka says, the adjunct *Upasarjanīkṛtasva* is used in relation to *artha*.⁴⁰ Thus in reply to Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Samgrahaśloka*, running as ;

Uktam Guṇīkṛtātmatvaṃ yadarthasya viśeṣaṇam/
Gamakatvānna tat tasya yuktamavyabhicāratāḥ//, Ruyyaka

has his own verse, that runs as follows :

Guṇīkṛtātmatārthasya na pratītvapūyatā/
Na cārutvamapi tvarthairbaudhairanupakāryatā//.

Mahimabhaṭṭa takes exception to the use of the word *śabda*, along with its adjunct '*Upasarjanīkṛtārtha*', and says that, as a word is endowed with no function other than that of *Abhidhā*, it is not possible for it to discharge any other duty and render the expressed meaning subservient to the suggested one. Moreover, this qualification is known automatically from the mention of the adjunct '*Upasarjanīkṛtasva*' in relation to *artha*. Thirdly, a word inserted in order to convey a particular meaning cannot render that meaning subordinate to its own self. In reply to this objection, Ruyyaka points out that, in the view of the learned Dhvanikāra, a word is endowed with more than one functions, of which the function of suggestion is one, and so it is possible for it to bring into light both conventional and unconventional meanings,—the first through *Abhidhā* and the second through *Vyañjanā*. The adjunct '*Upasarjanīkṛtārtha*', he says, is necessary in order to exclude these verses, in which comprehension of two ideas occur from

the same word-unit, but the implicit, instead of attaining prominence goes to embellish the explicit—from the category of *Dhvani*. The verse :

Dr̥ṣṭyā keśava goparāgahṛtāyā kimcinna dr̥ṣṭam mayā
tenaiva skhalitāsmi nātha patitām kim nāma nālambase/
Ekastvaṃ viṣameṣu khinnamanasām sarvāvalānām gati-
rgopyaivaṃ gaditaḥ saleśamavatād goṣṭhe harirvaściram//

serves as an illustration to the point.⁴¹ Here the use of the word 'saleśam', meaning 'deceitfully' shows that the request meted out to Kṛṣṇa by the milk-maid to support her as she stumbles in uneven land is not to be taken in its face value, but what she actually wants is that Kṛṣṇa should be her husband, dubbed as a fallen woman as she has now been through her attachment for him : thus the implicit idea instead of acquiring prominence renders itself subordinate to the explicit one, inasmuch as, it becomes the cause of establishment of the primary meaning of the term 'saleśam' which is incapable of being justified otherwise. The learned Dhvanikāra does not recognise the verse as a case of *Dhvani*, because according to him, in order to constitute *Dhvani*, it is necessary for the function of suggestion to convey an implicit idea of paramount importance,—an idea, that is not touched slightly even by the function of denotation.⁴² The criticism that a word is unable to keep its meaning, for the signification of which it is introduced subordinate to its own self, as a leathern vessel is unable to keep water, for the drawing of which it is made subservient to its own self is based on a misconception of the stand-point of the Dhvanivādin. The Dhvanivādin does not demand subservience of a primary meaning to a word denotative of it, because this subordination is an absurd proposition : what he means is that in a *Dhvanikāvya* a word renders its expressed meaning subservient to the suggested idea. Thus in reply to Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Samkṣepaśloka* :

'vāco guṇīkṛtārthatvaṃ na sambhati jātucit /

Tadarthaṃ tadupādānādudakārthaṃ dṛteriva //, Ruyyaka sums up his arguments in the following verse :

Vāco guṇīkṛtārthatvaṃ vyaṅgyamarthaṃ prati sthitaṃ /
Tadarthaṃ tadupādānādudakārthaṃ dṛteriva //

Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that non-mention of *Abhidhā* in the definition of *Dhvani* makes it vitiated by the fallacy of too narrow definition, inasmuch as, such poetic creation in which an expressed figure brings into comprehension a suggested figure is left out of the purview of *Dhvanikāvya* : this happens in case of an illustration of the expressed figure *Dīpaka*, that is characterised by cognition of a suggested simile. In reply to this criticism Ruyyaka points out that the charge brought by the learned Anumānavādin is based on a notion that figures are expressions of peculiar types. This concept of *Alaṃkāra* is a later development and earlier writers on the subject, such as Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa and the like do not regard *Alaṃkāras* as expressions to which peculiar turns are given by the imaginative faculty of the poet : they say that *Alaṃkāras* belong to words and meanings, and not to the function, known as *Abhidhā*. *Abhidhā*, these thinkers maintain, is a power belonging to a word, that is inferred from the very fact that the particular word brings a particular meaning into consciousness or it is the very function of pronunciation of a word. Now charm, that is said to constitute the life of an *Alaṃkāra* does not belong to the act of pronouncing of a word or to that of revelation of its meaning : on the other hand, it resides in a pronounced word and a revealed meaning. For this reason, following the authority of earlier rhetoricians like Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa etc. Anandavardhana, also, regards poetic figures as attributes, belonging to *Śabda* and *Artha*, and not to *Abhidhā*. Ruyyaka thinks that, as in the definition of *Dhvani*, adumbrated by Anandavardhana, both *Śabda* and *Artha* are clearly mentioned as bringing an implicit idea into light, the sense that in this type of poetry an *Alaṃkāra*, also, is capable of suggesting another *Alaṃkāra* is known through implication, and consequently, does not stand in need of further statement.⁴³ The point, he continues, that in the poetic figure *Dīpaka*, the suggested *Upamā* being more prominent than the expressed *Alaṃkāra*, its examples are to be recognised as specimens of *Dhvanikāvya*.

bespeaks total misunderstanding of the stand-point of the Dhvanivādin on the part of the learned Anumānavādin. It is said by a Dhvanivādin that subservience of an expressed meaning refers not only to its subordination, being a means to revelation of the suggested sense or to its deficiency in point of beauty, but also to the fact that as it is competent to rest on its own self, it does not stand in need of being helped or embellished by others. This characteristic feature of an expressed meaning, that is an essential requisite of *Dhvani* is conspicuous by its absence in an illustration of the figure of speech *Dīpaka*, in which the suggested simile goes to augment the beauty of the conventional meaning, which presents the poetic figure *Dīpaka*. In fact, for this reason, the designation *Dīpaka* is attached to it to the exclusion of the name *Upamā-dhvani*, in accordance with the dictum : '*Prādhānyena vyapadīśā bhavanti*'.

Mahimabhaṭṭa finds fault with the use of the terms '*tamartam*' in masculine gender, because, as he says, in conformity to such uses as : '*pratīyamānam punaranyadeva*' etc. the word denotative of suggested meaning is to be put in the neuter gender in the definition of *Dhvani* also. As a rejoinder to this charge, it is possible for a Dhvanivādin to point out that as in the *Kārikā*, immediately preceding the one, in which the theory of *Dhvani* is enunciated, the word, expressive of implicit idea is put in masculine gender, it is used in that gender in the definition of *Dhvani*, also, in the quite fitness of things. The *Kārikā* referred to in this connection is :

Tadvat sacetasāṃ so'rtho vācyārthavimukhātmanām/

Buddhau tatvārthadarsīnyām jhaṭityevāvabhāsate//

Mahimabhaṭṭa holds that the use of the indeclinable *vā*, as well as of the dual number in the verb *vyāññītaḥ* is defective, and this is so, because the particle under consideration does neither convey the sense of option nor that of joint action. The proposition of the Dhvanivādin that a word is endowed with the function of suggestion makes this animadversion unreal, because it is possible for him to argue that the indeclinable really conveys the sense of option. In fact, Abhinavagupta puts forward this view and maintains that, while the dual number in

'*vyāññītaḥ*' conveys the idea that both *śabda* and *artha* have their roles to play in the matter of bringing an implicit idea into comprehension, the particle *vā* indicates option between prominence of either of these elements. According to a Dhvanivādin in those cases in which words primarily suggest ideas, the expressed meanings also play their own parts, because a word, whose conventional meaning is not known does not bring any implicit idea whatsoever into consciousness : in a similar manner, in those cases in which explicit meanings primarily suggest ideas, the words also contribute their own shares, because a meaning brings into light a suggested sense, only when it is expressed through words. Thus though *śabda* and *artha* both combine to bring an implicit idea into consciousness, there is considerable difference between their contributions in different cases ; in some cases, the contribution of the sound-element is greater, and as such, these are regarded as fields of *Śābdī Vyaññjanā* : in others, the contribution of the sense-element is more, and so, these are regarded as fields of *Ārthī Vyaññjanā*.⁴⁴ The objection that there being sequence between knowledge of word and cognition of its meaning, it is not possible for the sound and the sense-elements to contribute jointly in the matter of bringing the implicit idea into light is without any value, because a sound-unit, also, is endowed with the function of suggestion, and after the primary meaning of a word is cognised nothing stands in the way of the word and meaning acting jointly and bringing out knowledge of the suggested idea.

The point that as the knowledge of the word ceases to exist at the time when its primary meaning is cognised, the function of suggestion, belonging to the word-element is unable to operate and produce comprehension of the implicit idea is answered by the Dhvanivādin in this way. He says that, connotation of a term is comprised of two factors : the primary meaning and the self of the word. In some cases, as in ordinary and poetic expressions, the first factor is prominent, the second going to qualify it, and in other cases, as in the rules of Grammar, the second factor is of more importance, the first

serving only as a *Viśeṣaṇa* to it. Thus just as the universal element of cowness is connoted by the term 'Cow', similarly the word itself is connoted by it, because there cannot be even an elementary experience, that is not associated with a linguistic expression. Bhartṛhari, the great philosopher-grammarian maintains that, every possible cognition is determinate, the determinate factor being an articulate verbal form, and asserts that like knowledge revealing the nature of other knowables and at the same time its own self, word, also is a self-luminous principle, revealing the world of objects along with its own self.⁴⁵ For this reason, a Dhvanivādin observes, the knowledge of the word lingers, when its connotation is ascertained, the self of the word forming a part of that connotation, and accordingly the cognition of the implicit idea is produced through the function of suggestion by both word and meaning acting jointly. The fact that a word reveals its own self along with others is further corroborated by use of such verses as :

Udeti savitā tāmrastrāma evāstameti ca/

Sampattau ca vipattau ca mahatāmekarūpatā//,

in which the substitution of the word '*Raktaḥ*' for '*Tāmraḥ*' fails to give rise to knowledge of the intended idea as also to the figure *Arthāntaramūṣa*.

Mahimabhaṭṭa argues that there can be no such thing as a 'type of poetry', and consequently, the use of the term *Kāvya-viśeṣaḥ* is defective. The point on which Mahimabhaṭṭa bases his conclusion is that *Rasa* being a blissful state of ego, in which knowledge of all other knowables is completely obliterated, the concept of excellence is incapable of being asserted of *Rasa*, and so it is wrong to argue that excellence of *Rasa* depicted makes a poetry one of excellent type : nor is it possible to say that depiction of a particular mood makes poetry one of best type, because such proposition narrows down the scope of *Dhvanikāvya*. In reply to this criticism, Ruyyaka says, that the use of the term '*Kāvya-viśeṣaḥ*', intended to differentiate a *Dhvanikāvya* from poetic creations of *Guṇābhūtavyāyā* and *Citra* types, is an imperative necessity. Definitions, he says, are propounded in such a way that they

bring out the characteristic features of the things defined and at the same time differentiates them from others. From time immemorial two varieties of poetry are in vogue : one, the primary variety, in which the suggested sense is more prominent, and the second, the secondary type, in which the implied meaning is subordinate. As the Dhvanivādin wants to apply the designation *Dhvani* to the first variety of Poetry only, he formulates its definition in such a way that, the type defined is differentiated from the other type. The observation of the Anumānavādin that in accordance with the dictum : *Guṇa-mukhyayormukhye eva kāryasaṃpratyayaḥ na guṇaḥ*, the appellation *Dhvani* applies automatically to the best type of Poetry, even though the term *Kāvya-viśeṣaḥ* is left unmentioned is not correct, because the dictum operates in the field of Grammar only, and not in the field of Poetics. Equally incorrect is the notion that *Rasa* always attains prominence, and the question of its subordination to another *Rasa* or *vāc्यārtha* is a myth, because a good number of such poetic creations are found in which one *Rasa* is presented as an *aṅga* to another *Rasa*. In order to explain the seeming incongruity between the concepts of the same *Rasa* becoming an *aṅgin* in some case, and an *aṅga* in another, Ruyyaka quotes the analogy of a *Vicorabhāṇḍārīka*, and states that the same man when committing theft is chastised and when recognised as owner of fabulous wealth is honoured ; in a similar manner the same emotional mood attains prominence in some cases and subservience in others. The idea of the Anumānavādin that existence of *Rasa* being essential in Poetry, the excellence or speciality of *Rasa* alone is able to render Poetry one of special type is not correct in the eye of a Dhvanivādin, because, at least, from the point of theory, he regards *Vāstu-dhvani*, *Alaṃkāra-dhvani* and *Rasa-dhvani*, all these three types of implied meaning as constituting the essence of Poetry.⁴⁶

Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that by formulating the definition of *Dhvani*, the learned Dhvanikāra gives only a new name to Poetry, and does nothing more. In reply to this charge, it is possible for a Dhvanivādin to point out that the whole theory of

Dhvani is based on an analogy of the theory of *Sphoṭa*, propounded by the Grammarians, who use the term '*Dhvani*' to signify the momentary sounds, pronounced by our speech-organs,—sounds, that go to reveal the eternal sound-essence called *Sphoṭa* : and the *Ālaṃkārikas*, also, use the term *Dhvani* to refer to a whole piece of poetic creation, competent to bring an implicit idea of supreme charm into light. The very fact that the term '*Dhvani*' is taken by the *Ālaṃkārikas* from use of the same term, made by the *Vaiyākaraṇas*, though on a different context goes to establish the proposition of the Dhvanivādin that the doctrine of *Dhvani* is based on the authority of the *Vaiyākaraṇas*,—the foremost of the scholars, and as such, is incapable of being explained away as a mere brain-wave of the Dhvani Theorists. On the use of this term, Abhinavagupta remarks that, it conveys the idea of a suggestive unit, a suggested meaning, and the function of suggestion also : in the *Kārikā*, under consideration, it refers to a whole piece of poetic creation, that is comprised of suggestive word and meaning, suggested sense and the function of suggestion.⁴⁷ As *Dhvani* is the designation attached to a particular piece of poetic creation the Dhvanivādin says, it is not possible to comprehend *Dhvani* under the figures of speech, that are but *aṅgas* to the *aṅgin* *Dhvani*. The concept of *Dhvani* is old, no doubt, and the Dhvanivādin does not deserve the credit of introducing an altogether new idea of the process of revelation, inasmuch as, this process is known to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, also ; but, what he deserves is signal honour, for smuggling the concept of revelation of meaning in the field of Poetry and at the same time declaring it as its very life. The Dhvanivādin, for the first time, shows also that *Rasa* is brought into comprehension through suggestion which is a power, belonging not only to meaning, but also to word : these are novel propositions and the criticism of Mahimabhaṭṭa that by propounding the definition of *Dhvani*, no new principle of literary criticism has been formulated by Ānandavardhana does not stand. It is said that the doctrine of *Dhvani* is based on the theory of *Sphoṭa*, and in explaining this *Kārikā*, Ānandavardhana himself points out that the use of the

expression : *Sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ* in it is highly significant, because it makes a clear confession of the indebtedness of the *Ālaṃkārikas* to *Vaiyākaraṇas*, and thereby points out the authority on which the Doctrine of Dhvani is based. Thus, the objection of Mahimabhaṭṭa that the insertion of the expression *Sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ* vitiates the definition by the fallacy of mention of the unspeakable, technically known as *avācyavacana* has no legs to stand upon.

The learned Dhvanikāra maintains that, the relation of cause and effect exists between cognition of the expressed and realisation of the suggested,—the former leading to the latter : accordingly, he continues, a sequence exists between apprehension of the explicit and comprehension of the implicit, though of course, it is clearly perceptible in case of *Vastu-dhvani* and *Ālaṃkāra-dhvani* and imperceptible in case of *Rasa-dhvani*. Mahimabhaṭṭa uses this observation as an argument against the proposition of the Dhvanivādin that the implicit idea is revealed by the explicit one and the Doctrine of Dhvani is based on the analogy of *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya*. In case of a lamp revealing an already existent jar, the knowledge of the manifestor and the manifested occurs simultaneously : as in case of the explicit revealing the implicit, the knowledge of two appears in succession, the analogy of *Ghaṭa-Pradīpa-Nyāya* is not applicable. In this connection he explains six types of possible *Abhivyakti*, and shows that none of them happens with regard to the suggested sense. In reply to this, Ruyyaka points out that, the definition of *Abhivyakti* as forming the object of perception, for the first time by the sense-organs in case of an effect that lies within its cause in a latent form is unauthorised. Its other definition also that renders it identical with *Anumāna* is not acceptable. The question of revelation of a suggested sense being of the same nature as that of a rainbow does not arise, because, while the latter is non-existent, the former is an existent entity. What the Dhvanivādin means by *Abhivyakti* of a suggested sense and *abhivyañjakatva* of a suggestive unit is that, knowledge of the latter brings the former within the range of one's intellect, in the same way as a lamp makes known the

jar. Ruyyaka asserts that the Dhvanivādin recognises only one type of *Abhivyakti*, that is based on the analogy of a lamp and a jar. As regards the objection that, cognition of the unexpressed does not appear simultaneously with that of the expressed, Ruyyaka says, a parallelism is introduced only to bring home a particular point of similarity: what the Dhvanivādin wants to clarify by introducing this parallelism is that, at the time of comprehension of the suggested the cognition of the expressed also lingers in the mind of an appreciator, in the same way as a lamp continues to exist even when the jar is known; he never says that the knowledge of the suggested appears simultaneously with that of the expressed. Thus, there is no real conflict of the concept of relation of cause and effect, existing between the expressed and the unexpressed with that of *vyañjya-vyañjaka-bhāva*, linking the two.⁴⁸ The Dhvanivādin certainly regards the expressed as a cause of the suggested: but he thinks that this relation is something other than that existing between a probans and a probandum, in which the former does not tinge the latter with its own colour: this relation, he says, is *vyañjya-vyañjaka-bhāva*, characterised by presentation of the suggested with colour of the suggestive reflected on it. This type of presentation of the implicit is found in case of suggestion of *Rasa*, that is relished along with *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, and without which *Rasa* has no existence, whatsoever. The experience of refined appreciators shows that at the time of enjoyment of aesthetic pleasure, the knowledge of excitants, ensuents and accessories persists in the mind of the perceiver. Thus it is clear that *Rasa* is capable of being brought into comprehension through suggestion and as such it is possible to assert its *Abhivyakti*. Mahimabhaṭṭa maintains that, as knowledge of suggested fact and imaginative mood appears definitely after the cognition of the expressed meaning, it is proper to explain their comprehension as being caused by inference. In reply to this, Ruyyaka says that, when it is an imperative necessity to postulate a separate function, known as *Vyañjanā* in order to account for revelation of *Rasa*, it is better to explain suitably the

manifestation of *Vastu* and *Alaṃkāra*, also, as being caused by that function. The Dhvanivādin believes that the implicit fact and figure are incapable of being brought into light through the functions of *Abhidhā* and *Lakṣṇā*,—by *Abhidhā*, because those do not constitute the conventional meanings and by *Lakṣṇā*, because the conditions necessary for its operation are absent. Moreover, the conditions of valid inference are conspicuous by their absence in the case of suggestion of a fact or a figure by another fact or figure. The point that knowledge of suggested *Vastu* or *Alaṃkāra* does not appear simultaneously with that of the expressed meaning is without any value, because the Dhvanivādin himself recognises the existence of a sequence between cognition of the expressed and understanding of the unexpressed fact or figure: by positing the relation of *vyañjya-vyañjaka-bhāva*, as remaining between the two units, the Dhvanivādin only means this that at the time of understanding of the suggested fact or figure, the knowledge of the expressed fact or figure lingers in the mind of the appreciator. To this an objection might be raised by an Anumānavādin who might point out that, persistence of the knowledge of the expressed is possible at the time of cognition of the suggested fact, that is not contrary to the former, but such persistence is absurd at the time of understanding of a suggested fact, that is completely opposed to it, as in the verse: '*Bhama Dhammā Vīsattā*' etc. in which the expressed meaning is affirmation, but the suggested one is negation. In reply to this Ruyyaka states that in case of this verse also, the knowledge of the expressed injunction lingers in the mind of the refined reader at the time when suggested prohibition is cognised, inasmuch as, he realises fully that the expressed meaning is merely a cloak, introduced by the speaker to cover up her real intention, and thus nothing stands in the way of existence at the same time, of both the ideas, though they are mutually opposed to each other in the mental plane of the appreciator.⁴⁹

According to Mahimabhaṭṭa, *Rasa* is an inferred entity and the probans that leads to its inferential knowledge is comprised of three constituents—*Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and

Vyabhicāribhāvas. He thinks that *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, presented on stage are artificial, because they are in no way related to the original personage, whose character is imitated only by an actor: in a similar way the feelings, in their turn, are unreal, because the actor exhibits only artificial moods, belonging actually to the original character. This inference of a semblance of mental condition, Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks, invariably causes pleasure. The inference of real mental conditions caused by real causes, effects and accessories does not always produce pleasure; and for this reason, it is possible to draw a line of demarcation between inference of ordinary world and inference in the realm of Poetry: the former produces pleasure, pain, hatred, anger and numerous other feelings, as the case may be: the latter produces supreme bliss without fail. In order to bring home this characteristic feature of an inferred semblance of mental condition, Mahimabhaṭṭa points out, the figurative expression '*Vyañjya*' is used in connection with it, which is actually *anumeya*. Thus it is clear that the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa on the problem of aesthetic realisation is very much similar to that of Śaṅkuka on the same issue. Like Śaṅkuka he thinks that *Rasa* belonging to the original personage is superimposed on the actor, and this artificial mood is known through inference from unreal *Vibhāvas*, *Anubhāvas* and *Vyabhicāribhāvas*, and this inference invariably causes delight. As against this view, Ruyyaka asserts that, according to the Dhvani Theorists, *Rasa* does not belong to the principal character; it, on the other hand, is a peculiar blissful state of ego, produced in the mind of a refined appreciator, who with his sense of narrow personality put into sleep realises the excitants, ensuents and accessories, presented in their generalised forms. The theory of Mahimabhaṭṭa, he says, fails to explain the fact that *Rasāsvāda* is a state of pure joy. Mental conditions are always inferred, but evidently, they are not always the cause of pleasure. The explanation that inference of artificial mental conditions, caused by unreal causes and effects produces nothing but pleasure does not seem to be convincing. In fact, while criticising the view of Śaṅkuka,

Abhinavagupta raises this relevant objection, and points out that, if there is pleasure in the inference of a mental condition, not actually existing in the actor, it is not clear as to how and why it should not be in the inference of a real mental condition. The Dhvanivādin regards *Rasa* as manifestation of bliss-portion of one's own consciousness: this pure consciousness, that remains covered by veil of ignorance in ordinary life, he says, is manifested by the transcendental function of *Vyañjanā* at the time of perception of poetry, and as the veil of ignorance is removed, *Ātmānanda* shines in its undimmed glory, and consequently, nothing but pleasure is derived from appreciation of Poetry. Thus as *Vyañjanā* is competent to raise *Rasa* into consciousness, the expression '*Vyañjya*' can rightly be used in relation to it and there is no necessity of explaining the use of the term as a figurative one.⁵⁰

It is curious to note that though a Naiyāyika, an ardent advocate of *Anumāna* gives separate recognition to *Lakṣaṇā*, Mahimabhaṭṭa comprehends it along with *Vyañjanā* under the process of inference. According to him superimposition of identity between a cow and a man in the expression '*Gourvāhikāḥ*' leads to knowledge of similarity existing between the two, and in a similar manner, the use of such terms, between the primary meanings of which no logical connection can be established as in the expression '*Gaṇḍāyām Ghoṣaḥ*' leads to this knowledge that one thing is superimposed on another thing and in this way, ultimately the sense of the bank is inferred: the sense of extreme dullness and laziness of the carrier in the first expression as also the idea of excess of coolness and purity, he thinks, are known through *Anumāna*. It is possible for a Dhvanivādin to refute this contention in the following way. In the view of the Ālankārikas, the indicated meaning in the expression '*Gourvāhikāḥ*' is not the relation of similarity existing between the cow and the carrier, but the sense of the individual carrier itself. Then again, the inability of the primary meanings of the two terms used in the expression: *Gaṇḍāyām Ghoṣaḥ* to establish logical connection between themselves may, as well, lead to this knowledge that, by the

term *Ghoṣa* the speaker actually means fish : there is no definite reason as to why the bank of the Ganges, alone, should be referred to by the term '*Gaṇjā*'. Thirdly, the proposition that, proximity of one thing to another leads to inferential knowledge of an attribute, really inherent in the second as belonging to the first is unacceptable, because the probans, put forward is an inconclusive one. A human skull, rolling on the bank of the Ganges lies very near the flowing mass of water, but for that reason, it does not possess the qualities of coolness and purity, that are related strictly to the flowing stream. The relation of universal concomitance, as is supposed to exist between use of a particular word to signify a thing, that does not constitute its conventional meaning and signification of an attribute that does not originally belong to it does not really connect the two, and as such, no valid inference is possible in the present case. Moreover, all the systems of Philosophy irrespective of their difference in other points agree in this that, the secondary sense is brought into light through the function of *Lakṣaṇā* by a word ; even Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, who regards *Lakṣaṇā* as a function actually belonging to the sense-element does not consider that a word-element has nothing to do in the matter of signification of the secondary sense. Then again, the assumption that the secondary sense is an inferred one makes the connection of such a sense impossible with ideas, presented by words actually used in the proposition, because the dictums concerning verbal knowledge state that an expectancy raised by a word is to be filled up by a word only and no meaning, known through a source of knowledge other than verbal testimony is competent to enter into concord with other meanings, presented by *śabla*. These considerations go to establish the point of the Dhvanivādin that the separate existence of *Lakṣaṇā* is to be posited, and it is not possible for *Anumāna* to comprehend it. As regards the point of Mahimabhaṭṭa that the meaning, said to be brought into light by *Tātparyasakti* is capable of being known through inference, the Dhvanivādin indicates that the observation of Mahimabhaṭṭa in this respect itself goes to falsify his stand.

According to the learned Anumānavādin, the idea that, taking of meal at the residence of this particular man is more dangerous than swallowing of poison is gathered through inference by a man, conversant with the nature of the speaker, speciality of context and such other factors from the proposition : 'Swallow poison, but do not eat in this man's house'. The presence of a definite knowledge concerning speciality of the speaker, person spoken to and context in the mind of the man who comprehends *tātparyārtha* is considered an essential factor ; these conditions, however, are not required, in the least, to arrive at an idea through inference, in which simply a probans leads to knowledge of the probandum.

Mahimabhaṭṭa finds fault with the classification of *Dhvani* into two main types : *Avivakṣitavācya* and *Vivakṣitānyapara-vācya*, and opines that the two designations themselves are inappropriate and inaccurate. The Dhvanivādin, however, finds no inaccuracy in these two names : he says that, in the first type, the primary meaning, being incompatible with the rest of the sentence is not accepted as such, and in the second type, the expressed idea is intended to be accepted, but, nevertheless the ultimate object of our cognition is the implicit idea, to which the former is rendered subordinate. Ānandavardhana thinks that this classification of an expressed meaning, that suggests goes to classify ultimately the implicit idea itself, whose charm is so essential for the existence of *Dhvanikāvya*.⁵¹ Thus, according to the learned Dhvanikāra, the *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani* is based on Indication and the *Vivakṣitānyapara-vācya* type on Denotation, and in order to bring out their characteristic features it is necessary to give them these designations.

The point that as in *Avivakṣitavācya Dhvani*, the *vācyārtha* is rejected, it is not possible for it to bring a suggested sense into light is without any value, because the *vācya* aspect of a meaning is entirely different from its *vyañjakatva* aspect, and the very fact that a *vācyārtha* is rejected does not go to prove that its *vyañjakatva* also, is repudiated. Similarly meaningless is the argument that *vivakṣitavācya* of a primary meaning is irreconcil-

able with *anyaparatva*, as the opposite qualities of prominence and subservience are incapable of co-inhering in the same substratum, which, in the present case, is the expressed meaning. And this is so, because by *vivakṣitatva* of the primary meaning, the Dhvanivādin does not mean its prominence; what he means is that, it is accepted in its original form, and by *anyoparatva* of this sense he wants to bring home the idea that the ultimate object of our cognition is the suggested sense. The objection raised by the Anumānavādin that, both *Avivakṣitavācya* and *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* being varieties of *Dhvani*, mention of the term '*anyapara*' in the designation of one of them is needless or if use of this term is felt necessary, it is to be used in the designations of both the varieties is baseless. As in *Avivakṣitavācya* type of *Dhvani*, the expressed meaning is not accepted in its original form, the probability of its prominence does not arise, and so the learned Dhvanikāra does not feel it necessary to rule out the question of its predominance; in *Vivakṣitānyaparavācya* type of *Dhvani*, however, the expressed meaning is not repudiated, and so the question of its prominence is likely to make itself felt: in order to remove all doubts about this and to show that though the primary meaning is not rejected, yet it does not constitute the main object of relish, which is the suggested sense only, the Dhvanikāra inserts the term '*anyapara*' in the designation of *Dhvani* of second variety.

Mahimabhaṭṭa regards *Śabdaśaktimūla* type of *Dhvani* as a figment of imagination, because as he says, words are endowed with no function other than that of *Abhidhā*. In explaining the stanza quoted by Ānandavardhana as an illustration of this variety of *Dhvani*,—the stanza, that runs as: '*Dattānandāḥ prajānām*' etc. he points out that the non-contextual sense of cows is neither presented by the noun nor by the adjective nor by the noun and the adjective acting jointly, and as the non-contextual idea of cows is not cognised, the question of apprehension of a relation of similarity existing between the contextual and the non-contextual meanings does not arise. In reply to this animadversion, a Dhvanivādin, argues that the particular

non-contextual meaning is conveyed by the noun and the adjective acting jointly, inasmuch as, the noun presents such meaning as is compatible with the sense of the adjective and the adjective, in its turn, presents such idea as is capable of being brought into relation with the sense of the noun. A number of things, helping one another and ultimately combining to produce the desired effect is found in the case of earth, water and seed jointly producing the sprout. The objection of the Anumānavādin that this mutual co-operation of causes is found in case of those things only, between which the relation of cause and effect is natural, and the comprehension of *vyañyārtha* being dependent on presence of appreciative genius in the mind of the refined reader, the relation of causality, supposed to exist between nouns and adjectives on the one hand and cognition of the implicit idea on the other is not natural has no legs to stand upon. According to the Dhvanivādin appreciative genius is not an accident, influencing the realisation of the implicit; it is a matter and an attendant or efficient cause, leading to knowledge of that idea. Thus the proposition of Mahimabhaṭṭa that the tradition of *Śabdaśaktimūla dhvani* is established only by pedantic demagogues, who are clever in making use of ambiguous words is unsound and untenable. His point that words are incompetent to convey ideas, other than the primary ones renders the beautiful works of such writers as Bāṇa and Subandhu nothing more than meaningless jargons. Moreover, the experience of refined readers shows that a second sense is clearly apprehended from poetical words, containing homonymous words. To an Anumānavādin who denies comprehension of such meaning, a Dhvanivādin answers by merely quoting the observation of Yāska:

Naiṣa sthūṇoraparāṭho yadenamandho na paśyati; puruṣa-parāḍhaḥ sa bhavati.

which means: 'it is not the fault of the post that the blind man does not see it: it is the fault of the man concerned.'

Mammaṭa and Viśvanātha consider a few illustrations, in which the suggested meaning is said to be known through the process of inference, and show that in none of these cases, the

sylogisms, put forward by Mahimabhaṭṭa are valid ones. Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, in the Prākṛta Gāthā: '*Bhama dhammia*' etc., the sense of absence of free movement is capable of being arrived at through *anumāna*, the form of the syllogism being: '*Idaṃ Godāvarīnikāñjṇaṃ śvabhīrubhramaṇāyogyam siṃharūpabhayaḥkūṛaṇasya sattvāt*'. When arranged in the form of an Aristotelian syllogism, it takes the following shape:

No place that is inhabited by a lion is a proper place for free movement of a man afraid of a dog.

The grove situated on the bank of the river Godāvarī is inhabited by a lion.

∴ The grove is not a proper place for free movement of a man, afraid of a dog.

As regards this syllogism, Mammaṭa, and following him Viśvanātha point out that, it is vitiated by the fallacies of inconclusive, contradicted and unestablished Probans, and as such, is not valid. First of all, he says, even a coward may go to a place, knowing fully well that it is infested with a cause of fear being ordered by his preceptor or being prompted by considerations of love. So the proposition that the free movement of a coward is always preceded by a definite knowledge regarding total absence of cause of fear is not true, and consequently, the Probans is an inconclusive one. Secondly, a man, who is afraid of a dog in his eagerness to avoid its impure touch may be brave enough to face a lion, and thus, the knowledge of the lion's presence on the banks of the river Godāvarī exist, as it does, with the free movement of a man, afraid of a dog, the Probans is a contradicted one. Thirdly, the presence of the lion in the grove is not known either through perception or through inference: it is known only from words, and those, too, of a lady of easy virtues,—a person, whose words are incapable of being relied upon; consequently, the Probans is unestablished, also. For these reasons, Mammaṭa concludes, inference, applied by Mahimabhaṭṭa in place of *Vyāñjanā* is fallacious.⁵² Analysis of other illustrations, put forward by the Anumānavādin goes to establish this proposition. In the view of Mahimabhaṭṭa, in the verse: '*Suvarṇaṇuṣpām*' etc. the description of agency of

brave, learned and servant in the act of plucking the golden flowers of the earth goes to convey through inference the fact that riches are easily obtained by these three categories of persons. The Probans, introduced by him in this syllogism, however, is inconclusive and unestablished, because, firstly, the description of this agency is competent to point out to insanity, as well, of three categories of persons, and secondly, the expressed meaning, residing only in the realm of the poet's imagination, is non-existent in the outside world. Moreover, according to the Dhvanivādin, the suggested sense in the verse under consideration is the excellence of the brave, learned and servant, and not the idea, supposed to be brought into light through inference by Mahimabhaṭṭa. Similarly, in the verse: '*Śikharīṇi*' etc. the implicit idea, whose charm invests the poetry with the status of *Dhvanikāvya* is the intention of the passionate lover to kiss the lips of the lady, as also, to please her, and not merely the sense that, a taste of her lips is capable of being enjoyed only by persons, rich in religious merits, as explained by Mahimabhaṭṭa. In this connection, Mammaṭa quotes the famous stanza: '*Niḥśeṣacyutacandanam*' etc., cited by a number of Ālaṃkārikas and contends that, the implicit meaning, namely the fact that, the messenger approached the wretched lover, and that, too, for enjoyment is incapable of being arrived at through the process of inference: and this is so, because the Probans is an inconclusive one, inasmuch as, complete removal of sandal-paste from slopes of the breasts and total absence of redness of lower lip are effects of a dip in the lake, as well. The Dhvanivādin says, that the word '*adhama*', implying infidelity, used in the verse helps the expressed meaning to suggest the new sense of affirmation; on the basis of this word, also, it is improper to regard the cognition of the implicit idea of affirmation as an inferential knowledge, because the wretchedness of the lover, which is deemed as one of the constituent factors of the Probans is unestablished and is known solely from the words of an infuriated heroine. Though *Anumāna* fails to bring the idea, under consideration into comprehension, *Vyāñjanā* is able to do so, as it does not depend for its operation on the

existence of the relation of universal concomitance, linking the expressed and the unexpressed. Jagannātha remarks that, this relation, though favourable to inference is definitely detrimental to suggestion, as in those cases in which it exists, *Anumāna* steps in to replace *Vyañjanā*.⁵³ The magic wand of suggestion, the Dhvanivādin says, does not require the valid conditions of inference in order to bring an implicit idea into light, and this, he argues, goes to establish the superiority of *Vyañjanā* over other functions and processes.⁵⁴ The Anumānavādin thinks that in the stanza : 'attā ettha' etc there is no such valid reason as is competent to convey the implied meaning of affirmation, but the Dhvanivādin in reply to the criticism argues that, as the operation of suggestion does not stand in need of valid reasons, the idea of affirmation, conveyed through this function is comprehended clearly by a true connoisseur of poetic art. With regard to the Prākṛta Gāthā : 'Kassa vā na hoi' etc. Mahimabhaṭṭa opines that, the idea that the lady has not enjoyed the company of her paramour as presented through inference is cognised by her husband : but, it is to note that, according to a Dhvanivādin, a number of suggested meanings,—all presented through suggestion are comprehended by different persons. Moreover, the reason, introduced in the so-called syllogism is inconclusive, contrary and unestablished.

The fallacies discussed before go to vitiate those syllogisms, also, in which reasons lead to inferential knowledge of imaginative moods. Thus in the verse : 'Lāvaṇyakāntiparipūrītadinimukhe'smin' etc., the agitation of the Ocean, put forward as a Probans is an inconclusive one, inasmuch as, this agitation is capable of being caused by movement of sea-vessels, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and thus is not a definite pointer to the idea that, the face is being presented with the form of the moon superimposed on it. Moreover, this reason is unestablished, because the whole description owes its existence to the imagination of the Poet, and as such, is objectively unreal. Viśvanātha observes that, this fallacy invariably vitiates syllogisms in all cases, in which one figure brings a fact or another

figure into comprehension : and this is so, because a figure resides only in the realm of a poet's imagination.⁵⁵ It is this fallacy, which vitiates the so called syllogism in the stanza : 'Prāptaśrīreṣa kasmāt' etc. in which the figure *Rūpaka*, consisting in superimposition of identity of Lord Vāsudeva on the king is said to be presented through *Anumāna*, because, firstly, the Probans, but forward by the Anumānavādin here is identical with the Probandum, and secondly, the generation of doubts in the mind of the Ocean is an unreality.

The arguments, advanced above, in order to refute the contentions of the Anumānavādin go to repudiate the proposition of those scholars, as well, who like to comprehend *Dhvani* under *Arthāpatti*.⁵⁶ This *Arthāpatti*, through which from a known effect an unknown cause is apprehended is recognised as a separate instrument of cognition by the Vedāntin ; the Naiyāyika, however, is of opinion that, this source of knowledge, being based on a type of universal concomitance, known as *Vyatireka-vyāpti* is nothing other than *Anumāna*. The Dhvanivādin asserts that, for reasons discussed before, it is not possible to arrive at the cause, namely dalliance from the described effects, namely the changes, appearing in the limbs of the messenger in the verse : 'Niḥśeṣacyutcandanam stanatatum' etc., and thus, *Arthāpatti* is not competent to bring the suggested sense into light. The considered opinion of a Dhvanivādin on this issue is this that, the function of *Vyañjanā* is incapable of being comprehended under the processes of *Anumāna* and *Arthāpatti*.

CHAPTER VII

RELEVANCE OF SANSKRIT LITERARY THEORIES TO MODERN LITERATURE

I

General Observation

Sanskrit literary theory gives a special status to 'Rasa' and declares with all emphasis at its command that this 'Rasa' constitutes the centre of gravity of Poetic Art. The semantic spectrum of the expression 'Rasa' is extremely wide, and an analysis of this extensive semantic spectrum shows that the concept of 'Rasa' is not merely subjective in character nor objective in nature ; but rather it is a combination of subjective and objective components and is capable of being employed to signify the sense of 'Beauty'.

Literary theoreticians describe 'Rasa' as subjective in character ; and say that by 'Rasa' is referred that mental state which is derived from experience of Poetry. This mental state, it is asserted, is comprised of Bliss and Bliss alone. The experience of the common appreciator indicates that even tasting of the Tragic and Disgustful leads to transcendental joy. This is so, possibly, because the Bliss which is derived from experience of Poetry does not depend on the character of the emotion presented or the nature of the subject-matter introduced, but on the self of the appreciator himself. Indian tradition believes in the principle that the Finite is the shadow of the Infinite,—the truncated is the reflection of the Great and the Sublime. The joy that is derived at the time of appreciation of poetry, therefore, is the joy associated with the Infinite,—the Grand and the Sublime.

Though Sanskrit literary theory pronounced this truth long back, it is only recently that the Western Aesthetics has

started a movement claiming that, the pleasure derived from appreciation of Poetry does not come from without, but from within the self of the experiencer. This is the common experience of the common man that, on witnessing a beautiful scene and on listening to a splendid melody, he enjoys himself more than the scenic beauty or the melody of the music. This justifies such questions as, 'how do you enjoy yourself?' rather than 'how have you enjoyed the scene or the melody?' The new school emerging in the area of Western Aesthetics, thus, has just started asserting that the joy derived from experience of Poetry is intrinsic to the nature of the experiencer and not external to him. This assertion had been made long back by Indian Aesthetics, which proclaimed times without number the identity of 'Rasa' with the Infinite,—the Grand and the Sublime.¹

Though the modern trends in Western Aesthetics have just started projecting the basic truth behind the experience of supra-mundane delight at the time of appreciation of Poetry, it has not been able to reach that height which had been arrived at by Indian Aesthetics. Indian Aesthetics which derives its inspiration from the Vedānta and the Śaiva systems of Philosophy as also the system of Grammar, naturally, accepts the Absolute as unitary in character, and says that the entire creation is nothing but projection of this Absolute. The Vedānta system of Philosophy considers the world as transformation of the Absolute: the Śaiva system regards the Paramaśiva as the only real entity, others being merely reflections of this Reality; and the system of Grammar considers the Eternal Verbum as the only truth expressing itself in both the directions of the word and the meaning. The contention of the Vedānta and the Śaiva systems, as also the School of Grammar that the Absolute manifests itself in diverse names and forms, and projects itself through different creations casts a deep impression on the thinkers belonging to the system of Indian Aesthetics, and they also declare the Infinite as the only real entity projecting itself through different expressions in the empirical plane. This Philosophy of Indian Aesthetics, which considers the Infinite as the only Reality prompts it to arrive at the Infinite in its search after the genesis of experience of delight.

When this Infinite is arrived at, the riddle is solved, because the Infinite always shines in its undimmed splendour and profundity of joy. As a matter of fact, Existence, Consciousness and Bliss constitute part and parcel of the Infinite, and the Sublime cannot exist without Bliss and Consciousness. This linkage which Indian Aesthetics establishes between transcendental Bliss derived from experience of Poetry and the Infinite gives a new colour to its theories, and lifts it to a height that is incapable of being attained by any other literary theory of the World,—the English theory, the Greek theory, the French theory and the theories of other traditions.

It may not be out of place here to present the thoughts of Tagore on the concept of Beauty. In his endeavour to find out the linkage between the Good and the Beautiful, Tagore refers to the statement of Keats that, Truth is Beauty and Beauty is Truth, and says that the Indian concept of the Goddess Sarasvatī also envisages this combination of Truth and Beauty. The Upanishad proclaims with all emphasis that the entire creation is manifestation of the Sublime and consequently, is full of joy and truth. The entire creation is nothing but manifestation of joy associated with the Infinite: beginning from the dust under foot to the Sun blazing in the firmament there emerge joy and glory, constituting the part and parcel of the Infinite,—combination of Truth and Beauty. When the man tries to give expression to this joy through employment of language, the field for genesis of Poetry is created. When truth is arrived at through our sense-organs or through intellect, Poetry does not emerge: but when we arrive at the grand truth through our emotions and feelings, then certainly the path for emergence of Poetry is created. This, however, does not mean that there is no scope for employment of intellect in Poetry. Poetry is emotion no doubt, but still there is some place of creative intellect in it. When the human heart discovers Truth with its feeling and emotions, it tries to give eternity to that moment of surpriseful delight and delightful surprise through language, music and colour. In this process Poetry, Music and Painting are brought into being. Poetry, Music and Painting, therefore, belong to the same category of Art,—the art of giving expression to the surpriseful delight,—

the joy of discovery of the sublime truth constituting a part and parcel of the Infinite.

Sanskrit reflects the vigour, broadness and the desire to discover unity, lying latent in Indian mind and consequently, it is not possible to have an idea of Indian mind or Indian culture without a deep penetration into Sanskrit. Long back in the early dawn of human civilisation the Vedas proclaimed—the one Absolute stands still in the firmament like a huge tree : by this Absolute the entire universe is comprehended. With this proclamation, the search carried out by Science, Devotion and Affection, all could find their unified goal. So long Science had been conducting search in matters and movements out of curiosity,—timid devotion had been trying to locate a Supreme God,—and affection had been searching after its locus. With the issue of this proclamation in regard to existence of One in all entities, the search carried by Science, Devotion and Love, all came to an end. The Science realised the truth that in the world the one Absolute was to be traced ; tired Devotion could locate its real object, and Affection proclaimed,—the Absolute was dearer than children,—dearer than wealth,—dearer than all mundane possessions. At that material moment the truth of the One, the fearlessness granted by One and Bliss constituting part and parcel of that One unified the universe and clothed it in profound beauty.²

Indian culture has been able to trace this One as the common bond in the midst of diversity,—as profound peace in the midst of all strifes and conflicts. When the universe is seen in fragments, it appears as ugly : when it is seen in totality, it appears an One steeped in fathomless beauty. The One Absolute,—the One above all beings keeps the entire matters and situations tied to a common string. It is for this reason that even the severest of sorrow gets itself merged in the concert of auspicious music emanating from the universe : it proclaims—the One Absolute stands firm in the firmament. Indian tradition believes that as long as realisation of this Absolute does not dawn in human mind, it does not experience joy or peace : it has to move about aimlessly in search after an anchorage. When, however, the experience of Bliss associated with this One is obtained, the mind experiences surpriseful delight and ex-

claims : 'I have been able to know that Great and the Sublime, living behind darkness' : 'I have known that One experiencing whom One attains immortality'. The Poetry identified by a mind desirous of discovering this One is grand,—the poetical paintings carved out by this mind are great : they constitute the natural repository of profound enchantment. Thus the power of Sanskrit is limitless : its enchantment is everlasting.³

An analysis of the literary creations beginning from the Vedic period down to the modern times shows that in all these creations the artists have tried to discover this One. Even those literary artists who have selected modern Indian languages as their media of expression, have carved out poetical structures drawing idea from Sanskrit literature and have been able to project this desire to know the One have achieved lasting fame : their creations have acquired tremendous charm and natural enchantment.

The complete surrender of the dedicated thinker is evident in the first specimen of literature—'Lead us from non-existence to existence,—from darkness to light and from death to immortality. Oh. Self-luminous one ; kindly extend protection with thy benign looks.' This tendency to trace the unified thread of goodness makes itself felt in the prayer of the Atharvaveda also : 'Let Firmament grant us fearlessness, let the Sky and Heaven grant it, let fearlessness be at our back and in front, down and above : may fearlessness come from friends and enemies alike, from known and unknown alike and from all directions'. This common bond of goodness has been referred to by the expression 'Brahma' in the Upanishads and 'ISVARA' in the Gītā. The observation of the Upanishads that the 'Universe is pervaded by the Absolute' and of the Gītā that the 'God resides in the heart of hearts of all beings', thus, has been able to retain its enchantment for all time to come.

The great poet Kalidasa has been able to demonstrate this search after One in all his poetic and dramatic creations and consequently, his literary creations also have proved themselves to be repositories of eternal enchantment. It is because of this that the distinction between the lady and the river has vanished before his eyes ; and the qualities of the lotus and the moon have found a happy habitat in the face of Pārvatī. The truth

is that those poets who have been able to realise this truth that all beings are created out of Bliss,—are sustained by Bliss and come back to Bliss—have been able to create literary compositions that are marked by profound beauty and endless charm.

In his attempt to trace the fibre of Indian culture, Tagore has pointed out to this special trait of Indian mind in one of his famous songs contained in *Gitañjali*⁴ :

It is here that the ceaseless reverberation of the Grand 'om'
Did arise in the hearts of all unifying them :
It is here that the diverse was consumed in the fire of unity.
All distinctions lost and one total mind produced.
Unlock the gate of this sacrificial sanctuary.
Of that grand worship and contemplation.
Here everybody is to come with heads subdued.
At this sea-shore of sublime Indian Humanity.

The whole of Sanskrit literature reveals the attitude of the mind to trace the 'One',—the propensity of the heart to discover the Absolute and to search after the common bond of Goodness and Greatness. Sanskrit literary artists believe in the principle that Bliss resides in the Great and the Sublime and consequently, their modality has been to dedicate themselves to the Infinite and the Great.

Summing up this attitude of the Indian mind Tagore says :

Unite with all and untie this Knot (of small ego) !
Intersperse all acts with thy tranquil music !
Keep my mind unflickering in thy lotus-feet !!⁵

II

Poet & Poetic Process

Indian Aesthetics conceives of the Poet as a person in whom the faculty of realising the truth and the faculty of giving expression to the truth realised combine. In the literary artist,

it asserts, the capacity of seeing the poetic truth and the capacity of constructing the poetic image find a happy home, as a result of which it becomes possible for him to carve out the poetical painting competent to give expression to the cherished emotive content. This description of the literary artist, as given by Indian Aesthetics puts great emphasis on the Faculty of Imagination, since Imagination plays a significant role not only in the matter of identifying the 'Poetic truth', but in the sphere of finding out the 'poetical painting' also. Imagination, as a matter of fact, presents ever-new corruscations of ideas before the poet and enables him to see all things, as steeped in profound beauty : it is for this reason that the literary artist becomes able to present even ordinary things as resplendent in a new light,—as a splendidly charming category, endowed with the power of generating supra-normal delight.⁶

It is significant that Indian Aesthetics extends recognition to two types of Imagination : one belonging to the literary artist and the other belonging to the appreciative reader,—the ideal reader, to whom alone the specimen of literary art is addressed. In describing the role of Imagination in the process of creation of Poetry, Mammaṭa states that this constitutes the germ of Poetry ; without it Poetry is not produced ; and if at all it is produced, it makes the Poetry ludicrous and instead of causing an enchantment for the document produced creates a definite dis-enchantment for it. In giving a detailed analysis of the part played by Imagination, Rajasekhara states that this faculty enables the creative artist to locate the emotion intended to be expressed, and at the same time presents words and meanings, metres and figures, styles and dictions suitable for giving expression to the emotion identified. This means that the Faculty of Imagination identifies emotions and at the same time carves out the image competent to give expression to the particular emotion.

Imagination, therefore, is of supreme importance in the process of creation of Poetry, which, according to the Indian Aesthetics, is capable of being analysed into three or four distinct stages. In his attempt to draw the line of demarcation between such poetic categories as the *Guṇa*, the *Alaṃkāra* and the *Lakṣaṇa*, Abhinavagupta speaks of three different activi-

ties on the part of the Poet's faculty of Imagination. He proceeds to say that, the Poetic Imagination takes recourse to three activities or vibrations at three different stages and when poetic process passes through all these three stages, then and then alone finished Literary Art is carved out. In the very first phase of poetic process, Imagination identifies the emotion intended to be presented in the document of literary art and its corresponding quality, which is technically known as *Guṇa* in the terminology of Indian Aesthetics. In the second stage, this faculty introduces poetic figures, technically known as *Alaṃkāras*, as a result of which these poetic figures become organically related to the Art of Poetry itself. These poetic figures that are improvised at the second stage of poetic process bring themselves into organic relation with the Poetic Art, as a result of which, they become part and parcel of the poetic tissue. It is with reference to these poetic figures that Ānandavardhana declares that these alone are intrinsic to the Poetic Art, being spontaneous in character. At the third stage of poetic process, Abhinavagupta asserts, the actual body of Poetry, consisting of the expression and the content is created. The charmingness of the body of poetry, which is the effect of the third vibration of Imagination is implanted by the factor, known as the *Lakṣaṇa*. The *Guṇa*, therefore, originates at the first stage of poetic process;—*Alaṃkāra* at the second stage and the *Lakṣaṇa* at the third and final stage.⁷

All these show the fundamental role of Imagination in genesis of Poetry. Imagination enables the literary artist to locate the emotive content: it enables him further to identify the quality, the poetic figure, the characteristics, and above all the poetic texture itself,—the appropriate texture, which alone is in a position to give expression to the particular emotive content.

It is to be understood in this connection that when Indian Aesthetics speaks of Imagination as the factor responsible for locating the emotive content, it does not refer to the 'brute emotion' of the literary artist, but rather to the 'impersonal emotion' expressed by him at the time of creation of Poetry. Sanskrit Poetics is very particular in drawing the line of demarcation between 'brute emotion' expressed by the poet in his

capacity as an ordinary man and 'idealised emotion' as expressed by the literary artist throughout the operation of the creative process. When Vālmiki, the first creative artist experienced grief on hearing the pitiful lamentations of the she-quail, he experienced ordinary grief; but when he contemplated on this grief, it was transmuted to tragic emotion and while coming out in the external world of existence assumed the shape of the great Epic,—the *Rāmāyaṇa*. The sage Vālmiki approaching the river for a bath, thus, experienced ordinary grief; the literary artist Vālmiki experienced the grand and sublime tragic. It is not without reason, therefore, that the tragic emotion manifests itself in different forms in the entire movement of the plot of the Epic,—sometimes through the lamentations of the blind sage,—sometimes through the bewailings of the old king Daśaratha,—sometimes through the tears of Sītā, as she is carried out forcibly by Rāvaṇa,—sometimes through the cries of Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa,—sometimes through the lamentations of the spouses of Rāvaṇa and so on and so on. The tragic, as a matter of fact, pervades the entire atmosphere of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. In drawing this line of demarcation between the feeling of the mind, which experiences and the feeling of the mind which creates, Ānandavardhana says that, had Vālmiki experienced only ordinary grief, it would not have been possible for him to carve out such magnificent poetical paintings, as are contained in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. When a man is over-powered with grief, he certainly is not in a position to construct a composition worth the name, what to speak of a shining poetical painting. It is not without reason, therefore, that the eminent literary critic, T. S. Eliot says: "It is not in his personal emotion, the emotion provoked by particular event in his life, that the poet is in any way remarkable or interesting... the business of the poet is not to find new emotions; but to use the ordinary ones, and in working them up into Poetry, to express feelings which are not in actual fact emotions at all. . . . Poetry is not a turning loose of emotion, but an escape from emotion". And this 'escape' to which T. S. Eliot refers cannot come about except through poetic process and the creative emotion and in the very act of creating. The faculty of Imagination thus, enables the creative artist to escape from his personal emotion and

experience a transmuted elevated feeling, as a result of which it becomes possible for him to construct poetical paintings resplendent in their own light.

It may not be out of place to mention here that Modern Psychology draws the line of distinction between the drive or the 'crude emotion' on the one hand and 'transformed emotion' on the other. The drive, it is asserted, is the tendency to action, which is aroused by a need as its complementary art expression. Woodworth points out that habits may become drives and the quality of the habit will depend upon the culture of the individual and the society in which he lives. The permanent feeling, as contemplated in Sanskrit Aesthetics, therefore, is capable of being equated with the stable feeling,—the profound transformation of the crude primitive equipment through a marvellous socio-economic process: this is to be distinguished definitely from the 'brute emotion,'—the 'crude primitive quipment' in the terminology of Modern Psychology. The Sthāyibhāva is not activated emotion, but the abiding sentiment which can develop into emotion when confronted by appropriate stimuli.⁸

In explaining the concept of 'Beauty' and the role of Imagination in inducting beauty to the document of literary art, Sanskrit Poetics with all emphasis at its command, asserts that, charmingness is inducted by the action of the artist,—the mind of the creator,—or to say more precisely, by poetic process itself. This poetic process is technically known as "Kavi-vyāpāra" in the language of Indian Aesthetics. It is curious to note that the Indian mind does not admit the distinction between 'beautiful' and 'ugly'; and proclaims that there cannot be any such thing as ugly in life. The latent idea is that when an art-form is given to the ugly, it becomes transformed into the most beautiful. When Sanskrit Poetics refers to this power of the poet and Poetry to unite under its light yoke the irreconcilable,—to transform the deformed into the most beautiful, it certainly refers to the supreme power of the literary artist and the Art itself. This theory in regard to Kavi-vyāpāra of Sanskrit Poetics is exactly equivalent to the theory of Action of Mind of Modern Aesthetics, as is evident from the proposition of Addison, who writes: 'Anything that is disagreeable when

looked upon pleases us in an apt description. Here, therefore, we must enquire a new principle of pleasure which is nothing else but the Action of the Mind, which compares the ideas that arise from words with the ideas that arise from the objects themselves. For this reason, therefore, the description of a dunghill is pleasing to the Imagination if the image is represented to our mind by suitable expressions".

In his attempt to draw the line of demarcation between the ugly and the beautiful, Tagore formulates a new principle; resting his findings on the speculations of the Upanishads. Tagore says that, when the help of the external sense-organs is taken to distinguish the beautiful from the ugly, the gap between the two categories seems to be too vast: when assistance of the mind and the intellect is sought in addition to that of the sense-organ, the gap remains, but it becomes shortened to a great extent. Finally, when the assistance of the sense of goodness is taken, and the sense of goodness is commissioned to help the external sense-organ and the internal intellect, the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly vanishes and the whole universe appears as steeped in beauty. By 'sense of goodness' Tagore certainly refers to the concept that the world is sustained by a single string of the good and the beautiful,—the Infinite. It is because of this that though surrounded by streams of grief and trials and tribulations, sorrows and strifes, the mind becomes able to appreciate the charmingness of the shining sun, the round ocean, the blue sky and the gliding moon.

It is this eternal chord of the Infinite because of which even the severest of sorrow gets itself merged in the splendid concert emanating from the sights and sounds of nature,—the passions and actions of humanity. Resting his thesis on the Upanisadic Theories, Tagore indentifies this eternal craving of the mind for the Infinite, and says that when this Infinite is taken into account, and the whole universe is seen as the seat of the Infinite and the Grand,—the 'Beautiful' and the 'Blissful', the distinction between the beautiful and the ugly vanishes. This approach of Tagore is definitely a confident approach, backed by the authority of the Upanishad, and confirmed times without number by the Gitā and subsequent

systems of Philosophy propounded by great thinkers of this great land. In the *Gītā* the Supreme Being in his attempt to inspire Arjuna proclaims : "Whatever is Sublime, Good, Auspicious, Mighty in the universe, understand that it exists as great and grand due to my splendour". It is evident that the Infinite affirms with all emphasis at its command that whatever is sublime and great is a manifestation of His power,—a fraction of His splendour. The *Gītā* thus describes Beauty as an objective property of the work of Art,—of the thing that is accepted as the beautiful.⁹

III

Beauty and Imagination

This takes the reader to a vexed question which repeatedly crops up in Aesthetic Theory,—the question as to whether or not Beauty is an objective quality. Since the concept of Beauty is to be equated with the quality of mental transfer, the issue naturally is whether the capacity to cause this mental transfer exists in the work of Art around. In its attempt to furnish a solution to this problem, Sanskrit Poetics says that Beauty is an objective property of the work of Art, but at the same time certain subjective instruments are necessary in order to appreciate it and to share the experience of the artist, who keeps himself cognisable in the object of Art. The object of Art is a beautiful and permanent record of an experience, because it could yield back the corresponding experience, which is an emotional one to another man of sensibility, remaining more or less constant to all sensitive appreciators, just as the scientific datum remains constant for all observers. But in order to enable the specimen of Art to create aesthetic experience in the mind of the reader, what is necessary is high sensitivity, which is the only instrument with the help of which an object of Art is to be approached. This sensitivity varies from individual to individual ; but there is basic identity of the man's nature between individuals : it

is always possible for all readers possessed of this sensitivity to experience as objective truth the emotion of the artist inducted in a specimen of Art. Sanskrit Poetics, thus, expounds the proposition that, Beauty is an objective property of Poetry and that, this property is donated in the document of Literary Art by *Kavivyāpāra* or action of the mind of the poet. It, at the same time, says that Beauty is a subjective concept, inasmuch as, transplantation of emotion in the mind of the experiencer depends on a high-level sensitivity lying latent in him. The proof of the enchantment of the objective truth of *Rasa* lies in its fascinating experience by the reader ; but the reader should be one of like heart with the poet. The objective truth of Beauty is witnessed by the identity of the reaction and experience of all sensitive minds.

Indian attitude is marked by a tendency to effect harmony between conflicting views and theories. Betraying the profound influence exhibited by this peculiar Indian attitude, Sanskrit Poetics tries to reconcile the concepts of 'objective science' and 'subjective art' also in the realm of Art, and declares that all distinctions between 'objective science' and 'subjective art' is practically invalid. It, is, therefore, useless to raise the vexed question as to whether Beauty is subjective or objective in the realm of Art.

All these take the critic to the doorway of the fundamental doctrine that, Poetry is the art of employment of expression for the purpose of transplanting the unique experience of the artist into the mind of the refined reader. The objective property of Poetry is donated by '*Kavivyāpāra*' : the subjective part is taken care of by the sensitivity of the refined reader. It is not without reason, therefore, that Sanskrit literary theories refer to both the poet and the critic as constituting the essence of Poetry jointly. It is said that the circuit of Poetry cannot complete itself without either,—the artist and the appreciator. Modern literary theory, also, defines Poetry in a similar manner, and expounds the Theory in regard to Poetic Circuit for proper understanding of the process of yielding back of the Poet's experience to another similarly delightful experience in the mind of the appreciator.

Once Poetry is conceived of as a process of employ-

ment of expression for the purpose of transplantation of experience from one mind to another, the question of admitting the two parties, necessary for this transplantation,—the Literary Artist, who transfers his experience and the refined reader, in whose mind the Art Symbol is transferred back into another experience naturally raises its head. Sanskrit literary theory employs the term 'Kavi' to signify the Literary Artist, who is described by Abhinavagupta as an Artist competent to create Poetry, full of charmingness and clarity through exuberance of emotion generated in his mind. Mammaṭa, of later date maintains that the creative genius constitutes the causal factor of Literary Art, and in defining creative genius or Imagination says that, it constitutes the germ of Poetry ;—without it Poetry is not produced, and if produced by force, makes the creation an object of ridicule. Bhaṭṭatauta speaks of the greatness of the Literary Artist, who is called a poet and a seer : a Kavi, he says, is one who combines in him the power of realising the truth and the power of describing the truth visualised. Poetry, thus, is not merely a literary composition : it is truth objectified through poetic tissue. The Doctrine of Sanskrit Literary Theoretician, thus, considers the poet as one possessed of genuine Rasa, seen through a rare capacity of having the most sensitive experience as also of the power of making an objective representation,—creating an Art-Symbol, which typifies the central feeling,—the centre of gravity of the Poetic Art.

While Imagination is an essential requirement for the Literary Artist, it is equally an essential requirement for the refined reader, to signify whom the technical term 'Sahṛdaya' is employed in Sanskrit Poetics. While creative genius of Imagination belonging to the Poet presents words and meanings, metres and figures suitable for production of Art-Symbol before the Poet, Imagination, belonging to the refined appreciator enables him to identify himself easily with the characters and situations presented in Poetry and share the feelings of the Poet. The Aesthetic emotion gets transplanted into the refined reader only when the Art-Symbol of this emotion effects an ideal reawakening of it in him. The Sahṛdaya of Indian Aesthetics is one who gets himself acquainted with

the literary creations of all master minds, as a result of which, whose mind becomes full of responsiveness to the events and characters presented in Poetry, consequential upon which there occurs an identification of his experience of Aesthetic emotion with that of the artist himself. In describing the different stages in the process of this unique transplantation, Abhinavagupta says that, the sensibility of the responsive reader first becomes attuned to the emotional situation portrayed : it then identifies itself with the portrayal. It is only when this identification is there that, the experience of the Aesthetic Emotion becomes a reality. Identification, it is asserted, is necessary for attainment of Aesthetic experience. The reader or the spectator has to observe the feeling as being inducted into his own self in order to enjoy it.

It is interesting to note that Sanskrit literary theory is not the only Theory to emphasise the part played by the refined appreciator in completion of 'Poetic Circuit'. Butcher, the famous commentator of Aristotle envisages the existence of an ideal reader or spectator to whom all specimen of Literary Art appeals ; without this ideal connoisseur, he says, Poetry does not achieve its fulfilment, because the poetic circuit is left incomplete. The noted critic, C. Day Lewis, agrees with the views that the sensitive reader is of like heart with the Poet, so much so that the feeling experienced by the Poet are experienced in the same manner by the connoisseur. Virginia Wolf similarly advises : "Do not dictate the Poet. Try to be one with him. Be a fellow-worker and accomplice." It is not without reason, therefore, that Abercrombie, while describing Poetry says that, along with the experience transplanted into the mind of the refined appreciator, the moment also in which the unique experience had been derived by the Literary Artist is re-created in his mind, as a result of which there happens complete identification of the connoisseur with the artist. The objective of Poetry, which is nothing but an Art-Symbol, thus, is not to communicate the stuff of experience, but to re-create the moment in which the unique experience is derived and finally to effect transportation of the splendid experience itself into the mind of connoisseur. Imagination, belonging to the refined reader, thus, plays a vital

role in the process of completion of 'Poetic Circuit': it enables the appreciator to transfer back the Art-Symbol into a corresponding experience in his mind. There is sufficient justification, therefore, in the assertion of Baudelaire that in all the Arts there is a lacuna, which is completed by the Imagination of the reader.

Imagination consequently plays a vital role both in the process of creation of Poetry, as also in that of its appreciation; without it the Art-Symbol is not produced nor is it transformed into corresponding experience in the mind of the receptive reader. When Sanskrit literary theory defines the Poet as one endowed with the power of realising the Truth and the power of making objective presentation of the Truth realised, it takes note of the capacity of the Artist to locate the poetic truth,—the truth which is in a position to conduct humanity to the gateway of the Good through the shady avenue of the beautiful: when it describes the Poet as one competent to make objective presentation, it certainly tries to pin-point the power of the Artist to create an Art-Symbol. The clarification given by Susanne Langer, one of the most noted critics of the present century of the Art-Symbol deserves mention in this connection. This noted critic maintains that, the Art-Symbol is a virtual and not an actual object, and in its capacity as a virtual object this symbol establishes its habitat at a distance from nature. But this does not mean that the Art-Symbol is an unreal entity and is a sheer figment of imagination. The fact that works of Art float in a space-time-causal world of their creation does not necessarily signify that they have no connection with life and reality. Aesthetic creativity is a part of life and reality, and this new order is its creation. There is sufficient substance, therefore, in the claim laid by Tagore that, 'Vālmīki' composed the Rāmāyaṇa before Rama was actually born and that Rama's birth in the imagination of Vālmīki was more profound and true than that of this monarch in the city of Ayodhya. There is equal substance in the claim that the grand world-view flashed before the inward eye of Vyāsa and Sañjaya, when they were contemplating in silence far away from the actual spot of the bloody fight between the Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas.¹⁰

The assertion of Susanne Langer that the Art-Symbol is a virtual and not an actual object reminds the curious reader of the statement made by the Philosophy of Grammar that word-meanings have fictive rather than factive existence: but that these fictions do have connections with life and reality, and consequently, they cannot be ruled out as purely intellectual abstractions. Resting his Theory possibly on this speculation of the Philosophy of Grammar, Ānandavardhana states that, the Poet excels the supreme creator in all respects, inasmuch, as, while the creation of the supreme creator is regulated by laws of nature, these laws do not control the realm of Art, envisaged by the creative genius of the Literary Artist. The realm of Art is removed from ordinary world of experience, but, nevertheless, it is more significant and profound than the world which is experienced daily by man. And this is so, because aesthetic creativity is very much an expression of life and reality like any other act leading to evolution of human mind.

Sanskrit literary theory, thus, presents certain significant truths in regard to the Poet and Poetic Process, Imagination and Poetic Circuit, and these truths have found expression in new forms and have been emphasised in Western Literary Theory also. The reason is that the truths presented by Indian Aesthetics are eternal in character: they are applicable to all forms and expressions of literature, ancient and modern, old and new. The relevance of Sanskrit literary theories to modern literature, therefore, is astounding.

IV

Doctrine of Suggestion

Though the germs of the doctrine of Dhvani manifest themselves in the speculations of earlier theoreticians, Ānandavardhana is the first literary critic to give a full-bodied form to the concept and to enunciate a new principle of literary evaluation absorbing the concepts propounded by earlier theo-

reticians. Ānandavardhana declares Dhvani or the symbolic content as the essence of Poetic Creation and hastens to observe that the best specimen of Poetic Art does not keep itself confined within the narrow limits imposed by the expression and the expressed; it transcends this limit and hints towards the symbolic content, which proves itself as one of inexplicable charm.

In his endeavour to establish the doctrine of Suggestion on a solid foundation, Ānandavardhana refers to the viewpoints of the opponents, some of whom try to comprehend Suggestion under Denotation,—some of whom like to equate Suggestion with Indication and Inference,—and some of whom describe it as lying beyond the comprehension of words. After demolishing the animadversions of these opponents, Ānandavardhana establishes his contention that Suggestion as a concept is a profound verity,—that it raises into comprehension the inexplicably charming Implicit, which constitutes the centre of gravity of all Poetic Art. The term 'Dhvani' employed by Ānandavardhana and other theoreticians signify a number of meanings: it refers to the suggestive unit: it signifies the sense of the symbolic content: it presents the meaning of the function of Suggestion, and at the same time, it refers to the whole specimen of Poetic Art, comprised of the suggested meaning, the suggestive unit and the function of Suggestion. Abhinavagupta, a brilliant exponent of Ānandavardhana makes this point clear, and in his eagerness to show that the Doctrine of Suggestion is backed by the authority of the Science of Language demonstrates the fact that in arriving at the four concepts of Dhvani, Sanskrit literary theory has taken cue from the Science of Language itself.

Sanskrit literary theory attaches profound importance to the Function of Suggestion, because though this function initially starts from facts and figures, at the ultimate level it reaches the stage of 'Rasa', when the self gets itself merged in the profound Bliss of the Infinite. And Sanskrit theory believes that no Poetry worth the name can develop and place itself on solid foundation unless it gives a hint at the Infinite, and serves as the bridge between the Small and the Sublimé, the Finite and the Infinite.

It is not without reason, therefore, that, Ānandavardhana speaks of three types of suggested content: the suggested fact, the suggested figure and the suggested emotional mood. In his attempt to show that the suggested differs from the expressed in all its varieties, Ānandavardhana cites a number of illustrations to demonstrate the distinction of the suggested fact from the expressed fact, and that of the suggested figure from the expressed one. The Function of Suggestion, Ānandavardhana states, has got an effulgence of its own, and the moment a concept is touched by it, it acquires tremendous charm and surpasses all other poetical elements in point of strikingness. It is because of this magic which the Function of Suggestion possesses that the most deformed is transformed into the most beautiful in Poetry,—the fathomless grief is transformed into supra-mundane delight and moments of horror are converted into moments of sane and wholesome pleasure. When Shelley exclaims about Poetry and says: "Poetry turns all things to loveliness; it exults the beauty of that which is most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed; it marries exultation and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change: it subdues to union under its light yoke all irreconcilable things",—he possibly refers to this great power of the Function of Suggestion.

Continuing his argument, Ānandavardhana states that though the symbolic content expresses itself in three forms, it is the suggested emotional mood which is of real significance: it constitutes the centre of gravity of Poetic Art,—the be-all and end-all of poetic process; it is, at this 'Rasa' that the endeavour of poet and the appreciator culminates. The suggested fact and figure, therefore, are not ends in themselves: they provide means only to the ultimate end which is furnished by 'Rasa' of paramount significance. It has already been pointed out that 'Rasa' refers to a state of beatitude, which is experienced at the time of carving out of poetical paintings by the literary artist and appreciation of Poetry by the connoisseur of aesthetic sensibility. As a matter of fact, the whole basis of the Art of Literature is that the emotions and feelings directly excited by words and meanings should aptly intensify our emotions and feelings arising from contemplation

of the meaning. When emotions and feelings lying latent in the mind of the appreciator are called into play, as a result of which he experiences his oneness with the literary artist and humanity at large, it is said that 'Rasa' has blossomed itself in its full splendour, enchanting the minds of all appreciators. Sanskrit Poetics, thus, expounds the principle of evocation of emotions and feelings by words and meanings acting conjointly, and not by words alone nor by meanings of themselves. There is profound justification, therefore, for the affirmation made by Sanskrit Poetics that while feeling is the soul of Poetry, sound and sense together form its body: the concept of this parity of the two implies that sound and sense both arouse nuances of feeling. It is this emphasis on sound made by Sanskrit literary theory that makes the Art of Poetry a close associate of the Art of Music. It is for this reason that Sanskrit Theory declares Poetry and Music as constituting the two essential limbs of the Goddess of Learning.

In elaborating the definition and classification of Dhvani, Ānandavardhana has referred to two categories,—the category in which the suggested content manifests itself perceptively, and that in which this content reveals itself imperceptively. Accordingly, the former is called 'Dhvani' of perceptible process' and the latter 'of imperceptible one'. Ānandavardhana connects this two-fold classification of Dhvani with three-fold classification of suggested content into the suggested fact, the suggested figure and the suggested emotional mood, and says that, while the case of suggested fact and figure come under the category of 'Dhvani of perceptible process', the case of suggested emotional mood, which is declared as constituting Dhvani par excellence is comprehended under the category of 'Dhvani of imperceptible process'. This linking of the three-fold classification of the symbolic content with the two-fold classification of 'Dhvani' comes to show the excellence of the suggested emotional mood, that is 'Rasa' over the other two-categories of symbolic content,—namely, the suggested fact and suggested figure.

Ānandavardhana expounds the proposition that the expressed content is cognised first and the suggested is comprehended next, and consequently there exists a sequence between

the understanding of the literal and the understanding of the symbolic. It is only that this sequence is perceptible in Dhvani of perceptible process, while it is not traceable in Dhvani of imperceptible variety. Ānandavardhana further declares that in the intellect of the connoisseur the literal remains mixed up with the symbolic, as a result of which, the two conjointly constitute the content of a unified contemplation leading to disinterested bliss. It is only the man initiated into the hieroglyphics of Poetry, who is in a position to catch the distinction between the literal and the symbolic, and to know that a particular literal content appears as profoundly charming, because it is in a position to reveal the symbolic content of paramount beauty. The charmingness of the literal content thus lies in its capacity to raise into comprehension the symbolic content of profound beauty.

Mahimabhaṭṭa takes cue from these observations, particularly the one relating to the sequence between the literal and the symbolic, and hastens to present a number of arguments in order to demolish the Doctrine of Suggestion and to show that Inference comprehends the concept of 'Dhvani'. Later Dhvani Theoreticians present a number of counter-arguments to show that the process of Inference-Cum-Reasoning is not in a position to comprehend the concept of 'Dhvani', which is regulated only by the logic of emotion. The controversy between Inference and Suggestion, as introduced in the works of 'Dhvani' theorists is capable of being explained in terms of the controversy between Intellect and Emotion, as projected by Croche in his magnum opus 'Aesthetics'. In projecting this eternal controversy Croche affirms that in the realm of Art, the main objective of which is to create and project Beauty and present it in its innumerable varieties, intellect has little role to play, and that it becomes necessary to take the help of emotion to appreciate Beauty in its myriad categories. It is not the intention of Croche to deny that inferential process ever takes place in comprehension of Beauty: it is only to establish that intuition has a significant role in the process of appreciation of Beauty. Similarly the Dhvani Theorist proclaims that inferential process does operate to some extent in the area of appreciation of Poetry, but it

is the emotion or intuitive process which plays a vital role in the area of poetic experience.

The major argument employed by the Dhvani Theorists to controvert the argument of the champions of Inference is that the understanding of the symbolic content does not follow the understanding of the literal alone, but that the function of suggestion is triggered into action by the sound, the literal, the letter, the compound, the metre, as also the musical power of the expression employed. The Dhvani Theorists thus do not rely solely on the literal sense for suggestive evocation, nor do they rely solely on the word as a phonetic entity possessed of musical sound for manifestation of the symbolic content. Ānandavardhana does not deny the normal powers of language, and their utility in Poetry. Language, he asserts, signifies its normal content, at the initial stage, but soon this power is transcended, and words start signifying meanings other than the normal ones allotted to them. The Dhvani theorists, thus, approve the normal use of language, and this, as a matter of fact proves to be one of the strongest points in favour of the Dhvani Theory in contra-distinction to Symbolists' Movement in the area of Western Aesthetics. Paul Valéry notices the great demand made by the poet on language, and suggests that the poet should employ a special type of language in his attempt to carve out poetical paintings, because the ordinary language is not suited to evocation of emotion. Stephen Mallarme, the father of French Symbolism, who had been trying hard to maintain the integrity of his Art by keeping faith with his intuition declared that, in order to remain faithful to the inner language of form, the poet must invent words and create images ; he must mishandle and stretch the meaning of words. The strange words employed by the Poet are to be accepted without questioning, but always with fresh recognition.

In sharp contra-distinction to the French Symbolists, the Dhvani Theorists understand the danger of employment of private language and realise the fact that with employment of private language, Poetry is sure to lose its power of communication. The merit of the Dhvani Theorists lies in the fact that though they invested Poetry with incantational power,

they strongly resisted a regression to magical concept. The expressions employed in Poetry signify their normal meanings, but due to action of the mind of the poet they soon acquire the evocative power, as a result of which the ordinary limits of language are transcended and a new meaning is hinted at. In the matter of this evocation of the new meaning, the words and meanings, the metres and figures, the sound and musical power, all have their role to play. It is also asserted that the symbolic is incapable of being comprehended by those who know Grammar and Lexicon, but is located only by men of taste and literary understanding, who know the Science of Poetry. It is the province of the appreciative connoisseur, who is expert in discerning through the intrinsic texture of veiled words and sounds and capable of locating and identifying himself with the aesthetic emotion that stays behind the poetic tissue.

Mahimabhaṭṭa thinks that, only the meaning of the word is relevant in the process of evocation of emotion, and the word as a separate entity has no role to play in this process. This is the safest position for him, for if a direct power is conceded to the word as a distinct entity, the case for Inference becomes weakened. It is here that the Dhvani Theorist takes the wind out of the sail of Inference, and says that emotions and feelings are directly excited by words also,—by the musical power lying latent in them, apart from the expressed meaning. Ānandavardhana, as a matter of fact, refers not only to this intrinsic suggestive quality of words, but also to their capacity to raise into comprehension different types of implicit due to their position. He further proclaims that, while certain categories of sounds are favourable to revelation of certain sentiments, others are detrimental to the evocation of these emotions.

The stand taken by Sanskrit Poetics on the issue of musical power and evocative power of language is thus clear. It proclaims that poetical paintings are to be carved out through employment of ordinary language which are to be employed in their ordinary meanings ; but language is to be surcharged with suggestive power in such a way that, it can soon transcend its ordinary limits and cause evocation of emotion of

profound intensity. In causing this evocation of emotion the help of expressed meaning alone is not to be taken: the musical power of words is to be utilised to a great extent. Sanskrit Poetics thus betrays its fascination for music, but, at the same time, it says that the poet cannot ignore the denotational meaning of words: he is required to work with the help of the explicit sense, as also the sensuous quality of sounds. The suggested meaning is the third dimensional meaning, which is an overtone of the expressed and not a total cancellation of it. It is interesting to note that though the French theory of Symbolism has close affinities with the Doctrine of Suggestion of the Dhvani Theorists on a number of issues, it differs from the latter on two major issues,—on the nature of the language to be employed in Poetry, and on the effect of music associated with language. Stephen firmly believes in the suggestive power of Poetry, and declares that, higher realities can be expressed only through the medium of musical verse. He envisages a new category of language for Poetry. With this language, he sets out to translate his inner visions that have nothing to do with logic, but constitute an action of superior reality. Ānandavardhana does not envisage creation of a new category of language: he says that, the best specimen of Poetic Art can be created through employment of the ordinary language: the only thing is that it is to be handled with great care by the poet gifted with the power to realise the truth and give an objective description of the truth realised. The familiar functions of language like Denotation, Indication etc. are to be utilised; but they have to be handled properly in order to enable the reader to have a glimpse of the Infinite. Nevertheless, the poet's instrument for such evocation is still the word. The word and the meaning thus conjointly raise into comprehension the symbolic content of profound beauty. This is why T. S. Eliot also does not accept Mallarmé's claim of the identity of Poetry and Music. He realises the basic principle that sense cannot be sacrificed to sound nor can sound to sense. While recognising the importance of Suggestion, he exclaims that suggestiveness of Poetry is the 'aura' around a bright clear centre; but one can-

not have the aura alone. (Ezra Pound: His Metric and Poetry).

V

The Doctrine of Aesthetic Experience

Though Ānandavardhana declares the suggested content as constituting the soul of Poetic Creation, he hastens at the same time to say that, the centre of gravity of Poetic Art is represented by suggested emotion alone, and neither by the suggested fact nor by the suggested figure. Abhinavagupta, the learned commentator of Ānandavardhana clarifies this position of his great master, and categorically affirms that, the soul of Poetry is represented by suggested emotion and that, as the suggested facts and figures excel the expressed facts and figures in point of strikingness, they are referred to as the soul of Poetry. Continuing this argument, Abhinavagupta says that, the suggested facts and figures are not ends in themselves: but rather they constitute means to the ultimate goal, which is represented by attainment of Aesthetic Experience. This Aesthetic Experience is technically signified by the term 'Rasa' which has got an extensive semantic spectrum in Sanskrit literature and literary theory. Sanskrit Theory asserts that 'Rasa' belongs to the creative artist,—the refined reader, as also to the specimen of literary art.

The small aphorism of Bharata constitutes the starting point of multi-structured discussions on the theory of Aesthetic Experience: the different interpretations furnished by commentators of different periods of this aphorism give rise to different theories, which emphasise the one or the other element in Poetry. The small aphorism of Bharata states that, 'Rasa' is brought into being through combination of the excitant, the ensuent, the permanent and the transient moods. To signify the excitant, the ensuent, the permanent and the transitory feelings, Bharata employs a few technical terms, which need introduction at the present moment. The term 'Vibhāva',

employed by Bharata refers to the characters and situations introduced by the literary artist for depiction of the particular emotion intended to be delineated by him. The 'Vibhāva', thus, is the literary symbol of the ordinary characters and situations, with which one comes across in the ordinary world of experience. This means that the actual character, which forms the locus of the 'Rasa', is not the 'Vibhāva', but an ordinary individual exciting pain or pleasure, hatred or horror in the mind of the experiencer. When the literary artist carves out a literary symbol to signify this ordinary character, he assumes a magnified role, and consequently, the exalted term 'Vibhāva' is employed to signify him. The ordinary cause leads to pain or pleasure, as the case may be; it is the ordinary cause of ordinary feeling. The extra-normal 'Vibhāva' is the cause of the significant emotion, which has its life in the poem, and not in the poet himself. This significant emotion always leads to unalloyed joy or unmixed bliss.

In explaining the term 'Anubhāva', Sanskrit literary theory applies the same principle, and asserts that when the ordinary fact is presented in Poetry through literary symbols it acquires a new dimension, and consequently the term 'Anubhāva' is employed to signify it. The Vibhāva, thus is the literary symbol of the cause of the significant emotion: it is the literary symbol of the characters and situations carved out by the literary artist, who does not experience ordinary feeling, but rather a transcendental one at the time of creation of Poetry. Anubhāva similarly refers to the literary symbol of effects of certain emotions, which are not ordinary, but creative and significant.

In his attempt to explain the concept of 'Rasa', Bharata employs two other technical terms,—Sthāyibhāva and Vyabhicāribhāva, which also need explanation. The Sthāyibhāva is the permanent mood that lies latent in the form of emotion in the minds of all persons irrespective of their place of residence or time. This permanent mood is incapable of being dissociated from the mental plane: it is not possible to locate a single person who does not have the play of this feeling. In sharp contradistinction to the Sthāyibhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva is a transient feeling, which appears and disappears and does not reside in

the mind in the form of latent impression for all time to come. Thus, Sthāyibhāva is permanent, while Vyabhicāribhāva is transient. It is to be understood, however, that the Sthāyibhāva is not the crude primitive equipment of modern Western Psychology, but its transformation through socio-cultural process. The Sthāyibhāva, thus, is not simply the 'drive' of modern psychology, but an abiding transformed sentiment, which can be developed into emotion, when confronted by appropriate stimuli. This is evident from the fact that while Sanskrit literary theory speaks of inborn disposition belonging to the refined reader, it, at the same time, affirms that, the competence to enter into mystery of Poetry can be acquired through experience and study. In Art the crude emotion, as a matter of fact, has no place, because as Sanskrit literary theory declares, the delectability of an emotion depends on the fineness and complexity which it attains in the course of evolution. The Vyabhicāribhāva, similarly, is not a crude or raw feeling but its transformation through socio-cultural process. This transformation of the crude emotion is effected through the action of mind of the literary artist, which is technically known as 'Kavivyāpara'. The literary artist takes help of expressions in his endeavour to carve out poetical paintings: these expressions are endowed with tremendous power to transform the ordinary into the extra-ordinary,—the normal into the extra-normal. The significant emotion, therefore, may not be identical with those of real life, but it is more idealised, and more sensitively organised. According to Bharata, this sensitive organisation is effected through building up of an integral pattern of stimuli corresponding to the cause and effects of feelings, ordinarily found in the ordinary world of experience. The literary artist creates literary symbols of these stimuli and other accessories, and when combination of these symbols takes place, the integral pattern of Poetry is created: this integral pattern effects transformation of the ordinary feeling into idealised one, as a result of which, the experiencer derives supramundane delight.

It is interesting to note that the identification of the 'objective correlative' is regarded as one of fundamental importance in the scheme of Western Aesthetics. In one of his famous Essays T. S. Eliot observes that, since the emotion constitutes

the centre of gravity of all Poetic Art, the prime purpose of the poet is to create appropriate 'Objective Correlatives', that are related to the feeling-element intended to be depicted in the specimen of Poetry. By the expression 'Objective Correlative' T. S. Eliot refers to those characters, situations and moods, that are related to the pre-dominant feeling and consequently, are in a position to evoke emotive experience in the mind of the connoisseur. This analysis of the concept of 'Objective Correlative' shows that the 'Objective Correlatives' are identical with the Vibhāva, Anubhāva, etc. of Indian Aesthetics. Indian Aesthetics observes that the Poet presents generalised characters, universalised stimuli, generalised responses and universalised moods and feelings, and when the reader gets himself acquainted with these universalised concepts, he necessarily derives supra-mundane delight. Eliot's concept of 'Objective Correlative', thus, corresponds to the concept of the universalised Vibhāva, Anubhāva, Vyabhicāribhāva and Sthāyibhāva of Indian Aesthetics.

It is necessary at this point of time to have an idea of the concept of 'universalisation' as projected by Sanskrit Poetics. Among Sanskrit literary theoreticians, Bhaṭṭanāyaka is the first to expound this concept of universalisation, technically known as 'Sādhāraṇikaraṇa' in the terminology of Sanskrit Poetics. What is meant by this is the process through which the poet and the experiencer both become free from the limitations of the individual or personal ego, as a result of which, what is experienced is the universal feeling of the universal man. Sanskrit literary theory takes care to draw the line of demarcation between the mind which experiences the 'brute emotion' and the mind which creates Poetry, and says that, it is the action of the mind of the creative artist that, transforms the ordinary 'brute feeling' into 'generalised emotion', which produces transcendental Bliss and Bliss alone. Bhaṭṭanāyaka thinks that, at the time of enjoyment of Poetry, the feeling is experienced neither as mine nor as another's; but as one of infinite extension: he is of opinion that, this is the unique nature of aesthetic appreciation or enjoyment and the artistic media contribute to genesis of this fantastic experience. While in the specimen of Poetic Art this commonness of emotional experience is effected by language and meaning, aided by metres and figures of speech, in a speci-

men of Dramatic Art this is produced by different types of acting, stage make-up, and diverse other theatrical devices.

Western Literary Theory recognises this distinction between the mind which experiences and the mind which creates, and admits further that it is the action of the mind of the creator which gives a transformation to the ordinary feeling and converts it into a universal one. In elaborating this process T. S. Eliot says: "the analogy is that of the catalist. When the two gases are mixed in the presence of a filament of a platinum they form sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only if the platinum is present: nevertheless, the newly formed acid contains no trace of platinum, and the platinum itself is unaffected; has remained inert, neutral and unchanged. The mind of the Poet is the shred of the platinum". What Eliot means is this that, the mind of the individual poet first derives experience of a thought,—a feeling; then it locates the objective co-relatives; and after this he carves out poetical paintings appropriate to expression of the experienced feeling, now transformed into a blissful universal experience. It is the action of the literary artist, that serves as the shred of platinum because it is due to this action that the ordinary stimuli are converted into universal stimuli,—common ensuents are converted into generalised ensuents and personal feelings are transformed into universalised emotions.

It is necessary at this point of time to have a detailed discussion on the experience of the individual poet and the experience of the universalised poet. When the literary artist is guided by mundane thoughts and derives an individual experience, his mind acts no doubt, but it acts at a lower level. When he starts creating Poetry; his mind acts at a high level, as a result of which his narrow individuality is rendered docile and an expansion of personality takes place. When this happens, what the Poet creates is delectably experienced by the universe.

Interestingly enough, Tagore draws a line of demarcation between the two stages in which the mind of the individual poet works. The first stage is referred to by him as the 'workshop of the individual mind'; the second stage is referred to as the 'workshop of the universal mind'. By referring to the first as 'workshop of the individual mind', and to the second as the

'workshop of the mind of the universe', Tagore draws the line of demarcation between the individual poet and the impersonal poet, and admits the principle of universalisation, which transforms the ordinary into the extra-ordinary. It is because the process of universalisation operates in two tiers, both at the tier of creation of Poetry and its appreciation, that the ordinary experience of the individual poet blossoms forth as extra-emotive experience and the feelings strictly belonging to the characters appear as universal feelings. As the poet is universalised, the stimuli, as well as the situation are universalised and the experiencer also is generalised. So it becomes possible for him to share the feelings of the artist and it becomes possible for Poetry also to effect connection between the mind of the poet and the mind of the experiencer,—the mind of one with that of another,—the past with the present, and so on. It is not without reason, therefore, that while defining Poetry, Tagore dwells upon the etymological meaning of the expression 'Sāhitya' and says that Poetry not only effects union between thoughts and expressions, but also between man and man, poet and reader, past and present, and so on. This observation of Tagore is almost similar to the observation of Tolstoy who says that Art has the characteristics of uniting the man with all members of humanity, nay with the bigger association of universe.

The Poetry, therefore, is not an expression of Poet's individuality : it is the expression of a universal mind, so much so that, the feelings of the literary artist are shared by the refined reader. It is this sharability of experience, that constitutes the criterion of Aesthetic Experience. When the literary artist carves out poetical painting, the 'workshop of the universal mind' starts operating, as a result of which, what comes into being proves itself to be an entirely new creation, different from the ordinary world of experience. As the land created by the Imagination of the poet is not regulated by the ordinary laws of nature, there is perfect autonomy in the realm of Poetry. It is not without reason, therefore, that Ānandavardhana, the brilliant exponent of the doctrine of Dhvani refers to the Poet as the supreme creator of the land of Poetry, and emphatically asserts that, the world takes different shapes and forms according to the mental inclination of the artist. Continuing his argument,

Ānandavardhana says that, if the Poet is competent enough to locate 'objective correlative's suitable for manifestation of sweet sentiments, the whole world is sure to appear as full of beauty and joy : if, on the other hand, he is of a different mental attitude and inclination, then the world is likely to appear as insipid and dry, and full of despair and strife. In elaborating this assertion of Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta says that, what is meant is that, the literary artist should be taken to be suffused with the delectation of the various ingredients of a love-situation or a tragic-episode, as found in literature. This assertion of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta shows that, Sanskrit Poetics does not consider 'brute emotion', belonging to the individual poet as the central feature in Poetry. At the time of creation of Poetry, 'brute emotions' are converted into 'significant emotions' which generally lie not in the life of the Poet, but in Poetry itself.¹¹ It is interesting to note that, T. S. Eliot introduces the concept of 'creative emotion', as distinct from the 'brute emotion', : this 'creative emotion' is sometimes referred to as 'significant emotion' also. Brute emotions are experienced in the ordinary life of the artist : these emotions are transformed into 'significant emotions' when the 'workshop of universal mind of the artist' starts operating.

It may not be out of place to discuss here Tagore's concept of 'Rasa', and make an analysis of the relation existing between the creative artist and the receptive reader. Tagore allows an extended scope to the concept of 'Rasa', and asserts that it is virtually identical with the Infinite, and hence belongs both to the Poet and the Connoisseur,—both of whom derive supramundane delight, springing from experience of Beauty, because Bliss and Beauty constitute part and parcel of the Absolute. In his attempt to explain Poetic Process, Tagore says that, the man is inhabited by One, who gloriously resides in his own self and he is extremely eager to find the unity of this One with the One residing in the external world. When the mind realises the identity of the One existing in the external world of appearance with the One residing in his own self, he has this feeling that, he is a great member of the grand Association of Universe, and consequently he derives unmixed Bliss. When this process takes place, 'Rasa' is described as being

experienced, because according to Indian Theory, it consists in enjoyment of the self by the self. Since human mind is eager to trace his own self in the universe and the universe in his own self, appreciation of Poetry or of any specimen of Art removes all impediment that stands in the way of realisation of this experience; the same experience is shared by the literary artist, locus of the original 'brute emotion' and the appreciative reader. For this reason, Sanskrit Poetics refers to the connoisseur, the literary artist and the original character as experiencing the same feeling. Tagore refers to this complete unity of heart between the literary artist and the connoisseur and says that, at the time of appreciation of Poetry, as also its creation, the narrow individualities of the reader and the artist are put into sleep, as a result of which the ego-boundaries of both expand. In this connection, Tagore tries to draw a line of demarcation between the 'truth of fact' and 'truth of Poetry'. Truth of fact or factual truth, he says, is capable of being communicated by ordinary function of Denotation: it has a limited scope, and it can easily be deciphered by the common mind: the Truth of Poetry or the Poetic Truth is raised into comprehension by the function of Suggestion, which knows no limit, being infinite in dimension. It is necessary for the creative artist to begin functioning of his 'Workshop of the universal mind' from the starting point of ordinary fact, but it takes only that much of help from the ordinary fact, which is just necessary to project the infinite truth in its brightest splendour. Kālidāsa, therefore, does not take the help of ordinary measure or yardstick to project the height of the Himalayas, but simply says that, the lotuses shining in the lakes situated on the top of the Himalayas are made to blossom by the upward rays of the Sun, which revolves below the great mountain. The Poetic Truth does not follow the path of reason, but it creates a deep impression on the mind, and presents to the reader the Bliss associated with his own self. Naturally, the function of the 'Workshop of the universal mind' of the poet can carve out such poetical paintings. Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta both, therefore, hold that the direct perception of 'brute emotion' in nature cannot yield that kind of aesthetic delight, which only the representation of it by a con-

summate poet can give. And this is given rise to by the Poet with the help of his artistic power.¹²

In this connection it may be profitable to close this observation by referring to the concept of 'Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa' as projected by Sanskrit Poetics. In his endeavour to explain the process of Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, Bhaṭṭanāyaka admits a new function known as Bhābhakatva, which belongs to the poetic structure as a whole and which enables the appreciator to understand the personal excitants and ensuents as impersonal ones. Abhinavagupta, however, feels that though Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa is an essentiality for Aesthetic Realisation, it is evoked naturally by the Function of Suggestion, which is in a position to create wonders,—to communicate all types of meanings,—and to transform the ordinary into the extra-ordinary. In explaining the concept of Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, Sanskrit Poetics says that, such characters as Sītā and Sakuntalā do not appear as particular ladies standing in particular relationship with particular persons, but as lovable and cultured ladies on the threshold of their youth. It is not that Sītā or Sakuntalā appears as the lady in general, because this presentation is in a position to jeopardise Aesthetic Realisation. In explaining this process of Sādhāraṇīkaraṇa, Abhinavagupta shows how a glutton's tasting of food differs from that of a real taster. The glutton is attentive to the food: but the real taster is inattentive to it; he is most attentive to its taste and the relish of enjoyment. In the case of the glutton's taste of food, the food itself serves as an impediment; in the case of the taster's taste this impediment is off. In case of appreciation of Poetry, thus, the object,—the characters and situations and 'brute emotions'—ultimately disappear, and self experiences repose in itself. It is this joy which is described as Aesthetic Delight. The appreciator, who is in a position to experience this joy,—to ignore the objective entity remaining outside is known as 'Sahṛdaya'. As at the time of appreciation of Art of Poetry, characters and situations lose their individualities, and the reader also enjoys his own self, all obstacles disappear and nothing stands in the way of the father and the son, the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law enjoying the same scene sitting together. Abhinavagupta makes this point clear, and concludes by saying that the vital essence of 'Rasa' depends on

common sharability of experience. It is because of this that the feeling of 'involvement-cum-detachment' is tracable in Aesthetic Experience. This is so, because the narrow individuality of the appreciator is put into slumber, as a result of which he is 'detached': since, however, he experiences the Poem as a member of the universe, he is 'involved' to some extent. In his individual capacity the appreciator is detached, but in his universal capacity he is involved. It is this combination of contradictions that has prompted Sanskrit Literary Theory to describe 'Rasa' as inexplicable,—'Anirvacanīya'. All this makes the position clear that Sanskrit Literary Theories have not lost their relevance in contemporary society: it is possible to adjudicate the beauty and excellence of contemporary writings by applying concepts and principles introduced in Sanskrit Theory. Indian mind which has a special fondness for universal, thus, could project long back certain theories, applicable to all types of literature of all ages,—theories, that have been able to maintain their relevance and enchantment for all time to come.¹³

REFERENCES

CHAPTER I

1. Yadetat vānmayaṃ viśvamarthamūrttyā vivarttate/
So'smi Kāvyaṃ pūṇāmba pādau vandeya tāvakau//
—KM. I., p. 6.
 2. Sabdārthau te śarīraṃ saṃskṛtaṃ mukhaṃ, prākṛtaṃ bāhuḥ jagha-
namapabhraṃśaḥ, paśācaṃ pādau, uro miśraṃ...ukticaṇaṃ ca
te vācaḥ, rasa ātmā, romāni chandāṃsi, prasnottarāpravahlikādi-
kaṃ ca vākkeliḥ, anuprāsopamādayaśca tvāmalaṃkurvanti.
—KM. I, p. 6.
 3. Yā dugdhāpi na dugdheva Kavidogdhrbhiranvahaṃ/
Hṛdi naḥ sannidhattāṃ sā sūktidhenuḥ Sarasvatī//
—KM. I, p. 6.
 4. Mā niśāda pratiṣṭhāṃ tvamagamaḥ śāśvatīḥ samāḥ/
Yatkrauñcamithunādekamavadhīḥ Kāmaṃmohitaṃ//
—KM. I, p. 6.
 5. Ānvīkṣikī trayī vārtā daṇḍanītiśceti vidyāḥ. Trayī vārtā daṇḍa-
nītiśceti mānavāḥ. Trayīviśeṣo hyānvīkṣikīti. Vārtā daṇḍanītiśceti
bārhaspatyaḥ. Saṃvaranāmātraṃ hi trayī lokayātravid iti. Daṇḍa-
nītiśceti vidyetyauśanasāḥ. Tasyāṃ hi sarvavidyārambhāḥ prati-
baddhā iti. Cātasa eva vidyā iti Kauṭilyaḥ. —AS. I. 2. 1-8.
 6. Pañcamī sāhityavidyā iti yāyāvarīyaḥ. Sā hi cātasaṃmapi vidyā-
nāṃ niṣyandaḥ. ...śabdārthayoryathāhvatsahabhāvena vidyā sāhi-
tyavidyā. —KM., pp. 4-5.
 7. Tatrābhīdhāvivakṣā'ātparyaprabhāgavyapekṣāsām arthyānvayaikār-
thībhāvadoṣahānaguṇopādānāṃkārayogarasāviyogarūpāḥ śabdār-
thayordvādaśa sambandhāḥ sāhityamityucyate.
—SP. (VII), Quoted in KM. edn. p. 133.
 8. Niyatikṛtanyamarahitāṃ hlādaikamayīmananyaparatantrāṃ/
Navarasarucirāṃ nirmitimādadhatī bhārati kaverjayati//
Niyatīśaktyā niyatarūpā sukhaduḥkhamohasvabhāvā paramāṇvā-
dyupādānakarmādisahakārikāraparatantrā śaḍrasā na ca hṛdayaiva
taiḥ tādṛśī Brahmaṇo nirmitirnirmāṇam. —KP. I, 1.
 9. Apūrvam yad vastu prathayati vinā kāraṇakalām
Jagad grāvaprakhyam nijarasabharāt sārayatī ca/
Kramāt prakhyopākhyaprasarasubhagam bhāsayati tat
Sarasvatyāstattvaṃ kavisaḥrdayākhyam vijayate//
—LC., I, p. 1.
 10. Catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pāda dve śīrṣe sapta hastāsoasya/
tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roravīti mahān devo marttyān nāviveśa//
—MB., quotation I, p. 37.
- Anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadākṣaram/
Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ//

Ekameva yadāmnātaṃ bhinnāṃ śaktivyapāśrayāt/
Aprthaktve'pi śaktibhyaḥ prthaktvene va vartate//

...
Ekasya sarvavijasya yasya ceyamanekadhā—VP., I, 2, 4.

11. Kāvyaalpāṇśca varjayet—Quoted by Mallinātha and other commentators in their commentaries on Mahākāvya.
12. Nānṛṣiḥ kaviḥ 'kavī varṇe' iti ca darśanāt varṇanācca kavistasya karma kāvyam. Evaṃ ca darśane satyapi varṇanāyā antarbhāvāditi hāsādinaṃ na kāvyatvamiti tallakṣaṇaṃ na vakṣyate.
—KS., p. 379.
13. Tathā cāha Bhaṭṭatotaḥ—
Nānṛṣiḥ kavirityuktamṛṣiṣca kiladarśanāt/
Vicitrabhāvadarmamāśatattvapraḥkhyā ca darśanam//
Sa tattvadarśanādeva śāstreṣu prathitaḥ kaviḥ//
Darśanādvārṇanāccātha rūḍhā loke kaviśrutiḥ//
Tathā hi darśane svacche nitye' pyādikavermuneḥ/
Noditā kavitā loke yāvajjātā na varṇanā//
—KS., p. 379.
14. Dharmārthakāmamokṣeṣu vaicakṣaṇyaṃ kalāsu ca/
Karoti kīrttiṃ prītiṃ ca sādhu kāvyaniibandhanam//—KL. I. 2.
15. Catūrvargaphalaprāptiḥ sukhādālpadhiyāmapī/
Kāvyaḍeva yatastena tatsvarūpaṃ nirūpyate// —SD. I. 2.
16. Catūrvargaprāptirhi vedaśāstrebyo nīrasatayā duḥkhādeva pariṇatābuddhīnāmeva jāyate. Paramānandasandohajanakatayā sukhādeva sukhārabuddhīnamapī punaḥ kāvyādeva.
—SD. Vṛtti on I. 2.
17. Kāvyaṃ saddrṣṭādrṣṭārthaṃ prītikīrttihetutvāt. —KIS, I. 1. 5.
18. Kīrttiṃ Prītiṃ ca vindati.—Sarasvatikanṭhābharaṇa,—I, 2.
19. Ānandanīyaṇḍiṣu rūpakeṣu vyutpattimātraṃ
phalamalpabuddhiḥ/
Yo'piti hāsādivadāha sādhusasmai namaḥ svādūparānmukhāya//
—DR. I. 6.
20. Kāvyaṃ yaśase rthakṛte vyavahāravide śivetarakṣataye/
Sadyaḥ paranirvṛtaye kāntāsammitatayopadeśayuje//
Kālīdāsādīnamiva yaśaḥ sriharṣādeḥ dhāvākādīnamiva dhanam,
Rājādigatocitācāraparijñānam, ādityādermayūrādīnamivānarthanivāraṇam,
sakalaprayojanamaulibhūtaṃ samanantarameva rasāsvādanasamudbhūtaṃ vigalitavedyāntaramānandam, prabhusammitaśabdapradhāna-vedādiśāstrebyaḥ suhṛtsammitārthatātparyavatpūrānādīti hāsebbhyaḥca śabdārthayorguṇabhāvena rasāṅgabhūtavayāparapravaṇatayā vilakṣaṇam yat kāvyam lokottaravarṇanānīpuna-kavikarma tat kānte va sarasatāpādānenābhimukhiḥkṛtya rāmādivadvartitavyam na rāvaṇādivadītyupadeśam ca
—KP, I, 1 and vṛtti.
21. Kāvyaṃ mānandāya yaśase kāntātulyatayopadeśāya ca ... dhanamānikāntikaṃ vyavahāra kauśalam śāstrebyo pyanarthanivāraṇam prakārāntareṇāpīti na kāvyaprayojanatayāsmābhīrūktam.
—KS, I. p. 3-5

22. Tathā cokaṭaṃ Hṛdayadarpaṇe—
Śabdapradhānyamāśritya tatra śāstram prthagviduḥ/
Arthe tattvena yukte tu vadantyākhyānametayoḥ/
Dvayorguṇatve vyāpārapradhānye kāvyagīrbhavet//
—KS, I. p. 4.
23. Mṛdulalitapadādhyam gūḍhaśabdārthahīnam/
Janapadasukhabodhyam yuktimanṇṛtyayojoyam//
Vahukṛtarasamārgam sandhisandhānayuktam//
Sa bhavati śubhakāvyaṃ nāṭakaprekṣakānām//
—NS, XVI. 118.
24. Śabdārthau sahītau kāvyam. —KL. I, 16.
25. Rupakādimalamkāraṃ bāhyamācakṣate pare//
Supāṃ tīṅgāṃ ca vyutpattiṃ vācāṃ vāñchatyalaṃkṛtiṃ//
Tadetadāhuḥ sauśabdyam nārthavyutpattirīdṛṣī/
Śabdābhideyālaṅkārabhedādiṣṭam dvyam tu naḥ//
—KL, I, 14-15.
26. Śarīraṃ tāvadiṣṭārthavyavacchinnā padāvalī.—KD, I. 10.
27. Śleṣaḥ prasādaḥ samatā mādhyamam sukumārāt/
Arthavyaktirudāratvamojāḥkāntisamādhayaḥ//
Iti vaidarbhamārgasya prāṇāḥ daśaguṇāḥ smṛtāḥ/
Eṣāṃ viparyāḥ prāyo dṛśyate gauḍavartmani//—KD. I.
28. Kāścīnmārgavibhāgarthamuktāḥ prāgapyalamkriyāḥ/
Sādhāraṇamalamkārajātamanyat pradārśyate// —KD. II. 3.
29. Kāvyaṃ grāhyamalamkārat... kāvyāśabdo'yaṃ guṇālamkārasam-skr̥tayoḥ śabdārthayorvartate... saundaryamalamkārah... Sa doṣa-guṇālamkārahānādānābhyaṃ.
—KLS, I. 1, 2, 3.
30. Rītirātmā Kāvyaśya. Rītirnāmeyamātmā Kāvyaśya. Śarīrasyeveti vākyaśeṣaḥ. Kā punariyam Rītirityāhaviśiṣṭāpadaracanā rītiḥ. Viśeṣavatī padānāṃ racanā rītiḥ. Ko' sau viśeṣa ityāha—viśeṣo guṇātmā. Vakṣyamāṇaguṇarūpo viśeṣaḥ. Sā tridhā—Vaidarbhī, Gauḍiā, Pāñcālī ca.... Samagraguṇā Vaidarbhī.... Ojāḥkāntimatī Gauḍiā.... mādhyasakumāryopapannā Pāñcālī.... Teṣāṃ pūrvā grāhyā, guṇasākalyāt. Na punaritare, stokaguṇatvāt....
—KLS, I. 2. 6-15.
- Kāvyaśobhāyāḥ kartāro dharmā guṇāḥ Tadatīśayahetavastalaṃkārah. Purve Nityāḥ.—KLS, III, 1. 1-3.
31. Nanu śabdārthau kāvyam..... —RKL, II. 1.
Pāñcālī Lāṭīyā Gauḍiā ceti nāmato'bhītiḥ/
Laghumaḍhyāyataviracanasamāśabhedādimāstatra//
—Do, II. 4.
- Vṛtterasamāśāyā vaidarbhī rītirekaiva. —Do, II. 6.
- Anyūnādhikavācakasukramapuṣṭārthaśabdacārupadam/
Kṣodakṣamamakṣūṇam sumatirvākyaṃ prayuñjita//
Racayettameva śabdaṃ racanāyā yaḥ karoti cārutvam/
Satyapi sakalayathoditapadaguṇasāmye'bhidhāneṣu//
—Do, II. 8-9.

32. Kāvyaśātmā dhvaniḥ —DL, I. 1.
Sa hyārtho vācyaśamarthyākṣiptaṁ vastumātramalamkārasāda-
yaścetyanekaprabhedaprabhinno darśayiṣyate.
—DL, I. p. 50.
Rasabhāvatadābhāsatatpraśāmalakṣaṇaṁ mukhyamarthamanuvarta-
mānā yatra śabdārthālamkāraḥ guṇāśca parasparaṁ dhvanyapekṣayā
vibhinnarūpā vyavasthitāstatra kavye dhvanirīti vyapadeśh.
—DL, II. p. 190.
33. Tena Rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalamkāradhvanī tu sarvathā
Rasaṁ prati paryavasyete iti vācyādutkrīṣṭau tāvityabhiprāyeṇa
'dhvaniḥ kāvyasyātm'eti sāmānyenoktaṁ —LC, p. 85.
34. Bhaṭṭanāyakena tu vyaṅgyavyāpārasya prauḍoktyābhyupagatasya
kāvyāmsatvaṁ brūvatā nyagbhāvitaśabdārthasvarūpasya vyāpāras-
yaiva prādhānyamuktam. On which Jayaratha comments: Na
punarlakṣaṇakaraṇena, Ata evokteḥ prauḍatvaṁ yallakṣayitumaśa-
kyam tasyāpyabhyupagamaḥ kāvyāmsatvamīti, na punaḥ kāvyāt-
matvam yadāha—Dhvanirnamāparo yo'pi vyāpāro vyañjanātma-
kaḥ/ tasya siddhe'pi bhedo syāt kāvyāmsatvaṁ na rūpitā// iti.
—AK, p. 10.
35. Yadūce Bhaṭṭanāyakena—'Amsatvaṁ na rūpatā' iti, tadvastvalam-
kāradhvanoreva yadī nāmopālabhaḥ, Rasadhvanistutenaivātma-
tayāṅgikṛtaḥ, Rasacarvaṇātmanah trītiyāmsāsyābhidhābhāvanām-
śadvayottīrnatvena nirṇayāt. —LC, p. 52.
36. Rāmyaṁ jugupsitamudāramathāpi nīcam
Ugraṁ prasādi gāhanaṁ vikṛtaṁ ca vastu/
Yadvāpyavastu kavibhāvabhāvyamānam
Tannāsti yanna rasabhāvamupaiti loke// —DR, IV. 85.
Ato na Rasādīnaṁ Kāvyeṇa saha vyaṅgyavyaṅjakabhāvaḥ.
Kiṁ tarhi bhāvabhāvakasambandhaḥ. Kāvyaṁ hi bhāvakaṁ
bhāvyaḥ Rasādayaḥ. —AV, p. 96.
37. Guṇavadalamkāraṇa vākyameva kāvyam. —KM, p. 24.
Kaḥ punarayaṁ pākaḥ ityācāryāḥ... 'Supāṁ tiṅgāṁ ca śravaḥ
yaiśa vyutpattiḥ' iti Maṅgalaḥ. 'Sausābhyametat. Padaniveśanīkam-
patā pākaḥ' ityācāryāḥ... 'Tyamasaktirna punaḥ pākaḥ' ityavanti-
sundarī... Tasmādrasocitaśabdārthasūktinibandhanam Pākaḥ. Ya-
dāha :
Guṇālamkārarītyuktiśabdārthagraṭhanakramaḥ/
Svādāte sudhiyāṁ yena vākyapākaḥ sa māṁ prati//
—Km, p. 20.
38. Nirdoṣaṁ guṇavatkāvyamalamkārairalamkārtam. Rasānvitam...
—SK, I. 2.
Samkṣepādvākyamiśārthavyavacchinnā Padāvalī/
Kāvyaṁ spuradalamkāraṁ guṇavaddoṣavarjitam//
—AP. CCCXXXVII, 6-7.
39. Rājā tu śrīṅgāramekameva śrīṅgāraprakāśe rasamūricakāra.
—EV, p. 98.
40. Aucityasya camatkāraḥ kārīnaścārucaṇaḥ/

- Rasajīvitabhūtasya vicāraṁ kurute' dhunā//....
Alamkāraśtvalamkāraḥ guṇā eva guṇāḥ sadā/
Aucityaṁ Rasasiddhasya sthiraṁ Kāvyaṁ jīvitam//
—AVC, 2, 5.
41. Ucitasthānavinyāsādalamkārtiralamkārtiḥ/
Aucityādacyutā nityaṁ bhavantiyeva Guṇā Guṇāḥ//
Kaṇṭhe mekhalayā nitambaphalake tāreṇa hāreṇa vā,
Pāṇau nūpurabandhanena caraṇe keyūrapāśena vā/
Śauryeṇa praṇate, ripau karuṇayā—nāyānti ke hāsyatām?
Aucityena vinā ruciṁ pratanute nālamkārtirno guṇāḥ//
—AVC, 6 & vṛtti on it.
42. Anaucityādrte nānyadrasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam/
Prasiddhaucitya-bandhastu-rasasyopaniṣat parā//—DL, III.
43. Na hi camatkāravirahitasya kaveḥ kavitaṁ kāvyasya vā kāvyat-
vam. Tatra daśavidhāscamatkāraḥ—Avicāritaramaṇīyaḥ, vicārya-
mānaramaṇīyaḥ, samastasūktavyāpī, sūktaikaśeṣadrīyaḥ, śabda-
gataḥ, arthagataḥ, śabdārthagataḥ, alamkāragataḥ, rasagataḥ,
prakhyātavṛttigataśca.
—KK, III. 1-2.
44. Studies on some concepts of the Alamkāraśāstra : Camatkāra.
—p. 269.
45. Śabdārthau sahitaḥ vakravividyāpārasālini/
Bandhe vyavasthitau kāvyam tadvidālhāḍakārīṇi//
Śabdārthau kāvyam vācyaṁ ceti dvau sammilitau kāvyam.
Dvāvekamīti vicitraivoktiḥ... Tasmād dvayārapi pratītilamiva tai-
laṁ tadvidālhāḍakārītvam vartate, na punarekasmin.
—VJ, I. 7 & vṛtti.
46. Śabdo vivakṣitārthaikavācako' nyeṣu satsvapi/
Arthaḥ sahrdayālhāḍakārīsvaspaṇḍasundaraḥ//
Tadevamvidhaṁ viśiṣṭameva śabdārthayorlakṣaṇamupādeyam.
—VJ, I. 9 & vṛtti.
47. Ubhāvetāvalamkāryau tayorḥ punaralamkārtiḥ/
Vakroktireva vaidagdhyaḥ bhaṅgibhaṇitirucyate//
Vaidagdhyaṁ vidagdhābhāvaḥ kavikarmakauśalaṁ tasya bhaṅgī
vicchittīḥ, tayā bhaṇitīḥ, vicitraivābhidhā vakroktirityucyate.
—VJ, I. 10 & vṛtti.
48. Alamkārtiralamkāryamapoddhṛtya vivecyate/
Tadupāyatayā tattvaṁ sālāmkārasya kāvyatā//
Ayamatra paramārthaḥ-sālāmkārasyalamkāraṇasahitasya sakalasya
nirastāvayavasya sataḥ samudāyasya kāvyatā kavikarmatvam.
—VJ, I. 6 & vṛtti.
49. Vargāntayoginaḥ sparśā dviruktāsta-la-nādayaḥ/
Śiṣṭāśca rādisamyuktāḥ prastutaucityaśobhinaḥ//
—V. J. II. 2.
50. Nātinirbandhavihitā nāpyapeśalabhūṣitā/
Pūrvāvṛttaparitāgānūtanāvartanojjvalā//...
Aprayatnaviracitā ityārthaḥ. V. J. II 4 & vṛtti.

51. Yamakaṃ nāma so pyasyāḥ prakāraḥ paridr̥śyate/
Sa tu śobhāntarābhāvādiha nāti pratanyate//
Asya ca varṇavinyāsavaicitryavyatirekeṇānyat kiñcidapi jīvitānta-
raṃ na paridr̥śyate. —V. J. II. 7 & vṛtti.
52. Etadeva viśeṣaṇavakratvaṃ nāma prastutaucityānusāri sakalasatkā-
vyajīvitatvena lakṣyate, yasmādanenaiva rasaḥ paraṃ paripoṣa-
pavimavatāryate. —V. J. II vṛtti on K 15.
53. Yatra sambriyate vastu vaicitryasya vivakṣayā/
Sarvanāmādibhiḥ kaiścīt soktā samvṛti-vakratā//
...Tatkāryābhidhāyina tadatīśayābhidhānapareṇa vākyañtareṇa
pratītigocaratām niyate. —V. J. II. 16 & vṛtti.
54. Sati līgāntare yatra strīlingaṃ ca prayujyate/
Śobhāniṣpattaye yasmānnāmaiva strīti peśalam//
Strītyabhidhānameva hrdayahāri. Vicchityantareṇa rasādiyojanayo-
gyatvāt. —V. J. II. 22.
55. Rasādidyotanaṃ yasyāmupasarganipātayoḥ/
Vākyaikajīvitatvena sāparā padavakratā//
Yasyām vakratāyāmupasarganipātayorvaiyākaraṇaprasiddhābhi-
dhānayoḥ rasādidyotanaṃ śrīgāraprabhṛtiprakāśanam. —V. J. II. 33.
56. Manojñaphalakollekhavaṃ nacchāyāśrīyaḥ prthak/
Citrasyeva manohāri kartuḥ kimapi kauśalamtt...
Rasasvabhāvālamkāra āsaṃsāramapi sthitāḥ/
Anena navatām yānti tadvidālhādāyīnīm//
—V. J. II. 4.
57. Mukhyamakliṣṭaratyādiparipoṣaṃonaharam/
Svajātyucitahevākasamullekhojvalaṃ paraṃ//
—V. J. III. 7.
58. Rasoddīpanasāmartyavinibandhanabandhuram/
Cetanānāmamukhyānām jaḍānām cāpi bhūyasā//...
Rasāḥ śrīgārādayasteṣāmuddīpanamullāsanam paripoṣaḥ tasmin
sāmartyaṃ śaktistayā vinibandhanam niveśastena bandhuram
hrdayahāri. —V. J. III. 8 & vṛtti.
Jaḍānāmacetanānām salilatarukusumasamayaprabhṛtīnāmevampvi-
dham svarūpaṃ rasoddīpanasāmartyavinibandhanabandhuram
varṇanīyatāmavagāhate. —V. J. III. 8 & vṛtti.
59. Alamkāro na rasavat parasyāpratibhāsanā//
Svarūpādiriktasya śabdārthasāṅgaterapi//
—V. J. III. 11.
60. Itivṛttānyathāvṛttarasasampadupekṣayā/
Rasāntareṇa ramyeṇa yatra nīrvahaṇam bhavet//
—V. J. IV. 16.
Nirantararasodgāragarbhasandarbhānirbharah/
Giraḥ kavīnām jīvanti na kathāmātramāśritāḥ//
—V. J. IV. 4 (vṛtti).
61. Tathā ca Bhāvasvabhāvasaukumāryavarṇane śrīgārādirasavarūpa-
samunmīlane vā vividhābhūṣaṇavinyāsavicchittiviracane ca paraḥ
paripoṣatīśayastadvidālhādītāyāḥ kāraṇam. ...V. J. III. 3. vṛtti.

64. Tadaśau śabdārthau saguṇāvanalampkṛti punaḥ kvāpi...Kvāpītya-
nenaitadāha yat sarvatra sālamkārau kvacit sputālamkāravirahe'pi
na kāvyatvahāniḥ. —KP, I. 4.
65. Nīrase tu yadi na sphuṭo' lamkāraḥ syāt tat kimkṛtaścamatkāraḥ
syāt. Camatkārasāraṃ ca kāvyamityavaśyaṃ. Sphuṭālamkārapēkṣā.
Analampkṛti punaḥ kvāpītyanenāpyasphuṭālamkārasya kvacideva
kāvyatvaṃ, yatra rasādīḥ sphuṭaḥ : na tu sarvatretyetadeva prati-
pādyate. Tasmāt sālamkāratvamātraṃ na viśeṣanaṃ kim tu sphuṭā-
lamkārarasānyataravattvaṃ. —PR, p. 9.
66. Ye rasasyāṅgino dharmāḥ śauryādaya ivātmanaḥ/
Utkarṣahetavaste syuracalasthitayo guṇāḥ// —KP, 8. 1.
Nanu śauryāderātmavṛttitvavanmadhuratvādīnām Rasavṛttitvavya-
vasthitāvevaṃ syāt. Saiva tvasiddhā vinigamakābhāvādīti cet mai-
vam. Bhavatyeva vinigamakābhāvo yadi tvayā varṇamātrāśrayā
guṇāḥ svikartuṃ śakyante. Na tvevam. Avīśeṣeṇa racanāyāmapi
tadabhyupagamāt. Tathā ca Rasamātravṛttitve lāghavam. Varṇa-
canobhayavṛttitve tu gauravam. —PR, p. 275.
67. Upakurvanti taṃ santaṃ ye'ngadvāreṇa jātucid/
Hārādivadalampkāraṣṭe'nuprāsopamādayaḥ//
—KP, viii. 2.
68. Mukhyārthahatirdoso rasaśca mukhyastadāśrayādvācyaḥ/
Ubhayopayoginaḥ syuḥ śabdādyāstena teṣvapi saḥ//
—KP, VII. 1.
69. Śabdacitramarthacitramavyaṅgyam tvavaraṃ smṛtam.
—KP, I. 5.
Etacca citraṃ kavīnām viśrīkhalagiraṃ rasādītātparyamanapekṣ-
yaiva kāvyapavṛttidarśanādasamābhiḥ parikalpitam. Idānīntanānām
tu nyāye kāvyānayaavyavasthāpane kriyamāṇe nāstyeva dhvani-
vyatiriktaḥ kāvyaprakāraḥ. —DL. III. 45. vṛtti.
70. Adoṣau saguṇau sālamkārau ca śabdārthau kāvyam...Guṇadoṣayo
rasa evāśrayaḥ. —KS. p. 19-20.
71. Tathā ca Lollaṭaḥ :
Yastu saridadrisāgaranagaturagapurārivarṇane yatnaḥ/
Kaviśaktikhyātīphalo vitatadhiyām no mato prabandheṣu//
Yamakānulomatadīracakrādibhido'tirasavirodhīnyaḥ/
Abhimānamātrametatadgādikātipravāho vā//
—KS, p. 257.
72. Sādhuśabdārthasandarbhāṃ guṇālamkārabhūṣitam/
Sphuṭarītirasopetaṃ kāvyam kurvīta kīrttaye//
—VL, I. 2. p. 5.
73. Śabdārthau nirdoṣou saguṇau prāyāḥ sālamkārau kāvyam.
—KS, p. 14.
74. Nirdoṣa lakṣaṇavatī sarītirguṇabhūṣitā/
Sālamkārarasānekavṛttīrvāk kāvyānāmabhāk//
Aṅgīkaroti yaḥ kāvyam śabdārthāvanalampkṛti/
Asau na manyate kasmādanuṣṭamanalampkṛti//
—CL, I. 7 & 8.

75. Na hi kīṭānuvedhādayo ratnasya ratnatvaṃ vyāhantūṣāḥ kintū-
pādeyatāratamyameva kartum. Tadvadatra śrutiduṣṭādayo'pi kāv-
yasya. Uktam ca :
Kīṭānuvidharatnādisādhāraṇyena kāvyatā/
Duṣṭeṣvapi matā yatra rasādyanugamaḥ sphuṭaḥ// iti.
—SD, I. p. 12.
76. Vākyam Rasātmakam Kāvyaṃ. Rasa eva ātmā sārārūpatayā jīva-
nādhāyako yasya. Tena vinā tasya kāvyatvānaṅgikāraḥ 'Rasyate
iti rasa' iti vyutpattiyogādbhāvatadābhasādayo'pi grhyante.
—SD, p. 22-23.
77. Rasasyāṅgitvampāptasya dharmāḥ śauryādayo yathā/
—SD, VIII. 1.
Śabdārthayorsthiraḥ ye dharmāḥ śobhatisāyinaḥ/
Rasādīnupakurvanto'laṃkāraṣṭe'ṅgadādivat// —Do, X. 1.
Rasāpakarṣakā doṣāḥ. —Do, VII. 1.
- 77(a). Kavivānnirmītiḥ Kāvyaṃ.
Vāgityukte kavivānmātrasyaiva kāvyatvāpattiḥ. Nirmītirityukte
kavikṛtāṣṭīpāntarasyapi. 'Vānnirmītirityukte vyākṛtṛviśeṣasya yasya
kasyāpi vyākṛtṛkauśalasyāpi. Asādhāraṇacamatkāraḥkārīṇi racanā
hi nirmītiḥ. Tena Rasāpakarṣakadoṣarahitam yathāsambhava-
guṇālaṃkāraṃ rasātmakam śabdārthayugalaṃ kāvyamiti lakṣaṇasya
svarasaḥ. —AK, I. 2.
78. Ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ Kāvyaṃ. —RG, I. p. 4.
79. Itthaṃ ca camatkārajanakabhāvanāviśayārthapratipādakaśabdātvaṃ,
yatpratipādītārtha-viśayaka-bhāvanātvam camatkārajanakatāvacche-
dakam tattvaṃ, svaviśiṣṭajanakatāvaccchedākārthapratipādakatāsaṃ-
sargeṇa camatkāratvavattvameva vā kāvyatvamiti phalitam.
—RG, I. p. 5.
80. Camatkāraṣṭu viduṣāmanandaparivāhakṛt/
Guṇam Rītim Rasam Vṛttim Pākam Śayyāmalamkṛtim/
Saptaitāni Camatkāraḥkaraṇam bruvate budhāḥ//
—Some Concepts of Alaṃkāraśāstra, p. 270.
81. Athāsyā prāgabhihitalakṣaṇasya kāvyātmano vyaṅgyasya ramaṇī-
yatāprayojakā alaṃkāraḥ nirūpyante. —RG, II. p. 203.
82. Api ca kāvyapadapravṛttinimittam śabdārthayorvyāsaktam, praty-
ekaparyāptam vā? Nādyah. Eko na dvāviti vyāvahārasyeva śloka-
vākyam na kāvyamiti vyāvahārasyāpatteḥ. Na dvitīyaḥ. Ekasmin
padye kāvyadvayavyāvahārāpatteḥ. Tasmād vedaśāstrapurāṇalak-
ṣaṇasyeva kāvyalakṣaṇasyāpi śabdaniṣṭhataivocitā.
—RG, I. p. 7.
85. Naisargikī ca pratibhā śrutam ca bahu nirmalam/
Amandaścābhiyogo'syāḥ kāraṇam kāvyasampadaḥ//
Na vidyate yadyapi pūrvavāsanā guṇānubandhi pratibhānamadbhu-
tam/Śrutena yatnena ca vāgūpāsītā dhruvam karotyeva kamapy-
anugrahaḥ// —KD, I. 103-104.
86. Chandovyākaraṇakalālokaṣṭhitipadapadārthavijñānāt/
Yuktāyuktaviveko vyutpattirīyam samāsenā//
—KL, I. 18.

- Vistarastu kimanyattata iha vācyam na vācakam loke
Na bhavati yat kāvyāṅgatvaṃ sarvajñatvaṃ tato nyesā//
—Do, I. 19.
- Na sa śabda na tadvācyam na sa nyāyo na sā kalā/
Jāyate yanna kāvyāṅgamaho bhāro mahān kaveḥ//
—Tikā on Do, I. 19.
87. Adhigatasakalajñeyāḥ sukaveḥ sujanasya sannidhau niyatam//
Naktamdinamabhyāsyedabhiyuktaḥ śaktimān kāvyam//
—Do, I. 20.
88. Loko vidyā prakīrṇam ca kāvyāṅgāni. Lokavṛttam lokaḥ śabdas-
mṛtyabhidhānakośacchandovicitikalākāmaśāstradāṇḍanītipūrvā vidyā.
Śabdasmṛteḥ śabdaśuddhiḥ. Abhidhānakośataḥ padārthanīścayāḥ.
Chandovicitervṛttasamśayacchedaḥ. Kalāśāstrebyaḥ kalātattvasya
saṃbit. Kāmaśāstrataḥ kāmopacārasya. Daṇḍanīternayāpanayayoḥ.
Itivṛttakuṣīlatvaṃ ca tataḥ. —KIS, I. III. 1-10.
89. Lakṣyajñatvamabhiyogo vṛddhasevāvekṣaṇam Pratibhānamavadhā-
nam ca prakīrṇam. Tatra kāvyaparicayo lakṣyajñatvam. Kāvya-
bandhodyamo'bhiyogaḥ. Kāvypadeśaguruśūśruṣaṇam vṛddhasevā.
Padādhānoddhāraṇamavekṣaṇam. Kavītvabijam pratibhānam. Cī-
taikāgryamavadhānam. Taddeśakālābhyām. Vivikto deśaḥ. Rātri-
yāmasturīyaḥ kālāḥ. —KIS, I. III. 12-20.
90. Samādhirāntaraḥ prayatnaḥ bāhyastvabhyāsaḥ Tāvubhāvapi śakti-
mudbhāsayataḥ. Sā kevalam kāve hetuḥ iti yāyāvarīyaḥ.
—KM, IV. p. 11.
91. Yā śabdagrāmamarthasārthamalaṃkāratrantramuktimārgamanya-
dapi tathāvidhamadhihṛdayam pratibhāsayati sā pratibhā.
—KM, IV. p. 11.
92. Sā ca dvividhā kārayitrī bhāvayitrī ca. Kaverupakurvāṇā kārayitrī.
Sā'pi trividhā sahajā'hāryaupadeśikī ca...Ta ime trayo'pi kavayaḥ
sārasvata, ābhyāsika, aupadeśikaśca. —KM, IV. p. 13.
93. Ekasya tiṣṭhati kavergrha eva kāvyamanyasya gacchati
suhṛdbhavanāni yāvat/
Nyasyāvidagdhavadaneṣu padāni śaśvat kasyāpi sancarati
viśvakutūhalīva//
—Do
94. Seyam kārayitrī. Bhāvakasyopakurvāṇā bhāvayitrī. Sā hi kaveḥ
śramamabhiprāyam ca bhāvayati. Tayā khalu phalitāḥ kavervyā-
pārataruḥ. Anyathā so'vakeśī syāt. —KM, IV. p. 13.
95. Kastvam bhoḥ kavirasmi kāpyabhinavā sūktiḥ sakhe paṭhyatām;
tyaktā kāvyakathaiva samprati mayā kasmādidam śrūyatām.
Yāḥ samyagvivinakti doṣaguṇayoḥ sāram svayam satkaviḥ;
so'sminbhāvaka eva nāstyatha bhaveddaivānna nirmatsaraḥ//
—KM, IV. p. 14.
96. Santi pustakavinyastā kāvyabandhā grhe grhe/
Dvitrāstu bhāvakamaṇaḥśilāpātṭanikuṭṭitāḥ//
—KM, IV. p. 15.
97. Bahujñatā vyutpattirityācāryāḥ...Ucitānucitaviveko vyutpattiḥ iti
yāyāvarīyaḥ. Pratibhāvvyutpattayoḥ pratibhā śreyasī ityanandāḥ

- ..Vyutpattiḥ śreyasī iti Maṅgalaḥ...Pratibhāvvyutpattiḥ mithaḥ samavete śreyasyau iti yāyāvarīyaḥ. —KM, V. p. 16.
98. Svāsthyam pratibhā'bhyāso bhaktirvidvatkathā bahuśrutatā/
Smṛtidārḍhyamanirvedaśca mātaro'stau kavitvasya//
—KM, X. p. 49.
99. Nāstyacaurāḥ kavijanāḥ nāstyacauro vanigjanāḥ/
Sa nandati vinā vācyam yo jānāti nigūhitum//
Utpādakaḥ kaviḥ kaścit kaścicca parivarttakaḥ/
Ācchādakastathā cānyastathā samvargako'paraḥ//
Śabdārthoktiṣu yaḥ paśyediha kiñcana nūtanam/
Ullikhetkiñcana prācyam manyatām sa mahākaviḥ//
—KM, XI. pp. 61-62.
100. Athedānīmakaveḥ kavitvaśaktirupadiśyate. Prathamam tāvaddi-
vyaḥ prayatnaḥ, tataḥ pauraḥ. —KM, I. p. 149.
101. Tatra trayāḥ śiśyāḥ kāvyakriyāyāmupadeśyāḥ. Alpaprayatnasādh-
yāḥ, kṛcchasādhyaḥ, asādhyaśceti. —Do, I. p. 150.
102. Rase Rase tanmayatām gatasya guṇe guṇe harṣavaśīkṛtasya/
Vivekasekṣavakapābhinnam manāḥ prasūte'ṅkura-
vatkavitvam//
—KK, I. p. 151.
103. Abhyāsahetoḥ padasamniveśairvākyārthaśūnyairvidadhīta
vṛttam/
Ślokaḥ parāvṛttipadaiḥ purāṇam yathāsthitartham
paripūrayecca//
—KK, I. 21.
104. Yastu prakṛtyāśmasamāna eva kaṣṭeṇa vā vyākaraṇena
naṣṭaḥ/
Tarkeṇa dagdho'naladhūminā vāpyavidhakarṇaḥ
sukaviprabandhaiḥ//
Na tasya vaktṛtvasamudbhavaḥ syācchikṣāviśeṣairapi
suprayuktaiḥ/
Na gardhavo gāyati śikṣito'pi samdarśitam paśyati
nārkamandhaḥ//
—KK, I. 22-23.
105. Chāyopajīvi padakopajīvi padopajīvi sakalopajīvi/
Bhavedatha prāptakavitvajīvi svonmeṣato vā bhuvanopajīvyāḥ//
—KK, II. 1.
106. Tatra tarka-vyākaraṇa-bharata-cāṇakya-vātsyāyana-bhāratarāmā-
yaṇa - mokṣopāyātmajñānadhātuvādaratnaparīkṣā - vaidyakajyo-
utiśadhanurveda - gaja - turaga - puruṣa - lakṣaṇadyūten drajāla-
prakīrṇeṣu paricayaḥ kavisāmrajya - vyañjanāḥ.
—KK, V. p. 163.
107. Na hi paricayahīnaḥ kevale kāvyakaṣṭe kukavirabhiniviṣṭaḥ spaṣṭa-
śabdapraviṣṭaḥ/Vibudhasadasi prṣṭaḥ kṣiṣṭadhīrvetti vaktum nava
iva nagarāntargahvaare ko'pyadrṣṭaḥ.. —Do, V. I. 1.
108. Śaktirnīpunatā lokaśāstrakāvyādyavekṣaṇāt/
Kāvyajñāśikṣābhyāsa iti hetustadudbhavae// —KP, I. 3.

109. Śaktiḥ kavitvavijarūpaḥ saṃskāraviśeṣaḥ. yām vinā kāvyaṃ na
prasaret, prasṛtaṃ vā upahasanīyaṃ syāt. —KP, vṛtti.
110. Lokasya sthāvarajaṅgamātmakalokavṛttasya, śāstrāṇām chandovyā-
karaṇābhīdhānakośakalācaturvargagajaturagakhadgādīlakṣaṇa-gra-
thānām. kāyānām ca Mahākavinibandhānām, ādigrahaṇādītiḥāśā-
dīnām ca vimarśanād vyutpattiḥ. —KP, Vṛtti on I. 3.
111. Kāvyaṃ kartum vicārayitum ca ye jānanti tadupadeśena karaṇe
yojane ca pounaḥpunyena pravṛttirīti trayāḥ samuditāḥ na tu
vyastāḥ tasya kāvyasyodbhave nirmāṇe samullāse ca hetuḥ na
tu hetavaḥ. —Do, Vṛtti.
112. Pratibhāsyā hetuḥ. Pratibhā navaṇavollekhaśālīnī Prajñā. Asya
Kāvyaśya. Idam kāraṇam. Vyutpattiyabhyāsau tu Pratibhāyā eva
saṃskārakāvitī vyakṣyate. Sā ca saha joupādhikī ceti dvidhā. Tatra
sahajāmāha—Sāvaraṇakṣayopāśamamātrāt sahajā Dvitiyā-
māha mantrāderaupā dhikī. —KS, p. 5-6.
113. Vyutpattiyabhyāsābhyām saṃskāryā. —KS, p. 6.
114. Lokaśāstrakāvyēṣu nīpunatā vyutpattiḥ...Saṃskṛtapratibhā hi
tadanatikrameṇa kāvyamupanibadhnāti. —KS, p. 9.
115. Kāvyaicchikṣayā punaḥ punaḥ Pravṛttirabhyāsaḥ...Abhyāsa-saṃs-
kṛtā hi Pratibhā Kāvyaṃrtakāmadhenurbhaviati. —KS, p. 9.
116. Śikṣām lakṣayati—Sato'pyanibandho 'sato'pi nibandho niyamaś-
chāyādyupajīvanādāyaśca śikṣāḥ. —KS, p. 9.
117. Pratibhaiva śrutābhyāsaśahitā kavitām prati/
Heturmṛdambusambandhavijavyaktirīlatāmiva//
—CL, I. 4.
118. Sabījo hi Kavirjñeyāḥ sa sarvāgamakovidāḥ/
Sarasāḥ pratibhāśālī yadī syāduṭtamastadā//
Sabīja ityeva Kavilakṣaṇam, anyāni tu viśeṣaṇāni, sabījaḥ kavir-
drṣṭaḥ syādītyarthaḥ...
Bījaṃ prāktanasaṃskāraviśeṣaḥ kāvyarohabhūḥ//
Rohaśca dvedhā nirmātmūlaḥ svādakamūlaśca, yaṃ vinā nirmā-
tum svādayituṇca na śakyate...
Prajñā navaṇavollekhaśālīnī Pratibhā matā//
—AK, I. 3-5.
119. Tasya ca kāraṇam kavigatā kevalā Pratibhā. Sā ca kāvyaghaṭanā-
nukūlaśabdārthopasthitiḥ. —RG, I. p. 9.
120. Tadgatam ca Pratibhātvam kāvyakāraṇatāvachedakatayā siddho
jātivīśeṣa upādhīrūpaṃ vākhaṇḍam. —Do, I. p. 9.
121. Tasyāśca hetuḥ kvacidevatāmāhāpuruṣaprasādādījanyamadṛṣṭam.
Kvacicca vilakṣaṇavyutpattikāvya-karaṇābhāysau. Na tu trayameva.
—RG, I. p. 9.
122. Na ca tatra taylorjanmāntarīyayoḥ kalpanam vācyam, gouravān-
mānābhāvāt kāryasyānyathāpyupapatteśca. —RG, I. p. 10.
123. Na ca tatra Pratibhāyāḥ pratibandhakamadṛṣṭāntaram kalpyamiti
vācyam. Tādṛśānekasthalagatādrṣṭadvayakalpanāpektayā klptavyut-
pattiyabhyāsayoreva Pratibhāhetutvakalpane lāghavāt.
—RG, I. p. 10.

124. Tādṛāḍṣṭasya tādṛśavyutpattyabhyāsoṣca pratibhāgataṃ vailakṣaṇyaṃ kāryatāvachedakam ato na vyabhicāraḥ. Pratibhātvaṃ ca kavitāyāḥ kāraṇatāvachedakam, pratibhāgatavailakṣaṇyameva vā vilakṣaṇakāvyam prati iti nātrāpi sah. —RG, I. p. 10.
125. Pāpaviśeṣasya tatra pratibandhakatvakalpanādvā na doṣaḥ. Pratibandhakābhāvasya ca kāraṇatā samuditaśaktyādītrayaḥ utvādinah śaktimātrahetutāvādinaścāviśiṣṭā. —RG, I. p. 10.
126. Yatrārthaḥ śabda vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau/Vyañktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ// —DL, I.
127. Idamuttamamatisāyini vyaṅgye vācyād dhvanirbudhaiḥ kathitaḥ// —KP, I. 4.
128. Budhairvaiyākaraṇaiḥ pradhānabhūtasphoṭarūpavyaṅgyavyaṅjaka-sya śabdasya dhvaniriti vyavahāraḥ kṛtaḥ. Atastanmatānusāribhiranyairapi nyagbhāvitavācyavyaṅgyavyaṅjanakṣamasya śabdārthayugalasya. —KP, I. Vṛtti on 4.
129. Prakāro'nyo guṇībhūtavyaṅgyaḥ kāvyasya' drśyate/Yatra vyaṅgyānvaye vācyacārutvam syāt prakarṣavat// DL, III. 34.
130. Tasyaiva svayamuktyā 'prakāśīkṛtatvena' guṇībhāvaḥ, yathodāhṛtam samketakālamanaśam ityādi. —DL, Vṛtti.
131. Atādṛśi guṇībhūtavyaṅgyam vyaṅgye tu madhyamam. —KP, I. 5.
132. Cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vācyavyaṅgyayoḥ prādhānyavivakṣā. —DL, I. p. 114.
133. Pradhānaguṇabhāvābhyāṃ vyaṅgyasaivam vyavasthite/Kāvyे ubhe tato' nyadyattaccitrambhidhīyate// Citram śabdārthabhedenā dvididham ca vyavasthitaṃ/Tatra kiñcicchabdacitram vācyacitramataḥ param// —DL, III, 41-42.
134. Kintu yadā rasabhāvādivivakṣāśūnyaḥ kaviḥ śabdālamkāramarthā-lamkāram vopaniḍadhnāti tadā tadvivakṣāpekṣayā rasādiśūnyatā arthasya parikalpyate. Vivakṣopārūḍhaḥ eva hi kāvyे śabdānā-marthaḥ. —DL, III. 41-42, Vṛtti.
135. Sarvamatacca mahākavīnāṃ kāvyēṣu drśyate...Tadevamidānīnta-nakavikāvyānyopadeśe kriyamāṇe prāthamikānāmbhyāsārthināṃ yadi paraṃ citreṇa vyavahāraḥ, prāptapariṇatīnāṃ tu dhvanireva kāvyamiti sthītametat. —DL, III. 42, Vṛtti.
136. Śabdacitramarthacitramavyaṅgyam tvavaram smṛtam —KP, I. 5.
137. Yadi ca avyaṅgyatvena vyaṅgyābhavaḥ tadā tasya kāvyatvampi nāstīti prāgevaktaṃ. Iṣadvyaṅgyatvamiti cet, kiṃ nāma iṣadvyaṅgyatvam, āsvādyavyaṅgyatvam, anāsvādyavyaṅgyatvam vā? Ādye prācīnabhedayoreva antaḥpātaḥ, dvitīye tvakāvyatvam. —SD, IV. 17 Vṛtti
138. Uttamam dhvanivaiśiṣṭye madhyame tatra madhyamam Avaram tatra niṣpanda iti trividhamāditāḥ/

- Dhvanerdhvanyantarodgāre tadeva hyuttamottamam Śabdārthayoṣca vaicitrye dve yātaḥ pūrvapūrvatām// —AK, I. 6-7.
139. Śabdārthau yatra guṇībhāvitātmānau kamapyarthamabhivyañktaś-tādyam. —RG, I. p. II.
140. Evaṃ ca vyañjakānam sādharāṇyaṃ pratipādayatām prāmāṇikā-nām granthaiḥ sahāsādhāraṇyaṃ pratipādayataśtaḥ granthasya virodhahsphuṭaḥ...Pratyutāsādhāraṇyasya vyāptyparaparyāyasyā-numānānukūlatayā vyaktipratikūlatvācca. —RG, I. p. 16.
141. Yatra vyaṅgyamapradhānameva saccamatkāraḥ kāraṇam taddvīti-yam. Vācyāpekṣayā pradhānībhūtam vyaṅgyāntaramādāya guṇī-bhūtam vyaṅgyamādāyātivyāptivāraṇyāvadhāraṇam. —RG, I. p. 20.
142. Yatra vyaṅgyacamatkārasamānādhikaraṇo vācyacamatkāraḥ tat tṛtīyam. —RG, I. p. 22.
143. Yatrārthacamatkṛtyupaskṛtā śabdacamatkṛtiḥ pradhānam tada-dhamam caturtham...Yadyapi yatrārthacamatkṛtisāmānyaśūnyā śabdacamatkṛtistat pañcamamadhamādhamamapi kāvyavidhāsu gaṇayitumucitam yathaikākṣarapadyārdhavrītiyamakapadmaban-dhādi, tathāpi ramaṇīyārthapratipādakaśabdātārūpa-kāvyasāmānya-lakṣaṇānākrāntatayā vastutaḥ kāvyatvābhāvena mahākavibhiḥ prācīnaparamparāmanurundhānaistatra tatra kāvyēṣu nibaddha-mapi nāsmābhiraṇam, vastusthite revānurodhyatvāt. —RG, I. p. 23.
144. Tatrārthacitraśabdacitrāyoraṇyaviśeṣeṇāḍhamatvamayuktaṃ vaktum, tāratamyasya sphuṭamupalabdheḥ. —RG, I. p. 24.

CHAPTER II

1. Tanna. Ādyeṇa pūrvō'yaṃ para ityabhihāpāsambhavana avyava-hitottaratvasambandhāyogāt. Naṣṭavidyamānāyoraṇyavahitottarat-vasambandhasya vaktumaśakyatvācca. Dvītiye śabdajāśabdanyā-yena padapratyakṣopapādane'pi padasyāvidyamānatvena tatra śaktyāśrayatvasya grahānupapatteḥ. Avidyamāne āśrayatvāṅgikāre naṣṭo ghaṭo jalavānītyādyāpateśca. Tṛtīye yena krameṇānubhavas-tenaiva krameṇa saṃskārasthīritiyatra vinigamakābhāvāt saro raso nadī dīna ityādaḥ viparītasamskāradbodhena pratyekamanyār-thapratyayāpateḥ. —PLM, p. 25
2. Dvāpupādānaśabdeṣu śabdau śabdavidō viduḥ/ Eko nimittaṃ śabdānāmaparo'rthe prajūñjate// —VP, I. 44.
3. Tadāha : Parā vān mūlacakrasthā Paśyantī nābhisaṃsthitā/ Hrdīsthā madhyamā jñeyā vaikhārī kaṇṭhadeśagā//iti Vaikharyā hi kṛto nādaḥ paraśravaṇagocaraḥ/ Madhyamayā kṛto nādaḥ sphoṭavyaṅjaka ucyate//iti ca. —PLM, p. 27.

4. Anādinidhanam Brahma śabdatattvam yadākṣaram/
Vivarttate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ//
—VP, I. 1.
5. Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śabdānugamādṛte/
Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvaṃ śabdena bhāsatē//
—VP, I. 123.
6. Vaikharyā madhyamāyāśca paśyantyāś caitadadbhutam/
Anekatīrthabhedāyāstrayā vācam param padam//
—Do. I. 144.
7. Idamādyam padasthānam siddhisopānaparvaṇam//
Iyam sā mokṣamānānāmajhā rāgapaddhatiḥ//
—VP, I. 16.
8. Pratyairanupākhyairgrahāṇānugunaistathā/
Dhvaniprakāśite śabde svarūpamavadhāryate//
—VP, I. 85.
9. Yathānūvākaḥ śloko vā soḍatvamupagacchati/
Āvṛtīyā na tu sa granthaḥ pratyāvṛtīyā nirūpyate//
—VP, I. 84.
10. Syādvācako lākṣaṇikaḥ śabdo'tra vyañjakastridhā. —KP, II. 1.
11. Asyāyam vācako vācyā iti śaṣṭhyā pratyate/
Yogaḥ śabdārthayostattvamapyato vyapdīsyate// —VP, III. 3.
12. Pratyakṣamekaṃ cārvākāḥ kaṇādasugatau punaḥ/
Anumānam ca taccāpi sāmkyā śabdaṃ ca te ubhe//
12(a). Śabdādīnāmapyanumāne'ntarbhāvaḥ samānavidhitvāt.
—Praśastapādabhāṣya, p. 576.
13. Na hi śabdārthayoḥ kuṇḍavadarayoriva samjogasvabhāvaḥ, tantu-
paṭayoriva samavāyātmā vā sambandhaḥ pratyakṣamupalabhyate.
—NM, 4. p. 241.
14. Tatṛānumānamevedaṃ Bauddhair Vaiśeṣikāiḥ smṛtam. —SV.
15. Aviyuktaḥ śabdārthayorbhāvaḥ sambandhaḥ, notpannayor paścāt
sambandhaḥ śabdasyārthena sambandhaḥ. —Mim. Sātra. I. 1. 5.
16. Nanu sati svābhāvike sambandhe vyutpannavad avyutpannyasyāpi
bodhaḥ syāt. na hi agniraviditāśaktir na dahati—ityatra pratyak-
śādeḥ svābhāvike'rthapratyāyakatve satyapi yathā indriyasanni-
karṣāpekṣā tathā'trāpi samketagraha-sacivasyaiva bodhakatvam
ityāha. —VB, p. 189.
17. Prāptilakṣaṇastu śabdārthayoḥ sambandhaḥ pratiśiddhaḥ. Kasmāt?
Pramāṇato'nupalabdheḥ. —Vātsyāyana on Nvāyasūtra, 2. 1. 52.
18. Atrā tārīkāḥ—'Asmācchabdādayamartho boddhavyaḥ' ityākārā
'Idam padamimamartham bodhayatu' ityākārā veśvarecchā śaktiḥ
lāghavāt. Saiva samketāḥ sambandhaḥ. . . ityāhuḥ.
—PLM, p. 6.
19. Vākyabhāvamavāptasya sārthakasyāvbodhataḥ/
Sampadyate śabdabodho na tanmātrasya bodhataḥ//
—SSP. 12.
20. Padajñānam tu karaṇam dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhīḥ/
Śabdabodhaḥ phalaṃ tatra śaktidhīḥ sahakārīḥ//
—BP. 81.

21. Ādhunikasaṅketite tu na śaktirīti sampradāyaḥ. Navyāstu īśva-
recchā na śaktiḥ, kintu icchaiva. Tena ādhunikasaṅketite'pi śakti-
rastyevetyāhuḥ. —SM. 81.
22. Tanna. Icchāyāḥ sambandhinorāśrayatāniyāmakatvābhāvena sam-
bandhatvāsambhavāt. 'Sambandho hi sambandhidvayabhinnatve sati
dviṣṭhatve ca sati āśrayatayā viśiṣṭabuddhīniyāmakāḥ' ityabhīyukta-
vyavahārat. —PLM, P. 7.
23. Indriyāṇāṃ svaviśayeśvanādiryogyatā yathā/
Anādirarthaiḥ śabdānāṃ sambandho yogyatā tathā//
—VP, III. 29.
24. Siddhe śabdārthasambandhe. —MB. I. 1. 1.
25. Tasmāt padapadārthayoḥ sambandhāntarameva śaktiḥ vācyavāca-
kabhāvāparaparyāyā. Tadgrāhakaṇca itaretarādhyāsamūlakam
tādātmyam, tadeva sambandhaḥ. . . Śakterapi kāryajanakatve sam-
bandhasyaiva niyāmakatvāt. . . Tādātmyam ca tadbhinnatve sati
tadabhedena pratiyāmānatvamiti bhedābhedasamanīyatam. Abhe-
dasyādhyastatvācca na tayorvirodhaḥ. —PLM, p. 8-11.
26. Yadi ca śabdaḥ svarūpenārtham pratipādayati tadā'kṣaśabdasyai-
kyād devana-vibhūṭaka-rathākṣeṣu tulyā pratītiḥ syāt. . . api ca
paryāyeṣu hastaḥ karaḥ pāpīryādīṣu śabdarūpabhedādhyāśapakṣe
arthabuddhibhedāḥ prāpnoti. —NM, Vol. II. p. 101.
27. ātmādhyāśca sādṛśyādūparāgacca jāyate. —SV, V. 209.
- 27(a). Evaṃ ca kṛtvā sarva-ghaṭa śabda-sādhāraṇam sāmānyarūpam
artha-pakṣa-nikṣiptam artha-samānādhikaraṇam svarūpam asya
vācyam Arthavat-tat-samānādhikaraṇyāt tatrāpi tathā pratīteḥ,
sāmānya-rūpe eva saṅketopapatteḥ tenaivārthasya sāmānādhikara-
ṇyāt, tatraiva śrotapratīteḥ. . . . Lolībhūṭāni śabdārthajñānāni
ghaṭa ityavagamyante.
—Hetārāja on V. 2. Sambandha-samuddeśa
Book III of Vākyapadīya
28. Evaṃ ca padādirūpa āntaraḥ sphaṭa vācaka iti siddham. Evaṃ
śakyo'rtho'pi buddhisattāsamāviṣṭa eva na tu bāhyasattāviṣṭaḥ.
Ghaṭa ityata eva sattāvagamena ghaṭo' stīti proyoge ghaṭārthat-
vādestīti proyogānāpatteḥ, sattayā virodhāt ghaṭo nāstītyasānā-
patteśca. —VSM, p. 339.
29. Śabdaḥ kāraṇamarthasya sa hi tenopajanyate/
Tathā ca buddhiviśayādarthācchabdaḥ pratyate//
—VP, III. 32.
31. Iaha tu katham vartamānakālata kamsam ghātayati valim ban-
dhayatīti cirahate ca kamse cirabaddhe ca balau? Atrāpi yuktaiva,
katham? . . . te'pi hi teṣāmutpattiprabhṛtyāvināśāttadṛddhīrvyācak-
ṣāṇāḥ sato buddhiviśayān prakāśayanti. —MB.
32. Tatha ca smṛtiḥ:
Vipra prthāvādi cittastham na bahistham Kadācana/
Svapnabhramamadādyeṣu sarvairvānubhūyate//
—VSM, p. 250.
33. Anyathā arthavattvābhāvena prāḍipadikatvābhāvāt svādyutpattirna
syāt.
PLM, p. 12.

34. Pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā iva/
Vākyāt padānāmatyantam praviveko na kaścana//
—VP. I. 73.
Tasmānmanyāmahe padānyasatyāni, Ekamabhinnavabhāvakam
vākyam. Tadvabodhanāya padavibhāgaḥ kalpitah.
—Puṇyārāja under VP. II. 57.
35. Brāhmaṇārtho yathā nāsti kaściddbrāhmaṇakambale/
Devadattādayo vākye tathāiva syuranarthakāḥ// VP. II. 14.
36. Ataśca sāvayavau vākyā-vākyārthau padopajanāpāyābhyām tadar-
tho'pajanāpāyadarśanāt/ ... yo'rtho yaṁ śabdām anugacchatī sa
tasyārtha ityavasiyate/tat katham asatyā bhāgaḥ.
—NM. Vol. I. p. 354.
37. Taddharmāvacchinnaviśayakaśābdabuddhitvāvacchinnaṁ prati tad-
dharmāvacchinnaṁ nirūpitavṛttiviśiṣṭajñānaṁ hetuḥ. Jñāne vṛt-
tiviaiśiṣṭyam ca svaviśayakodbuddhasaṁskārasāmānādhikarānya-
svāśrayapadavisayakatvobhaya sambandhena bodhyam.
—PLM. p. 5-6.
38. Sa mukhyo'rthastatra mukhyo vyāpāro'syābhidhocyate.
—KP. II. 3.
Tatra saṅketitārthasya bodhanādagrimābhidhā. —SD. II. 7.
39. Ānanyāt vyabhicārācca vyaktināmabhidheyatāyā akalpanat. Na
ca jñātagotvādīrūpayā gotvādijñānarūpayā vā pratyāsattyaḥ pratyak-
ṣeṇa parikalitāsu sakalatādīyavyaktisvabhidyāyāḥ kalpane nāsti
doṣa iti vācyam. Sāmānyapratyāsatternirākaranāt. Gouravadoṣa-
syānuddhārāccā.
—RG. II. pp. 181-82.
40. Śabdānām viśayavibhāgo na prāpnoti iti ca...
—KP. II. 3 (Vṛtti).
Upādhiśca dvividhaḥ-vastudharma vaktṛyadrccchāsamniveśitaśca.
vastudharmo'pi dvividhaḥ-siddhaḥ sādhyāśca. Siddho'pi dvividhaḥ-
Padārthasya-prānaprado viśeṣādha.
41. Uktam hi Vākyapadiye na hi Gouḥ svarūpeṇa Gouḥ, nāpyagauḥ,
Gotvābhisambandhāt tu Gauḥ iti. —KP. II. 3 (Vṛtti).
42. Tathā sati dūrādanabhivyaktasamsthānatayā gotvāgrahadaśāyām
gavi gouriti gobhinna iti vā vyavahāraḥ syāt. Svarūpasyāviśeṣād
ghaṭe gouriti gavi cāgouriti vā vyavahāraḥ syāditi bhāvaḥ. Gotvā-
bhisambandhādgotvavattayā jñānat gourgośabdavyavahārya iti.
—RG. II. p. 182.
43. Sattve nivīśate'paiti prthagjātiṣu dr̥ṣyate/
Ādheyaścākriyāśca so'sattvapraṁkṛtiṅgaḥ//
—MB. 4. 1. 2.
44. Kriyā he nāmeyamatyantāparidṛṣṭā pūrvāparibhūtāvayavā na śakyā
piṇḍīkṛtya nidarśayitum.
—MB, under Bhubādayo dhātavaḥ.
Sādhyāḥ pūrvāparibhūtāvayavaḥ kriyārūpaḥ.
—KP. II. 3 (Vṛtti).
45. Ditthādiśabdānāmantyabuddhinirgrāhyam saṁhṛtakramam svarū-
pam vaktrā yadrccchayā ditthādiśvartheṣūpādhitvena samniveśyate
iti so'yaṁ sajnārūpo yadrccchātmaka iti. —KP. II. 3 (Vṛtti).

46. Yadrccchikastu vaktrā svecchayā ditthādiśabdānām pravṛttinimittatve
samniveśito dharmah. Sa ca paramparayā vyaktigataścaramavarṇā-
bhivyāṅgo'khaṇḍaḥ sphoṭa ityēke. Ānupūrvyavacchinno varṇasa-
mudāya ityapare. Kevalā vyaktireva ititare. Tatrādyamatadvaye viś-
ṣaṇajñānād viśiṣṭapratyaḥ. Tr̥tīyamate ca nirvikalpakātmakaḥ
pratyaḥ. Tadiṭṭham catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttiriti darśanam vya-
vasthitam. —RG. II. p. 183.
47. Guṇakriyāyadrccchānām vastuta ekarūpānāmapyāśrayabhedād bheda
iva lakṣyate yathāikasya mukhasya khaḍgamukuratāilādyāmbanā-
bhedāt. —KP. II. 3 (Vṛtti).
48. Himapayaḥśāṅkhādyāśrayeṣu paramārthato bhinneṣu śuklādīṣu
yadvaśena śuklaḥ śukla ityādyabhinnābhidhānapratyotpattistat śuk-
latvādi sāmānyam. Guḍaṭaṇḍulādīpākādiśvevameva pakatvādi.
—KP. II. p. 37.
49. Sarveṣām śabdānām jātirevārthaḥ. Guṇakriyāśabdānām Guṇakriyā-
gatāyāḥ yadrccchāśabdānām ca vālavṛddhaśuklādyudīritatattacchabda-
vṛttestattatsamayabhinnārthavṛttervā jātere vābhidheyatā sambhavāt.
Iti jātiśaktidarśanam. —RG. II. p. 184.
50. Jāterastitvanāstितve na hi kaścid vivakṣati/
Nityatvāllakṣaṇīyā vyaktestehi viśeṣaṇe//
—SV. V. 311.
51. Yugapacca tr̥tīyam vibhaktiyarthaḥ-kāraḥ, liṅgam, saṁkhyā ca.
na cañtad tr̥tīyam prātipadikārthe jātau anveti na jātiḥ kāraḥ,
na ca jāteḥ strī puṁ-napuṁsakavibhāgaḥ, na cāsyā dvitīyādyoga-
iti. —NM, Vol. I. p. 294.
52. Sakṛt prayuktaṁ padaṁ aṁśena kāmcidarthamabhidhātī, tato'r-
thāntaraṁ lakṣayati, tadgatatvena punarliṅgasamkhyādyabhidhātte
—iti na prāṭitiko'yaṁ kramah. —NM, Vol. I. p. 294.
53. Pratyakṣam na hi niṣkr̥ṣṭa-jātyaṁśa-pariveṣṭitam/
Tadgocara-pravṛtteśca śabdāḥ tam kathayet katham//
—tasmāt pratyauṣaviśaye pravartamānaṁ tatsamānaviśayameva
bhavitum arhatī padam na sāmānyamātranīṣṭham.
—NM, Vol. I. p. 296.
54. Padaṁ tadvantamevārthamāñjasyenābhijalpati/
Na ca vyavahitā buddirna ca bhārasya gauravam//
Sāmānādhikarānyādivyavahāro'pi mukhyā/
Vṛtyopapadyamānaḥ san nānyathā yojayisyate//
...
Tasmād gavādīśabdānām tadvānartha itī sthitam//
—NM. Vol. I. pp. 295-97.
55. Sthite'pi tadvato vācyatve kvacit prayoge jāteḥ prādhānyam,
vyakteraṅgabhāvaḥ, yathā 'Gaurāna padā spr̥ṣṭavye'ti sarvagaviṣu
pratiśedho gamyate, kvacit vyakteḥ prādhānyam jāteraṅgabhāvaḥ,
yathā 'Gām muñca', 'Gām badhāne'ti niyatam kāmci vyaktimud-
diśye prayujyate, kvacidākṛteḥ prādhānyam, vyakteraṅgabhāvo
jātirnāstīeva, yathā 'piṣṭakamayyo gāvaḥ kriyāntām' iti.
—NM, Vol. I. p. 297.
56. Kiñca Gotve yadi śaktistadā Gotvatvaṁ śakyatāvaccchedakam

- Vācyam. Gotvatvam tu Gavetarāsamavetatve sati sakala-go-samavetatvam. Tathā ca go-vyaktinām śakyatāvaccchede'nupraveśāt ta-vaiva gauravam. —SM. on Śabdakhaṇḍa.
57. Vikalpaviśaye vrttīrīṣṭā śabdānumānayoh/
Avastuviśayāścaite vikalpā iti varṇitam//
Yā ca bhūmirvikalpānām sa eva viśayo girām/
At eva hi śabdā-thamanyāpoham pracakṣate//
—NM. Vol. I. p. 276.
58. Tadiṭṭham catuṣṭayī śabdānām pravṛttirīti darśanam vyavasthi-
tam. —RG. II. p. 184.
59. Sambandhibhēdāt sattaiva bhidyamānā gavādiṣu/
Jātirityucyate tasyām sarve śabda vyavasthitāh//
Tām prātipadikārtham ca dhātvartham ca pracakṣate/
Sā sattā sā mahānātmā tāmahustvatalādayaḥ//
—VP. 3. 33-34.
60. Idam yaugikarūḍhamityucyate. —PLM, p. 14.
61. Caturdhā evāyamabhidhāvā bheda ityapyanye. —RG. II.
61. Asādhuranumānena vācakaḥ kaiścidīṣyate/
Vācakatvāviśeṣe vā niyamaḥ puṇyapāpayoh//
—VP. 3. 30.
62. Tanna. Sādhumarāṇam vināpi bodhānubhavāt. Tadvācakasādhū-
śabdamañānatām bodhānāpatteśca. —PLM, p. 14.
63. Ekatra śaktyapyanyatra tadāropāttadarthapratityupapattāvekatraiva
śaktīrtaḥbhavāt. —TC. p. 627.
64. Na ca śaktībramād bodho sādhuśabdeṣviti vācyam. Niḥsande-
hāpratyayasya bādhakam vinā bhramatvājogāt.
—PLM, pp. 12-13.
65. Śāstrasthā vā tannimittatvāt...ke śāstrasthāḥ? śiṣṭāḥ. Teśāma-
vicchinā smṛtiḥ śabdeṣu vedeṣu ca. Tena śiṣṭā nimittam śrūtismṛ-
tyavadhāraṇe. —Mim. Sūtra 1. 3. 9.
66. Mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito'tha' prayojanāt/
Anyo'rtha lakṣyate yat sā Lakṣaṇā// —KP. II. 9.
67. Lakṣaṇāropitā. ...Sa āropitaḥ śabdavyāpāraḥ sāntarārthanīṣṭho
lakṣaṇā. —KP. II. 4.
68. Lakṣaṇā śaktīrarpitā Sā śabdasyārpitā svābhāvīketarā īśvarānū-
dhāvitā vā śaktīrlakṣaṇā nāma. —SD. II. 9.
68. Upakṛtam bahū tatra kimucyate sujanatā prathitā bhavatā
param/
Vidadhadīdṛśameva sadā sakhe sukhitamāssva tataḥ
śaradām śatam//
—Etadapakāriṇam prati viparīṭtalakṣaṇayā kaścidvakti.
—KP. IV. 1 (Vṛtti).
69. Jāterastitvanāstīve na hi kaścid vivakṣati/
Nityatvāllakṣyamānāvā vyakteste hi viśeṣaṇe// —SV. V. 311.
70. Gouranubandhya ityādaḥ śrūticoditamanubandhanam katham me
syāditi jātyā vyaktīrākṣipvate na tu śabdenocyate. ...ityupādā-
nalakṣaṇā tu nodāhartavyā, śrūtārthāpatterarthāpattervā tasya viśa-
yatvāt. —KP. II. 10 (Vṛtti).

71. Nirūḍhā lakṣaṇā kāścit sāmartyādabhidhānavat/
Kriyante sāmpratam kāścit kāścinnaiva tvaśaktīḥ//
—TV, III. I. p. 700
72. Svabodhyasambandho lakṣaṇeti kecit, Gabhīrāyām Nadyām Ghoṣa
ityādanurodhāt.....Tasmāt tatsamudāyabodhyagabhīratvaviśiṣṭa-
nadīpadārthaḥ, tatsambandho lakṣaṇeti, —PLM, p. 18-19.
73. Sā ca śakyasambandharūpā. Tathāhi-Pravāharāpaśakyārthasam-
bandhasya tīre grhītatvāt tīrasya smarāṇam. Tataḥ śādbodhaḥ.
—SM. on Kārikā. 82.
74. Tātsthyāttathaiva tāddharmyāttatsāmīpyāttathaiva ca/
Tatsāhacaryāttādarthyāḥ jñeyā vai lakṣaṇā budhaiḥ//
—PLM. p. 17.
75. Vastutastu tātparyānupapattipratīśandhānameva tadbijam.
—PLM, p. 17.
76. Vākye tu śakterabhāvāt śakyasambandharūpa lakṣaṇāpi nāstī.
Yatra tu gabhīrāyām nadyām ghoṣa ityuktam, tatra nadīpadasya
nadīrīre lakṣaṇā, gabhīrapadārthasya nadyā sahābhedenānvayaḥ
....Tadā nadīpadasya gabhīranadīrīre lakṣaṇā, gabhīrapadam tāt-
paryagrāhakam.
—SM. on Śabdakhaṇḍa, K. 82.
77. Itthañca samāse na kvāpi saktiḥ, padaśaktyaiva nirvādhīti.
—SM. on Śabdakhaṇḍa K. 82.
78. Śaktyākhyo'rthasya śabdagataḥ, śabdasyārthagato vā sambandha-
viśeṣo'bhīdā ...Śakyasambandho lakṣaṇā.
—RG. II. p. 176 & 181.
79. Pare tu āropitaśakyatāvaccchedakarūpeṇa śaktyaiva tatpadavācyat-
vena prasiddhānyavyaktibodhe vyaktiviśeṣabodhe vā lakṣaṇeti vya-
vahāraḥ. Chatrīṇo yāntityādāvaccatṛīṣu sāhacaryācchatritvāropāḥ.
Kākeobhyo dadhī'tyādāvapi dadhyupaghātakamātre kakatvāropāḥ.
—VSM, p. 133.
80. Na ca 'Gaṅgāyām Ghoṣa' ityādāvāropitagaṅgātvena bodhe'pi tasya
jñānasya bhramatvāt śāstrajñānavatām sarvathā bhramatvena gra-
hācca taduttaram gaṅgāgataśaitiāpāvanatvādīpratīṭirūpaḥ phalaḥ
na siddhyet.....iti vācyam, madhye vyañjanayā mukhyagaṅgā-
padārthābhēdasyāpi pratīṭeḥ. Vyañjanājñāne ca bādhajñānena
nāpramāṇyagraha ityadoṣāt. —VSM, p. 134.
81. Goutamo'pyāha — "sahacaranasthānatādārthavṛttamānadhāraṇasā-
mīpyayogasādhanaḥhipatyebho Brāhmaṇa-bālakaṭa-rāja-saktu-
candana-gaṅgā-śakatā'nna-puruṣeṣvatadbhāve'pi tadupacāraḥ" iti.
Nyāyavārttikakāro'pi—"...Tatra samjuktasamavetām jātīm brāh-
maṇe samavāyenādhyāropya Brāhmaṇam yaṣṭiketyāha' ityāha.
—VSM, p. 141.
82. Ata eva 'Gaṅgāyām Mīna-Ghoṣau staḥ'ityādyupapādyate...Gaṅgāt-
vena eva tīrabodhāt ekadharmāvaccchinne'nvayasattvena na kṣatiḥ
...Yugapadeva gaṅgātvenaiva nīratīrayorupasthitiḥ.
—VSM, p. 138.
83. Sati tātparye 'sarve sarvārthavācaka' itī bhāṣyāllakṣaṇayā abhāvāt.
Vṛttidvayāvaccchedakadvayakalpane gauravāt.

- Jaghanyavṛttikalpanāyā anyāyavācca...Tathā hi śaktirdivividhā —Prasiddhā'prasiddhā ca. Āmandabuddhivedyātvaṃ Prasiddhātvaṃ. Sahṛdayaḥṛdayamātravedyātvaṃprasiddhātvaṃ. Tatra Gaṅgādīpadānāṃ pravāhādaṃ prasiddhā śaktiḥ, tīrādaṃ cāprasiddheti kimanupapannam. —PLM, pp. 20-21.
84. Harirapyāha :
Ekamāhuraneṣārtham śabdamanye parīkṣakāḥ/
Nimittabhedādekasya sārvarthyam tasya bhidyate//
Sarvasakteṣu tasyaiva śabdasyānekadharmaṇaḥ/
Prasiddhibhedādgaṇatvaṃ mukhyatvaṃ copacaryate//
iti. Gaṇanamukhyārthabodhakaḥ śabda eka eva. Yugapatsarvārtha-
prakāśanam tu na, prakaraṇādīrūpanimittabhedāt. Gośabdo gojā-
tau prasiddha iti tatra mukhyaḥ, vāhike tvaprasiddhya gaṇa iti
tadarthaḥ. Nanvevaṃ śabdārthasambandhasyānityatvaṃ syādate
āha—
Gotvānusaṅgo vāhike nimittāt kaiścidiṣyate/
Arthamātre viparyastam śabdaḥ svārthe vyavasthitaḥ//
iti...Śabdastu gotvamevābhidhatte gaurityatra mukhyam gotvam,
vāhike tūpacaritam. Śabda eva pravṛttinimittamiti pakṣe sa kadācit
gojātavanuṣṇyate kadācit vāhike iti. —VSM, pp. 145-46.
85. Atrocyate samāse śaktyasvīkāre viśiṣṭasyārthavattvābhāvena prāti-
padīkatvaṃ na syāt. Ata evārthavatsūtre bhāṣye 'arthavaditi kim,
arthavatāṃ samudāyo'narthakaḥ—daśa dāḍimāni saḍapūpāḥ kuṇḍa-
majājīnam' iti pratyudāhṛtam. Evaṃ ca Rājapuruṣapadayostan-
mate pratyekamarthavattve' pi samudāyasya daśadāḍimānivadanar-
thakatvāt prātipadīkatvānāpatteḥ. —PLM, p. 115.
86. Kim ca rājapuruṣādaṃ rājapadādeḥ sambandhe sambandhīni vā
lakṣaṇā, nāḍyaḥ. Rājñāḥ puruṣa iti vivaraṇavirodhāt.nāntyaḥ
rājasambandharūpa-puruṣa ityanvaya-prasaṅgāt. —PLM, p. 117.
87. Harirapyāha—
Samāse khalu bhinnaiḥ śaktiḥ pañcakaśabdavat/
Bahūnāṃ vṛttidharmāṇāṃ vacanaireva sādhanā/
Syañmahat gauravaṃ tasmādekārthibhāva āsṛitaḥ//....
—PLM, p. 119.
88. Svanirūpitasādṛśyādhikaraṇatvasambandhena śakyasambandhyartha-
pratīpadīkā gaunī, Tadatiriktasambandhena śakyasambandhyartha-
pratīpadīkā śuddhā. —PIM, p. 16.
89. Mānāntaraviruddhe tu mukhyārthasya parigrahe/
Abhidheyāvinābhūtapratītilakṣaṇocyate//
Lakṣyamāṇagunairiyogādvṛtteriṣṭā tu gaṇatā// —TV, 1.4.
...Vahnitvalakṣitādarthāt yat pañgalyādi ganyate/
Tena mānavake buddhiḥ sādṛśyādūpajāyate// —TV, 1.4.
90. Mukhyārthasākṣātsambandhamūlārōpānmukhyārthavṛttiguṇasa māna-
gaṇavattvarūpaparamparāsambandhamūlārōpo jaghanyā iti gaṇyā
atijaghanyatvaṃ bodhyam. —VSM, p. 146.
91. Svasiddhaye parākṣepaḥ parārtham svasamarpanam/
Upādānam lakṣaṇam cetyuktā śuddhaiva sā dvidhā//
—KP, II. 10.

92. Śakyārthasambandho yadi tīratvena rūpeṇa grhītaṣṭadā tīratvena
tīrabodhaḥ. Yadi tu gaṅgātīratvena rūpeṇa grhītaṣṭadā tenaiva
rūpeṇa smaraṇam. —BP, Vṛtti on K. 82.
Tīratvena lakṣaṇāyāmeva jahatsvārthatvasya sarvasammatatvāt.
Gaṅgātīratvena bhāne tvajahatsvārthaiva lakṣaṇeti.
—Dinakarī, p. 287.
93. Viśayasyānigīrṇasyānyatādātmapratītikṛt/
Sāropā syānnigīrṇasya matā sādhyavasānikā// —SD, II. 13.
94. Sādhyavasānāyāṅca 'Candrarājī Virājate' ityādaṃ candradīśābdair-
lakṣaṇayā mukhatvenopasthitasyāpi mukhādeḥ śādbodhaścandrat-
vādinā bhavati, lakṣaṇājñānasyaiva mātmyāt ityēke. Lakṣaṇayā
mukhatvena mukhādeḥ śādbodhe vṛtte vyāñjanaikaśābdopāttat-
vapṛādurbhūtayā candratvena bodhaḥ ityapare...Apare tu nivār-
yata eva viruddhabhānasāmagryā svadharmasya bhānam. Rajata-
tvabhānasāmagryā śūktitvasyāhāt itī vadanti.
—RG, II. pp. 201-202.
95. Atra kecī—'Rūpakasyopamātaḥ svarūpasamvedanāṃsamādāyāvai-
lakṣaṇe' pi lakṣaṇāphalibhūtatādrupyasamvedanamādāya vailakṣa-
ṇyam nirbādham. Tādrupyasamvedanam ca viṣaye mukhādaṃ viṣa-
yitāvaccchedakasya candratvādeḥ sampratyah.Atha candratat-
sādṛśyorevaikapadopāttatvāccandrasādṛśe candratādrupyasya prat-
yayo yathākathañcidastu, na tu mukhatvaviśiṣṭe mukhe...Svatā-
drupyavadabhedabuddhyā svatādrupyasya subodhatayā tasminnapi
tasya siddheḥ' ityāhuḥ. —RG, II. pp. 187-88.
96. Anye tu—'Candradīpadebhyo lakṣaṇyā candrasādṛśatvenāpi rupeṇa-
pasthāpitānāṃ mukhādīnāṃ candratvena rupeṇaiva mukhādīpado-
pasthāpitaiḥ sabābhedānvayabodho jāyate...Prakṛte tu viśayican-
drādīniṣṭhāsādhāraṇagūṇavattvapratyāḥ phalam....Itthaṃ ca
svarūpasamvittikṛtaḥ phalibhūtasamvittikṛtaścopamāto rupakasya
bhedaḥ sphuṭa eva' itī vadanti. —RG, II. pp. 188-89.
97. Apare tu bhedakarambitam sādṛśyamupamāñjivātubhūtam, bheda-
karambitam ca gaṇasāropalakṣaṇāyā itī sphuṭe bhede kṛtam plala-
kṛtavailakṣaṇyaparyantānudhāvanena. Pakṣo'smin bhedagarbhasādṛ-
śyapratipattestādrūpyapratītiḥ katham nāma phalam bhavitumīṣṭe
ityanupapattim parihartumāyāso'pi nāpataṭīyaparamanukūlamitya-
pyāhuḥ. —RG, II. p. 190.
98. Navyāstu—'mukham candraḥ' 'vāhiko gauḥ' ityādaṃ candradīnāṃ
mukhādībhiḥ saha sambhavati lakṣaṇāṃ vinaivābhedena saṃsar-
geṇānvayabodhaḥ. Bādhaniścayapratibādhvatāvacchedakakoṭāvanāhār-
yatvasyeva śābdānyatvasyāpi niveśyatvāt. Ata eva atyantā-satyapi
hyarthe jñānam śabdaḥ karoti hi' itī prācāṃ pravādo'pi saṅgac-
chate....Mukham Candraḥ, gourvāhikaḥ ityādaṃ tvīṣṭacamatkāra-
prayojakatājñānādhīnāyāḥ icchāvāḥ sattvādāhāryayogayatājñānasam-
rājyam....Ato nāmārthayorabhedasaraṇireva rūpakasthale rama-
ṇīyā. —RG, II. pp. 190-95.
99. Itthameva ca mukham candra ityādiprasiddhodāharaṇe'pi iyaṅstu
viśeṣaḥ—yadekatra sādṛhāṇo dharmāḥ prasiddhatayā nīyamataḥ
svabodhakaśrutim nāpekṣate itaratra tvaprasiddhatayā tathā....

- Na cāhāryapadārthadvayābhedabuddhau taccamatkāre vā sādharmaadharma viśeṣajñānam prayojakamiti śakyam vaktum. 'Yadyanuṣṭo bhavedvahniradyaśītam bhavējalam' ityādaṁ sādharmaadharma viśeṣajñānam prayojakamiti śakyam vaktum. 'Yadyanuṣṭo bhavedvahniradyaśītam bhavējalam' ityādaṁ sādharmaadharma viśeṣajñānam prayojakamiti śakyam vaktum. —RG. II. p. 195-96.
100. Nanu rūpakapratiterupamānābhedaviśayatvavirahe 'Simhena sadṛśo nāyam kintu simho narādhipaḥ' ityādaṁ niśedhyavidheyayorasāṅgatiriti cet, na. Anupadameva prācīnamatadvaye'pi rūpake tādrūpyapratipatteḥ svikārasya pratipādanāt...Yadapyuktaṁ rūpake sadṛśalakṣaṇāyāḥ phalaṁ tādrūpyapratyayo na yujyate tatsadṛśa iti śabdajabodhānantaramapi tathā pratyāpatteriti, tanna tatsadṛśa ityatra lakṣaṇāyā abhāvena tādrūpyapratyasyāpādanāyogāt. Tādrūpyapratyāḥ lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalaṁ prācīnamatadvaye'pi rūpake tādrūpyapratyasyāpādanāyogāt. Tādrūpyapratyāḥ lakṣaṇāyāḥ phalaṁ prācīnamatadvaye'pi rūpake tādrūpyapratyasyāpādanāyogāt. —RG. II. pp. 197-201.
101. Na caivam, tattadārthakaśābdasāmānyam pratyeva tattarthanistatparyaktvadhiyaḥ pratibandhakatvāt, tattadārthanām yathākathāñcidupanayavaśena manasaiva viśiṣṭadhīsam bhavāt, mānorathikasukhaprabhedaparyavasitam camathāram pratyapi śābdasyeva mānasasyāpi bodhasya viśiṣṭa hetutāyāḥ suvacatvāt, atiriktasya vyañjanākyapadārthāntarasya svarūpasattayā anvayabuddhau taddhetutvasya ca pramāṇaviraheṇāsattvāceti saṁkṣepaḥ. —SSP. Vṛtti on K. 24
102. Mukhyārthabādhagrahanirapekṣabodhajanako mukhyārthasambaddhāsambaddhasādhāraṇaprasiddhāprasiddhārthaviśayaḥ vaktṛādīvaiśiṣṭyajñānapratibhādyudbuddhasaṁskāra viśeṣo vyañjanā. Ata eva nipātānām dyotakatvam sphoṭasya vyaṅgyatā ca haryādibhiruktā. —VSM. p. 156.
103. Sarveṣāṁ prāyaśo'rthānām vyañjakatvampīṣyate. —KP. II. 2. Śabdāśrayatvena śabdātadekadeśatadārthavarṇasamghaṭanāśrayatvena ca āśrayasya... —KP. V. Vṛtti.
104. Viratāsvabhidhāyāsu yayārtho bodhyate'paraḥ// Sā vṛttirvyañjanā nāma śābdasyārthādikasya ca// —SD. II. 19.
105. Yat so'rthāntarayuk tathā/ Artho'pi vyañjakastatra saha karitayā mataḥ// —KP. II. 15. Śabdapramāṇavedyo'rtho vyanaktyarthāntaram yataḥ/ Arthasya vyañjakatve tat śābdasya saha karitā// —Do. III. 3.
106. Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaḥ śābdānugamādṛte/ Anuviddhamiva jñānam sarvam śābdena bhāsatē// —VP. I. 124.
107. Udeti savita tāmraśtāmra evāstameti ca/ Sampattau ca vipattau ca mahatāmekarūpatā// —RG. II. p. 463.
108. Abhidhālakṣaṇāmūlā śābdasya vyañjanā dvidhā// —SD. II. 20.
109. Lakṣyam na mukhyam nāpyatra bādho yogaḥ phalaṁ na/ Na prayojanametasmin na ca śābdāḥ skhaladgaṭiḥ// —KP. II. 16.

110. Evamapyanavasthā syāt yā mūlakṣatikārinī. —KP. II. 17. Mūlakṣatikārimāhuranavasthāḥ hi dūṣaṇam. —NM. I. p. 21.
111. Athavā nedṛśī carcā kavibhiḥ saha śobhate/ Vidvāṁso'pi vimuhyanti kāvyārthagahane'dhvani// —NM, Vol. I. p. 45.
112. Viśiṣṭe lakṣaṇā naiva viśeṣāḥ syustu laksite/ Taṭādaṁ ye viśeṣāḥ...Vyāparāntarena gamyāḥ. Tacca vyañjanadhvananadyotanādiśābdavācyaṁ avasāyameṣitaṁ. —KP. II. 13.
113. Anekārthasya śābdasya vācakatve niyantrite/ Samyogādyaivācārthadhikṛd vyāpṛtirañjanam/ —KP. III. 14.
114. Samyogo viprayogaśca sāhacaryam virodhitā/ Arthaḥ prakaraṇam liṅgam śābdasyānyasya sannidhiḥ// Sāmānyamaucitī deśaḥ kālo vyaktiḥ svarādayaḥ/ Śābdārthasyānavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ// —VP. II. 317-18
115. Atra kecinmanyante—'Yata eteṣāṁ śābdānām pūrvamāntare' bhidhāntaram drṣṭam tatastathāvidhe'rthāntare drṣṭatadabhidhāśaktereva pratipatturñyantritābhidhāśaktikebhya etebhyaḥ pratipattirbhavanavyāparādeva'...iti. Anye tu—'Śābhidaiva dvitīyā artha-sāmānyam...sahakāritvena yato'valambate, tato dhvananvyāpararūpocate' iti. Eke tu—'Śābhidaśleṣe tāvadbhede sati śābdasya, arthaśleṣe'pi śaktibhedācchābdabhedā iti darśane dvitīyaḥ śābdastvānīyate. Sa ca kadācidabhidhavyāparāt...tatra vācyaḥ kārātā. Yatra tu dhvananavyāparādeva śābda ānītaḥ tatra śābdāntaravāladapi tadārthāntaram pratipannam pratīyamānamūlatvāt pratīyamānameva yuktaṁ' iti. Itare tu—'Dvitiyapakṣavyākhyāne yadārthasāmānyam tena dvitīyābhidhaiva pratiprasūyate, tataśca dvitīyo'rtho bhidhiyate eva na dhvanyate, tadanantaram tu tasya dvitīyārthasyāpi pratipannasya prathamārthena prakaraṇikena sākam yā rūpanā sā tāvadbhātyeva, na cānyataḥ śābdāditi sā dhvananavyāparāt. —LC. pp. 241-43.
116. Tatra kecidāhuḥ—Nānārthasya śābdasya sarveṣvartheṣu samketagrahasya tulyatvācchrutamātra eva tasmin sakalānāmāntarānāmupasthitau, śābdasyāsa kasminnarthe tātparyamiti samdehe ca sati prakaraṇādikam tātparyanirṇāyakam paryālocayataḥ puruṣasya sati nirṇaye, tadātmakapadajñānāyā ekārthamātraviśayāyāḥ punaḥ padārthopasthiteḥ prāthamikyā iva na kuto nānārthagocarateḥ prakaraṇādiñānasya tadadhinatātparyanirṇayasya vā padārthopasthitau pratibandhakatvam vācyaṁ, anyathā śābdabuddherapi nānārtha-viśayatvāpattiḥ. Ata evoktam —'Anavacchede viśeṣasmṛtihetavaḥ' iti. Anavacchede tātparyasamdehe. Viśeṣasmṛtikārthamātraviśayā smṛtiḥ. —RG. II. pp. 134-36.
117. Apare tvāhuḥ—nānārthaśābdajāśābdabuddhau tātparyanirṇayahetutāyā avasāyakaḥ patvāt prathamam nānārthaśābdā danekārthopasthāpane'pi prakaraṇādiḥ tātparyanirṇayahetubhirutpādite tasmin yatra tātparyanirṇayastasyaivārthasyānvayabuddhirjāyate, nānyasyeti saraṇāvāśrīyamānāyām naikamātragocarasmṛtyapekṣā, nāpya-

- parārthopasthāpanapratibandhakatvakalpanam. Evaṃ ca prāgu-
padarśitanānārthasthale prakaraṇādijñānādhināttātparyanirṇayāt
prākaraṇikārthaśābdabuddhau jātāyāmatātparyaviśayāpi śābdabud-
dhiḥ tasmādeva śābdajīyamānā kasya vyāpārasya sādhyatāmava-
lambatām, rthe vyañjanāt. ... Itthaṃ smṛtiśābdasya niścayaparatayā
viśeṣasmṛtiśābdena viśeṣaviśayastātparyanirṇayo grhyate. Samyogā-
dyairvācakatāyā niyantraṇaṃ caikamātraviśayakatātparyanirṇaya-
jananadvārā śābdabuddhāvanukūlatvam.
—RG. II. pp. 136-37.
118. Tasmānnānārthasyāprākaraṇike'rthe vyañjaneti prācāṃ siddhāntaḥ
śītilaḥ eva. Prākaraṇikāprākaraṇikayorarthayorupamāyām tu sā
kadācit syādapītyatrāsmākaṃ pratibhāti. —RG. II. p. 143.
119. Śabdaśaktyā prakāśamāne satyaprākaraṇike' rthāntare...
—DL. II. p. 244.
120. Uktiyantareṇāśakyam yat taccārutvam prakāśayan/
Śabdo vyañjakatām bibhrad dhvanyukterviśayibhavet//
—DL. I. p. 146.
121. Yogarūḍhasya śabdasya yoge rūḍhyā niyantrite/
Dhiyam yogasprśo' rthasya yā sūte vyañjanaive sā//
Evaṃ sthite nānārthasthale'pyupamāyāḥ prākaraṇikāprākaraṇikār-
thagatāyāḥ pratipattaye'vaśyaṃ vācyayā vyañjanayaivāprākaraṇi-
kasyāpyarthasya pratipattāvalaṃ klišṭakalpanayetyāśayena prācī-
nairuktaṃ nānārthavañjakatvamapi na duṣyati.
—RG. II. pp. 143-46.
122. Samyoga nānārthaśābdasākyāntaravṛttitayā aprasiddhatve sati
tacchakyavṛttitayā prasiddhaḥ sambandhaḥ —RG. II. p. 146.
123. Viprayoga viśeṣaḥ. ... Atra hi viśeṣanīyatapūrvavartinaḥ saṃś-
leṣasya prāguktadaladvayākṛāntatvampekṣyate.
—RG. II. p. 147.
124. Sāhacaryamekasmin kārye parasparāpekṣitvam.
—RG. II. p. 147.
125. Ucyate-samyogaśābdasya sambandhasāmānyaparatayā yatra śabdo-
pāttaṃ prasiddham sambandhasāmānyam śaktinīyamākaṃ tadād-
yasya, yatra, tu dvandādigataḥ sambandhyeva kevalastadā tatsā-
hacaryasyodāharaṇamiti prācāmāśayāt. Itthaṃ ca sagāṇḍīvo'rjunah
iti samyogasya. gandīvārjunāvīti sāhacaryasyodāharaṇam.
—RG. II. p. 149.
126. Rāmalakṣmaṇāvītyādaḥ sāhacaryenobhayoryugapadeva niyamana-
miti nānyonyāśrayaḥ. Sāhacaryam sādrśyam sadrśyoreva saha-
prayoga iti niyamāt. —VSM. p. 111.
127. Virodhitā prasiddham vairam, sahānavasthānañca. Tatṛādyasya
'Rāmārjunau' ityudāharaṇam prāñco vadanti. ... Sahānavasthāna-
lakṣaṇavirodhitā tu chāyātapāvītyādaḥ bodhvā.
—RG. II. pp. 149-51.
128. Arthaḥ prayojanaṃ caturthyādyabhidhevaṃ. ... Nanu arthasya
līṅgātko bhedah? ... Atrāhuḥ-uktasya viśiṣṭadharmasya śābdabo-
dhottarabhāvimānasabodhaviśayatvena prakṛtāśābdabodhaviśayat-
vāllīṅgato vailakṣanyopapattiriti. Līṅgaṃ tvekapadārthakopadiḥ,

- ananvīta eva ya padārthāntareṇa prakṛtāśakyadharmatām śakyān-
taravyāvṛttatām ca bhajate, uktadharmastu na tatheti kecit.
—RG. II. p. 151.
129. Prakaraṇaṃ vaktṛśrotṛbuddhistatā. —RG. II. p. 152.
130. Līṅgaṃ nānārthapadaśakyāntaravṛttirekaśakyagataḥ sāksācchabda-
vedyo dharmah. —RG. II. p. 152.
131. Śabdasyānyasya sannidhirnānārthapadaikārthamātrasaṃsargarthān-
taravācakaḥ padasamabhivyaḥhārah. Yathā'kareṇa rājate nāgaḥ'ityatra
karapadasya nāgapadamādāya nāgapadasya ca karapadamādāya
śūṇḍāyām gaje ca. —RG. II. p. 153.
132. Sāmartyam kāraṇatā. Yathā madhunā mattaḥ kokilaḥ ityatra
kokilamadajanakatayāmadhuśābdasya vāsante...
—RG. II. p. 154.
133. Aucitī yogyatā. —RG. II. p. 154.
134. Deśo nagarādīḥ yathā—'bhātyatra Paramesvaraḥ' ityādaḥ parames-
varādīśābdasya rājādaḥ... Evaṃ vaikuṇṭhe harirvasati ityatrāpi
bodhyam. —RG. II. p. 155.
135. Kālo divasādīḥ... vyaktiḥ strīpūṃnapuṃsakalīṅgāni... Svaraḥ
udāttādīḥ. —RG. II. p. 155.
136. Tathāhi svarāḥ kākṛvādāya udāttādayo vā vyaṅgyarūpameva viśe-
ṣaṃ pratyāyayanti, na khalu prakṛtoktamanekārthaśābdasyaikārtha-
nīyantraṇarūpaṃ viśeṣam... ityalamupajīvyānām mānyānām vyā-
khyāneṣu kaṭākṣanikṣepeṇa. —SD. II. Vṛtti on K. 21.
137. Atha prasiddhatvādinā teṣāmasādhāraṇatābuddhiryathākaṭhāñcidu-
papādyate, tadā prayāso līṅgabhedā evaite, na tu sarvathaiva tataḥ
svatantrā itī bodhyam. —RG. II. p. 156.
138. Vaktṛboddhavyākūnām vākyavācyānyasannidheḥ/
Prastāvadeśakālādervaiśiṣṭyāt pratibhājuṣām//
Yo'rthasyānyārthadhīheturvyāpāro vyaktireva sā//
—KP. III. 1-2.
139. Mithaḥ sākāṅkṣaśābdasya vyūho vākyam caturvidham/
Śūptīṅgantacayo naivamativṛtyādidōṣataḥ//
..... Kriyārahitanna vākyamastītyādikastu prācāṃ pravādo
niryuktikatvādaśraddheyaḥ. —SSP. V. 13 & Vṛtti thereon.
140. Vākyasvarūpamāha—
Vākyam syādyogyatākāṅkṣasattiyuktaḥ padocayaḥ.
—SD. II. K. 1.
141. Vākyasamayagrāhikā ākāṅkṣā. Sā caikapadārthajñāne tadarthān-
vayajogyarthasya yajñānaṃ tadviśayecchā 'asyānvayarthah kah'
ityevamrūpā puruṣaṇiṣṭhaiva, tathāpi tasyāḥ svaviśaye'rthe āropah.
Ayamartho'rthāntaramākāṅkṣatīti vavahārāt. ... Pade tu nāropah,
arthabodhottaramevākāṅkṣodayāt. Padaṃ sākāṅkṣamīti tu sākāṅk-
ṣārthabodhakamītyarthakam. —PLM, pp. 33-34.
142. Yadvā utthāpakatāviśayātanyatarasambandhena ubhayasamban-
dhena vā arthāntarajijñāsa ākāṅkṣā. Ādyam—Paśya mrgo dhāvati-
tyatra darśanārthasya kārakadhāvanākāṅkṣotthāpakatvam dhāva-
naṃ tu tadviśaya eva. Antyantu —'Pacati tādulaṃ devadattaḥ'
ityādaḥ, kriyākārayordvayorapi paraspāram tadutthāpakatvāt

tadviṣayatvācca. Ata eva ghaṭaḥ karmatvam ānayanam kṛtiḥ
ityato ghaṭamānayetivannānvayabodhaḥ ākāṅkṣāviraḥat.

—PLM. p. 35.

143. Na ca sarvatra jijñāsā nibandhanam, ajijñāsorapi vākyaṛthodayāt
ākāṅkṣāpadārthastarhi kaḥ? jijñāsāṃ prati yogyatā. sā ca smṛita
—tadāksiptayoravinābhāve sati śrotari tadutpādyasamsargāvaga-
maprāgabdhāvaḥ. —NK, p. 122.

144. Atrāhuḥ—abhidhānāparyavasānam ākāṅkṣā, yena vinā yasya na
svārthānvayānubhāvakatvaṃ tasya tadaparyavasānam, nāma-vibh-
akti-dhātuvākhyāta-kriyā-kāraka-padānām parasparaṃ vinā na svār-
thānvayānubhāvakatvaṃ. —PS. p. 67.

145. Yatpadena vinā yasyā'nanubhāvakatā bhavet/Sākāṅkṣā...//
Yena padena vinā yatpadyānvayānanubhāvakatvaṃ tena padena
saha tasyākāṅkṣeyarthāḥ. ...Vastutastu kriyākāraka-padānām
sannidhānam āsattiyā caritārtham. Parantu ghaṭakarmatābodham
prati ghaṭapadottaradvitīyārūpākāṅkṣājñānam kāraṇam.

—BP-SM on K, 84.

146. Padārthe tatra tadvattā yogyatā parikīrtita. ...Ekapadārthe
aparapadārthasambandho yogyatā ityarthāḥ. Tajjñānābhāvācca
vahninā siñcatītyādaḥ na śābdabodhaḥ.

—BP with SM on K, 83.

147. Yogyatā ca bādhakamānābhāvaḥ. —PS. Ch. III. p. 67.

148. Yogyatā ca parasparānvayaprayojakadharmavattvaṃ. Tena Payasā
siñcatīti vākyaṃ yogyaṃ. Asti sekānvayaprayojakadravadravayat-
vaṃ yogyatā jale, karaṇatvena jalānvayaprayojakādrīkaraṇatvaṃ
yogyatā sekakriyāyām. Ata eva vahninā siñcatīti vākyaṃajogyam,
vahnēḥ sekānvayaprayojakadravadravayatvābhāvāt. Etādṛśāsthaleṣu
nānvayabodhaḥ, kintu pratyekaṃ padārthabodhamātramiṭi Naiyā-
yikāḥ. —PLM. p. 36.

149. Tanna—Śābdaprayojye bodhe bādha-jñānasya apratibandhakatvāt.
tadabhāvajñānasya akāraṇatvācca. Satyapi bādhaniścāye....'Eṣa
vandhyāsuto yāti' ityādīto bodhadarśanāt. Kiñcaivaṃ 'vahninā
siñcati' ityato bodhābhāve tadvākyaṃprayoktuḥ 'adraveṇa vahninā
katham sekam bravīsi' ityupahāsaḥ śrotṛbhīḥ kriyamāno'saṅgataḥ
syāt. Etadarthakadraviḍabdhāśāsravanottaraṃ pāścātyasyeva muktā
tasya syāt. Kiñcaivaṃ sati vāde prativādiśābdasyābodhakatvena
tatkhāṇḍanakathocchedaḥ. —VSM, pp. 505-07.

150. Na ca 'vahninā siñca' ityāditaḥ pravṛttirapi syāt, bādhajñānena
jāyamānajñāne aprāmāṇyaśaṅkāyā jananāt tacchūnyajañānasyaiva
pravṛtṭyupayogitvenākṣeteh. Bauddhasyaiva sarvatra bodhaviṣayat-
vena bādhasyaivābhāvācca. Taduktam—'atyantāsatyapi hyarthe jñā-
nam karoti hi śabdaḥ' iti. Vastuto bādhajñānam na kvāpi jñāne
pratibandhakam. —VSM. p. 513.

Vākyaṛthabodhe jāte buddhārthaviṣaye pravṛtṭistū na bhavati,
buddhārthe aprāmāṇyagrahādityanyatra vistaraḥ. —PLM. p. 37.

151. Sannidhānam tu padasyāsattirucyate....Anvayapratyogyanuyogi-
padayoravyavadhānam āsattih, tajjñānam śābdabodhe kāraṇam
....Vastutastu avyavadhānajñānasya anapekṣitatvāt yatpadārthasya

yatpadārthena anvayopekṣitastayoravyavadhānena upasthitiḥ śābda-
bodhe kāraṇam. Tena 'Girirbhuktam agnimān devadattena' ityādaḥ
na śābdabodhaḥ. Nilo ghaṭo dravyaṃ paṭa ityādaḥ āsattibhra-
māt śābdabodhaḥ....Nanu yatra chatrī kuṇḍalī vā asvī deva-
datta ityuktam, tatra uttarapadasmarāṇena pūrvapadasmarāṇasya
nāśāt avyavadhānena tattatpadasmarāṇāsambhava itī cet, na.
Pratyekapadānubhāvanyasamskāraīścaramaṃ tāvatpadaṇiṣayaka-
marāṇasya avyavadhānena utpatteḥ....Parantu tāvatpadārthā-
nām smaṇāpādekadaiva khale kapotanyāyāt tāvatpadārthānām
kriyākarmabhāvena anvayabodharūpaḥ śābdabodho bhavati kecit.

—SM. on K, 83.

152. Āsattirbudhyavicedaḥ.

—SD II. 1.

153. Ataḥ sannihitatvābhāvāt śābdabodhitvābhāvācca dvedhā sanni-
dhyabhāvo bhavati. tatra bhinnakāloccaritayor gām ānaya ityatra
padayor sannihitatvābhāvāt ananvayaḥ. Gām badhāna ityatra
badhānapekṣasya dṛṣyamānasya śābdabodhitvābhāvād eva anan-
vayaḥ ataḥ śābdapratipannānāmeva anvayaḥ itī niyamaḥ siddhaḥ.

—Mānameyodaya

154. Āsattirapi mandabuddher avilambena śābdabodhe kāraṇam. Aman-
dabuddhestvāsattiyabhāve api padārthopasthitau ākāṅkṣāditaḥ avi-
lambena bodho bhavati itī na bodhe tasya kāraṇatvaṃ. Dhvani-
tam cedam 'Na Padānta' sūtrabhāṣye.

—PLM. pp. 37-38.

155. Atredaṃ vicāryam. Vyutpattir balīyasī—na śābdo'rtham avaga-
mayati vyutpattimantareṇa. Vyutpattiśca kim vākasya, vākyaṛthe,
padasya vā padārthe itī. Yadi vākasya vākyaṛthe vyutpattista-
dānvitābhidhām. Padasya padārthe vyutpattau abhihitānvaya itī.

—NM. Vol. I. p. 364.

156. Ata eva vākyaṛtho lākṣaṇika itī Mīmāṃsakāḥ.

—Nyāyaratnamālā. p. 125.

157. Tasmāt padānām padārthasvarūpamātraparatve vākyaṃprāmāṇyānu-
papattir eva lākṣaṇākṣepike'ti tadeva lākṣaṇam lākṣaṇāyāḥ.
Bhāṭṭapādaiśca vākyaṛthasya sarvatra lākṣanikatvasvikārāt.

—TP. pp. 152-55.

158. Na ca padārthasmṛtīnām smṛtānām vā padārthānām anvayabod-
hakatve saptamapramāṇābhūyupagama-prasaṅgaḥ, līṅga prakaraṇa-
sthānānāmiva śābdapramāṇānta-bhāvopapatteḥ. —TV. p. 149.

159. Naun kim anabhihitena padārthena anvitaṃ svārtham avabodha-
yati go-padam, uta padāntarābhīhitena? nādyāḥ, ekasmād eva
padāt tattadrthānvitasvārthābhāvabodhasambhavana padāntarasya vai-
yarthya-prasaṅgāt. na dvitīyaḥ, parasparāśraya-prasaṅgāt.

—TP. p. 145.

160. Yathā cakṣuṣo nīla-pītādiviṣaya-sahakāribhedāt eva ekayā'pi rūpa-
prakāśanaśaktiā nīlapītādivijñānakāryabhedāḥ tarhi śabdeṣvapi
sahakāribhedāt kāryabhedo na daṇḍavāritaḥ.

—Prakāśānanda's gloss on Śabdaṇiṣaya : K. 31.

161. Arthaprakaraṇapṛāptapadārthāntaravedane/

Padam prayujyate yattadvākyaṃevoditam bhavet//

- Vaktā vākyam prayunkte ca samsr̥stārthavivakṣayā/
Tathaiva buddhyate śrotā tathaiva ca tatasthitāh//
—NM. p. 366.
162. Asābdatvaṃ ca vākyaṛthapratīteritthamāpatet/
Vyavadhānamayuktaṃ ca sākṣacchabdatvasambhave//
—NM. p. 367.
163. Nābhidhātṛī śaktiranvitaviṣayā kiṃ tvanvayavyatirekāvagataniṣkr̥ṣṭā
—svārthaviṣayaiva, tātparyaśaktistu teṣāmanvitāvagamaparyantā
saha vyāpārāt vyāpārasya ca tadīyasya nirākāṅkṣapratyayotpādana-
paryantatvāt. —NM. p. 371.
164. Matadvayamapīdaṃ tū nāsmabhyam rocatetarām/
Kuto'nvitābhidhānam vā kuto vābhihitānvayaḥ//
—NM. p. 370.
165. Ucyate samhatyakāritāpyasti, na cānvitābhānam, anvitam arthaṃ
padānī samhatya sampādayanti na tvanitamabhidhātī.
—NM. p. 371.
166. Anyameva ca pakṣaḥ śreyān yatsamhatyakāritvaṃ padānāmasaṅki-
rṇārthatvaṃ ca—
Nirapekṣaprayoge'yaṃ śalākākālpānā bhavet/
Tadanvitābhidhānstu padāntaramanarthakam//
Samhatyakāripakṣe tu doṣo naiko'pi yujyate/
Tenāyamupagantavyo mārgo hi hatakaṇṭakaḥ//
Abhidhātṛī matā śaktiḥ padānāṃ svārthanīṣṭhatā/
Teṣāṃ tātparyaśaktistu samsargāvagamāva dhiḥ//
Tenānvitābhidhānam hi nāsmābhiriha mṛṣvate/
Anvitapratipattistu bādhamabhyupagamyate//
—NM. p. 372.
167. Tātpatyārtho'pi keṣucit. . . Ākāṅkṣā-yogyatā-sannidhivaśād vakṣya-
mānasavarūpānāṃ padārthānāṃ samanvaye tātparyārtho viśeṣava-
purapadārtho'pi vākyaṛthaḥ samullasati itvabhihitānvayavādināṃ
matam. —KP. II. Kārikā I & Vṛtti.
168. Keṣucinnyāyādinayeṣu. na tu mīmāṃsakādimateṣu api.
—PR p. 17.
- Ādinā bhāṭṭāmīmāṃsakāḥ. —KP-uddyoṭa. p. 24.
169. Tātparyākhāyāṃ vṛttimāhuḥ padārthānvayabodhane/
Tātparyārthaṃ tadarthaṃ ca vākyam tadbodhakampare//
. . . Abhidhāyāḥ ekaikapadārthabodhanavirāmāt vākyaṛtharūpasya
padārthānvayasya bodhikā tātparyam nāma vṛttiḥ. Tadarthaśca
tātparyārthaḥ. Tadbodhakam ca vākyamityabhihitānvayavādināṃ
matam. —SD. II. Kārinā 20 & Vṛtti thereon.

CHAPTER III

1. Tatrāvivakṣitavācyo nāma lakṣaṇāmālo dhvaniḥ. Lakṣaṇāmūlatvā-
devātra vācyamavivakṣitaṃ bādhitavarūpam. Vivakṣitūnyaparavā-
cyastvabhidhāmūlaḥ, ata evātra vācyam vivakṣitam.
—SD. Vṛtti on K. 2. Ch. IV.

2. Arthāntare samkramitamatyantaṃ vā tiraskṛtam/
Avivakṣitavācyasya dhvanervācyam dvidhā matam//
—DL. II. I.
3. Rāmapadaṃ ca sarvasahatvāhupayuktaśakyārthatayā sakaladuḥ-
khabhājanatvaṃ lakṣayat sītāṃ vināpi jīviṣyāmīti vyañjayadeva
vipralambhaṃ vyanakti. —PR. p. 132.
4. Andhaśabdo'tra padārthasphuṭikarāṇāsaktatvaṃ naṣṭadṛṣṭigataṃ
nimittikṛtya ādarśaṃ lakṣaṇayā pratipādayati. Asādhāraṇavicchāyat-
vānupayogitvādidharmajātamasamkhyam prayojanaṃ vyanakti.
—LC. p. 172.
5. Asaṃlakṣyakramoddyotaḥ krameṇa dyotitaḥ paraḥ/
Vivakṣitābhidheyasya dhvanerātmā dvidhā mataḥ//
Mukhyatayā prakāśamāno vyaṅgyo'rtho dhvanerātmā. Sa ca vācyār-
thāpekṣayā kaścidalakṣyakramatayā prakāśate, kaścit krameneti
dvidhā mataḥ. —DL. II. 2.
6. So'yaṃ nigaditaḥ sarvo'pi rasādilakṣaṇo vyaṅgyaprapaṇicah sphuṭa
prakaraṇe shagiti protīteṣu vibhūbhāvavyabhihārīṣu sahrdayata-
meṇa pramātrā sūṅkṣmenaiva samayena pratīyat iti hetuhetumatoḥ
paurvāparyakramasyālakṣaṇādalkṣyakramo vyapadiśyate.
—RG. I. p. 129.
7. Yatra tu vicṇavedyaṃ prakaranam, unneyā vā vibhādayastatra
sāmagrīvilambādhīnam camatkṛtermāntharyamīti samlakṣyakramo'
pyeṣa bhavati. Yathā 'talpagatāpi ca sutanuḥ' iti prāgudāhrte padye
'samprati' ityetaḍarthāvagotirvilambena. —RG. I. p. 129.
8. Na khalu dharmigrāhakamānasiddhaṃ ratyādiddhvaneralakṣyakrama-
vyaṅgyatvam. —RG. I. p. 129.
9. Yo rasādirarthaḥ sa evākramo dhvanerātmā na tu akrama eva
saḥ. Sakramatvamapi tasya kadācid bhavati. Tādā cārthaśaktiyud-
bhavānūsvānarūpabhedateti vakṣyate. —LC. p. 174.
10. Syādetat—Yadyaṃ rasādīḥ samlakṣyakramasya viśayaḥ syāt,—
anuraṇanabhedaprastāve 'arthaśaktimūlasya dvādaśa bhedaḥ' itya-
bhinvaguptoktiḥ, 'tenāyaṃ dvādaśātmakaḥ' iti mammatoktisca na
saṅgaccheta. . . vastvalaṃkārayoriva rasāderapyabhihvañjanādaśāda-
śatvaprasaṅgāt. Atrocitate —Prakaṭairvibhāvanūbhāvavyabhihārībhī-
ralakṣyakramatayaiva vyajyamāno ratyādīḥ sthāyibhāvo rasībhavati,
na samlakṣyakramatayā. Rasībhāvo hi nāma jhagiti jāyamānālauki-
kacamatkāraṇaviśayasthāyitvam. Samlakṣyakramatayā vyajyamānasya
ratyādestu vastumātrataiva na rasāditvamīti teṣāmāśayasya varṇa-
ṇena na taduktīnāṃ virodhaḥ. —RG. I. pp. 130-31.
11. Anena ślokena atyantasahrdayo yo na bhavati tasyaiṣa sputasam-
vedya eva kramaḥ. Yathā atyanta-śabda-vṛttajñō yo na bhavati
tasya padārtha-vākyaṛtha-kramaḥ. Kāṣṭhāprāptasahrdayabhāvasya
tu vākya-vṛtta-kuśalasyeva sannapi kramo'bhyastānumānābhīnā-
bhāva-smṛtyādivadasamvedya iti darśitam. —LC. p. 100.
12. . . Tasmādaṅgatvena ca rasādīnāmalaṃkāratā. Yaḥ puraraṅgī
raso bhāvo vā sarvākāramalaṃkāryaḥ sa dhvanerātmēti.
—DL. II. 5.

13. Alamkāro na rasavat parasyāpratibhāsanat/
Svarūpādatiriktasyā śabdārthāsangaterapi// —VJ. III. II.
14. Tasyāṅgānam prabhedā ye prabhedāḥ svagatāśca ye/
Teṣāmānantyamanyonyasambandhaparikalpane// —DL. II. 12.
15. Rasādīnāmanantatvāt bheda eko hi gaṇyate. ...Tathā hi nava-
rasāḥ. Tatra śrīṅgārasya dvau bhedaḥ. Sambhogo vipralambhaśca.
Sambhogasyāpi paraspārāvalokanāliṅganaparcumbanādikusumocca-
yajalakelisūryastamayacandrodayaśadrtuvarṇanādayo bahavo bhe-
dāḥ. Vipralambhasyābhihāśādaya uktoḥ. Tayorapi vibhāvānubhāva-
vyabhičārīvaicitryam. Tatrāpi nāyakayoruttamamadhyaṁdhama-
prakṛtivyam. Tatrāpi deśakālāvasthādibhedā ityekasyaiva rasasyā-
nantyam, Kā gaṇanā tvanyeṣām. Asamlakṣyakramatvam tu sāmā-
nyamāśrītya rasādīdhvanibhedā eka eva gaṇyate. —KP. IV. 57.
16. Krameṇa pratibhātyatmā yo'syānusvānasamñibhaḥ/
Śabdārthāśaktimūlatvāt so'pi dvedhā vyavasthitāḥ//
—DL. II. 10.
- & Śabdaśaktiā arthaśaktiā śabdārthāśaktiā vākṣipto'pi vyaṅgyo'
rthaḥ.... —Vṛtti on II. 23.
17. Parivṛttisahiṣṇūnām śabdānām prācurye tadprayuktāt prādhānyāt
satyā apyarthāśakteraprādhānyācca vyaṅgyasya śabdaśaktimūlakat-
venaiva vyāpadeśaḥ. Parivṛttisahiṣṇūnām tu prācurye arthaśakte-
reva prādhānyāt satyā api śabdaśakteḥ pradhānānugūnyārthatayā
mallagrāmādivat pradhānenaiva vyāpadeśaḥ. Yatrato kāvyē pari-
vṛttim sahamānānāmasahamānām ca śabdānām naikajātīyaprācu-
ryam, api tu sāmyameva, tatra....dvyuttho dhvaniḥ.
—RG. II. p. 173.
18. Ākṣipta evālamkārah śabdaśaktiā prakāste/
Yasminnaniuktaḥ śabdena śabdaśaktiyudbhavo hi sah//
Yasmādalamkāro na vastumātram yasmin kāvyē śabdaśaktiā
prakāśate, sa śabdaśaktiyudbhavo dhvaniritvasmākam vivakṣitam.
Vastudvaye ca śabdaśaktiā prakāśamāne śleṣaḥ. —DL. II. 21.
19. 'Atra r̥tuvarṇanāprastāvanīyanīritābhīdhāśaktayaḥ ate eva—'avayava-
prasiddheḥ samudāya-prasiddhirbalīyasī' iti nyāyam apākurvanto
mahākālaprābhṛtayaḥ śabdāḥ etamevārtham abhidhāya kṛtakṛtyā
eva. Tadantaram arthāvagatiridhvananavyāpārādeva śabdaśakti-
mūlāt. —LC. p. 141.
20. Tasmāt prastutāprastutobhayapare'pi prastutaprastutobhayāvācyār-
the'bhidhāva vṛttīḥ. Tadūpasthiteṣu ca padārtheṣu ākāṅkṣādīsaha-
kāriyasāt ubhayavidhāvākārthapratyayaḥ ityaprasutaviṣaye na
padārthapratīṭtaye nāpi vākārthapratīṭtaye vyaktirupagantavyā.
—VV. p. 11-16.
21. Atha śliṣṭaviṣeṣaṇāyām samāsoktau vyaṅgyasyāprakṛtavavyavahārasya
prakṛtadharminyāropyamāṇasya prakṛtopaskāratayā yathā guṇi-
bhūtavyaṅgyatvam evamihāpi ucitam. —RG. II. p. 157.
22. Na cātra upamādināmālamkārah svabhāvataḥ sundaratvāt
kāvyapravṛttyuddeśyatayā ca vastumātre guṇibhāvo na sambhavatī,
yathā vastumātreṇābhiviyaktānām alamkārahām, tulyanyāyatvāt.
Aprakṛtavavyavahārasya tu samāsoktavavyavasya nīralamkāratayā

- vastunyupaskāratvam samāsoktau aviruddham iti vācyam eva-
mapi 'bādhe' dṛḍhe anyasāmyāt kiṁ dṛḍhe anyadapi bādhyatām
iti nyāyena uktayukteḥ śīthilavāt, aparāṅgatayā durapahnnavatvāt.
—RG. II. pp. 157-58.
23. Atha ucyeta—upamānam upameyam sādharāno dharma iti hyupa-
māsarīraghaṭakam, na tu tataḥ prthagbhūtam, tairvinā tasyā
aniṣpatteḥ. Ittham copameyasya sādrśyāmsena upaskāre api
upamāyā nāparāṅgatvam, upameyasyāparatvābhāvāt. Yathā samā-
soktau aprakṛtavavyavahāreṇa prakṛtopaskaraṇe api na samāsoktera-
parāṅgatvam, prakṛtāprakṛtaghaṭitvāt, evam ihāpi syāditi. Tathāpi
samāsokteriva asyāpi prabhedasya guṇibhūtavyaṅgyatvāpatteḥ,
asyeva vā samāsokterapi dhvanivyapadeśyatvāpatteḥ.
—RG. II. p. 158.
24. Na caivam upamākr̥totkarṣamādāya astu dhvanitvam alamkāra-
dhvaniriti tu kathamiti vācyam. Alamkārakṛt̥otkarṣadhvanau eva
Alamkāra-dhvaniriti vyavahārāt iti. —Nāgeśa. II. p. 159.
25. Anye'pi cālamkārah śabdaśaktimūlānusvanarūpavyaugye dhvanau
sambhavantyeva. Tathā hi virodho'pi śabdaśaktimūlānusvanarūpo
dr̥ṣyate....Evamvidho vyatreko'pi dr̥ṣyate. —DL. II. pp. 244-45.
26. Na cātra vyatirekasya guṇibhūtasya katham dhvanivyapadeśahetut-
vam, pradhānasyaiva dhvanivyapadeśahetutvāditi vācyam, udāśīne
vaktari tattvarthakathanaparasyāsyā padyasya vaktṛgatarativyāñ-
jakatvāsamgateḥ, guṇibhūtasyāpyarthasya vācyārthāpekṣayā pr-
adhānatayā dhvanivyapadeśahetutāyāḥ prācīnaiḥ svīkāṛācca.
—RG. II. p. 161.
27. Alamkāryasyāpi Brāhmaṇaśramaṇanyāyenālamkāratā.
—KP. IV. Vṛtti on K. 38.
- Nanu udāhṛteṣu upamādinām prādhānyam na vā. Ādye kutaste-
śāmalamkāratvam, anyānalamkāranāt. Dvītiye kuto'sya kāvyasya
dhvanitvam, vyaṅgyasya aprādhānyāt iti cet, na. Purvamayama-
lamkāra āsit ityetāvatā alamkāravvyapadeśāt. Yathā brāhmaṇapūr-
vabauddhasannyāsini brāhmaṇavyapadeśaḥ. Nanu evam vyāpade-
śasamarthane'pi alamkāradhvanitvam na samarthitāmīti cet, na.
Alamkārapadena tadyogyatāyā vivakṣitavāt. —PR. p. 100.
28. Eṣaiva ca yadā sakalena vākyaena prādhānyena dhvanyate, tadā
parihṛtālamkārabhāvā dhvanivyapadeśahetuḥ. Asyām ca alamkā-
ravvyapadeśaḥ kadāpi alamkārabhāvam aprāpteṣu mañjūśādigateṣu
kaṭakādiṣu iva almkurvāṇagatadharmamātrasamsparsanibandhanāḥ.
—RG. II. p. 185.
29. Evam śabdaśaktiā vācyagatena ca sāmāthyaviṣeṣeṇa arthāntara-
pratītau kāryāyām ubhayaśaktimūlatvamevātra paryavasyatī, na
kevalam śabdaśaktimūlatvam....Kintu 'pañthia—' ityādyubhayaśak-
timūlasya eva udāharāṇam vācyam, arthaśakterapi vyāpārāt.
Anyathā kevalaśabdaśaktervastumātram dhvanyam na syāt. Ane-
naiva āśayena śabdaśaktimūlavastudhvanim dhvanikṛt na āṅgikṛta-
vān. —SA. pp. 29-36.
30. Vastudhvanirapi sambandhāntareṇa tatra samicīnāḥ syāt.
—AK. p. 102.

31. Yattu kāvyaprakāśasamkete grathakṛtā vastudhvaneḥ śabdaśaktimūlatvaṃ cintyamuktam, tadudāharaṇābhiprāyeṇa eva unneyam.
—VS. p. 102.
32. Na cātra nṛpacandrayorupamānopameyabhāvaḥ bhedāpoharūpaṃ rūpakam vā tathāstu iti vācyam, iha nṛparūpasya arthasya candra-rūpārthagopanamātrārtham upāttatvena yugapadullasitopamānopameyakayorupamārūpakayoḥ tātparyaviśayatāyā ayogāt. Na ca asaṃsr̥stārthadvayabodhane vākyabheda iti vācyam, tulyakakṣatayā dvayoḥ asaṃsr̥stayoḥ arthayoḥ pratipipādaiśitatve eva tasya abhyupagamāt. Iha tu ācchādakapratītisamaye ācchādyāpratītiḥ, ācchādyapratītau ca ācchādakanyagbhāva eveti nāsti tulyakakṣatā.
—RG. II. p. 162.
33. Evamanye'pi śabdaśaktimūlānusvānarūpavyaṅgyadhvaniprakārāḥ santi, te sahr̥dayaiḥ svyamanusarttavyāḥ. Iha tu granthavistara-bhayāt na tatprapañcaḥ kṛtaḥ.
—DL. II. Vṛtti on K. 21.
34. Arthaśaktiyudbhavo'pyartho vyañjakāḥ sambhavī svataḥ prauḍhoktimātrāt siddho vā kaveḥ tenombhitasya vā Vasturvālamkṛtirve śadbhedo'sau vyanakti yat Vastvalamkāramathavā tenāyam dvādaśātmakāḥ//
—KP. IV. k. 39-40.
35. Anyathā 'vasante sapallavasahakārodgama' iti vastumātram na vyañjakam syāt. Eṣā ca kavarevoktiḥ prauḍhā.
—LC. p. 255.
36. Atra lohitam Bimbaphalam śuko daśatīti na vyañjakatā kācit. Yadā tu kavinibaddhasya sābhilāśasya taruṇasya vaktuḥ ittham prauḍhoktiḥ tadā vyañjakatvam.
—LC. p. 255.
37. Iha cārthaḥ svataḥsambhavī kaviprauḍhoktimātranīṣpannaśarīraḥ, kavinivaddhavakṛtprauḍhoktimātranīṣpannaśarīro vā...iti bheda-kathanam na nyāyam prauḍhoktinirmitatvamātreṇa eva sādhyasiddheḥ. Prauḍhoktim antareṇa svataḥ sambhavinah api akiñcitkaratvāt. Kaviprauḍhoktireva ca kavinivaddhavakṛtprauḍhoktiḥ iti kiṃ prapañcena.
—KS. pp. 55-56.
38. Pratibhānirmitatvāviśeṣāt ca kavi-tadumbhitavakṛtprauḍhoktiniṣpannayōḥ arthayoḥ na prthaggaṇanā ucitā, umbhitombhitādeḥ api bhedāntaraprayojakatāpatteḥ. Na ca tasyāpi kavyumbhitatvānapāyāt tatprayojyabhedāntargatatvam eva iti vācyam. Prathamombhitasya'pi lokottaravarṇanānīpuṇatvalakṣaṇakavitvānapāyāt prthagbhedaḥ prayojakatānupapatteḥ.
—RG. II. p. 134.
39. Vṛddhoktivyāyāt śīśūktivyāyā iva kavyuktivyāyāt kavinibaddhoktivyāyā camatkārādhikyānubhavitvāt prthaguktiḥ.
—Nāgeś's commentary on RG. II. p. 134.
40. Atandracandrābharaṇā...etc. Atra śyāmārūpakāminīviśeṣarajanyōḥ upamā vyaṅgyā, Sā ca atandracandreyādeḥ parivṛtṭyasahatayā, samuddīpitatyādestatsahatayā ubhayasyāpi vyañjakatvena śabdārthobhayaśaktimūlā.
—PR. p. 109.
41. Śabdaśaktimūlo'rthaśaktimūlasceti vyaṅgyo dvidhā. Ubhayaśaktimūlastu śabdaśaktimūlānnatiricyate, śabdasyaiva prādhānyena vyañjakatvāt.
—KS. p. 46.

- & Yadyapi samuddīpiteti sānandamiti cārtho vyañjakastathāpi na śabdaśaktim vinā arthaśaktirunmūlati iti śabdaśaktireva vyañjikā.
—KS. p. 51.
42. Ubhayaśaktiyā yathā—'Dṛṣṭyā Keśava—'itayādaḥ.
—DL. Vṛtti on II. 23.
cf. Atra goparāgādīśabdānām gope rāga ityādivyaṅgyārthanām 'saleśam' iti padena sphuṭatayāvabhāsaḥ. 'Saleśam' iti padasya parityāge dhvanireva.
—SD. IV. Vṛtti on K. 17.
43. Śabdārthobhayaḥbhūrekaḥ.
—KP. IV. 55.
Ekaḥ śabdārthaśaktiyutthaḥ.
—SD. IV. 10.
44. Śabdārthaśaktiyākṣipto 'pi vyaṅgyo' rthaḥ kavinā punaḥ/
Yatrāviśkriyate svoktyā sā'nyavālamkṛtirdhvaneḥ//
—DL. II. 23.
45. Agūḍhamaparsyāṅgam vācyasiddhyaṅgamasphuṭam/Sandigdhatulyaprādhānye kākvākṣiptamasundaram// Vyaṅgyamevaṃ guṇibhū-tavyaṅgyasyāṣṭau bhidā matāḥ//
—KP. V. I.
46. Vyajyante vastumātreṇa yadālamkṛtayastadā/
Dhruvam dhvanyaṅgatā tāsām kāvyavṛttistadāśrayā// —DL. II.
47. Nanu yadi alamkārepekṣayā vastumātrasya nātiśayaniyamaḥ tadā katham alamkāreṇa vastumātravyaṅjane dhvanitvam iti cet, ucyate—sa evārtho vācyāḥ san na tathā camatkaroti yathā vyaṅgyatvamāpanna ityanubhavasiddham. Ato vācyatā apakarṣahetuḥ, vyaṅgpātā tu utkarṣāya iti sthītam. Yatra ca alamkāreṇa vastumātram vyaṅgyam, tatra alamkārasya vācyatvena kiñcit apakarṣāt vastu mātrasya ca vyaṅgyatvena kiñcit utkarṣāt yujyate eva dhvanitvam.
—PR p. 145.
48. Rūpakādīralamkārastasyānaiyrbahudhoditāḥ/
Na kāntamapi nirbhūṣam vibhāti vanitānam//
Rūpakādīmalamkāram bāhyamācakṣate pare/
Supām tingām ca vyutpattim vācām vāñchantyalamkṛtim//
Tedetadāhuḥ sauśabdyam nārthavyutpattiridr̥ṣṭi/
Śabdābhidheyālamkārabhedādiṣṭam dvayam tu naḥ// —KL.
49. Śabdārthacitram yatpūrvam kāvyadvayamudāhrtam/
Guṇapradhānatatratra sthitiścitrārthaśabdayoḥ//
—KP. VI. I.

CHAPTER IV

1. Tatra vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārisaṃyogādṛaṇanispattiḥ.
—NS. p. 272.
2. Atrānuvaṃśyau ślokaḥ bhavataḥ—
Yathā bahudravayutairvyañjanairbahubhiryutam/
Āsvādayanti bhuñjānā bhaktam bhaktavido janāḥ//

- Bhāvābhīnayasambaddhān sthāyibhāvaṃstathā budhāḥ/
Āsvādayanti manasā tasmānātyarasāḥ smṛtāḥ//
—NS. pp. 289-90.
3. Nātyāt samudāyarūpāt rasāḥ. Yadi vā nātyameva rasāḥ. Rasasamudāyo hi nātyam. Na nātye eva ca rasāḥ. Kāvye'pi nātyāyāmāna eva rasāḥ. Kāvyaṛthaviṣaye hi pratyakṣakalpasamvedanodaye rasodaya ityupādhyāyāḥ.
—AB. p. 290.
4. Yādāhuḥ—
Viruddhairaviruddhairvā bhāvairvicchidyate na yaḥ/
Ātmabhāvaṃ nayatyāśu sa sthāyī lavaṇākaraḥ//
Ciraṃ citte'vatiṣṭhante, sambadhyante'nubandhibhiḥ/
Rasatvaṃ ye prapadyante prasiddhāḥ sthāyino'tre te//
...Tathā—Sajātīyavijātīyairtiraskṛtamūrtimān/
Yāvadrasaṃ vartāmānaḥ, sthāyibhavā udrāhṛtaḥ//
—RG. I. p. 37.
5. Yathāha Patañjaliḥ—'na hi caitra ekasyāṃ striyāṃ rakta ityan-yāsu viraktaḥ.
—AB. p. 293.
6. Tasmāt sthāyirūpacittavṛttisūtrasyutā evāmī vyabhicāriṇaḥ svātmānam udayāstamayavaicitryasatasahasradharmānam pratilabhamānā raktanīlasūtrasyūtaviralabhāvopalambhānasambhāvitabhangīśahasragarbhasphaṭikakācabhramakapadmarāgamarakatamahānīlādīmayagolakavattasmin sūtre svasamskāraictryam aniveśayanto'pi tatsūt-rakṛtaṃ upakārasandarbhāṃ vibhṛtaḥ svayam ca vicitrārthasthāyisūtraṃ ca vicitrāyanto'ntarāntarā śuddham api sthāyisūtraṃ pratibhāsāvakāśam upanayanto'pi pūrvāparavyabhicāriratnacchāyāśabalimānam avāśyam ānayaṇtaḥ pratibhāsante iti vyabhicāriṇa-ucyante.
—AB. p. 293.
7. Te ca...bāhyaḥadarūpabhautikanetrajalādivilakṣaṇā...bhavanti. Tathā hi—Prthībhāgapradhāne prāṇe samkrāntacittavṛttigaṇaḥ stambho viṣṭambhacetanatvam. Jalabhāgapradhāne tu vāspaḥ. Taijasastu prāṇanaikaṭyāt ubhayathā tivrātivrataṇa prāṇanugraha iti dvīdhā svedo vaivarṇyaṃ ca...Ākāśanugrahe gatacetanatvam pralayaḥ. Vāyusvātantrye tu tasya mandamadhyotkrṣṭāveśāt tredhā romāñca-vepathu-svarabhedabhāvena sthīriti bharatavidaḥ. Bāhyastu stambhādayaḥ śarīradharmā anubhāvāḥ.
—KS. pp. 119-20.
8. Gobalīvarddanyāyena iti śeṣaḥ.
—SD. III. Vṛtti on K. 143.
9. Ratyādyudbodhakā loka vibhāvāḥ kāvyanātyayoh/
Ālambanoddīpanākhyau tasya bhedāvubhau smṛtau//
Ālambanam nāyakādīstamālambya rasodgamāt.
Uddīpanavibhāste rasamuddīpayanti ye/
Ālambanasya ceṣṭādyāḥ deśakālādayastathā//
—SD. III. 32, 3, 4, 138-39.
10. Udbuddham kāraṇaiḥ svaiḥ svairbahirbhāvaṃ prakāśayan/
Loka yaḥ kāryarūpaḥ so'nubhāvāḥ kāvyanātyayoh//
Uktāḥ strīṇāmālamkāraṃ āṅgaśāca svabhāvajāḥ/
Tadrūpāḥ svattvikābhāvāstathā ceṣṭā parā api//
—SD. III. 140-41.

11. Prāk prītirdarśitā seyaṃ ratiḥ śṛṅgāratām gatā/
Rūpavāhulyayogena tadidaṃ rasavat vacaḥ/
...Ityārabhya parāṃ koṭim krodo raudrātmataṃ gataḥ/
—KD. II. 281, 83.
12. Viśayī yasya tasyaiva vyāpāro jñānalakṣaṇaḥ Jñānalakṣaṇāpratyāsattistu yadvīṣayakaṃ jñānaṃ tasyaiva pratyāsattiḥ...Evaṃ jñānalakṣaṇāyā asvikāre surabhi candanamiti jñāne saurabhābhānaṃ kathaṃ syāt.
—BP. K. 65.
13. Mate'smin sāksātkāro 'Duṣyanto'yaṃ śakuntalādiviṣayakaratiṃ mān' ityādiḥ prāgvaddharmyaṃśe laukika āropyāṃśe tvalaukikaḥ.
—RG. I. p. 33.
14. 'Vibhāvādīnām sambandhād rasasya ratyāderniṣpattirāropaḥ' iti Pañcame.
—RG. I. p. 34.
15. Vibhāvādibhiḥ kṛtrimairakṛtrimatayā gṛhītaiḥ saṃyogāt anumānāt rasasya ratyāderniṣpattiranumitiḥ naṭṭadāu pakṣe iti śeṣaḥ.
—RG. I. p. 34.
16. Duṣyantādigato ratyādirnate pakṣe duṣyantatvena gṛhīte vibhāvādibhiḥ kṛtrimairapyakṛtrimatayā gṛhītaibhinne viṣaye'nūmitisāmāgryā valavattvādanumīyamāno rasāḥ ityapare.
—RG. I. p. 34.
17. Na ca kāntātvam sādharmaṇavibhāvātāvacchedakamatrāpyasti iti vācyam, aprāmānyaniścayānālīṅgitāgamyātvaprakāraḥ jñānavirahasya viśeṣyatāsambandhāvachinnapratīyogitākasya vibhāvātāvacchedakakoṭau avāśyaṃ niveśyatvāt. Anyathā svasrāderapi kāntātvādīnā tattvāpatteḥ.
RG. I. p. 28.
18. Tasmāt kāvye doṣābhāvaguṇālamkāramayatvalakṣaṇena nātyā caturvidhābhīnayarūpeṇa nīḍanijamohasaṅkaṭakāriṇā vibhāvādisādhāraṇīkaraṇātmanā abhidhāto dvītyeṇāṃśena bhāvakatvayyāpāreṇa bhāvyaṃ māno rasāḥ anubhavasamṛtyādivilakṣaṇena rajastamo'nuvedhavaictryavalāt drutivistāravikāśalakṣaṇena sattvodrekāprakāśānandamayasaṃvidviśrāntīlakṣaṇena parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena paraṃ bhujyate iti.
—Abhinavabharati. p. 277.
19. Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārinām samyak sādharmaṇātmatayā yogāt bhāvakatvayyāpāreṇa bhāvanāt rasasya sthāyupahitasattvodrekaprakāśītasvātmānandarūpasya niṣpattiḥ bhogākhyena sāksātkāreṇa viṣayīkṛtiḥ iti dvītye.
—RG. I. p. 34.
20. Tena pratītiḥ tādā rasasya siddhā, sā ca rasanārūpā pratītirutpad-yate. Vācyavācyakayostatrābhīdhādivivikto vyañjanātmā dhvananavyāpāra eva. Bhogīkaraṇavyāpāraśca kāvyasya rasaviśayo dhvananātmaiva, nānyat kiñcit.
—LC. p. 188.
21. Uktameva muninā na tvapūrvam kiñcit. Tathāhyāha—'Kāvyaṛthāṇa bhāvayanti' iti tatkāvyārtho rasāḥ.
—AB. p. 278.
22. Sādharmaṇyena pratītiśca na sarvasambandhitayā pratītiḥ. Kintu sambandhiviśeṣyatvenāpratītau pratītiḥ.
—PR. p. 67.
23. Matasya etasya pūrvasmāt matāt bhāvakatvayyāpārāntarasavikāra eva viśeṣaḥ. Bhogastu vyaktiḥ. Bhogakṛtvam ca vyañjanāt aviśiṣṭam. Anyā tu saiva saraṇiḥ.
—RG. I. p. 29.

24. Mukutaṇpratiśīrṣakādīnā tāvat naṭabuddhirāccādyate. Gādhaprākta-nasvmbitsamskārācca kāvyabalānīyamānāpi na tatra rāmadhīh viśrāmyati. Ata eva ubhyayadeśakālatyāgaḥ. Romāñcādayaśca bhūyasā ratipratīṭikāritayā dr̥ṣṭāstatrāpi laukikā deśakālānīyamena tatra ratim gamayanti. Yasyām svātmāpi tadvāsanāvattvādanupraviṣṭaḥ. Ata eva na taṭasthatayā ratyavagamaḥ na ca niyatakāraṇatayā. Yenārjanābhisaṅgādisambhāvanā na ca niyataparātmagatatayā. yena duḥkhadveṣādyudayaḥ. —AB. I. p. 295.
25. Na jāyate tadāsvādo vinā ratyādivāsanām... Uktāñca dharmadat-tena—
Savāsanānām sabhyānām rasasyāsvādanam bhavet/
Nirvāsanāstu raṅgāntaḥkāṣṭhakuḍyāśmasannivāḥ//
—SD. III. 8 & Vṛtti rhereon.
26. Sarvathā rasanātmakavītabighnapratīṭigrāhyo bhāva eva Rasaḥ. —AP. I. p. 280.
27. Ata eva sarvasāmājikānām ekaghanatayaiva pratipattīḥ sutarām rasapariṣāya. —AB. I. p. 279.
28. Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicāribhiḥ saṃyogāt vyañjanāt rasasya cidā-nandaviśiṣṭasthāyātmanāḥ sthāyupahitacidānandātmano vā niṣpattīḥ svarāpeṇa prakāśanam ityādye. —RG. I. p. 34.
29. ...Sthāyivilakṣaṇa eva Rasaḥ. ...Tena sthāyīpratīṭīranumitirūpā prāpyā. Na Rasaḥ. Ata eva sūtra sthāyīgrahaṇam na kṛtam. Tat pratyuta śalyabhūtam syāt. Kevalam aucityāt evam ucyaṭe sthāyī rasībhūta iti. Aucitam tu tatsthāyīgatatvena kāraṇādītyā prasid-dhānām adhunā carvaṇopayogitayā vibhāvādivālembanāt. —AB. I. 284.
30. Pānakarasāsvādo'pi kim guḍamarīcādiṣu dr̥ṣṭa iti samānametat. —AB. I. p. 285.
31. Kva anyatra itthaṃ dr̥ṣṭam iti cet bhūṣaṇam etat asmākam alauki-katvasiddhau. —AB. I. p. 285.
32. Tathā cāhuḥ—'vyaktaḥ sa tairvibhāvādyaiḥ sthāyibhāvo rasaḥ smṛtaḥ' iti. Vyakto vyaktiviśayikṛtaḥ. Vyaktiśca bhagnāvaraṇā cit. Yathā hi śarāvādīnā pihito dīpastannivṛttau sannihitān padārthān prakāśayati, svayam ca prakāśate, evam ātmacaitanyam vibhāvādi-sambalitān ratyādīn. Antaḥkāraṇadharmānām sākṣibhāsyatvābhyu-pagateḥ. —RG. I. p. 26.
33. Vibhāvādināmapi svapnaturagādīnāmiva raṅgarajatādīnāmiva sākṣi-bhāsyatvam aviruddham. Vañjakavibhāvādicarvaṇāyā āvaraṇabhaṅ-gasya vā utpattivinaśābhyām utpattivinaśau rase upacaryete.... —RG. I. p. 26.
34. Tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvavapravṛtayaḥ. Tathā hi loke śakala-vighnavinirmuktā saṃvittireva camatkāranirveśarasanāsvādanabho-gasamāpattīlayaviśrāntyādiśabdairabhidhīyate. Vighnāścāsyām—Pra-tīpattau ayogyatā sambhāvanāviraḥ nāma svagatatvaparaगतat-vaniyamena deśakālaviśeṣāveśaḥ nijasukhādīvivaśībhāvaḥ pratīyū-pāyavaikalyam sphuṭatyābhāvo apradhānatā saṃśayayogaśca. —AB. I. p. 280.

35. Vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārinām saṃyogāt bhāvanāviśeṣarūpāt doṣāt rasasya anirvacanīyatyadyātmano niṣpattirutpattīḥ iti Tṛṭīye. —RG. I. p. 34.
36. Ayam hi lokottarasya kāvyavyāpārasya mahimā yatprayojyā ara-manīyā api śokādayaḥ padārthā āhlādam alaukikaṃ janayanti. Vilakṣaṇo hi kamanīyaḥ kāvyavyāpārāja āsvādaḥ pramaṇāntara-jādanubhāvāt. Janyatvam ca svajanyabhāvanājanyatyādiviśaya-katvam. Tena rasāsvādasya kāvyavyāpārājanyatvepi na kṣatīḥ. —RG. I. p. 31-32.
37. Etaīśca svātmani duṣyantatvadharmitāvacchedakaśakuntalādiviśa-yakarativaiśiṣṭyāvagāhī, svātmatvaviśiṣṭe śakuntalādiviśayakarati-visiṣṭaduṣyantatādātmyāvagāhī, svātmatvaviśiṣṭe duṣyantatvaśakun-talāviśayakaratyorvaiśiṣṭyāvagāhī vā trividho'pi bhdho rasapa-dārthatayā abhyuṇyayaḥ. —RG. I. p. 32.
38. Vibhāvādinām saṃyogāt jñānāt rasasya jñānaviśeṣātmano niṣ-pattirutpattīḥ iti caturthe. —RG. I. p. 34.
39. Vikāśaḥ kusumasyeva pādapasyeva vistarāḥ/
Kṣobho'bdheriva vikṣepo mārutasasyeva cetasaḥ//
—EV. p. 96.
40. Śṛṅgārāddhi bhaveddhāsyō raudrācca karuṇo rasaḥ/
Vīrācivādbhutotpattirbībhatsācca bhayānakaḥ//
—NS. VI. 39.
41. Śāntasya tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasya yaḥ paripoṣastallakṣaṇo rasaḥ prati-yate eva.
Tathā cōktam—
Yacca kāmāsukhaṃ loke yacca divyaṃ mahatsukhaṃ/
Tṛṣṇākṣayasukhasyaite nārhaṭaḥ ṣoḍarśīm salām//
—DL. III. Vṛtti on K. 26.
42. Śāntaḥ śamasthāyibhāvaḥ uttamaprakṛtirmataḥ/
Kundendusundaracchāyaḥ śrīnārāyaṇadaivataḥ//
Anītyavādīnā' śeṣavastuniḥsārātā tu yā/
Paramātmāsvarūpaṃ vā tasyāḥ lambanamiśyate//
Puṇyāśramaharikṣetratīrtharamyavanādayaḥ/
Mahāpuruṣasaṅgādyāstasyoddīpanarūpiṇaḥ//
Romāñcādyāśnubhāvāstathā syurvyabhicāriṇaḥ/
Nirvedaharṣasmarāṇamatibhūṭadayādayaḥ//
—SD. III. 210.
43. Yairapi nāṭye śānto raso nāstītyabhyupagamyate, tairapi bādhakā-bhāvāt mahābhārataḍiprabandhānām śāntarasapradhānatāyā akīla-lokānubhavasiddhatvācca kāvyē sā' vāsyam svikāryaḥ. Ata eva 'aṣṭau nāṭye rasāḥ smṛtāḥ' ityupakramya 'śānto'pi navamo rasaḥ' iti Mammatābhaṭṭa apyupasaṃmāhāṣuḥ. —RG. I.
44. Vatsalaśca rasa iti tena sa daśamo rasaḥ/
Sphuṭam camatkāritayā vatsalaśca rasaṃ viduḥ//
—SD. III. 231.
45. Premarase sarve rasā antarbhavanti ityātry mahīyāneva prapañcaḥ. Keṣāñcinmate śrīrādhākṛṣṇayoh śrīṅgāra eva rasaḥ. Śrīṅgāro'ṅgī premāṅgam, aṅgasyāpi kvacit udriktatā. Vayam tu premāṅgī.

- śrīṅgāro'ṅgam iti viśeṣaḥ. Tathā ca—Unmajjanti nimajjanti prem-
nyakhaṇḍarasatvataḥ/
Sarve rasāśca bhāvāśca taraṅgā iva vāridhau//
—AK. V. p. 148.
46. Sa navadhā bhaktaḥ. Bhaktirsasyaiva hāsya-śrīṅgākaruṇa-raudra-
bhayānaka-bībhatsa-śāntādbhuta-vīrarūpeṇa anubhavāt. Vyāsādib-
hirvarṇitasya viṣṇoḥ viṣṇubhaktānām vā caritrasya navarasātma-
kasya śravaṇādīnā janitaścamatkāro bhaktirasah.
—MP. p. 164.
47. Vibhāvairanubhāvāśca sāttvikairvyabhicāribhiḥ/
Svādyatvaṃ hṛdi bhaktānāmānītā śravaṇādibhiḥ/
Eṣā kṛṣṇaratih sthāyī bhāvo bhaktiraso bhavet//
&
Bhavedbhaktiraso' pyeṣa mukhyagaunatayā dvidhā/
... ..
Evam bhaktiraso bhedāt dvayordvādaśadhocyate//
—BHS—Pañcama-laharī, pp. 120 & 293.
48. Eṣā ca prītilukikekāvyavidāṃ ratyādivat kārapakāryyasahāyāḥ
militvā rasāvasthām āpnuvati svayaṃ sthāyī bhāva ucyate.
... Tataḥ kāraṇādīṣpurtiśeṣavyaktasphurtiśeṣā tanmilitā bhaga-
vatprītiśāntādivyapīṭirāsamay ucyate; Bhaktimayo raso Bhaktirasa
iti ca.
—PTS. p. 571.
49. Tasmāt laukikasya eva vibhāvādeḥ rasajanakatvaṃ na śraddheyam,
Tajjanakatve ca sarvatra bībhatasajanakatvameva siddhyati.
—PTS. p. 583.
50. Ratirdevādiviśayā Vyabhicārī tathorjitah/
Bhāvah prokto Raso neti yaduktam Rasakovidaiḥ//
Devāntareṣu Jibyatvāt Parānandaprakāśanāt/
Tad vojyam paramānandarūpe na paramātmāni//
Kāntādiviśayā vā ye Rasādyāstra nedrśam/
Rasatvaṃ puṣyate purnaśukhāspārśitvakāraṇāt//
Paripurnarasā kṣudrarasebhyo Bhagavatratih/
Khadyotebhyā ivādityaprabheva valavattarā//
—BS. 2/75-78.
51. Ātmasthitam guṇaviśeṣamahāhṛtasya
Śrīṅgāramāhūriha jīvitamātmayoneḥ/
Tasyātmāśaktirasaniyatavā rasatvaṃ
Yuktasya yena rasiko'yamiti pravādaḥ//
... ..
Śrīṅgāra-vīra-karuṇādbhuta-hāsya-raudra-
Bībhatsa-vatsala-bhayānaka-śāntanāmanah/
Āmnāśiśurdasa rasān sudhiyo, vayaṃ tu
Śrīṅgārameva rasanād rasamāmanāmaḥ//
SP. I.
52. Āsvādāṅkurakando'sti dharmah kaścan cetasaḥ/
Rajastamobhyāṃ hīnasya śuddhasattvatayā sataḥ//
Āsvādāṅkurakando'sau Bhāvah Sthāyī Rasāyate//
... ..

- Rasasyānandadharmatvādaikadhyam Bhāva Eva hi/
Upādhibhedānnānātvaṃ ratyādaya Upādhayaḥ//
—AK. V. 62-63, 71.
53. Ratirdevādiviśayā vyabhicārī tathāñjitah Bhāvah proktaḥ.
—KP. IV/35.
54. Bhāvasya śāntirudayaḥ sandhiḥ śabalata tathā/Sandhirekakārameva
tulyakakṣayorāsvādaḥ. Śabalatā tu kālabhedena nīrantaratayā
pūrvapūrvopamardinām. Na ca bhāvasya śabalatāyā śāntyudaya-
bhyāmaviśeṣaḥ. Śānterudayaṣya vā ekaikasya asvāde tadbhedad-
vay opagamāt.
—PR. p. 94.
55. Anaucityameka eva Doṣaḥ : anye tu tasya prapañcabhūtaḥ-Vyakti-
viveka II, referring to which Śrīharṣa comments : Doṣaṃ Vyakti-
viveke'muṃ Kavilokavilocane/Kāvyaīmāṃ sīṣuḥ prāptamahimā
mahimādrtaḥ//
—Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā IV. 248.
56. Upanāyakasamsthāyām munigurupatnīgātāyāñca/
Bahunāyakaviśayāyām ratau tathā'nubhayaniṣṭhāyām//
Pratināyakaniṣṭhatve tadvadhamapātrtiragādigate/
Śrīṅgāre'naucityam raudre gurvādigatakope//
Śānte ca hīnaniṣṭhe gurvādyālambane hāsye/
Brahmavadhādyutsāhe' dhamapātragate tathā vīre//
Uttamapātragate bhayānake jñeyamevamanyatra//
—SD. III. 238.
57. Apare tu rasābhāsaṃ tiryakṣu pracakṣate, tanna parīkṣākṣamam,
teṣu api vibhāvādisambhavāt Vibhāvādijñānaśūnyāstiryañco na
bhājanam bhavitum arhanti rasasyeti cet na, manuṣyeṣu api
keṣucit tathābhūteṣu rasaviśayabhāvābhavaprasaṅgāt. Vibhāvādis-
ambhavo hi rasam prati prayojako na vibhāvādijñānam. Tataśca
tiraścāmapyastyeva rasaḥ.
—EV. p. 106.
58. Rasapadenātra prakaraṇe tadupādhiḥ sthāyibhāvo grhyate. Rasasya
sāmājikavṛttitvena nāyakādyavṛttitvāt advitīyānandamayatvena
virodhāsambhavacca.
—RG. I. p. 57.
59. Virodhastāvaddivividhaḥ, sthitivirodho jñānavirodhaśca.
—RG. I. p. 57.
60. Tatra adhikaraṇāntare virodhinaḥ sthāpane prathamō nivartate.
—RG. I. p. 57.
61. Rasāntarasya avirodhinaḥ sandhikarturiva antarāle avasthāpane
dvitīyo'pi nivartate.
—RG. I. p. 57.
62. Aṅgāṅgiṇoḥ aṅgini anyasmin aṅgayor vā na virodhaḥ, aṅgatvānu-
papattiprasaṅgāt.
—R.G. I. p. 58.
63. Api ca yatra sādharmaṇaviśeṣaṇamahimnā viruddhayaḥ avivyakti-
tatrāpi virodho nivartate.
—RG. I. p. 58.
64. Virodhamavirodham ca sarvatrettham nirūpayet/
Viśeṣatastu śrīṅgāre sukumāratamo hyasau//
—DL. III. 28.
65. Kim ca śrīṅgārasya sakalajanamanoḥarābhīrāmatvāt tadanāgasamā-
veśaḥ kāvyē śobhātiśayam puṣyati ityanenāpi prakāreṇa virodhini
rase śrīṅgārāṅgasamāveśo na virodhī.
—DL. Vṛtti, on III. 30.

66. ...Vyaṅgyasya vācyīkaṇe sāmānyato vamanākhyadoṣasya vak-
ṣyamānatvāt. Āsvādyatāvachedakarūpeṇa pratyājanakatayā rasas-
thale vācyavṛtteḥ kāpeyakalpatvena viśeṣadoṣatvācca.
—RG. I. p. 61.
67. Samavalapravalapratikūlarasāṅgānām nibandhanam tu prakṛtara-
ṣaposaprātipikamīti doṣaḥ. —RG. I. p. 61.
68. Vamśa-vīrya-śrutādīni varṇayitvā riporapi/
Tajjayāt nāyakotkarṣa ityasmākaṁ dhinoti naḥ//
—KP. I. 22.
69. Yādṛśasya pratināyakotkarṣavarṇanasya tadabhibhāvakanāyakotkar-
sāṅgatāsampādakatvaṁ tādṛśasya iṣṭatvāt, tadvirodhinaḥ eva niṣe-
dhyatvāt. Na ca pratipakṣasya prakṛtāpekṣayā varṇyamāno'pyut-
karṣaḥ svāśrayahantṛatāmātrādeva prakṛtagatam utkarṣam atīśāya-
yet, ato na doṣāvaha iti vācyam. Evaṁ hi sati mahārājaṁ ka-
mapi viśaśarakṣepamātreṇa vyāpāditavato varākasya śavarasyeva
prakṛtasya nāyakasya na ko'pi utkarṣaḥ syādiṭi.
—RG. I. p. 63.
70. Evaṁ prakṛtarasānupakāraḥ vastuno varṇanamapi prakṛtara-
savirāmahetutvāt doṣa eva. —RG. I. p. 63.
71. Anaucityaṁ tu rasabhaṅgaḥ pariharaṇīyam. Bhaṅgaśca pāna-
kādirasādaḥ sīkatādinipātajanitevāruntudatā.
—RG. I. p. 63.
72. Tadayamatra paramārthaḥ—
Anaucityādṛte nānyat rasabhaṅgasya kāraṇam/
Prasiddhaucityabandhastu rasasyopaniṣat parā//
Ata eva ca Bharate prakhyātavastuviśayatvaṁ prakhyātoḍātanā-
yakatvaṁ ca nāṭakasya avaśyakartavyatayā upanyastam. Tena hi
nāyakaucityānaucityaviśaye kaviṇa vyāmuhyati. Yastūtpādyavastu
nāṭakādi kuryāt tasya aprasiddhānucitanāyakasvabhāvavarṇane
mahān pramādaḥ. —DL. Vṛtti on III. 14.
73. Parikarāślokaścātra—
'Avyutpattikṛto doṣaḥ śaktyā samvriyate kaveḥ/
Yastvaśaktikṛtastasya sa jhaṭityavabhāṣate//
Tathā hi-Mahākavīnām api uttamadevatāviśayaprasiddhasambho-
gaśṅgāra-nibandhanādyanaucityaṁ śaktitiraskṛtatvāt grāmyatvena
na pratibhāṣate. Yathā kumārasambhave Devīsambhoghavarṇa-
nam. —DL. Vṛtti on III. 6.
74. Na ca sādharmaṇīkaraṇāt āradhyatvajñānānutpattiriti vācyam.
Yatra sahrdayānām rasodbodhaḥ pramāṇasiddhaḥ tatraiva sādha-
raṇīkaraṇasya kalpanāt. Anyathā svamātrviśayakasvapitṛativarṇa-
ne'pi sahrdayasya rasodbodhāpatteḥ. Jayadevādibhistu Gītagovindā-
dīprabandheṣu śakalasahrdaya'ammato'yaṁ samayo madonmatta-
mataṅgaḥjairiva bhinnāḥ iti na tannidarśanena idānīntanena tathā
varṇayitum sāmpratam. —RG. I. p. 64.
75. Kathāśarīramutpādyavastu kāryaṁ tathā tathā/
Yathā rasamayaṁ sarvameva tat pratibhāṣate//
... ..

- Santi siddharasaprakya ye ca rāmāyaṇādayaḥ/
Kathāśrayā na tairyojyā svecchā rasavirodhīni//
—DL. Vṛtti on III. 14.
76. Vibhāvabhāvānubhāvasaṅcāryaucityacāruṇaḥ/
Vidhiḥ kathāśarīrasya vṛttasyotprekṣitasya vā//
Itivṛttavaśyātām tyaktvānanugūṇam sthitim/
Utprekṣyāpyantarābhīṣṭarasocitakathonnayaḥ//
Sandhisandhyaṅgaghaṭanam rasābhivyaktyapekṣayā/
Na tu kevalayā śāstrasthitisampādanecchayā//
Uddīpanaprasāmane yathāvasaramantarā/
Rasayārabdhaviśrānteranusandhānamāṅginaḥ//
Alaṁkṛtīnām śaktāvapyānurūpyeṇa yojanam/
Prabandhasya rasādīnām vyañjakatve nibandhanam//
—DL. III. 10-14.

CHAPTER V

1. Tatrābhāvavikalpasya trayāḥ prakārāḥ—śabdārthagūṇālaṁkāra-
ṇāmeva śabdārthaśobhākaritvāt lokaśāstrīritiktasundaraśabdārtha-
mayasya na śobhāhetuḥ kaścīdanyo'sti sti ye'-smābhīrna gaṇita
ityekaḥ prakāraḥ, yo vā na ganitaḥ sa śobhākārī eva na bhavati
iti dvitīyaḥ, atha śobhākārī bhavati tarhi asmadukte eva guṇe vā
alaṁkāre vā antarbhavati, nāmāntarakaraṇe tu kiyadidaṁ pāṇḍit-
yam. —LC. p. 15.
2. Tathā cānyena kṛta evātra ślokaḥ—
Yasminnasti na vastu kiñcana manaḥprahlādi sālaṁkṛti
Vyutpanna' racitaṁ ca naiva vacanairvakroktiśūnyaṁ
ca yat/
Kāvyam taddhaninā samanvitamīti prītyā praśamsaṇjaḍo
No vidmo' bhidadhātī kiṁ sumatinā pṛṣṭaḥ svarūpaṁ
dhvaneḥ//
—DL. I. page 26.
3. Bhajyate sevyaṭe padārthena prasiddhatayā utprekṣyate iti, bhaktir-
dharmo'bhīdheyena sāmīpyādīḥ, tata āgato bhāktō lākṣaṇiko'rthaḥ.
...Guṇasamudāyavṛtteḥ śabdasyārthabhāgastaiḥkṣṇādirbhaktīḥ, tata
āgato gaṇo'rtho bhāktāḥ. Bhaktīḥ pratipādye sāmīpyataikṣṇyādaḥ
śraddhātīśayaḥ, tāṁ prayojanatvenoddiśya tata āgato bhāktō iti
gaṇo lākṣaṇikaśca. —LC. p. 30.
4. Etaduktam bhavati—dhvanatīti vā, dhvanyata iti vā, dhvanana-
miti vā yadi dhvaniḥ, tathāpyupacaritaśabdārthavyapārātirikto
nāsau kaścīti. Mukhyārthe hyabhidhaiva iti pāriśeṣyādamukhya eva
dhvaniḥ, tṛtīyārāśyabhāvāt. —LC. p. 31.
5. Amukhyavṛttā kāvyeṣu vyavahāraṁ darśayatā,—commenting on
which Locana states—Bhaṭṭodbhāṭavāmanādīnā. —LC. p. 32.
& Iha hi tāvat Bhāmahodbhāṭaprabhṛtayaścīrantanālaṁkāraḥ
pratīyamānamarthaṁ vācyopaskāratayā alaṁkārapakṣaṇikṣiptam
mayante. —ALS. p. 3.

dūrībhavati, vācyāvabhāśāvinābhāvena tasya prakāśanāt. Tasmād ghaṭapradīpanyāyastayoh. Yathaiva hi pradīpavāreṇa ghaṭapratī-tāvutpannāyām na pradīpaprakāśo nivartate vyaṅgyapratīṭāu vācyā-vabhāśaḥ. Yattu prathamoddyote—'yathā padārthadvāreṇa' ityā-dyuktaṃ, tadupāyatvasāmyamātrasya vivakṣayā.

—DL. III. pp. 419-21.

25. Yaḥ saṃyogaviyogābhyām karaṇairupajanyate/
Sa sphoṭaḥ śabdajaśśabdā dhvanayo'nyairudāhrtāḥ//
—VP. I. 102.
26. Pratyayairanupākyeyairgrahāṇānugūṇaistathā/
Dhvanīprakāśīte śabde svarūpamavadhāryate// —VP. I. 83.
27. Śabdasyordhamabhivyakṭervṛttibhede tu vaikṛtāḥ/
Dhvanayaḥ samupohante sphoṭātmā tairna bhidyate//
—VP. I. 77.
28. Yatrārthaḥ śabdo vā tamarthamupasarjanīkṛtasvārthau/
Vyaṅktaḥ kāvyaviśeṣaḥ sa dhvaniriti sūribhiḥ kathitaḥ//
—DL. I. 13.
29. Anena vācyavācakacārutvahetubhya upamādibhyo'nuprāśā-dibhyaśca vibhakta eva dhvanerViśaya iti darśitam.
—DL. I. 13.
30. Vyaṅgyaprādhānye hi dhvaniḥ. Na caitat samāsoktyādiśvasti.
—DL. I. p. 108.
31. Cārutvotkarṣanibandhanā hi vācyavyaṅgyayoh prādhānyavivakṣā.
—DL. I. p. 114.
32. Api ca saṅkarālaṃkare'pi ca kvacit saṅkaroktīreva dhvanīsam-bhāvanām nirākaroti.
—DL. I. pp. 124-25.
33. Taṣmādaṅgatvena ca rasādīnāmalāṃkāratā. Yaḥ punaraṅgī raso bhāvo vā sarvākāramalāṃkāryaḥ sa dhvanerātmeti.
—DL. II. p. 204.

CHAPTER VI

1. Dvididho hi viśayaḥ śabdānām—anumeyaḥ pratipādyāśca, Tatrā-numeyo vivakṣālakṣaṇaḥ. Vivakṣā ca śabdavarūpaprakāśaneccā, śabdenārthaprakāśaneccā ceti dviprakārā. Tatrādyā na śabdavya-vahārāṅgam, sā hi prāṇitvamātrapratipattiphalā. Dvitiyā tu śabda-viśeṣādvadhāraṇāvasitavyavahitā'pi śabdakaraṇavyavahāranibandha-nam. Te tu dve apyanumeyo viśayaḥ śabdānām. Pratipādyastu prayokturarthapratipādanasamīhaviśayikṛto'rthaḥ. Sa ca dvididho vācyo vyaṅgyāśca.
—DL. III. p. 449.
2. Na ca vyañjakatvaṃ līṅgatvarūpameva, ālokādiśvanyathā dr̥ṣtat-vāt.
—DL. III. p. 453.
3. KāvyaViśaye ca vācyavyaṅgyapratīṭinām satyatvāsatyatvanirūpaṇa-syāprayojaktvameveti tatra pramāṇāntaravyāpārāparikṣā upahāśaya-yaiva sampadyate.
Tasmāllīṅgipratīṭireva sarvatra vyaṅgyapratīṭiriti na śakyate vak-tum.

- Yattvanumeyarūpavyaṅgyaviśayaṃ śabdānām vyañjakatvaṃ, tad-dhvanivyavahārasyāprayojakam. —DL. III. pp. 455-56.
4. Anumāne'ntarbhāvaṃ sarvasyaiva dhvaneḥ prakāśayitum/
Vyaktivivekaṃ kurute praṇamya Mahimā parām vācam//
—VV. I. 1.
 5. Sambhavyabhicārābhyām syād viśeṣaṇamarthavat/
Na śaityena na cauṣṇyena vahnīḥ kvāpi viśīṣyate//
—TV. I. 3.
 6. Uktam guṇīkṛtātmatvaṃ yadarthasya viśeṣaṇam/
Gamakatvānna tat tasya yuktamavyabhicārataḥ//
—VV. I. 7.
 7. Yo hi yadarthamupādīyate, nāsau tamevopasarjanīkarotīti yuktam vaktum yathodakādyupādānārthamupātto ghaṭādistadevodaḥ. Anyathā pradhānetaravyavasthā niribandhanaiva syāt.
—VV. I. p. 16.
 8. Kiñca yathābhīdeyo'rthastadvīśeṣaṇam copāttaṃ tadvadabhidhāpyu-pādānamarhatyeva. Anyathā yatra Dīpakālaṃkāradālaṃkāraṇta-rasyopamādeḥ pratīṭistatra dhvanitvamīṣṭam na syāt tallakṣaṇenā-vyāpteḥ.
—VV. I. pp. 18-19.
 9. Yathā ca vākyārthaviśaye sādhyasādhanā-bhāve sādhyasādhanā-pratītyoh sulakṣyaḥ kramabhāvaḥ tathā vastumātrādāvanumeya-viśaye'pyavagantavyaḥ kevalam rasādīśvanumeyeṣvayamasamlakṣya-kramo gamyagamakabhāva iti sahabhāvabhāntimātrakṛtastatrān-yeṣām vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-bhāvābhyupagamaḥ, tannibandhanaśca dhvanivyapadeśaḥ. Sa tu tatraupacārika eva prayukto na mukhyaḥ tasya vakṣyamāṇanayena bādhitatvāt. Upacārasya ca prayojanaṃ sacetanacamatkāritvaṃ nāma.
—VV. I. p. 53.
 10. Ata eva śrūyamāṇānām śabdānām dhvanivyapadeśyānāmantaḥ sanniveśinaśca sphoṭābhīmatasyārthasya vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāvo na sambhavatīti vyañjakatvasāmyāt yaḥ śabdārthātmani kāvye dhvanivyapadeśaḥ so'pyanupapannaḥ, tatrāpi kāryakāraṇamūlasya gamya-gamaka-bhāvasy-opagamāt.
—VV. I. p. 57.
 11. Na hi vibhāvānubhāvavyabhicārīnaḥ eva rasā iti kasyacidavaga-maḥ. Ata eva vibhāvādipratītyavinābhāvinī rasādīnaṃ pratīṭiriti tatpratītyoh kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvenāvasthānāt kramo'vaśyambhāvī. Sa tu lāghavānna lakṣyate ityalakṣyakrama eva santo vyaṅgyā rasādaya ityuktaṃ.
Tasmādabhidhānābhīdeyapratītyoriva vācyavyaṅgya-pratītyorni-mitta-nimittibhāvād niyatabhāvī kramaḥ. —DL. III. p. 404.
 12. Tadevaṃ vācyapratīyamānayorvakṣyamāṇakrameṇa līṅgaliṅgibhā-vasya samarthanāt sarvasyaiva dhvaneranumānāntarbhāvaḥ saman-vito bhavati, tasya ca tadepekṣyayā mahāviśayatvāt. Mahāviśayat-vaṃ cāsyā dhvanivyatirikte'pi viśaye paryāyoktādu guṇī-bhūtavyaṅgyādu ca sarvatra sambhavāt.
—VV. I. pp. 63-64.
 13. Tacca vacanavyāpārāpūrvakatvāt parārthamityavagantavyam.... tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi dr̥ṣtānte tadavedīnaḥ/Khyāpyete viduṣām vācyo hetureva ca kevalaḥ.
—VV. I. pp. 64-65.

- 13 (a). Bhrāntirapi sambandhataḥ Pramā.
Maṇipradīpaprabhayor maṇibuddhyābhidhāvatoḥ/
Mithyājñānāviśeṣe'pi viśeṣo'arthakriyām prati//
—VV. I. p. 74.
14. Tadevaṃ vibhāvādīnām hetvādīnām ca kṛtimā-kṛtimatayā kāvyā-
lokaviśayatayā ca svarūpabhede viśayabhede cāvasthite satyekat-
vāsiddheryadā vibhāvādibhirbhāveṣu ratyādiṣu asatyēṣu eva prati-
tirupajanyate tadā teṣāṃ tanmātrasārāt vāt pratiyamānā iti gamyā
iti ca vyapadeśā mukhyavṛttyopapadyante eva. —VV. I. p. 73.
15. VV. I. pp. 76-78.
16. VV. I. p. 80.
17. Athobhayaorapi grahaṇaṃ na kariṣyate iti tarhyanumānasyaiva
tallakṣaṇaṃ paryavasyati na vyakteḥ. Tacceṣṭameva naḥ, vācya-
pratiyamānayoḥ satoreva ca krameṇaiva prakāśopagamāt.
—VV. I. p. 81.
18. Yadyartha iti vācyo'rtho'bhimato'vyāptireva sā/
Yenaivaṃ vādīnīyādāvartasyārthāntarādgaṭiḥ//
Athobhau tarhyativyāptirdivitravastuvyavāyini/
Prahelikādirūpe'pi Kāvye dhvanyātmatā yataḥ//
—VV. I. p. 88.
19. Arthasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ śabdaḥ saviśeṣanastadaḥ pumstam
Dvivacanavāśabdau ca vyaktirdivhanirnāma kāvyavaiśiṣṭam/
Vacanañca kathanakartuḥ kathitā dhvanilakṣmaṇītidaśa doṣā
Ye tvanye tadbhedaprabhedalakṣaṇagatā na te gaṇitāḥ//
—VV. I. p. 104.
20. Vācyastadanumito vā yatrārtho'rthāntaraṃ prakāśayati/
Sambandhataḥ kutuācit sā Kāvyanūmitirityuktā//
Etaccānumānasyaiva lakṣaṇaṃ nānyasya. Yaduktam "Trirūpālīngā-
khyānaṃ parārthānūmānamiti. Kevalaṃ samjñābhedaḥ.
—VV. I. p. 105.
21. Yaḥ satatvasamāropastatsambandhanibandanaḥ/
Mukhyārthabādhe so'pyarthaṃ sambandhamanumāpayet//
Tatsāmyatatsambandhau hi tatvāropaikakāraṇam/
Guṇavṛtterdivrūpāyāstatpratītirato'numā//
—VV. I. p. 116.
22. VV. I. pp. 116-18.
23. Bhaktyā bibharti caikatvaṃ rūpābhedaḥ dayam dhvaniḥ/
Na ca nāvyaṇṇatīvyāptyorabhāllakṣyate tayā//
... ..
Tasmāt vyutpattīśaktibhyāṃ nibandho yaḥ skhaladateḥ/
Śabdasya so'pi vijñeyo'numānaviśayo'nyavat//
—VV. I. pp. 119, 121.
24. Tenārthāntaragatirārthī tātparyaśaktijā na punaḥ.
—VV. I. p. 122.
25. Tadayuktam. Sākṣacchabdasyārthapratītihetutvāsiddheḥ. Pāram-
paryeṇa tu tasya hetutvopagame vastūnām hetuphalabhāvavyavahā-
rāniyamo na vyavatiṣṭhate....Kiñcāyaṃ viśamaḥ śaraḍrṣṭānto-
panyāsaḥ. —VV. I. p. 123.

26. Prasiddhaṃ mārgamutsrjya yatra vaicitryasiddhaye/
Anyathaivocyate so'rthaḥ sa vakroktirudāhṛtā//
... ..
Atrocyaṭ'bhidhāsaṇjñāḥ śabdasyārthaparakāśane/
Vyāpāra eka eveṣṭo yastvanyo'rthasya so'khilāḥ//
Vācyādarthāntaraṃ bhinnam yadi tallīngamasya saḥ/
Tannāntarīyakatayā nibandho hyasya lakṣaṇam//
Abhede bahutā na syāt uktermārgāntarāgrahāt/
Tena dhvanivadeśā'pi vakroktiranumā nu kim//
—VV. I. pp. 126-27.
27. VV. I. pp. 129-32.
28. Tasmāt bhāktameva dyotakatvamupagantavyam, na mukhyaṃ,
bhakteśca prayojanaṃ vācyasyārthasya spuṭatvapratipattiḥ. Nimit-
taṃ cā viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyapratītyorāśubhāvitayā kramānupalakṣaṇāt
sahabhāvapratītiḥ. —VV. I. p. 131.
29. Atā'tadātmabhūtasya ye'bhāvaṃ jagadurdhvaneḥ/
Te mudhaiva pratikṣiptāḥ svoktibhāvamapaśyatā//
Atheṣyate sa tatrāpi rasādivyaktyapakṣayā/
Kāvymeavānyathā na syādrasātmakamidam yataḥ//
Vācyasyetyetaduktam syānmata saivānumā tataḥ//
—VV. I. pp. 142-43.
30. VV. I. pp. 146-47.
31. Atyantatiraṣkṛtavācyastu padarthopacāra eva yathā Gourvāhikāḥ
iti Tasyāpyanumānāntarbhāvaḥ samarthitāḥ eva. —VV. I. 147.
32. Nāvivakṣītavācyasya dhvaneryuktā prakāratā/
Na hi prakārastasyaiva sa evetyupapadyate//
Bhaktiḥ padārthavākyaṅrtharūpatvād dvidivdhā matā//
Tadbuddhiścanumānanta bhūtā yadupapādītā//
Tat tiraṣkṛtavācyasya dhvanerbhakteśca kā bhidā/
Dvitiyo'pi prakāro yaḥ so'pi saṅgacchate katham//
Parasparaviruddhatvād vivakṣātataratvayog/
Yaḥ śabdaśaktimūlo'nyaḥ prabhedo varṇito dhvaneḥ//
So'yukto'nyato evāsau tatpreṣārthāntare matīḥ/
Śabde śaktyantarābhāvasyāśakṛt pratipādanat//
—VV. I. p. 148.
33. Avāśyom caitadabhyupagantavyam. Anathā śūktikārajatapatītyo-
rapi kramabhāvinoryetadparyanuyogoprasaṅgaḥ kena vāryate. Tas-
mād bādhyabādhaḥ bhāvavāśayakṛta evāttrottarārthviśrāntiniyama
iti sthitam. —VV. III. p. 401.
34. VV. III. pp. 401-03.
35. VV. III. pp. 405-07.
36. VV. III. pp. 417-18.
37. Kiñca na svabhāvataḥ eva śabdānām arthapratītikramaḥ iti niya-
masambhavaḥ. Kintarhi? Sāmagrīvaśāt. —VV. III. p. 419.
38. Tasmāt upapattīśūnyaḥ evāyaṃ gatānugatikatayā anekārthaśabda-
prayogavipralabdavyākhyātparamparāsamayamātrapravartitāḥ śab-
daśaktimālānusvānarūpārthāntarapratītipakṣaḥ.
—VV. III. p. 423.

39. Tadevam dhvaneranumānāntarbhāvābhyupagamaḥ śreyāniti. Tadi-
dam vistarasyāsyā tātparyamavadharyatām/
Yārthāntarābhivyaktaḥ vassāmagrīṣṭā nibandhanam//
Saivānumitīpakṣe no gamakatvena sammatā/
Anyato'nyasya hi jñānamanumaikasamāśrayam//
Vācyavacakayoḥ śvārthaprādhānyapratīṣedhataḥ/
Dhvanēḥ śaktyantarābhāvād vyakteścānupapattitah//
Prānabhūtā dhvanervyaktirīti saiva vivecitā/
Yattvanyat tatra vimatiḥ prāyo nāstītyupekṣitam//
—VV. III. pp. 454-55.
40. Atra vyaktivādinō'yamabhiprāyaḥ—Yadetadarthasya guṇīkṛtātmat-
vam tadarthāntarapratyāyakatvenopāyatvādaprādhānyam, pratiya-
mānāpekṣayā acārutvam, viśrāntatvenārthāntarānupakāryatvam ceti
trayāḥ pakṣāḥ sambhavanti. Tatrādyam pakṣadvayamanūdyā kāmam
dūṣitam. ...Tṛtīyastu pakṣa Guṇībhūtavyaṅgyanirāsāya siddhānti-
taḥ. Tathā hi—Samāsoktyādaḥ pratiyamānārtho vācyārthoupayiko'
pi na svātmani viśrāntim bhājate, pratyāvṛtya vācyārthopaskārāya
pravṛttatvāt. ...Tataśca Guṇībhūtavyaṅgye vācyasya svaviśrāntat-
venārthāntaropakāryatvam vyāvartyamīti viśeṣaṇamupapannam.
—VVV. I. p. 13.
41. Vyaktivādināḥ punarmate śabdasya śaktyantarasarmanāt svarū-
peṇa upādānasya sārthakatvam vivakṣyate. Tasya copasarjanīkṛtār-
thatvam viśeṣaṇam saprayojanameva. Tathā hi 'dṛṣṭyā Kesava
goparāgahr̥tayā' ityādaḥ pratiyamānasya arthasya śabdasprṣṭatvāt
vācyam prati upaskāratvāt vācyārthāpekṣayā śabdasya guṇīkṛ-
tārthatvam nāsti. Tadvyavacchedārtham viśeṣaṇam upādeyameva.
—VVV. I. pp. 17-18.
42. DL. II. Kārikā 23.
43. Atra vyaktivādinō'yamāśayah-ihā cirantanairalamkāratantraprajā
patibhirbhaṭṭodbhāṭaprabhṛtibhiḥ śabdārthadharmā evālamkārah,
pratipāditāḥ, nābhidharmāḥ, yato'rthapratipattyunneyaḥ śabdavyā-
pārah śabdoccāraṇavyāpāro vābhidhā. Na ca tatprakāratvamalamkā-
kāranām yuktimat. cārutvam hi vaicitrāparapāryām prakāśamāna-
malamkārah. Na ca śabdoccāraṇasyārthaprakāśanasya vā cārut-
vam prakāśate, uccāryamānasya ca pratipādyamānasya ca cārut-
vapratīteḥ. Tena cārutvasya sadbhāvacchabdārthadharmā evālamkā-
kārah nyāyāḥyā, nābhidharmāḥ. —VVV. I. p. 18.
44. Vyañkta itī dvivacanenedamāha—Yadyapyavivakṣitavācyē śabda eva
vyañjakastathāpyarthasyāpi sahakāritā na truṭyati, anyathā ajñā-
tārtho'pi śabdastadvyañjakah syāt. Vivakṣitānyaparavācyē ca
śabdasyāpi sahakāritvam bhavatyeva, viśiṣṭaśabdābhidheyatayā
vinā tasyārthasyāvyañjakatvāditi sarvatra śabdārthayorubhayorapi
dhvananam vyāpārah. Tena yadbhaṭṭanāyakena dvivacanam dūṣi-
tam tadgajanimilikayaiva. Artha śabdo veti tu vikalpābhidhānam
prādhānyābhiprāyeṇa. —LC. p. 104.
45. Na so'sti pratyayo loke yaśśabdānugamādṛte/
Anubiddham iva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāṣate//
—VP. I. 124.

- Ātmarūpaṁ yathā jñāne jñeyarūpaṁ ca dṛṣyate/
Artharūpaṁ tathā śabde svarūpaṁ ca prakāśate//
—VP. I. 50.
46. VVV. I. p. 103.
47. Artho vā śabdo vā vyāpāro vā. Artho'pi vācyo vā dhvanatīti,
śabo'pyevam vyaṅgyo vā dhvanyate iti vyāpāro vā śabdārthayordh-
vananamitī. Kārikayā tu prādhānyena samudāya eva kāvyarūpa
mukhyatayā dhvanirīti pratipāditam. —LC. pp. 105-06.
48. Vyañjakapratītikāle hi niyamena vyaṅgyapratītirīti nāsmākam
āśayaḥ. Vyaṅgyapratītikāle tu niyamena vyañjakapratītiḥ bhavati
eva ityāśayena akramatvam vyaktiśca samarthitā.
—VVV. I. p. 58.
49. VVV. I. pp. 58-59.
50. Tasmāt vidyamāna eva vāsanātmā ratyādīḥ sthāyibhāvo vibhāvā-
dibhiḥ sambandhasmaranādīvyavadhānam antareṇa vyakta itī stit-
hau mukhyam eva vyaṅgyatvam rasasya naupacārikam nāpyanu-
meyamīti tāvat. —VVV. I. p. 59.
51. Tathāvidhābhyām ca tābhyām vyaṅgyasaiva viśeṣaḥ.
—DL. II. p. 167.
52. Atrocyate. Bhīrurapi Guroḥ Prabhorvā nideśena priyānurāgena
anyena caivaṁbhūtena hetunā satyapi bhayakāraṇe bhramatīya-
naikāntiko hetuḥ śūno bibhyadapi vīratvena śimhāna bibhetīti
viruddho'pi Godāvarītīre śimhasadbhāvaḥ pratyakṣādanumānādvā
na niścītaḥ api tu vacanāt, na ca vacanasya prāmānyamasti arthe-
nāpratibandhādītyasiddhaśca tat kathamevamvidhāddhetoḥ sādhy-
yasiddhiḥ. —KP. V. p. 254.
53. RG. I. pp. 18-19.
54. Vyaktivādinā cādhamapadasahāyānāmeṣām vyañjakatvamuktam.
Na cātra adhamatvam pramānapratipannamīti kathamanumānam.
Evamvidhādarthādevamvidho'rtha upapattyanapekṣatve'pi prakāśate
itī vyaktivādināḥ punastat adūṣaṇam. —KP. V. p. 256.
55. Kiñca evamvidhānām kāvyānām kavipratibhāmātrajanmanām prā-
mānyānāvśyakatvena sandigdhasiddhatvam hetoḥ.
—SD. V. Vṛtti on K. 4.
56. Etena arthāpattivedyatvam api vyaṅgyānām apāstam, arthāpatterapi
pūrvasiddhavyāpticchāyām upajīvyāiva pravṛtteḥ.
—SD. V. Vṛtti on K. 4.

CHAPTER VII

1. Vastutastu vakṣyamānaśrutisvārasyena ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnā-
varaṇā Citeva rasaḥ. Sarvathaiva Cāsyā viśiṣṭātmano viśeṣaṇam
viśeṣyam vā Cidamśamādāya nityatvam svaprakāśa-katvam ca
siddham. Ratyādyamśamādāya tvanityatvamarabhāsyatvam ca.
Carvaṇā cāsyā cidgatāvaraṇabhanga eva prāguktā, tadākārantah-
karaṇavṛttirvā. —Rasagaṅgādhara, I, p. 27.

2. Vrkṣa iva stabdho divi tiṣṭhatyekastenedaṃ puruṣaṃ puruṣeṇa
sarvam.
Ekadhaivānudraṣṭyavyamettadaprameyaṃ dhruvam.
Eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipatireṣa bhūtapālah/
Eṣa seturvidharaṇa eṣaṃ lokānāmasambhedāya.
Tadetat preyah putrāt preyo vittāt
Preyo'nyasmāt sarvasmāntarataram yadayamātmā.
—Quoted from Upaniṣads in 'Dharma', pp. 49-50 by Tagore.
3. Vedāhametaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntamādityavarṇaṃ tamasah
parastāt/
Tameva viditvātīmrtyumeti nānyaḥ pāthā vidyate'-yanāya//
4. Atra kadācid virativihīnaḥ
Sumahānomīti nādaḥ,
Ekakamantreṇāntaratantre
Prollasīti nirvādhah.
Tapaśaikāgnau hutvā bahulaṃ
Samapākṛtya vibhedam,
Ekamapūrvam hṛdayamudāram
Manuḥ 'janayadakhedam.
Adya tadārādhanaatsādhana—
makhaśālānāṃ vivṛtam dvāram,
Atra sameṣāṃ milanaṃ bhāvyaṃ
Niyataṃ vyānatasīrṣamudāram.
—Gītāñjali, Translated by Mm. Kalipada Tarkacarya, p. 114.
5. Saṃyogaya nikhilaiḥ saha vigataṃ kuru bandham,
Sañcārāya sakalavidhiṣu śāntaṃ tvacchandam!
Padakamale mama mānasamacalaṃ kuru he!
—Do, p. 6.
6. Śa tattvadarśanādeva śāstreṣu kathitaḥ kaviḥ/
Darśanāt varṇanāccātha ruḍhā loke kaviśrutiḥ//
—Bhaṭṭatauta, quoted by Hemacandra in Kāvyaṇuśāsana.
7. Eteṣāṃ tu darśanam—kaveḥ yaḥ pratibhātmā prathamapari-
spandataḥ tadvyāpārabalopanataḥ guṇāḥ. Pratibhāvata eva hi
rasābhivyañjanasāmarthyamādhuryādiḥ upanibandhanasāmarthyam,
na sāmānyakaveḥ. Anena śabdena idaṃ vastu varṇayāmītyevaṃ-
bhūtavarṇanāparaparyāyadvitīyavyāpārasampādyastvalaṃkāraḥ. Śab-
dānamībhiḥ śabdairarthānamībhirarthaiḥ saṃghaṭayāmītye-vamāt-
makstu yastṛīyaḥ kaveḥ parispanḍaḥ tadhaninātmalābhādiḥ śab-
dārthātmakākāvyaśarīrasaṃśritāni vakṣyamāṇaśleṣādigunadaśaka-
samabhiñjanavyāpārāṇi śabdārthopasaṃskāra-kalpani kriyārūpā-
nīti yatuktaṃ tatraiva—
Kāvyepyasti tathā kaścit snigdhaḥ sparśorthaśabdayaḥ/
yaḥ śleṣādiguṇa....
Atra pakṣe kavivyāpārabhedād Guṇāṃkāralakṣaṇavibhāgaḥ.
—Abhinavabhāratī, p. 380.
8. Viruddhairaviruddhairvā bhāvairvicchidyate na yaḥ/
Ātmabhāvaṃ nayatyāśu sa sthāyī lavaṇākarah//

- Ciraṃ citte'vatiṣṭhante sambadhyante'nubandhibhiḥ/
Rasatvaṃ ye prapadyatne prasiddhāḥ sthāyino'tra te//
—Quoted in Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 37.
9. Yad yad vibhutimat sattvaṃ śrīmadūrjitameva vā/
Tattadevāvagaccha tvaṃ mama tejo'mśasambhaṃ//
—Śrīmadbhagavadgītā, X. 41.
 10. Śatyam satyamaye! tadeva racayīṣyāṃ bhuvi tvaṃ tu yat/
Śatyō yo ghaṭate na sa vyatikaraḥ sarva'pi he satkave!
Sāketādapi sattaraṃ tava manaḥ śrīrāmājanmasthalāt//
—Bhāṣā O' Chanda of Tagore, translated by Sri Durgadas
Goswami, Majuṣā, Oct, 1958.
 11. Apāre kāvyasaṃsāre kavireva prajāpatiḥ
Yathāsmāi rocate viśvaṃ tathedaṃ parivartate/
Śṛṅgārī cet kaviḥ, kāvyē jātāṃ rasamayaṃ jagat,
Sa eva vītarāgaścet nīrasaṃ sarvameva tat//
—Śṛṅgārōkta-vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-carvaṇārūpa-pratitimayo,
na tu strīvyasanīti mantavyam. ... śṛṅgāra-padaṃ rasopalakṣaṇam.
—Dhvanyāloka, IV with Locana.
 12. Kaviśaktyarpitā bhāvāstanmayībhāvayuktītiḥ/
yathā sphurantyamī kāvyānna tathādhyakṣataḥ kila//
—Abhinavabhāratī
 13. Madhurādirasāsvāde tu viśaya-sparśavyavahānam; tato'pi kāvyā-
nātyādaḥ tadvyavahānaśūnyatā.
—Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛti-vimarśinī, Vol. 2, Page 180.
&
Pitā-putra-snuṣā-śvaśrū-dṛṣyaṃ yasmāttu nāṭakam/
Tasmādetāni sarvāṇi varjanīyāni yatnataḥ//
—Abhinavabhāratī.

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